Hall v. The City of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------------------------------- X

:

MICHAEL HALL,

:

Plaintiff,

: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER

– against – :

22-CV-5738 (AMD) (MMH)

:

THE CITY OF NEW YORK; CAPTAIN

JERMAINE SLACK; DEPUTY IDI GUITY; :

FORMER C.O. NATASHA KEIZER;

:

CAPTAIN ROBERT VENECHANOS;

CAPTAIN TONY MONTAGUE; NANA :

ASARE, P.A.; CAPTAIN SAMANTHA

BRYANT; and CORRECTION OFFICER :

ALPHA DIALLO, :

Defendants.

:

--------------------------------------------------------------- X

ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:

The plaintiff brings this action against the City of New York and eight corrections and

medical officers at Rikers Island, in connection with an assault by another inmate on September

23, 2021. Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. For the

following reasons, the plaintiff’s motion is denied and the defendants’ motion is granted.

BACKGROUND1

Factual Background

On September 23, 2021, the plaintiff, a pretrial detainee on Rikers Island, was transferred

from the Robert N. Davoren Complex (“RNDC”) to the Vernon C. Bain Center (“VCBC”).

(ECF No. 70, Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement (“Defs. 56.1”) ¶¶ 3–4; ECF No. 71-5, Exhibit E,

1 The factual background is based on the Court’s review of the entire record, including the defendant’s

56.1 statement. The plaintiff did not respond to the defendants’ motion or file a Rule 56.1 statement.

Nevertheless, the Court has considered the entire record, including the plaintiff’s previous filings, in

deciding these motions.

Hall Deposition (“Hall Dep.”) at 80.) Following intake at the VCBC, the plaintiff was taken to

housing area 1BA, although he was “reject[ed]” upon arrival. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 5; ECF

No. 71-6, Exhibit E, Hall Deposition Pt. 2 (“Hall Dep. Pt. 2”) at 2–3.) Corrections officers took

the plaintiff to housing area 1BB, a dormitory-style section of the VCBC. (ECF No. 70, Defs.

56.1 ¶ 6; ECF No. 71-6, Hall Dep. Pt. 2 at 2–3.) The plaintiff walked into 1BB but left, with his

belongings, and sat with another inmate in the vestibule. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 7–8; ECF

No. 71-6, Hall Dep. Pt. 2 at 4–5.)

Captain Robert Venechanos and former Corrections Officer Natasha Keizer arrived and

asked the plaintiff why he left the housing area. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 9; ECF No. 71-7,

Exhibit F, Venechanos Body Camera Video 1 (“Venechanos Body Cam 1”) at 00:00–00:14.)

The plaintiff replied, “[F]or the record, nobody [in 1BB] said anything to us, nobody tried to

intimidate us.” (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 10; ECF No. 71-7, Venechanos Body Cam 1 at 00:05–

00:12.) He explained that he wanted to be placed in a housing area with individual cells; he

believed that in “the dorm setting . . . the windows don’t open, you have no foliage, you have no

trees, you have no plants, so therefore the oxygen becomes stagnant.” (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1

¶¶ 11–14; ECF No. 71-7, Venechanos Body Cam 1 at 00:14–02:41.) He also said that he had

“religious rights.” (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 14; ECF No. 71-7, Venechanos Body Cam 1 at

02:41–02:55.) Captain Venechanos and Officer Keizer explained that there were no cell-styled

housing areas available, and the plaintiff went back into 1BB. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 15–

17; ECF No. 71-7, Venechanos Body Cam 1 at 07:04–09:07.)

After about five minutes, however, the plaintiff left again and sat in the vestibule. (ECF

No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 18; ECF No. 71-8, Exhibit G, Genetec Surveillance Video 1 (“Genetec

Video 1”) at 2:16:25–2:21:55.) He repeated his concerns about air quality to Captain

Venechanos, Captain Tony Montague, and other officers. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 19; ECF

No. 71-9, Exhibit H, Venechanos Body Camera Video 2 (“Venechanos Body Cam 2”) at 00:00–

00:25.) When the plaintiff refused to go back inside, Captain Montague picked up the plaintiff’s

bags and moved them into the housing area; the plaintiff grabbed the bags and tried to drag them

back into the vestibule. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 20; ECF No. 71-9, Venechanos Body Cam 2

at 03:45–04:40.) Captains Montague and Venechanos called for a probe team, and the plaintiff

went back into 1BB, where he stayed for about nine minutes. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 21–22;

ECF No. 71-8, Genetec Video 1 at 2:32:11–2:41:35; ECF No. 71-9, Venechanos Body Cam 2 at

04:52–05:00.) The plaintiff tried to leave 1BB when the probe team arrived, but Corrections

Officer Michael Bushrod directed the plaintiff to “[m]ove back” and pushed him with his shield.

(ECF No. 71-11, Exhibit J, Bushrod Use of Force Report (“Bushrod Report”); see also ECF No.

70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 23–24; ECF No. 71-8, Genetec Video 1 at 2:41:09–2:41:36.) When the

plaintiff walked out of 1BB again, officers tied his wrists with zip ties and took him to the VCBC

clinic for evaluation. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 25–26; ECF No. 71-10, Exhibit I, MVI 0995

Video (“MVI 995”) at 01:20–01:52; ECF No. 71-12, Exhibit K, Genetec Surveillance Video 2

(“Genetec Video 2”) at 07:22–07:35.) Doctor Okvunduh Okene examined the plaintiff,

determined that he suffered “no visible injury” and discharged him. (ECF No. 71-13, Exhibit L,

Okene Injury Report; see also ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 27.)

The probe team took the plaintiff to a hallway outside the VCBC clinic, and an

unidentified officer told the plaintiff that they “would try to work with” him but had to place him

in a housing area. (ECF No. 71-14, Exhibit M, MVI 0997 Video (“MVI 997”) at 02:24–02:49;

see also ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 28–29.) The plaintiff asked if there were gangs in the dorm-

style housing areas, and stated that he had a right to be safe in jail. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1

¶¶ 30, 32; ECF No. 71-14, MVI 997 at 02:55–03:13.) The officer agreed the plaintiff had a right

to be safe, and that there were gangs in every housing area. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 31–32;

ECF No. 71-14, MVI 997 at 02:55–03:13.) The officer asked if the plaintiff wanted to be placed

in protective custody; the plaintiff said he wanted to be assigned to a cell. (ECF No. 70, Defs.

56.1 ¶¶ 34–35; ECF No. 71-14, MVI 997 at 03:13–03:35.) The officer told the plaintiff that the

only available cell was in housing area 3CB and directed the probe team to take the plaintiff

there. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 36–38; ECF No. 71-14, MVI 997 at 03:40–03:55.) When the

plaintiff objected, Deputy Idi Guity explained that the facility had limited availability and that

officers were extending him a “courtesy” by putting him in a housing area that he requested.

(ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 40–42; ECF No. 71-14, MVI 997 at 04:10–05:05.)

When they arrived at housing area 3CB, Captain Jermaine Slack took the plaintiff to his

cell. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 43–46; ECF No. 71-14, MVI 997 at 18:50–19:05; ECF No. 71-

15, Exhibit N, Genetec Surveillance Video 3 (“Genetec Video 3”) at 3:15:48-3:16:15.)2 As the

plaintiff approached his cell, several inmates said that “he ain’t got no mattress here.” (ECF No.

70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 47; ECF No. 71-14, MVI 997 at 18:50–19:05.) The probe team left the area

once the plaintiff was in his cell with the door closed. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 50–51; ECF

No. 71-15, Genetec Video 3 at 3:19:18–3:19:38.) Shortly thereafter, another inmate brought a

mattress to the plaintiff’s cell. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 52; ECF No. 71-15, Genetec Video 3

at 3:24:10–3:24:20.) As the cell door opened, a group of inmates crowded in front of the cell

while one inmate went in and hit the plaintiff in the head. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 53–55;

2 The plaintiff testified at his deposition that he “tried” to tell an officer that he “shouldn’t be” placed in

3CB, but this statement is not on the video. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 48; ECF No. 71-6, Hall Dep. Pt.

2 at 13.)

ECF No. 71-15, Genetec Video 3 at 3:24:20–3:24:35.)3 Immediately after the attack, an officer

pushed past the crowd and the assailant left the cell. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 57–58; ECF

No. 71-15, Genetec Video 3 at 3:24:25–3:24:40.) The officer stood outside the cell and the

inmates left the area. (ECF No. 71-15, Genetec Video 3 at 3:24:40–3:25:50.)

Two minutes later, the probe team returned and took the plaintiff, with his belongings, to

the VCBC clinic, where Physician Assistant Nana Asare treated him. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1

¶¶ 60–61, 69; ECF No. 71-15, Genetec Video 3 at 3:27:40–3:28:50; ECF No. 71-16, Exhibit O,

Asare Injury Report 1; ECF No. 71-17, Exhibit P, Asare Injury Report 2.) The plaintiff was not

seriously injured; he had a cut on his head, but was alert. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 73–74;

ECF No. 71-16, Asare Injury Report 1 at 2; ECF No. 71-17, Asare Injury Report 2 at 2–4.) PA

Asare treated the plaintiff with a cold pack, hydrogen peroxide, acetaminophen, and a band aid.

(ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 75; ECF No. 71-16, Asare Injury Report 1 at 2.) Officers then took

the plaintiff to a different housing area. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 76.) Doctors did not do a

CAT scan, MRI, X-Ray, or other assessment of the plaintiff’s brain or head. (ECF No. 70, Defs.

56.1 ¶ 80; ECF No. 71-6, Hall Dep. Pt. 2 at 44–45.)4

Procedural Background

On September 22, 2022, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the New York City

Department of Corrections. (ECF No. 1.)5 On January 13, 2023, the plaintiff filed an amended

complaint against the City of New York (ECF No. 5), which was further amended pursuant to

3 The attack was not captured on the surveillance video because the camera did not film the plaintiff’s

cell. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 55; ECF No. 71-15, Genetec Video 3 at 3:24:25–3:24:40.)

4 The plaintiff testified at his deposition that he has headaches and vision impairment, but traced those

symptoms to a July 2023 incident in which he hit his head on a table at a Chipotle restaurant. (ECF No.

70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 81–83; ECF No. 71-5, Hall Dep. at 9–13.)

5 The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s first complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), (ECF No. 4).

Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997), to name Captain Slack, Deputy Guity, Officer

Keizer, Captain Venechanos, Captain Montague, PA Asare, Captain Samantha Bryant, and

Correction Officer Alpha Diallo as defendants (ECF Nos. 20, 23, 32).

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on December 5, 2024 (ECF No. 68), and the

defendants cross-moved for summary judgment the next day, (ECF No. 69).6 The defendants

responded to the plaintiff’s motion. (ECF No. 76.) The plaintiff filed a one-page “affirmation,”

(ECF No. 78), which the Court construes as his opposition brief.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the parties’ submissions — including pleadings,

deposition transcripts, affidavits, and other material in the record — show that there is “no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

The movant has the burden of demonstrating that no material fact is genuinely in dispute. Coyle

v. United States, 954 F.3d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 2020). “A fact is material if it might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a factual dispute is “genuine” only if “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Roe v.

6 Local Rule 56.2 provides that a party moving for summary judgment against a pro se litigant must

“serve and file as a separate document, together with the papers in support of the motion, [a] ‘Notice To

Pro Se Litigant Who Opposes a Motion For Summary Judgment’ with the full texts of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

and Local Civil Rule 56.1 attached.” In conjunction with their motion, the defendants filed an affidavit

of service which stated that they served the plaintiff with the Local Rule 56.2 notice by mail. (ECF No.

74.) However, the defendants did not separately file that notice to the docket. The Court has considered

whether to deny the motion for failure to file the notice separately and concludes under these

circumstances that it is unwarranted. The defendants served the notice by mail at the plaintiff’s address

of record. Moreover, the defendant filed and served the Local Rule 56.2 notice in connection with their

summary judgment motion in another of the plaintiff’s lawsuits, which was proceeding along the same

timeline as this case. See Hall v. City of New York, et al., 23-CV-1787, ECF No. 50 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12,

2024). On these facts, the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff was given the necessary notice.

City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

Summary judgment is appropriate only if “on the record presented, considered in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable fact-finder could find in its favor.”

Roberts v. Genting N.Y. LLC, 68 F.4th 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2023) (alterations adopted) (quoting

Capobianco v. City of N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 54–55 (2d Cir. 2005)). A court should not ask whether

“the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded fact-finder

could return a verdict for the non-moving party on the evidence presented.” Id. (alterations

adopted) (quoting Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005)).

“Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the basic standard.” Basora v. City of

Poughkeepsie, No. 22-CV-3300, 2025 WL 50322, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2025). “When both

parties move for summary judgment, asserting the absence of any genuine issues of material fact,

a court need not enter judgment for either party.” Roberts, 68 F.4th at 88 (2d Cir. 2023) (cleaned

up) (quoting Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Coutard v.

Mun. Credit Union, 848 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2017) (“The fact that both sides have moved for

summary judgment does not guarantee that there is no material issue of fact to be tried and that

one side or the other is entitled to that relief.”). Where, as here, the parties have cross-moved for

summary judgment, the Court evaluates each party’s motion “on its own merits,” and draws all

reasonable inferences “against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Roberts, 68 F.4th

at 88 (quoting Morales, 249 F.3d at 121). However, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different

stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

The Court affords “special solicitude” to pro se litigants who are “confronted with

motions for summary judgment,” Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988), and

“liberal[ly] constru[es] their pleadings . . . to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”

Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

However, “proceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve a litigant of the usual requirements of

summary judgment, and a pro se party’s bald assertions unsupported by [evidence] are

insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Leon v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 10-CV-

2725, 2017 WL 6729676, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Leon v. New York City

Dep’t of Educ., 740 F. App’x 759 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Both parties move for summary judgment. The defendant claims that summary judgment

is warranted because “no reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional

deprivation at the hands of the City or the individual defendants.” (ECF No. 72 at 9.) The

plaintiff also moves for summary judgment, although it is difficult to identify precisely what he

is claiming. (See ECF Nos. 5, 68.) The Court construes the plaintiff’s submissions liberally to

raise claims for deliberate indifference to safety, deliberate indifference of medical needs, and

interference with access to courts against the individual defendants, as well as a Monell claim

against the City.7 For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the defendants’ motion and

denies the plaintiff’s motion.

7 The plaintiff maintains that the defendants have not complied with their discovery obligations and did

not preserve certain surveillance footage. (ECF No. 68 at 1–4.) The plaintiff raised these claims before

Magistrate Judge Marcia M. Henry, who did not find that the defendants violated their discovery

obligations. (See ECF Nos. 64, 65, 67.)

Deliberate Indifference to Safety

“A pretrial detainee’s claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement are governed

by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause of the Eight Amendment.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir.

2017) (citation omitted). “To state a claim of deliberate indifference under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege both (a) conditions that objectively

pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to health; and (b) that the defendant-official acted

intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to

mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-

official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or

safety.” Vega v. Semple, 963 F.3d 259, 273–74 (2d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up)

The plaintiff cannot satisfy either prong. The Second Circuit has explained that there “is

no ‘static test’ to determine whether” a sufficiently serious harm existed. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30

(quoting Blissett v. Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531, 537 (2d Cir. 1995)). While a “prison official’s failure

to intervene in an attack may under certain circumstances create a condition which poses a

substantial risk of serious harm,” the “focus of inquiry must be, not the extent of the physical

injuries sustained in an attack, but rather the existence of” that risk. House v. City of New York,

No. 18-CV-6693, 2020 WL 6891830, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020). Such a risk “can be

demonstrated where there is evidence of a previous altercation between a plaintiff and an

attacker, coupled with a complaint by plaintiff regarding the altercation or a request by plaintiff

to be separated from the attacker,” though these conditions are not required. Luckey v. Jonas,

No. 18-CV-8103, 2019 WL 4194297, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2019) (citations omitted).

Additionally, injuries that are sufficiently severe can satisfy this prong, in and of themselves.

House, 2020 WL 6891830, at *13 (citing Knowles v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., 904 F. Supp.

217, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). Under that theory, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he sustained

serious injuries as a result of an altercation with other inmates and (2) the prisoner was the victim

of an undisputedly unprovoked attack.” Gordon v. Drummond, No. 19-CV-8405, 2022 WL

884971, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2022) (cleaned up).

The record establishes that the plaintiff did not face “conditions that objectively pose an

unreasonable risk to” his safety. Vega, 963 F.3d at 273–74. Although another inmate attacked

the plaintiff, there is no evidence that the defendants should have known that the inmate posed a

danger to the plaintiff; there is, for example, no evidence of other disputes between the assailant

and the plaintiff, nor did the plaintiff alert the defendants that he was afraid of the other inmate.

In fact, the plaintiff declined an officer’s offer to put him in protective custody. (ECF No. 70,

Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 34–35; ECF No. 71-14, MVI 997 at 03:13–03:35.) Nor was the plaintiff’s injury

— an abrasion to the side of his head — severe enough to create a substantial risk of harm. See

Jimenez v. Lashley, No. 23-CV-628, 2024 WL 4932554, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2024) (“The

Court does not believe that an isolated incident of a single strike . . . created a substantial risk of

harm that . . . [qualifies as] sufficiently serious[].”).

Similarly, there is no evidence that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a risk

of serious harm. Nothing in the record establishes that the defendants had any notice that an

attack was imminent. “Absent clear notice of a risk of harm to the prisoner, ‘courts routinely

deny deliberate indifference claims based upon surprise attacks.’” Fernandez v. New York City

Dep’t of Corr., No. 08-CV-4294, 2010 WL 1222017, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010) (alteration

incorporated) (quoting Zimmerman v. Macomber, No. 95-CV-882, 2001 WL 946383, at * 5

(S.D.N.Y. Aug.21, 2001)); see also Edwards v. Black, 854 F. App’x 382, 384 (2d Cir. 2021)

(“Prison officials are not deliberately indifferent when they fail to act on stale or vague threats of

inmate attacks.”).

As explained above, the plaintiff did not tell the defendants that he was afraid of

particular inmates or that he thought he could be attacked. While the plaintiff told an officer that

he had a right to be safe — a statement with which the officers agreed — he did not alert any

officer to a particular risk or a specific inmate. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 30–32; ECF No. 71-

14, MVI 997 at 02:55–03:13.) Nor did the plaintiff’s other complaints — about the unhealthy

environment in housing area 1BB or a general concern about gangs — put the defendants on

notice of an unreasonable risk to his safety. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 10–14, 30–32; ECF No.

71-7, Venechanos Body Cam 1 at 00:04–02:55; ECF No. 71-14, MVI 997 at 02:55–03:13.) That

the defendant was the unfortunate victim of a surprise attack does not support a deliberate

indifference claim. See Fernandez, 2010 WL 1222017, at *4.

Courts also dismiss deliberate indifference claims where prison officials were not present

or otherwise incapable of intervening to stop an attack on an inmate. Brown v. Annucci, No. 19-

CV-9048, 2021 WL 860189, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2021) (dismissing deliberate indifference

claim where the plaintiff failed “plausibly to allege [that the defendants] were personally

involved in the alleged assault or were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk that plaintiff

would be harmed by correction officers.”). In this case, seven of the individual defendants —

Deputy Guity, Officer Keizer, PA Asare, and Captains Venechanos, Montague, Slack, and

Bryant — were not present when the plaintiff was attacked (ECF No. 72 at 19–23), and not in a

position to intervene in the attack. These defendants had no personal involvement; thus, the

deliberate indifference claim must be dismissed against them. See Brown, 2021 WL 860189, at

*5.

Only one defendant — Officer Diallo — was in the area at the time of the attack, and

apparently opened the cell door when an inmate approached with a mattress. (ECF No. 72.)

But nothing in the record supports a finding that Officer Diallo knew or should have known that

the attack was imminent. (See ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 47, 50–51; ECF No. 71-15, Genetec

Video 3 at 3:19:18–3:24:30.) Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

the plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to his safety.8

Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

The plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs also arises under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019). For this

claim, the plaintiff “must meet two requirements: (1) that [he] had a serious medical need . . . and

(2) that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to such needs.” Id. (citations omitted).

To “determine[e] whether a medical need is sufficiently serious,” courts consider “factors such

as whether a reasonable doctor or patient would find the injury important and worthy of

treatment, whether the medical condition significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, and

whether the illness or injury inflicts chronic and substantial pain.” Id. (citing Chance v.

Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)). “[B]ruises, lacerations, cuts, black eyes, and

other superficial injuries are ‘not sufficiently serious to support’ a deliberate indifference claim.”

Morehouse v. Vasquez, No. 17-CV-4836, 2020 WL 1049943, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2020)

(collecting cases).

8 The plaintiff also argues that “Rikers Island is NOTORIOUS for Official Misconduct towards

Detainees,” and cites publicly reported instances of violence, as well as legal actions against Rikers

Island and corrections officers. (ECF No. 68 at 5–7.) However, public reports and lawsuits did not put

the defendants on notice that the plaintiff was at particular risk of attack.

As for the second prong, “mere medical malpractice is not tantamount to deliberate

indifference, but it may rise to the level of deliberate indifference when it involves culpable

recklessness, i.e., an act or a failure to act that evinces a conscious disregard of a substantial risk

of serious harm.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). In other

words, the plaintiff must show “that the defendants knew that failing to provide the complained

of medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to his health or that the defendants should

have known that failing to provide the omitted medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to

the detainee’s health.” Charles, 925 F.3d at 87 (emphases in original). “Although a delay in

providing necessary medical care may in some cases constitute deliberate indifference,” the

Second Circuit “has reserved such a classification for cases in which, for example, officials

deliberately delayed care as a form of punishment; ignored a ‘life-threatening and fast-

degenerating’ condition for three days; or delayed major surgery for over two years.” Demata v.

New York State Corr. Dep’t of Health Servs., 198 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

The record reflects that the plaintiff’s only injury was an abrasion on his head, which is

not a serious medical condition. See Morehouse, 2020 WL 1049943, at *18. Even if the Court

were to credit the plaintiff’s unsubstantiated assertions that he suffered a concussion and

nosebleed after PA Asare discharged him (ECF No. 68 at 4–5), he does not assert that he

suffered any lasting symptoms or damage. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 81–83; ECF No. 71-5,

Hall Dep. at 9–13.) Nor does the record show that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to

the plaintiff’s injuries; almost immediately after the attack the probe team returned and took the

plaintiff to the VCBC clinic for evaluation and treatment. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 69; ECF

No. 71-16, Asare Injury Report 1 at 2; ECF No. 71-17, Asare Injury Report 2 at 2–4; ECF No. 72

at 27.) Nothing in the record suggests that the defendants recklessly disregarded the plaintiff’s

injuries or delayed in providing him treatment.

Denial of Access to Court

The plaintiff claims loss of property — his “Legal Defense Arguments.” (ECF No. 68 at

2.) The Supreme Court has explained that “even an intentional destruction of property by a state

employee does not violate due process if the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation

remedy.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531 (1984). “New York state law provides [the

plaintiff] with an adequate post-deprivation remedy here, i.e., § 9 of the Court of Claims Act.”

Little v. Mun. Corp., 51 F. Supp. 3d 473, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases). Section 9 of

the Court of Claims Act vests the New York Court of Claims with jurisdiction over all claims

“against the state for the appropriation of any real or personal property . . . or for the torts of its

officers or employees while acting as such officers or employees.” N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 9.

The plaintiff’s claim can be read as a Fourteenth Amendment claim for denial of access

to the courts. Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Thomas v. Egan, 1

F. App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts,

which is infringed when prison officials interfere with a prisoner’s preparation of legal

documents.”). However, “[t]o state a claim of denial of access to the courts, an inmate must

allege an actual injury” — conclusory allegations will not do. Thomas, 1 F. App’x at 54 (citing

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996)). Moreover, “the appointment of counsel can be a

valid means of satisfying a prisoner’s right of access to the courts.” Bourdon, 386 F.3d at 93.

There is no evidence that the plaintiff suffered an “actual injury” because his legal papers

or arguments were lost. As an initial matter, the plaintiff does not say which defendant lost the

papers. Indeed, the surveillance and bodycam footage does not show that any officer took the

plaintiff’s property, tampered with it, or destroyed it. The plaintiff does not explain how the loss

of these materials harmed him in connection with his criminal case, especially since he testified

at his deposition that he was represented by counsel. (ECF No. 70, Defs. 56.1 ¶ 77; ECF No. 71-

5, Hall Dep. at 23.) As a result, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the denial

of access to court claim.

Monell Claim

Finally, the Court interprets the complaint to assert a Monell claim for failure to train and

failure to supervise. (See ECF No. 68 at 8.) However, the plaintiff cannot sustain a Monell

claim because, as explained above, there was no constitutional violation. City of Los Angeles v.

Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“[N]either Monell . . . nor any other of our cases authorizes the

award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers

when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.”). In any

event, even if there were a constitutional violation the record does not support a Monell claim.

A Monell claim based on a failure to train requires a plaintiff to show “that a City’s

‘failure to train its subordinates . . . is so obvious, and the inadequacy of current practices so

likely to result in a deprivation of federal rights, that the municipality or official can be found

deliberately indifferent to the need.’” Nelson v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-4636, 2019 WL

3779420, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2019) (quoting Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d

Cir. 2007)). A municipality is deliberately indifferent when it knows “to a moral certainty that

[it] would confront a given situation; the situation presented [it] with a difficult choice or there

was a history of its mishandling the situation; and the wrong choice . . . would frequently cause

the deprivation of plaintiffs’ rights.” Reynolds, 506 F.3d at 192 (citing Walker v. City of New

York, 974 F.2d 293, 297–98 (2d Cir. 1992)). While a single incident is generally insufficient to

demonstrate liability, “a municipality can be found to be deliberately indifferent based on a

single constitutional violation where the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train [are]

. . . patently obvious.” Breitkopf v. Gentile, 41 F. Supp. 3d 220, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citation

and internal quotations omitted).

A plaintiff can sue a municipality under a failure to supervise theory where there is a

“persistent failure to discipline subordinates who violate civil rights,” that gives “rise to an

inference of an unlawful municipal policy of ratification of unconstitutional conduct.” Nelson,

2019 WL 3779420, at *16 (quoting Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 1983)).

“[A] city’s failure to train its subordinates satisfies the policy or custom requirement . . . where

the need to act is so obvious, and the inadequacy of current practices so likely to result in a

deprivation of federal rights, that the municipality or official can be found deliberately

indifferent to the need.” Reynolds, 506 F.3d at 192 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 387 (1989)).

The defendants are entitled to summary judgment under either theory. There is no

evidence that the City has a pattern or practice of failing to train corrections officers, including

the officers in this case. Nor does the record show a “persistent failure to discipline subordinates

who violate civil rights,” Nelson, 2019 WL 3779420, at *16 (quoting Batista, 702 F.2d at 399),

that would support a failure to supervise claim.9 Accordingly the City is awarded summary

judgment on the Monell claim.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk of Court is respectfully

directed to enter judgment, close this action, and mail a copy of this order to the plaintiff.

9 The lawsuits and articles the plaintiff cites do not alter this analysis because the cases either do not exist

or are distinguishable because they involve corrections officers who assaulted inmates or denied them

medical care. (ECF No. 68 at 6–7.)

SO ORDERED.

_ _ _ _ s_/_A_n_n_ _M_._ _D_o_n_n_e_l_ly________

ANN M. DONNELLY

United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

August 13, 2025