explaining that it is “extremely difficult” to justify alteration of the magistrate judge's non-dispositive actions
How later courts described this case
- explaining that it is “extremely difficult” to justify alteration of the magistrate judge's non-dispositive actions
- “The district court may limit discovery if the discovery sought is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
KIERRA MACHAE DUNMORE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Cause No. 2:24-CV-225-PPS-JEM
)
EXPERIAN INFORMATION )
SOLUTIONS INC., et al., )
)
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
In this case brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Magistrate Judge
Martin recently denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel a certain category of discovery
[DE 52], and she now seeks review of that decision. [DE 55]. For the reasons explained
below, Dunmore’s Motion to Review is denied.
Background
Kierra Dunmore originally brought claims against three defendants: Experian,
Equifax Information Services, LLC, and RentGrow, Inc. All three defendants were
alleged to have violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act. [See DE 1]. Equifax and
RentGrow have settled their claims with Ms. Dunmore and are no longer parties to the
case. [See DE 25; DE 42]. Experian remains as the sole defendant.
The facts underlying the allegations against Experian are relatively
straightforward. In March 2024, Dunmore completed and submitted a lease application
to Homewood Village to rent an apartment there. [DE 1 at 25]. Dunmore tells me that as
part of the tenant screening process, Homewood Village contracted with a third party to
obtain a consumer report about her. This consumer report was obtained from Experian.
[Id. at 26]. Dunmore alleges that the consumer report obtained from Experian contained
accounts and identification information that did not belong to her but belonged to her
twin brother instead. [Id.] Dunmore claims that Experian mixed her file with that of her
twin brother’s and that the consumer report sold to the third party contained
information pertaining to her twin brother and not her. [Id.] As a result of Experian’s
inaccurate reporting, Dunmore claims Homewood Village denied her housing
application. [Id. at 29].
On July 1, 2024, Dunmore brought this suit alleging violations of various
provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. [See DE 1]. The case has proceeded through
discovery, and on April 24, 2025, Dunmore filed a motion requesting the Court order
Experian to produce its “Admin Handbook” and “Matching Algorithm.” [DE 40].
Experian has since produced the Admin Handbook leaving only the issue of the
production of the Matching Algorithm. [DE 52 at 3]. On June 11, 2025, Magistrate Judge
Martin denied Dunmore’s motion to compel Experian to produce its Matching
Algorithm, and Dunmore now seeks review of that order. [DE 52; DE 55].
Discussion
When a district judge assigns pretrial discovery matters to a magistrate judge
that are not dispositive of a claim or defense, the magistrate judge’s decision may be set
aside only if it “is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C.
2
§636(b)(1)(A); Hassebrock v. Bernhoft, 815 F.3d 334, 340 (7th Cir. 2016). Under the clear
error standard, the court can “overturn the magistrate judge's ruling only if the district
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Hall v.
Menard, Inc., 2023 WL 6555499, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 19, 2023) (quoting Weeks v. Samsung
Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997)). As this Court has stated previously,
clear error is an “extremely deferential standard of review.” Huizar v. Experian Info. Sols.,
Inc., 2025 WL 830540, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 17, 2025).
In this instance, there isn’t a hint of clear error. Dunmore has made no mention of
any potential errors or mistakes Judge Martin made when issuing his ruling. Instead,
she focuses on the relevancy of Experian’s Matching Algorithm, the protections
provided by the protective order, and the fact that trade secrets are not exempt from
discovery. [DE 55 at 6-9]. Experian does not dispute the relevancy of the Matching
Algorithm and Judge Martin did not doubt the relevancy of the Matching Algorithm in
his ruling. Although the Matching Algorithm is relevant to the issues in this case, Judge
Martin determined that the probative value of the Matching Algorithm, considering the
other evidence already produced in the case, is outweighed by the potential harm to
Experian from sharing its trade secrets. [DE 52 at 4]. Dunmore has failed to show where
Judge Martin went wrong in arriving at that conclusion.
Dunmore does not dispute that the Matching Algorithm qualifies as a trade
secret. [DE 55 at 8]. And while trade secrets are not excepted from discovery, courts
should exercise discretion to avoid the unnecessary disclosure of such information.
3
AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The discovery
sought in federal litigation should not only be relevant but “proportional to the needs of
the case.” Avenatti v. Gree USA, Inc., 2022 WL 2439999, at *2 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2022);
Generation Brands, LLC v. Decor Selections, LLC, 2020 WL 6118558, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16,
2020). The production of the Matching Algorithm is unnecessary here. Experian has
already provided Dunmore with information about her credit file, Experian’s internal
processes and procedures, Experian’s manuals with reporting codes and credit industry
reporting codes, Experian’s report showing all information in its system about
Dunmore, Experian’s internal procedures guide for processing consumer disputes and
related to mixed or merged files and explained its matching criteria and how they were
applied in this matter. [DE 52 at 2]. As explained in Experian’s brief opposing the
instant motion, Dunmore deposed Experian’s Rule 30(b)(6) Representative, Christina
Hamilton. Among other designated topics, Ms. Hamilton testified about “Experian’s
policies and procedures for preventing mixed files” and “Experian’s policies and
procedures for matching the Mixed Information to Plaintiff’s credit files.” [DE 57 at 3].
In his ruling, Judge Martin pointed out that Dunmore has all the evidence she
needs to “establish what happened, how it happened, and what losses she incurred.”
[DE 52 at 4]. As Experian has explained, Dunmore and her twin brother obviously share
the same birthday. But additionally, they also share almost the exact same name. The
plaintiff’s full name is Kierra Machae Dunmore; her brother’s is Kierre Machone
Dunmore. What’s more, they also share similar prior addresses and similar social
4
security numbers. [DE 57 at 1]. Considering the evidence already produced in
discovery, requiring the production of Experian’s technical mathematical Matching
Algorithm is not proportional to the needs of the case. An esoteric algorithm is, frankly,
not needed to understand how the mix-up between Ms. Dunmore’s credit file and her
twin brother’s occurred. See e.g., Garrett v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 2025 WL 1510558, at
*2 (N.D. Fla. May 27, 2025) (explaining that the mix-up of twin credit files was not
unreasonable where the twins’ information was “remarkably similar”).
Experian has also explained that producing the Matching Algorithm would be
burdensome as the algorithm is “highly technical source code embedded in Experian’s
File One database.” [DE 57 at 9]. The Matching Algorithm requested here not only risks
the exposure of trade secrets but is also a hassle to hand over. It is not clear error to limit
discovery where there are less burdensome means to obtain the information sought.
Burton v. Ruzicki, 258 F. App'x 882, 886 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The district court may limit
discovery if the discovery sought is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”).
Dunmore argues that the concerns that Experian will be prejudiced or harmed by
the production of its Matching Algorithm are alleviated by the protective order in the
case. [DE 55 at 7-8]. While the protective order and its confidentiality designations of
“Confidential” and “Attorney’s Eyes Only” do provide some protection against the
Matching Algorithm being used in a widespread or detrimental manner, the risk of
such a use, even if small, is not justified considering the needs of the case. Dunmore
5
must clear a high hurdle to show a clear error in Judge Martin’s decision. Finwall v. City
of Chicago, 239 F.R.D. 504, 506 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (explaining that it is “extremely difficult”
to justify alteration of the magistrate judge's non-dispositive actions). She has failed to
do so here.
ACCORDINGLY:
Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying the Plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel Defendant Experian Information Solution, Inc.’s Compliance with
Plaintiff’s Post EBT Discovery Demands [DE 55] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: August 13, 2025.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6