Travis Roe v. Clint Redmond

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-13588

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

TRAVIS ROE,

individually,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HOWARD E. FRYER,

in his individual capacity, et al.,

Defendants,

CLINT REDMOND,

Deputy,

MARK MAERTZ,

Deputy,

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

SHERIFF, CLAY COUNTY,

a governmental entity

a.k.a. Michelle Cook,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-00971-MMH-LLL

____________________

Before LAGOA, KIDD, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Travis Roe appeals the district court’s order granting sum-

mary judgment to defendants Clint Redmond and Mark Maertz,

officers who were employed by the Clay County Sheriff’s Office

(CCSO). Roe argues the district court erred by concluding that

Redmond and Maertz were entitled to qualified immunity as to his

Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims. Those claims are

based on events that occurred during Roe’s arrest for murder, dur-

ing which Roe asserted that the defendants unreasonably kicked

him in the knee, struck him with a firearm, tackled him, hit him

numerous times while he was on the ground, and pressed knees

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24-13588 Opinion of the Court 3

into his neck and back. After review, 1 we affirm in part, vacate in

part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

We recite the facts of this case drawing all inferences in the

light most favorable to Roe as the non-movant except where such

inferences are blatantly contradicted by video evidence. See Pour-

moghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010)

(“Where the video obviously contradicts Plaintiff’s version of the

facts, we accept the video’s depiction instead of Plaintiff’s ac-

count.”); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contra-

dicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a

court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of rul-

ing on a motion for summary judgment.”). There are two record-

ings of Roe’s arrest: a video taken by a surveillance helicopter and

security camera footage from the location of the arrest.

In August 2020, the CCSO obtained an arrest warrant for

Roe for murder. The murder victim was beaten to death with a

blunt object, and a confidential informant related that Roe and

multiple of his brothers, among others, were responsible. Before

executing the warrant, the CCSO held a briefing and devised an

operational plan for Roe’s arrest. During that briefing, it was

1 “We review de novo a grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity, drawing all inferences and viewing all evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t,

783 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015).

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advised that Roe was in possession of multiple firearms, including

a submachine gun, which he typically carried on his person or in

his vehicles. It was also relayed that Roe and his family had a hatred

of law enforcement, that Roe was known to be violent, and that he

was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, a white supremacist

gang.2 Some of the officers involved in Roe’s arrest had also re-

cently executed a search warrant at the home of Roe’s father, and

during that operation one of Roe’s family members or close friends

who lived nearby had exhibited hostility to the officers.

On the morning of August 27, 2020, Roe left his house to

drive his wife to work and his kids to school. After he dropped his

kids off, he started to drive to his parents’ house, as he usually did

every day. On his way, CCSO officers began to follow him in un-

marked vehicles. Redmond, who was driving the vehicle immedi-

ately behind Roe, attempted to pass Roe to initiate a traffic stop,

but Roe did not let him pass. Redmond then decided to initiate a

Precision Immobilization Technique (PIT) maneuver to stop Roe

by running into the back of his truck and forcing him to lose con-

trol. The maneuver was unsuccessful, as Roe maintained control

of his vehicle and drove away with Redmond following behind

him. Redmond then unsuccessfully attempted a second PIT

2 Roe denied owning a firearm and belonging to the Aryan Brotherhood, but

he did not submit any evidence controverting the defendants’ statements that

they had received such information prior to his arrest.

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maneuver, after which Roe turned into a driveway leading up to

his parents’ house.3

Upon entering the driveway, Redmond drove into the back

of Roe’s car, bringing him to a stop. Redmond and Roe got out of

their cars at approximately the same time. Redmond pointed a pis-

tol at Roe, and Roe held his hands up in the air with his palms open.

Redmond told Roe to turn around and put his hands behind his

back, but Roe continued to walk towards Redmond with his hands

in the air. Redmond approached Roe with his gun drawn.

When the two were within arms’ reach, Redmond kicked

Roe in the knee. Roe then lowered his hands and turned his body

away from Redmond. Redmond grabbed Roe by the shirt with his

left hand and struck Roe with his firearm, which he was holding in

his right hand. Roe fell to the ground.

After Roe fell down, Maertz, who was in one of the vehicles

behind Redmond, got out of his car and ran up to Roe. 4 Roe stated

3 Roe testified during his deposition that he was unaware that the officers were

following him until after he turned into his parents’ house, and that the officers

never turned on their emergency lights or sirens. The former statement is

controverted by the video evidence showing Redmond attempting to initiate

two PIT maneuvers. As to the latter statement, video evidence shows that at

least one of the vehicles following Roe had its emergency lights turned on

when it entered his parents’ driveway. Also, in an interview prior to his dep-

osition, Roe acknowledged that the police had activated their emergency

lights and sirens during the pursuit.

4 The remainder of the relevant events is largely obscured in both videos. In

the security camera footage, all that can be seen of Maertz is the top of his

body moving up and down above where Roe fell, but Roe himself and

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

during his deposition that Maertz tackled him to the ground. Roe

landed face down with his hands extended straight out in front of

him above his head on the ground, “superman style,” and did not

move. Maertz was on top of Roe and punched him approximately

34 to 37 times in his face. Roe told Maertz “all right, enough,” and

asked Maertz to stop hitting him. Maertz told Roe, “shut up you

piece of shit,” and continued to punch him. After Maertz stopped

punching, he told Roe to put his hands behind his back to be hand-

cuffed, and Roe complied. 5

Once Roe was handcuffed, Maertz did not hit him anymore,

but Maertz placed one knee in the middle of Roe’s back and one

knee on the back of his neck for approximately one minute. Roe

told Maertz that he was having trouble breathing, and Maertz re-

plied, “shut up, you’re not black,” and pushed harder, causing Roe

to feel a pop in his neck. While this was happening, other individ-

uals came out of Roe’s parents’ house. Roe was soon after taken

to a police car, and the officers left the scene with him.

Maertz’s lower body cannot be seen. The relevant events can briefly be seen

in the helicopter video, but the video is zoomed out too far and too low quality

to make out exactly what is happening.

5 Maertz testified in his deposition that he observed Roe throw something un-

der his car when he fell, and that Roe had his hands underneath his body while

lying on the ground. He also stated that he “delivered several knee strikes and

scapula hammer fists” to Roe until he placed his hands behind his back. The

officers never confirmed whether Roe had thrown anything under his car. At

this stage of the proceedings, we must accept Roe’s version of the facts.

See Mobley, 783 F.3d at 1352.

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When he was taken to jail, Roe received medical attention

for his injuries, including an x-ray and CAT scan. He reported

bruising and swelling in his right eye, multiple broken teeth, and

pain in his neck, ear, jaw, and fingers. The x-ray did not show any

evidence of a fracture, but the CAT scan showed evidence of a

“prior right [zygomatic] fracture deformity.” Roe also stated that

he suffered from panic attacks.

Roe filed an internal complaint with the CCSO for use of

excessive force, and the CCSO conducted an investigation. Ulti-

mately, Internal Affairs exonerated Redmond and Maertz of the al-

legations of excessive force, but it concluded that Redmond had

violated internal policy by striking Roe with his firearm because it

was an unauthorized tactic.

Roe then filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint 6 against Red-

mond and Maertz, arguing they violated the Fourth Amendment

during his arrest by utilizing excessive force and failing to intervene

in each other’s use of force. He also brought state law claims of

assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress

against them.7

Redmond and Maertz moved for summary judgment, argu-

ing they were entitled to qualified immunity as to Roe’s Fourth

Amendment claims. On October 25, 2024, the district court

6 The operative pleading is Roe’s fourth amended complaint.

7Additionally, Roe asserted multiple claims against Clay County Sheriff

Michelle Cook, but he consented to the dismissal of those claims.

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

granted summary judgment to Redmond and Maertz because it de-

termined they were entitled to qualified immunity. Specifically, it

concluded that (1) Redmond and Maertz did not use excessive

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment during Roe’s arrest,

(2) Roe failed to point to any authority indicating that Redmond

and Maertz had violated a clearly established constitutional right,

and (3) neither Redmond nor Maertz had a duty to intervene in the

other’s use of force. The court then declined to exercise supple-

mental jurisdiction over Roe’s remaining state law claims.

II. DISCUSSION

Roe argues that the district court erred by granting sum-

mary judgment to Redmond and Maertz as to his excessive-force

claims because (1) they used excessive force in violation of the

Fourth Amendment during his arrest, and (2) they violated a

clearly established constitutional right.8 “Summary judgment

should be granted only if the evidence of record yields no genuine

dispute of material fact, and the moving party is entitled on the un-

disputed material facts to judgment as a matter of law.” Hinson v.

8 In his brief, Roe only challenges the district court’s ruling as to his exces-

sive-force claims, so he has abandoned any challenge as to the remainder of

the October 25 order. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678,

680-81 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding that a party abandons a claim “when he

does not plainly and prominently raise it” in his appellate brief (quotation

marks omitted)). That includes any challenge to the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the defendants on the failure-to-intervene claims and

the court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state

law claims.

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Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1115 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). We address Roe’s arguments as to Redmond and Maertz in

turn.

A. Redmond

Roe argues the district court erred by concluding that Red-

mond was entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity

shields a government official from liability unless he violates clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947,

951 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). “An officer assert-

ing a qualified-immunity defense bears the initial burden of show-

ing that he was acting within his discretionary authority.” Id. (quo-

tation marks omitted). “The term discretionary authority covers

all actions of a governmental official that (1) were undertaken pur-

suant to the performance of his duties, and (2) were within the

scope of his authority.” Hinson, 927 F.3d at 1116 (quotation marks

omitted). Redmond and Maertz were acting within their discre-

tionary authority when they arrested Roe because “they undertook

all the challenged actions while on duty as police officers conduct-

ing arrest and investigative functions.” Id.

Once an officer meets his initial burden of showing that he

was acting within his discretionary duty, to defeat a qualified-im-

munity defense the plaintiff must show that “(1) the officer violated

a constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the

time of the alleged violation.” Piazza, 923 F.3d at 951. “We may

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

consider these two prongs in either order; an official is entitled to

qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to establish either.” Id.

Roe asserts that Redmond violated the Fourth Amendment

during his arrest. Specifically, he contends that Redmond used ex-

cessive force when Redmond kicked him in the knee and struck

him in the face with his firearm.

“Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures under

the Fourth Amendment encompasses the right to be free from ex-

cessive force during the course of a criminal apprehension.” Mobley

v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015)

(quotation marks omitted). When analyzing a claim of excessive

force, we apply “an objective-reasonableness standard” and assess

“the totality of the circumstances.” Acosta v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 97

F.4th 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2024). In doing so, we consider the fol-

lowing factors: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether

the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers

or others,” (3) “whether he was actively resisting arrest or attempt-

ing to evade arrest by flight,” (4) “the need for the application of

force,” (5) “the relationship between the need and amount of force

used,” and (6) “the extent of the injury inflicted.” Id. (quotation

marks and alterations omitted).

After weighing all of the relevant factors and considering the

totality of the circumstances, we agree with the district court that

Redmond did not violate the Fourth Amendment during Roe’s ar-

rest. The first of the factors weighs strongly in Redmond’s favor

because Roe was being arrested for murder.

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As to the second factor, Roe argues he did not pose an im-

mediate threat to the officers once he got out of his car because he

was holding his hands up in the air and walking slowly. We disa-

gree. We must consider the totality of the circumstances from “the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with

the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396

(1989). Viewing the facts from that perspective, we conclude that

Roe posed a potential threat to the officers at the time of his arrest.

Prior to the day of his arrest, the officers were informed that

Roe carried firearms on his person and in his vehicles, had a hatred

of law enforcement, and was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood.

Further, the arrest occurred at Roe’s parents’ house, a location

where some of the officers had experienced hostility when they

previously executed a search warrant there. Based on these facts,

it would not be unreasonable for the officers to perceive Roe as a

potential threat to their safety leading up to the arrest.

As to the events of the arrest itself, while Roe held his hands

up in the air after getting out of his car, he did not comply with

Redmond’s command to turn around and put his hands behind his

back and instead walked directly towards Redmond in a manner

that could reasonably be interpreted to be threatening in the heat

of the moment, especially in light of the information Redmond had

received about Roe. Then, after Redmond kicked Roe in the knee

in order to destabilize him, Roe lowered his hands and turned his

body away from Redmond in a way that could reasonably be inter-

preted as an attempt to reach for a weapon located in his

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12 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

waistband. Based on these considerations, it would be reasonable

for an officer on the scene to believe that Roe potentially posed an

immediate threat to their safety based on a “split-second judg-

ment[].” See id. at 396-97 (“The calculus of reasonableness must

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced

to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is

necessary in a particular situation.”).

The third factor also weighs in Redmond’s favor. Roe de-

nies that he fled from the officers in his car. However, we do not

accept Roe’s version of the events because video evidence shows

that Redmond attempted on multiple occasions to effect a traffic

stop, but Roe continued driving and only stopped once he arrived

at his parents’ house. See Pourmoghani-Esfahani, 625 F.3d at 1315;

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. Although the pursuit was not protracted and

Roe did not appear to drive at an excessively high speed, it would

nevertheless have been reasonable for the officers to interpret

Roe’s actions as an attempt to evade arrest. Further, once Roe got

out of his car, he did not comply with Redmond’s commands, and

his actions immediately after Redmond kicked him and before he

fell to the ground could reasonably be viewed as active resistance.

As to the fourth factor, it was not unreasonable for Red-

mond to conclude that force was necessary to safely arrest Roe.

The above factors indicate that a reasonable officer on the scene

could have believed that Roe posed a potential threat and so

needed to be immobilized as soon as possible. We have explained,

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“the typical arrest involves some force and injury,” so it was rea-

sonable for Redmond to judge based on the “tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving” circumstances that it was necessary to use some

force to arrest Roe. See Mobley, 783 F.3d at 1353 (quotation marks

omitted); Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.

The fifth factor also weighs in Redmond’s favor. As stated

above, it was reasonable for Redmond to believe that he needed to

use force to immobilize Roe, and the amount of force he em-

ployed, kicking and striking Roe with his firearm once, was not dis-

proportionate to that need. See Hinson, 927 F.3d at 1120 (holding

officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by performing a

takedown on an arrestee who was suspected of murder, was be-

lieved to be armed with a knife, failed to comply with instructions,

and was moving towards an unarmed officer). Although an inves-

tigation concluded that Redmond violated internal policies by us-

ing his firearm to strike Roe, that conclusion does not necessarily

mean that the use of force was unconstitutional. See Charles v. John-

son, 18 F.4th 686, 701-02 (11th Cir. 2021) (rejecting argument that

violation of departmental policy should be considered as an addi-

tional factor in excessive-force analysis where other factors estab-

lished that officer did not engage in unconstitutionally excessive

force). Additionally, we disagree with Roe’s contention that the

hypothetical possibility that Redmond’s firearm could have dis-

charged while striking Roe could render an otherwise reasonable

use of force excessive.

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14 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

As to the sixth factor, Roe’s injuries were not insignificant,

so this factor weighs slightly in his favor. See Saunders v. Duke, 766

F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that “lacerations, injuries

to [the] teeth and jaw, damage to [the] left eardrum, and emotional

distress” are not de minimis).

Weighing all of the relevant factors and considering the to-

tality of the circumstances, we conclude that Redmond did not vi-

olate the Fourth Amendment during Roe’s arrest. Redmond had

reason to believe that Roe posed a threat to the officers, Roe fled

from the officers in his car, and Roe did not comply with com-

mands and instead walked directly towards Redmond, albeit with

his hands in the air. Considering all of these facts, it was not exces-

sive for Redmond to kick Roe in the knee and strike him once in

the face with a firearm. Given that Redmond did not violate the

Fourth Amendment, he also did not violate any clearly established

constitutional law. See Piazza, 923 F.3d at 951 (“We may consider

these two prongs in either order; an official is entitled to qualified

immunity if the plaintiff fails to establish either.”). Therefore, Red-

mond is entitled to qualified immunity as to Roe’s excessive-force

claim. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment as to Redmond.

B. Maertz

Roe argues that Maertz used excessive force in violation of

the Fourth Amendment when he (1) tackled Roe to the ground

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after Redmond struck him, 9 (2) punched or kicked Roe 34 to 37

times after Roe was lying on the ground, and (3) pressed his knees

into Roe’s back and neck after Roe was handcuffed. This is a close

call, but after weighing the relevant factors and analogous prece-

dent, we conclude that the district court erred by granting sum-

mary judgment to Maertz in full.

1. Tackle

We conclude that Maertz did not violate the Fourth Amend-

ment by tackling Roe. Much of the above analysis for Redmond’s

use of force applies equally to Maertz’s tackle. When Maertz tack-

led Roe, a reasonable officer still could have viewed Roe as a po-

tential threat for the reasons discussed above. Although Redmond

had just struck Roe with his firearm, causing him to fall over, Roe

was not completely subdued at the time that Maertz tackled him,

so it was reasonable for Maertz to think it necessary to tackle Roe

in order to safely arrest him. See Hinson, 927 F.3d at 1120; Charles,

18 F.4th at 699-700 (holding that tackling an arrestee who was not

obeying commands was a reasonable use of force where the ar-

restee posed an immediate risk of danger to the officer and

9 The video of the arrest suggests that Maertz may not have tackled Roe to the

ground because it appears that Roe had already fallen to the ground before

Maertz approached him due to Redmond striking him with his firearm. How-

ever, because the video does not blatantly contradict Roe’s position that

Maertz tackled him in some form, we accept Roe’s version of the facts.

See Pourmoghani-Esfahani, 625 F.3d at 1315; Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

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16 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

himself). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum-

mary judgment to Maertz as to his tackle.

2. Punches

However, we conclude that Maertz violated the Fourth

Amendment by punching Roe 34 to 37 times while Roe was lying

face down on the ground. In the October 25 order, the district

court did not address this use of force because it found that Roe

had failed to argue that it constituted excessive force in his response

to the defendants’ summary judgment motion. This conclusion

was erroneous because we determine that Roe raised this issue

with sufficient clarity in his summary judgment response brief. 10

Ordinarily, we do not review issues not raised before the district

court except under rare circumstances and remand issues that the

district court declined to address in the first instance. See Burch v.

P.J. Cheese, Inc., 861 F.3d 1338, 1352 (11th Cir. 2017). However, we

will review this issue at this stage because it is sufficiently preserved

10 It is true that in the argument section of his response brief, Roe’s analysis

explicitly focused primarily on Redmond’s pistol strike and Maertz’s use of

knee pressure. However, on multiple occasions throughout the brief, Roe re-

ferred to Maertz’s punches that were employed while he was lying on the

ground. For example, Roe described Maertz’s punches in his summary of the

facts, in a section titled “QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT,” and in his dis-

cussion of his expert witness’s opinion, although he sometimes referred to the

punches as kicks. We conclude that these references, in addition to Roe’s gen-

eral arguments that Redmond and Maertz used excessive force during his ar-

rest, which included the assertion that Roe “continued to avoid any aggression

by lying prone on the ground with his hands extended in front of him,” were

sufficient to preserve this issue for appellate review.

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for appellate review. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 846

F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2017) (reviewing an issue that a dis-

trict court declined to address in the first instance because the ap-

pellant sufficiently preserved it for appellate review).

First, we will explain that Maertz violated the Fourth

Amendment by striking Roe many times after he had already been

subdued and became compliant. Second, we address that Maertz

violated a clearly established constitutional right.

a. Constitutional Violation

According to Roe, whose account we must accept because

this portion of the arrest was not recorded on video, after Maertz

tackled him, he lay face down with his hands extended straight out

in front of him above his head on the ground, “superman style,”

and did not move. When Maertz got on top of and started hitting

him, Roe told Maertz, “all right, enough,” then asked Maertz to

stop hitting him and put his hands behind his back as soon as

Maertz instructed him to do so. It was only then that Maertz hand-

cuffed Roe.

Of the relevant factors, only factor one strongly weighs in

Maertz’s favor. Factor two weighs in Roe’s favor because, alt-

hough it would have been reasonable for an officer on the scene to

judge that Roe potentially posed a threat when he was walking to-

wards Redmond, the same is not true for when Roe was lying on

the ground with his hands spread out in front of him. Maertz ar-

gues that we should take into consideration the threat that Roe

posed throughout the arrest as a whole rather than just at the time

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18 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

of the relevant use of force. We agree that is relevant, but it misses

the point that the primary focus of factor two is whether Roe

“posed an immediate threat,” that is, whether Roe posed a threat

when Maertz was punching him while he was lying on the ground.

See Acosta, 97 F.4th at 1239 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1240

(weighing factor two in the plaintiff’s favor because, even though

he “posed some threat to the officers early in the encounter,” he

was no longer a threat at the time that the officers tased and kicked

him, as he “had been taken to the ground and subdued and was no

longer resisting”).

Factor three also weighs in Roe’s favor. Maertz argues that

Roe was resisting arrest because he was disobeying lawful orders

and refused to give his hands up while he was lying on the ground.

However, according to Roe, as soon as he fell onto the ground, he

did not move or actively resist. Indeed, Roe testified that he pro-

vided his hands to be handcuffed as soon as Maertz ordered him to

do so. Even though Roe fled from the officers in his car and previ-

ously acted in a way that could be interpreted by a reasonable of-

ficer as resisting arrest by failing to comply with Redmond’s orders,

Roe’s account indicates that he did not resist or fail to comply once

he was on the ground. See id. at 1240 (noting that the plaintiff

“wasn’t actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee once he was

taken to the ground and subdued,” and “the fact that it took tasing

to get [the plaintiff] on the ground doesn’t justify additional tases

or kicks once he was there and had stopped resisting”). We cannot

say that Roe’s decision to spread his hands out in front of him con-

stituted resistance when he did not actively attempt to keep his

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24-13588 Opinion of the Court 19

hands away from Maertz and placed them behind his back as soon

as he was ordered to do so.

As to factor four, because Roe did not pose an immediate

threat and was not resisting once he was on the ground, it was not

reasonable for Maertz to decide that additional force in the form of

34 to 37 punches was necessary to safely effectuate the arrest. Fac-

tor five also weighs in Roe’s favor because, even if some additional

force was warranted, such as placing a knee on Roe or striking him

a few times, his use of 34 to 37 punches goes beyond that need,

given that Roe was already subdued and compliant at that time.

Our conclusion is supported by analogous precedent. We

have held on multiple occasions that gratuitous force used on a

handcuffed, subdued arrestee is excessive in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. See, e.g., Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329-30

(11th Cir. 2008) (holding officer used excessive force by punching

in stomach a handcuffed arrestee who was not struggling or resist-

ing); Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1198 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding

officer used excessive force by slamming handcuffed arrestee’s

head into trunk after stop for traffic violation); Slicker v. Jackson, 215

F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding officer used excessive

force by kicking arrestee and beating his head on the ground where

arrestee was handcuffed and not struggling or resisting). Indeed,

we have explained that our excessive-force precedent demon-

strates “that the point at which a suspect is handcuffed and poses

no risk of danger to the officer often is the pivotal point for

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20 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

excessive-force claims.” Mobley, 783 F.3d at 1356 (quotation marks

and alteration omitted).

Our precedent is less clear when it comes to force used

against an arrestee who is on the ground but has not yet been hand-

cuffed. In Mobley, the plaintiff, who was in his car preparing to

smoke crack cocaine, was approached by an officer. Id. at 1350.

Fearing that he was being robbed, the plaintiff drove away and

struck the officer with his car. Id. After crashing, the plaintiff ran

into a pond but began to approach nearby officers who were pur-

suing him once he realized he was surrounded. Id. at 1350-51. One

of the officers grabbed the plaintiff by the hair, shoved him to the

ground, and ordered him to surrender his hands while other offic-

ers struck and kicked him, breaking his nose and teeth. Id. at 1351.

The plaintiff covered his face to protect it from the officers’ blows,

and the officers repeatedly tased him. Id. We held that the officers

did not use excessive force because of the seriousness of the plain-

tiff’s offense, his attempt to evade capture, and his refusal to give

his hands up to be handcuffed. Id. at 1354-57. We explained, “force

applied while the suspect has not given up and stopped resisting

and may still pose a danger to the arresting officers, even when that

force is severe, is not necessarily excessive.” Id. at 1356.

In Acosta, officers received a 911 call for a “violent dispute,”

and when the officers arrived on the scene, they encountered the

plaintiff who began to act erratically and ran away. Acosta, 97 F.4th

at 1236-37. When the officers caught the plaintiff, they could not

handcuff him because he was fighting them off with his elbows and

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24-13588 Opinion of the Court 21

knocked one of them down. Id. at 1237. The officers got the plain-

tiff to the ground by tasing him and putting him into a chokehold.

Id. Once he was on the ground, the plaintiff stopped resisting, but

the officers tased and kicked him. Id. It was not until after this that

the officers handcuffed him. Id. Later that night, the plaintiff died,

although it was unclear whether he died from his injuries or due to

an overdose. Id. at 1237, 1241-44. We held that the arresting offic-

ers used excessive force by tasing and kicking the plaintiff while he

was subdued on the ground and no longer resisting arrest. Id. at

1239-41. We explained that our precedent clearly established that

“an arresting officer may not use gratuitous force on a non-resisting

suspect who no longer poses a threat to his safety.” Id. at 1241-42.

The factual distinctions between Mobley and Acosta are ex-

pressive of the line that our precedent draws for force used on an

arrestee who is on the ground but has not been handcuffed. On

the one hand, we have held a use of force to be reasonable when it

is used against unhandcuffed arrestees who are on the ground but

continue to resist arrest or are in a position such that they are not

completely subdued and may still pose a threat to officer safety.

See, e.g., Mobley, 783 F.3d at 1354-57; Hinson, 927 F.3d at 1120-21

(holding officer did not use excessive force when he struck un-

handcuffed arrestee suspected of murder and thought to be in pos-

session of a knife who was lying on the ground with his hands un-

der his body and was refusing to comply with instructions to pro-

vide hands for handcuffing); Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1291-

93 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding officers did not use excessive force

when they allowed a police canine to bite an unhandcuffed arrestee

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22 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

31 times where the arrestee was suspected of armed robbery, fled

from police into a forest, and was reasonably suspected of being

armed and dangerous even though he was lying on the ground and

shouting out his location in an apparent attempt to surrender be-

cause the arrestee was hidden from view, and the officers had no

reason to trust that he would not try to do them harm); Crosby v.

Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding of-

ficer did not use excessive force by putting foot on unhandcuffed

arrestee’s face who was lying on the ground because shots were

heard in the area prior to the arrest; arrestee was found to be in

possession of a shotgun; he did not drop the shotgun when com-

manded to do so; and, although he was lying down on the ground,

he raised his head, jerked his hand away from a handcuffing at-

tempt, and shoved the officer’s foot away from him).

On the other hand, we have held a use of force to be exces-

sive when it is used against unhandcuffed arrestees who are on the

ground, are subdued in some way, are not resisting or refusing to

comply with orders, and do not pose an immediate threat to officer

safety. See, e.g., Acosta, 97 F.4th at 1239-42; Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d

1416, 1419-20 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding officer used excessive force

by, while on top of the unhandcuffed arrestee who was lying on

the ground, breaking his arm while attempting to handcuff him

where the arrestee was suspected of possessing cocaine, was hold-

ing a baseball bat when the officer first arrived and refused to drop

it, and ran away from the officer, but then complied with an order

to get on the ground and did not subsequently resist); see also Sebas-

tian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[I]f an arrestee

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24-13588 Opinion of the Court 23

demonstrates compliance, but the officer nonetheless inflicts gra-

tuitous and substantial injury using ordinary arrest tactics, then the

officer may have used excessive force” even if the arrestee “was in-

itially recalcitrant and even acted aggressively toward the officer.”).

This case is more analogous to the latter category of prece-

dent than the former. The critical factor in Mobley, Hinson, Cren-

shaw, and Crosby was that the unhandcuffed arrestees, despite lying

on the ground, were not fully subdued in the control of the officers

or were resisting arrest in some way such as refusing to give up

their hands or moving around to prevent handcuffing. See Mobley,

783 F.3d at 1354-57; Hinson, 927 F.3d at 1120-21; Crenshaw, 556 F.3d

at 1291-93; Crosby, 394 F.3d at 1333-35. However, like in Acosta and

Smith, once Roe was taken to the ground with Maertz on top of

him, he did not move, had his hands out in front of him in a way

that did not indicate he was resisting handcuffing, and complied

with Maertz’s order to place his hands behind his back. See Acosta,

97 F.4th at 1239-42; Smith, 127 F.3d at 1419-20. Even though he

was initially resistant and previously acted in a way that could rea-

sonably be interpreted as dangerous, once Roe was on the ground

with Maertz on top of him, subdued, and compliant, it was unrea-

sonable for Maertz to inflict gratuitous injury on Roe by striking

him 34 to 37 times. See Acosta, 97 F.4th at 1239-42; Smith, 127 F.3d

at 1419-20; Sebastian, 918 F.3d at 1311.

For these reasons, we conclude that Maertz violated the

Fourth Amendment by striking Roe 34 to 37 times when Roe was

on the ground, subdued, and compliant.

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24 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

b. Clearly Established

Maertz argues that, even if he violated the Fourth Amend-

ment, he is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because

Roe has failed to establish that he violated a clearly established con-

stitutional right. In determining whether a constitutional right was

“clearly established” at the time the officer acted, “we ask whether

the contours of the right were sufficiently clear that every reason-

able officer would have understood that what he was doing violates

that right.” Prosper v. Martin, 989 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021).

A plaintiff may show that a right was “clearly estab-

lished” through: (1) case law with indistinguishable

facts clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a

broad statement of principle within the Constitution,

statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitu-

tional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a consti-

tutional right was clearly violated, even in the total

absence of case law.

Id. (quotation marks omitted). “If a plaintiff relies on case law, the

decisions must come from the United States Supreme Court, the

Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the pertinent state.” Id.

“However it is shown, clearly established law must be particular-

ized to the facts of the case, . . . and must not be defined at a high

level of generality.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

We disagree with Maertz that his constitutional violation

was not clearly established at the time of Roe’s arrest in August

2020. In Acosta, we held that it was clearly established that “an ar-

resting officer may not use gratuitous force on a non-resisting

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24-13588 Opinion of the Court 25

suspect who no longer poses a threat to his safety” even if the sus-

pect was unhandcuffed and previously posed a threat to officer

safety. Acosta, 97 F.4th at 1241-42. Even though Acosta was decided

in 2024, after Roe’s arrest, we relied on earlier precedent, including

Smith, to conclude that the above principle was clearly established

in 2014, before Roe’s arrest. See id. Additionally, we explained in

Sebastian, which was decided in 2019, that Smith established that “if

an arrestee demonstrates compliance, but the officer nonetheless

inflicts gratuitous and substantial injury using ordinary arrest tac-

tics, then the officer may have used excessive force” even if the ar-

restee “was initially recalcitrant and even acted aggressively toward

the officer.” Sebastian, 918 F.3d at 1311.

Based on this precedent, we conclude that Maertz violated a

clearly established constitutional right and is not entitled to quali-

fied immunity. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to Maertz as to his 34 to 37 strikes to Roe after

he was on the ground and remand for further proceedings on this

claim.

3. Knee Pressure

Lastly, we conclude that Maertz did not violate the Fourth

Amendment by placing his knee on Roe’s back and neck after he

was handcuffed. Although Roe was not a threat to officer safety

after he was handcuffed, it was not unreasonable for Maertz to

place his knees on Roe as part of the force ordinarily used to safely

effect an arrest. See Mobley, 783 F.3d at 1353 (“[T]he typical arrest

involves some force and injury.” (quotation marks omitted));

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26 Opinion of the Court 24-13588

Croom v. Balkwill, 645 F.3d 1240, 1251-53 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding

that pressing knee into plaintiff’s back for ten minutes was de min-

imis use of force not in violation of the Fourth Amendment where

the plaintiff was compliant and did not pose a threat to officer

safety); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he

application of de minimis force, without more, will not support a

claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).

This conclusion is supported by the fact that Maertz’s placement of

his knee lasted only approximately one minute, and Roe did not

submit any evidence indicating that he suffered any injuries to his

neck other than some pain.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, the district court did not err by concluding that Red-

mond was fully entitled to qualified immunity and that Maertz was

entitled to qualified immunity for tackling Roe and placing his

knees on Roe’s neck and back. However, the district court erred

by concluding that Maertz was entitled to qualified immunity for

striking Roe 34 to 37 times while he was on the ground. Therefore,

we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to the

latter use of force, otherwise affirm the district court, and remand

for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN

PART.