McLemore v. Bogalusa City School District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IY BY HER PARENT CIVIL ACTION

BRITTANY McLEMORE

NO. 25-1042

VERSUS

SECTION M (5)

BOGALUSA CITY SCHOOL

DISTRICT, et al.

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by institutional defendants the Bogalusa City School

District and the Bogalusa City District School Board (together, the “School Board”), and

individual defendants Eddie Walker, Byron Hurst, and Karla McGehee (collectively, the

“Individual Defendants,” and together with the School Board, “Defendants”).1 Plaintiff IY, by her

parent Brittany McLemore, responds in opposition,2 and Defendants reply in further support of

their motion.3 Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the

Court issues this Order & Reasons.

I. BACKGROUND

This is the second case filed in this Court by plaintiff alleging that IY was sexually harassed

at school by Walker, a physical education teacher.4 In the earlier suit, which was filed on June 3,

2024 (C/A No. 24-1407), plaintiff alleged that IY was a freshman at Bogalusa High School for the

1 R. Doc. 17.

2 R. Doc. 22.

3 R. Doc. 23.

4 See also IY by her parent Brittany McLemore v. Bogalusa City District Schools, et al., Civil Action No.

24-1407 (E.D. La).

2023-2024 school year and enrolled in Walker’s physical education class.5 The School Board’s

dress code required all high school students to wear khaki bottoms and black polo shirts for most

of the school day, but for physical education class, students were required to change into joggers

or gym shorts and a school T-shirt.6 On November 8, 2023, IY properly changed before gym class

and was awaiting instructions when Walker ordered her and two other female students to pull down

their jogger pants so that he could ensure they were not wearing khaki bottoms underneath.7 At

first, IY refused, but when Walker threatened to give the girls “zeros” if they failed to comply, IY

“agreed to pull down the side of her pants exposing her undergarments and hip area to coach

[W]alker and her peers.”8 IY called her mother, McLemore, who in turn informed the assistant

principal of the events that had transpired in Walker’s gym class.9 The assistant principal called

Walker in for a meeting where he admitted what occurred, but characterized his actions as a

“classroom rule.”10 McLemore, unsatisfied with the result of the meeting, demanded more action,

so the assistant principal consulted with the principal and initiated an investigation.11 The incident

was captured on school surveillance cameras and the investigators reviewed the footage.12 On

November 27, 2023, McLemore sent a letter to the School Board office to notify the board of the

alleged sexual harassment and unsatisfactory resolution at the school level.13 McLemore claims

that the Title IX coordinators did not get involved and sent the matter back to the school’s

principal.14 Then, on January 25, 2024, McLemore was informed that the investigation was

5 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 4 at 4. The balance of the facts related here are taken from the factual allegations

in the complaint.

6 Id. at 5.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id.

completed and the school decided to eliminate Walker’s classroom rule and advised him not to

check for dress code compliance anymore.15 McLemore again was not satisfied and threatened to

sue.16 In February 2024, superintendent Hurst informed McLemore that the investigation proved

that Walker acted within the scope of his duties.17 In March 2024, McLemore worked with

McGehee, the School Board’s Title IX coordinator to initiate another investigation of the

November 8 incident.18 After McLemore presented evidence to McGehee, and both she and IY

participated in interviews, McGehee, on March 22, 2024, informed McLemore that this latest

investigation resulted in a finding that Walker did not violate Title IX and acted within the scope

of his duties.19 McLemore, still unsatisfied, asked for review by an outside, unbiased third party,

but that never occurred.20 After March 21, 2024, IY was removed from Walker’s physical

education class.21 Plaintiff, in the first complaint, brought claims against Defendants for Title IX

violations and various constitutional violations, including unlawful search (Fourth Amendment),

invasion of her right to privacy (Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments), lack of due

process (Fifth Amendment), and denial of equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment).22

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s first suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to

state a claim.23 Because Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion when due, and because

the motion appeared to have merit, this Court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s

15 Id.

16 Id. at 5-6.

17 Id. at 6.

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 7.

22 Id. at 2-4.

23 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 24.

complaint without prejudice.24 Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment,25 which the Court

denied on December 12, 2024.26 Plaintiff did not appeal.

Months later, on May 23, 2025, plaintiff filed the instant suit realleging Title IX and

constitutional claims against Defendants arising from the November 8, 2023 incident.27 The

factual allegations are largely the same as those made in the previous complaint, but this time

plaintiff alleges more pointedly that the gym dress code was Walker’s policy, not one promulgated

by the School Board, and that Walker required IY to remove her pants “exposing her personal

sexual intimate body areas for his visual inspection as a provision, and openly exposing sexually

intimate body areas in an excessive manner to her peers.”28 Plaintiff then recounts the School

Board’s investigation of the incident, which is largely the same as in the previous complaint, but

now adds how she believes the investigation failed to follow Title IX regulations and she attaches

to the complaint correspondence McLemore exchanged with various school officials regarding the

investigation, along with other documents.29 One such document is the Title IX coordinators’

March 21, 2024 letter to McLemore and IY explaining that, after reviewing the evidence, they

found that Walker did not violate Title IX, but that they had implemented specific supportive

measures, including having: (a) provided training to staff members on sexual misconduct and

sexual harassment; (b) provided training to school administrators on handling and reporting Title

IX allegations; (c) reviewed disciplinary actions for the misconduct of employees; (d) changed

procedures for the inspection of physical education uniforms for teachers and students; (e)

removed IY from Walker’s physical education class; and (f) provided IY access to counseling

24 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 29.

25 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 34.

26 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 37.

27 R. Doc. 1. From this point forward, all record document (R. Doc.) citations will refer to the record in the

present case, unless otherwise noted.

28 Id. at 4-5.

29 Id. at 5-13; R. Docs. 1-1 through -10.

sessions with a certified counselor at the school.30 In the current complaint, plaintiff asserts claims

for Title IX violations and constitutional violations, including deprivation of substantive and

procedural due process (Fourteenth Amendment); denial of equal protection (Fourteenth

Amendment); and unconstitutional strip search (Fourth Amendment).31 Plaintiff seeks

compensatory damages for past, present, and future emotional distress and educational harm, along

with punitive damages and injunctive relief requiring the School Board to revise its Title IX

policies, provide staff training, and ensure compliance with federal law.32

II. PENDING MOTION

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, contending that plaintiff has not stated a viable

claim for relief.33 Defendants argue that plaintiff has not stated a Title IX claim because: (1) the

allegations do not establish that quid pro quo sexual harassment occurred as plaintiff admitted that

changing for physical education class was a school rule, Walker was ensuring that the students

who were wearing long jogger pants had complied with that rule, and there is no allegation of

unwelcome sexual conduct; (2) plaintiff failed to plead that the alleged harassment deprived her

of, or interfered with, educational opportunities; (3) plaintiff’s allegations show that the School

Board investigated her complaint and therefore did not act with deliberate indifference; and (4)

plaintiff does not state a viable remedy under Title IX, which does not permit recovery of damages

for emotional distress.34 Defendants also argue that a Title IX claim cannot be asserted against the

30 R. Doc. 1-5 at 2.

31 R. Doc. 1 at 13-18.

32 Id. at 18.

33 R. Doc. 17.

34 R. Docs. 17-1 at 8-13; 23 at 1-3. Defendants identify certain inconsistencies between the facts alleged in

the complaint plaintiff filed in the first suit, and the current one, regarding the November 8, 2023 incident. R. Doc.

17-1 at 3. Defendants argue that the facts alleged in the first suit are judicial admissions which bind plaintiff. Id.

While that may be true, because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will liberally construe the pleadings and

consider all facts alleged.

Individual Defendants.35 Further, Defendants argue that plaintiff’s constitutional claims are

“recycled” Title IX claims recast as claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which otherwise lack

factual support.36 Finally, Defendants make a distinction between the Bogalusa City School

District and the Bogalusa City District School Board, arguing that the Bogalusa City School

District is not an entity capable of being sued.37

In opposition, plaintiff argues that she has stated a Title IX claim because (1) Walker, in a

quid pro quo manner, threatened to give IY “zeros” if she failed to comply with his order to pull

down her pants; (2) the School Board acted with deliberate indifference when it failed to follow

certain Title IX investigation procedures; and (3) she has pleaded a claim for nominal and

compensatory damages for educational disruption and seeks injunctive relief consisting of staff

training and School Board policy revisions.38 As to the § 1983 claims, plaintiff argues that

Defendants violated IY’s right to privacy, performed an unconstitutional strip search, and failed to

provide her with due process through the Title IX investigation.39 Further, plaintiff contends that

the Bogalusa City School District is a political subdivision of the state of Louisiana that has the

capacity to be sued.40

In reply, Defendants reassert that plaintiff, under no set of facts, can prove that the School

Board violated Title IX because the incident was a one-time event that did not subject IY to

harassment severe enough to compromise her educational opportunities and because the School

Board, which conducted multiple investigations of the incident, did not act with deliberate

35 Id. at 14-15. Defendants also make a distinction between the Bogalusa City School District and the

Bogalusa City District School Board, arguing that the Bogalusa City School District is not an entity capable of being

sued. Id. at 18.

36 Id. at 15-17.

37 Id. at 18.

38 R. Docs. 22 at 2-3; 22-1 at 3-5, 7-8. In this filing, plaintiff claims that IY was 12 years old at the time of

the incident. See R. Doc. 22 at 1.

39 R. Docs. 22 at 3-4; 22-1 at 5-7.

40 R. Docs. 22 at 4; 22-1 at 8-10.

indifference to the alleged harassment.41 The School Board emphasizes that plaintiff does not

argue that it did not respond to her complaint, but rather she asserts that the School Board did not

perfectly follow Title IX procedures.42 However, says the School Board, perfect application of

Title IX procedures is not required in order for a court to find that it was not deliberately indifferent

to known harassment.43 The School Board argues that deliberate indifference is a high bar for

which plaintiff bears the burden of proof and here she has admitted that the School Board

conducted an investigation and implemented remedial measures, meaning that she cannot prevail

on her Title IX claims.44 Moreover, reiterates the School Board, plaintiff has not stated a viable

Title IX remedy and such claims cannot be brought against the Individual Defendants.45 As to the

§ 1983 claims, Defendants reassert that they are impermissibly “recycled” Title IX claims.46

Finally, Defendants reurge that the Bogalusa City School District is not a juridical entity under

Louisiana law.47

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule

8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The statement of the claim must

“‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

41 R. Doc. 23 at 3-7.

42 Id. at 5.

43 Id.

44 Id. at 6-7.

45 Id. at 7-8.

46 Id. at 8-9.

47 Id. at 9-10.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A pleading does

not comply with Rule 8 if it offers “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action,” or “‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (alteration omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move to dismiss

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on the face of the complaint “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility does not equate

to probability, but rather “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Thus, if the facts

pleaded in the complaint “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘shown’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to

relief.’” Id. at 679 (alteration omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court employs

the two-pronged approach utilized in Twombly. The court “can choose to begin by identifying

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions [unsupported by factual allegations],

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. However, “[w]hen there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether

they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “‘[The] task, then, is to determine whether

the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s

likelihood of success.’” Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 385 (5th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir.

2012)).

A court’s review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is limited to the complaint, any

documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that

are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.

Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)). A court may also take judicial notice of certain

matters, including public records and government websites. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540

F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, 418 F.3d 453, 457 (5th

Cir. 2005). Thus, in weighing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, district courts primarily look to the

allegations found in the complaint, but courts may also consider “documents incorporated into the

complaint by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public

record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint

whose authenticity is unquestioned.” Meyers v. Textron, Inc., 540 F. App’x 408, 409 (5th Cir.

2013) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).

B. Claims against the Bogalusa City School District

Plaintiff names as defendants both the Bogalusa City School District and the Bogalusa City

District School Board. However, only the Bogalusa City District School Board is a proper

defendant, because the Bogalusa City School District is not a separate juridical entity with the

capacity to sue and be sued. Pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 36:642 and 17:1, the Louisiana

Department of Education and the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education are bodies

corporate with the capacity to sue and be sued. Further, under Louisiana Revised Statute 17:51,

parish school boards are also juridical entities. Taken together, these statutes show that a school

district, as opposed to its board, is not a juridical entity with the capacity to sue and be sued. See

Williams v. Recovery Sch. Dist., 859 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828-30 (E.D. La. 2012) (holding that, under

La. R.S. 36:642, 17:1, and 17:51, the recovery school district is not a juridical entity that can be

sued). Thus, plaintiff’s claims against the Bogalusa City School District are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.48

C. Title IX Claims against Defendants

Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under

any education program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

Public schools that are supported with federal dollars are among the “programs or activities” within

the statute’s ambit. J.T. v. Uplift Educ., 2024 WL 5118486, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024)

(alterations omitted). The statute prescribes only the elimination of the public entity’s funding as

a remedy for a violation, but the Supreme Court has held that Title IX includes an implied right of

action for suits for damages for persons aggrieved by a Title IX violation. Id. (citing Cannon v.

Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979)). And, “[b]y extension, plaintiffs may bring a suit for

damages based on the discriminatory actions of a school employee.” Id. (citing Gebser v. Lago

Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998)).

48 Because the Bogalusa City School District is not a proper defendant, the term “School Board” will

hereinafter refer only to the Bogalusa City District School Board.

Here, plaintiff asserts Title IX claims against the School Board and the Individual

Defendants for Walker’s alleged sexual harassment of IY.49 As an initial matter, Title IX claims

cannot be brought against school officials, teachers, or other individuals because the statute

“reaches [only] institutions and programs that receive federal funds.” Fitzgerald v. Barnstable

Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009). Thus, plaintiff’s Title IX claims against the Individual

Defendants must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Turning now to plaintiff’s Title IX claim against the School Board, to prevail, she must

prove that a school district official, who at a minimum had the authority to institute corrective

measures, had actual notice of, and was deliberately indifferent to, Walker’s alleged misconduct.50

J.T., 2024 WL 5118486, at *3. Stated differently, to prevail on a Title IX claim for teacher sexual

harassment, a student-plaintiff must allege and prove “that (1) a school district employee with

supervisory power over the offending teacher51 (2) had actual notice of the harassment52 and (3)

responded with deliberate indifference.” King v. Conroe Indep. Sch. Dist., 289 F. App’x 1, 3 n.3

(5th Cir. 2007). “A school district acts with deliberate indifference if its response to known abuse

was ‘clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.’” J.T., 2024 WL 5118486, at *5

(citing Roe v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 53 F.4th 334, 341 (5th Cir. 2022)).

Deliberate indifference is a difficult standard for a plaintiff to meet. Id. It requires a

plaintiff to prove “more than just negligence or unreasonableness,” because “Title IX mandates

49 R. Doc. 1 at 13-15, 17-18.

50 Because the Court finds that the School Board did not act with deliberate indifference, it need not determine

whether Walker’s alleged conduct, as described in the complaints filed in this case and the previous case, violated

Title IX.

51 Here, Hurst, as superintendent, had supervisory power over Walker. See Doe v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist.,

427 F. Supp. 3d 870, 878-79 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (“An employee has supervisory power if he or she is (1) invested by

the school board with the duty to supervise the employee and (2) had the power to take action that would end such

abuse.” (quotation omitted)).

52 It is undisputed that Hurst and McGehee, as well as other school officials, such as the principal and assistant

principal, received actual notice of the alleged harassment. See R. Doc. 1.

neither flawless investigations nor perfect solutions.” Id. at *5-6 (quotation and alteration

omitted). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit “has stressed that ‘botched investigations … due to the

ineptitude of investigators, or responses that most reasonable persons could have improved upon

do not equate to deliberate indifference.’” Id. at *5 (quoting I.F. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist.,

915 F.3d 360, 369 (5th Cir. 2019)). “Deliberate indifference instead lies only where a school

district completely ‘fails to act’ or ‘fails to take additional reasonable measures after a school

learned that its initial remedies were ineffective.’” Id. at *6 (alterations omitted) (quoting Menzia

v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 47 F.4th 354, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2022)). “So, rather than ‘second-

guessing the … decisions made by school administrators,’ this inquiry focuses on whether a

defendant’s acts or omissions were ‘tantamount’ to the district ‘intentionally subjecting its students

to harassment.’” Id. (alteration and internal citation omitted) (first quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty.

Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999), then quoting Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d

598, 411 (5th Cir. 2015)).

Here, the School Board clearly did not act with deliberate indifference. In her complaints

in both cases, plaintiff explains that the School Board conducted not one, not two, but three

investigations into the incident. First, the day the incident occurred, McLemore reported it to the

assistant principal, who called Walker in for a meeting, reviewed the surveillance video, and

consulted with the principal.53 The allegations, as drawn, suggest that those officials found no

wrongdoing on Walker’s part.54 A couple of weeks later, McLemore sent a letter to the School

Board office to notify the board of the alleged sexual harassment and unsatisfactory resolution at

the school level.55 The board sent the matter back to the school’s principal, and on January 25,

53 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 4 at 5; C/A No. 25-1042, R. Doc. 1 at 5.

54 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 4 at 5; C/A No. 25-1042, R. Doc. 1 at 5-7.

55 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 4 at 5; C/A No. 25-1042, R. Doc. 1 at 7.

2024, McLemore was informed that the second investigation was completed and the school

decided to eliminate Walker’s classroom rule and advised him not to check for dress code

compliance anymore.56 McLemore again was not satisfied and threatened to sue.57 In February

2024, superintendent Hurst informed McLemore that the investigation proved that Walker acted

within the scope of his duties.58 Finally, in March 2024, McGehee conducted yet another

investigation, for which McLemore presented evidence, and both McLemore and IY participated

in interviews.59 Although McGehee’s investigation resulted in a finding that Walker did not

violate Title IX and acted within the scope of his duties, the Title IX administrators offered several

remedial measures that included providing appropriate training to staff, removing IY from

Walker’s class, and offering counseling services to IY.60 In light of these multiple investigations

and remedial measures, the School Board certainly did not fail to act on or address plaintiff’s

complaint. Compare id. at *5-7 (holding that the school did not act with deliberate indifference

when it conducted some investigation, even if that investigation was flawed), with Roe, 53 F.4th

at 341-46 (holding that a reasonable jury could find that a school employee was deliberately

indifferent where, after receiving complaints, the official did not interview the plaintiff or the

perpetrator, waited weeks to speak to campus police, failed to obtain a campus police report, and

took no further action once external law enforcement became involved). In the complaint filed in

this case, plaintiff alleges that the School Board is liable because, in her view, it failed to follow

proper Title IX procedures in the investigation of the incident.61 But the Supreme Court has never

held that Title IX allows recovery in damages for violations of the statute’s administrative

56 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 4 at 5; C/A No. 25-1042, R. Doc. 1 at 7.

57 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 4 at 5-6; C/A No. 25-1042, R. Doc. 1 at 7.

58 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 4 at 6; C/A No. 25-1042, R. Doc. 1 at 7.

59 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 4 at 6; C/A No. 25-1042, R. Doc. 1 at 9.

60 C/A No. 24-1407, R. Doc. 4 at 6; C/A No. 25-1042, R. Docs. 1 at 9-10; 1-5 at 2.

61 R. Doc. 1 at 3-15, 17-18.

requirements. See J.T., 2024 WL 5118486, at *7 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292). Thus, because

the School Board conducted multiple investigations (even if they were not perfect) and

implemented reasonable remedial measures, it cannot be said to have acted with deliberate

indifference, and consequently, plaintiff’s Title IX claims must be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.62

D. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides a remedy against “every person,” who under color of state law,

deprives another of any rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The statute is not itself a source of

substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.

Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hous., 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999). To pursue a claim under §

1983, a plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States; and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting

under color of state law. Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Hous., 529 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2008); see

also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “Claims under § 1983 may be brought against persons

in their individual or official capacity, or against a governmental entity.” Goodman v. Harris Cnty.,

571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 403 (1997)).

Plaintiff brings § 1983 claims against all Defendants for violations of procedural due

process and equal protection arising from what she says was a faulty Title IX investigation and for

violations of substantive due process and an unlawful search arising from Walker’s alleged actions

in physical education class on November 8, 2023.

62 Because the facts concerning the investigations are undisputed and thus established, plaintiff cannot amend

her complaint to plausibly allege that the School Board acted with deliberate indifference.

1. Procedural Due Process and Equal Protection

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable for violating IY’s rights to procedural due

process and equal protection by conducting what she says was a faulty Title IX investigation.63 In

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246 (2009), the Supreme Court, after

reviewing the purpose and scope of both Title IX and § 1983, held that Title IX does not preclude

the use of § 1983 to address unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools. However, since

then, several courts have held that a plaintiff may not state a § 1983 claim based on an underlying

violation of Title IX, because Title IX does not allow for suits against individuals and “providing

a § 1983 claim against individuals for Title IX liability would permit an end run around Title IX’s

explicit language limiting liability to funding recipients.” Doe #2 v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State

Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 2022 WL 16701930, at *22-24 (M.D. La. Nov. 3, 2022) (quotation

omitted); see also Doe v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 2018 WL 4859978, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr.

24, 2018); Wilkerson v. Univ. of N. Tex., 223 F. Supp. 3d 592, 608 (E.D. Tex. 2016). As explained

in these cases, Fitzgerald does not compel a different outcome here.

A plain reading of plaintiff’s complaint leads to the conclusion that she is impermissibly

attempting to sue the Individual Defendants under § 1983 for alleged due process and equal

protection violations that question only the way the Title IX investigation was handled.64 Allowing

these claims to go forward against the Individual Defendants would be tantamount to allowing

impermissible Title IX claims against individuals. Therefore, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for alleged

63 R. Doc. 1 at 16-17.

64 Moreover, to state an equal protection claim with respect to the Title IX investigation, plaintiff would have

to show that the school officials treated IY differently in the investigation than they would have treated a male

complainant under similar circumstances, with the intent to discriminate against IY because she is female. Ruvalcaba

v. Angleton Indep. Sch. Dist., 2022 WL 340592, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 4, 2022). Plaintiff has made no such allegations.

violations of IY’s rights to procedural due process and equal protection are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Similarly, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the School Board for alleged procedural due

process and equal protection violations must also be dismissed because, as alleged, those claims

only question the manner in which the Title IX investigation was handled. This Court has already

determined that plaintiff’s Title IX claims against the School Board fail because it did not act with

deliberate indifference. Since plaintiff’s procedural due process and equal protection claims

against the School Board do not allege any additional facts outside of the Title IX investigation

issues, those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.65

2. Substantive Due Process and Search

a. Individual Defendants66

i. Substantive Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment

The Fifth Circuit “has held repeatedly: a student has a substantive due-process right to be

free from physical sexual abuse; and such abuse by a school employee violates that right.” Doe v.

Ferguson, 128 F.4th 727, 734 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443,

450-52 (5th Cir. 1994); Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 640 (5th Cir. 2013)). In addition to any

school employee who was personally involved in the abuse,

[a] supervisory school official can be held personally liable for a subordinate’s

violation of an elementary or secondary school student’s constitutional right to

bodily integrity in physical sexual abuse cases if the plaintiff establishes that:

(1) the defendant learned of facts or a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior by

a subordinate pointing plainly toward the conclusion that the subordinate was

sexually abusing the student; and

65 Nevertheless, these claims against the School Board would also be dismissed for the same reasons the

substantive due process and search claims are dismissed. See infra § III(D)(2)(b).

66 The complaint is unclear as to whether the Individual Defendants are being sued in their official or

individual capacities, or both, for the alleged § 1983 violations. This section analyzes only any individual-capacity

claims against Hurst, McGehee, and Walker.

(2) the defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference toward the constitutional

rights of the student by failing to take action that was obviously necessary to

prevent or stop the abuse; and

(3) such failure caused a constitutional injury to the student.

Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 454. Deliberate indifference requires proof that a state actor

actually knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the victim’s health or safety. Whitley, 726

F.3d at 641.

Plaintiff, at this motion-to-dismiss stage of the proceeding, has sufficiently alleged that

Walker violated IY’s substantive due process rights on November 8, 2023, by subjecting her to

sexual harassment. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as to plaintiff’s § 1983

substantive due process claim against Walker.67

However, plaintiff makes no allegation that Hurst and McGehee were directly involved in

the harassment. Nor has plaintiff otherwise stated a viable § 1983 substantive due process claim

against Hurst or McGehee since she alleged no facts demonstrating that either or both acted with

deliberate indifference toward IY’s constitutional rights by failing to take action after they learned

of the November 8, 2023 incident. Indeed, plaintiff alleges exactly the opposite – namely, that the

school administration (including Hurst and McGehee) investigated the incident and, at McGehee’s

recommendation, removed IY from Walker’s class. Thus, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED as

to plaintiff’s § 1983 substantive due process claims against Hurst and McGehee, which are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.68

67 While this claim survives under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review, this by no means indicates how it

might fare on a motion for summary judgment, upon development of the relevant facts.

68 Because the factual allegations about the investigations, and Hurst’s and McGehee’s actions once they

learned of the incident, are undisputed and thus established, plaintiff cannot amend her complaint to plausibly allege

that the School Board acted with deliberate indifference to IY’s constitutional right to substantive due process.

ii. Strip Search under the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment protects students from unreasonable searches. S.O. v. Hinds Cnty.

Sch. Dist., 2018 WL 3300227, at *4 (S.D. Miss. July 3, 2018). But the scope of that protection is

limited because school officials must be able to exert control over the school. Id. (citing Tinker v.

Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)). To that end, the Supreme Court

has explained:

the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness,

under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any

search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider whether the action was

justified at its inception; second, one must determine whether the search as actually

conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the

interference in the first place. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student

by a teacher or other school official will be justified at its inception when there are

reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the

student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a

search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably

related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the

age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (quotations, internal citations, and footnotes

omitted). In a later case, the Supreme Court clarified that searching a student’s bags or outer

clothing for contraband requires a lower level of suspicion than do more intrusive searches.

Stafford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 372-77 (2009) (holding that school

officials who had reasonable suspicion to suspect a student of distributing drugs at school were

justified in searching the student’s bag and outer clothing, but not justified in instructing her to

“pull out” her bra and the elastic band on her underpants, because “the content of the suspicion

failed to match the degree of intrusion”).

Plaintiff asserts §1983 claims against Hurst, McGehee, and Walker for an unconstitutional

search. It is undisputed that neither Hurst nor McGehee was present in the high school gymnasium

when the improper search allegedly occurred. Accordingly, plaintiff’s §1983 claims against Hurst

and McGehee for an unconstitutional search must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

As to Walker, the alleged perpetrator, the Court cannot say at this motion-to-dismiss stage

of the proceeding that plaintiff has failed to state a §1983 claim against him for an unconstitutional

search. The facts alleged in the first complaint concerning what occurred – that IY pulled down

the side of her pants – are different from those alleged in the second, now operative, complaint –

that IY entirely removed her pants. At a minimum, this difference requires that the facts be

developed through discovery. Thus, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as to plaintiff’s §1983 claim

against Walker for an unconstitutional search.69

b. The School Board

The School Board is a governmental entity.70 See La. R.S. 17:51. A § 1983 claim brought

against a governmental entity, like a school board or municipality, is analyzed under the Monell

doctrine. In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only

when the entity itself caused the constitutional violation at issue. 436 U.S. at 694. To succeed on

a Monell claim (i.e., the claim against the governmental entity), the plaintiff must establish: (1) an

official policy or custom, of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive

knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is that policy or custom. Valle

v. City of Hous., 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). A school board, like a

municipality, cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Lee-Khan v. Austin

Indep. Sch. Dist., 567 F. App’x 243, 244 (5th Cir. 2014) (school board); York v. Welch, 2024 WL

69 See supra note 67.

70 “[A] § 1983 claim against a government employee acting in his or her official capacity is the same as a suit

brought against the governmental employer itself.” Johnson v. Harris Cnty., 83 F.4th 941, 946 (5th Cir. 2023).

Accordingly, any official-capacity claims asserted against Hurst, McGehee, or Walker are treated as claims against

the School Board.

775179, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2024) (municipality) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485

U.S. 112, 121-22 (1988)). Thus, “[i]t is only when the execution of the government’s policy or

custom inflicts the injury that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.” City of Canton

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (quotation and alterations omitted). In other words, “to prevail

against a public school district, a plaintiff must show that the district’s final policymaker acted

with deliberate indifference in maintaining an unconstitutional policy that caused the plaintiff’s

injury.” Doe v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351, 365 (5th Cir. 2020).

“At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a plaintiff need not allege the specific identity of the

policymaker, but must allege facts that show an official policy, promulgated or ratified by the

policymaker, under which the municipality is said to be liable.” Benfer v. City of Baytown, 120

F.4th 1272, 1285-86 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotations omitted). An official policy “incudes a policy

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the

municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-

making authority.” York, 2024 WL 775179, at *3 (quotation and alteration omitted). And, for

Monell liability, “an official policy may also be a persistent, widespread practice of city officials

or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so

common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy and

practically ha[s] the force of law.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted). To prove the existence

of a custom, a plaintiff must show “a pattern of abuses that transcends the error made in a single

case.” Benfer, 120 F.4th at 1286 (quotation omitted). “A successful showing of such a pattern

requires similarity and specificity; prior incidents cannot simply be for any and all bad or unwise

acts, but rather must point to the specific violation in question.” Id. (quotation omitted). The

pattern of similar and specific acts also “must be comprised of sufficiently numerous prior

incidents rather than merely isolated instances.” Id. (quotation omitted). Indeed, “‘[i]solated

violations are not the persistent, often repeated, constant violations, that constitute custom and

policy as required for [Monell] liability.’” Skyy v. City of Arlington, 712 F. App’x 396, 400 (5th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 581 (5th Cir. 2001)). Considering

all these requirements, “[s]howing a pervasive pattern is a heavy burden.” Benfer, 120 F.4th at

1286 (quotation omitted).

Moreover, the official policy or custom “must be either unconstitutional or adopted with

deliberate indifference to the known or obvious fact that such constitutional violations would

result.” Blanchard-Daigle v. Geers, 802 F. App’x 113, 116 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).

Deliberate indifference is established by showing “a pattern of similar violations arising from a

policy so clearly inadequate as to be obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation.”

Covington v. City of Madisonville, 812 F. App’x 219, 225 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).

However, the Fifth Circuit has recognized a narrow “single incident” exception to the pattern

requirement that allows deliberate indifference to be based on a single incident when “it should

have been apparent to the policymaker that a constitutional violation was the highly predictable

consequence of a particular policy.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Mere negligence, even gross

negligence, is not sufficient to establish deliberate indifference.” Id.

The “moving force” element of Monell liability requires a plaintiff to “show that the

municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and demonstrate a direct causal

link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” York, 2024 WL 775179,

at *3 (quotation and alteration omitted). Causation in this context “requires proximate causation.”

Id. When a plaintiff claims that a municipality, or governmental entity, caused an employee to

inflict an injury, “rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that

the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Accordingly, to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint’s description of a policy or custom and

its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation cannot be conclusory; it must contain

specific facts.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted). Importantly, “[t]he causal link ‘moving

force’ requirement and the degree of culpability ‘deliberate indifference’ requirement must not be

diluted, for where a court fails to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation,

municipal liability collapses into respondent superior liability.” Covington, 812 F. App’x at 225-

26 (quotation omitted).

Plaintiff fails to allege a School Board policy or custom that was the moving force behind

Walker’s alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff has pleaded no facts suggesting that the

School Board maintained an official policy or custom that was permissive of teachers committing

sexual harassment or conducting alleged strip searches. Indeed, plaintiff alleges that the School

Board had a policy in place for the search of students, which specified that searches were to be

done in private by an employee of the same sex as the student, with one witness of the same sex.71

Plaintiff alleges that Walker did not follow this policy, not that the policy was unconstitutional.

Therefore, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for violations of substantive due process and improper search

against the School Board are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (R. Doc. 17) is GRANTED as to

plaintiff’s claims against the Bogalusa School City District, which are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

71 R. Doc. 1 at 17.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to

plaintiff’s Title IX claims against all Defendants, which are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to

plaintiff’s § 1983 procedural due process and equal protection claims against all Defendants, which

are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to

plaintiff’s § 1983 substantive due process and improper search claims against Hurst and McGehee

in in their individual capacities, which are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to

plaintiff’s § 1983 substantive due process and improper search claims against Walker in his

individual capacity.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to

plaintiff’s § 1983 substantive due process and improper search claims against the School Board,

and those against Hurst, McGehee, and Walker in their official capacities, which are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 12th day of August, 2025.

________________________________

BARRY W. ASHE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE