Prunty v. Obregon

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

SHERRY RENEE PRUNTY, et al. PLAINTIFFS

v. CASE NO. 3:23-CV-00136-BSM

COREY OBREGON, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 16] is granted. Plaintiffs’

federal claims are dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiffs’ state law claims are dismissed

without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

This is an extremely sad case whose undisputed material facts, as set forth in the

parties’ filings and the body camera footage, are as follows.

Jonesboro police officer Corey Obregon was patrolling a high-crime area around

10:30 p.m. when he noticed an unusual object in the middle of the street. Defendants’

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Defs.’ SUMF”) ¶¶ 1–4, Doc. No. 18; Plaintiffs’

Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Pls.’ SUMF Resp.”) ¶¶

1–4, Doc. No. 25; Plaintiffs’ Statement of Additional Facts (“Pls.’ SAF”) ¶¶ 6, 10, Doc. No.

26. As Obregon turned around his patrol car to identify the object, he spotted an individual,

later identified as Jayden Prunty, and stopped to speak with him. Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 5; Pls.’

SUMF Resp. ¶ 5; Pls.’ SAF ¶ 13.

Obregon stepped out of his car, identified himself, and as he walked toward Jayden,

Obregon stated that he was conducting “a little bit of drug interdiction in the area” and “a

little bit of community policing.” Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 9; Pls.’ SAF ¶ 19. Obregon noticed

Jayden take a headphone out of his ear, and realized that Jayden may not have heard him, so

Obregon repeated himself. Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 10; Pls.’ SUMF Resp. ¶ 10.

Jayden turned away from Obregon and began to walk away, telling Obregon that he

“wasn’t doing anything” and that he “was just coming from the store.” Pls.’ SAF ¶ 20.

Obregon told Jayden to “come here,” but as Jayden continued to walk away, Obregon then

said “I can smell marijuana on you, come here.” Id. ¶ 21. Jayden responded by stating, “Oh,

you’re lying. You’re lying . . . you can’t smell marijuana, bro” and continued to walk away.

Id. ¶ 23. Obregon then quickened his pace towards Jayden, and Jayden asked him “What are

you doing?” and told Obregon, “You’re making me nervous,” before turning to run. Id. ¶ 24.

Obregon chased after Jayden a short distance before pushing Jayden to the ground.

Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 19. Obregon then jumped on top of Jayden. Pls.’ SUMF Resp. ¶ 20. Jayden

initially had both hands underneath him, but then Jayden brought his left hand from beneath

him and above his head when Obregon used his left hand to control Jayden’s left hand.

Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 21. Jayden’s right arm and hand are not completely visible in the video, but

they appear to have remained under his body. Pls.’ SAF ¶ 29. According to Obregon, he

was holding Jayden’s right forearm. Id. ¶ 30. Obregon told Jayden several times to give up

his hand, and Jayden responded “no” and “I can’t.” Id. ¶ 31.

Obregon then radioed dispatch that he has “got one fighting.” Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 24.

Obregon continued to tell Jayden to give him his hand, to which Jayden continued to refuse,

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saying “no.” Id. ¶ 26. Obregon then told Jayden to “quit reaching for whatever you’re

reaching for,” “give me your hand,” and “let go.” Id. ¶ 27. Obregon then told Jayden, “I

promise you if that’s a gun, it’s not going to end well for you,” to which Jayden replied “I

know, I know it’s not.” Id. ¶ 28. Obregon again told Jayden, “Give me your hands,” and

then appeared to shift positions on top of Jayden, as Jayden cried out in pain. Pls.’ SAF ¶¶

37–38.

A second later, in the video, there is the sound of a gunshot, and Obregon cries out

because he has just been shot in the right upper calf by Jayden’s gun. Id. ¶ 39; Pls.’ SUMF

Resp. ¶ 32. Obregon then rolled onto his right side, unholstered his own firearm, and

squeezed the trigger, but his gun did not fire. Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 35. Obregon testified that he

did not know where Jayden’s gun was at the time; however, he believed that Jayden still had

the gun. Pls.’ SUMF Resp. ¶ 37. After his gun failed to fire, Obregon slapped the magazine

on the ground to make sure it was secure and then attempted to fire again. Defs.’ SUMF ¶

38. The gun fired towards the back of Jayden’s head; however, the shot missed Jayden. Id.

¶ 39. After the first shot, Jayden appears in the video to be lying motionless and not fighting

back. Pls.’ SAF ¶ 41. After a brief pause, Obregon fired a second shot, this time striking

Jayden in the back of the head, killing him. Id. ¶ 42. The incident, from the time Obregon

first spoke with Jayden to the fatal gunshot, took approximately one minute.

Obregon’s sole justification for his initial detention of Jayden is his assertion that he

smelled marijuana on Jayden. Pls.’ SAF ¶ 44. This assertion is corroborated in several ways.

First, Jonesboro Police Chief Rick Elliott, a defendant herein, testified that when he arrived

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on scene that night, he observed that Jayden “reeked” of marijuana. Pls.’ SUMF Resp. ¶ 48.

Second, Caleb Landreth, a special agent with the Arkansas State Police, noted in his case

notes that the morning after the incident, he noticed a strong odor of marijuana when the

county coroner opened Jayden’s body bag at the funeral home prior to Jayden’s body being

transported to the state crime lab. Id. ¶ 54. Third, Jayden tested positive for marijuana in his

toxicology reports. Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 56. Jayden’s parents, the plaintiffs herein, characterize

Obregon’s assertion that he smelled marijuana on Jayden as a “deliberate falsehood” and they

question the testimony of Elliott and Landreth because of the “bias of law enforcement

personnel to defend a fellow officer in an officer-involved deadly shooting case.” Plaintiffs’

Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pls.’ MSJ Resp.”)

9 n. 3, 12 n. 4, Doc. No. 24.

Jayden’s parents are suing Obregon, Elliott, and the city of Jonesboro, alleging: (1)

federal constitutional violations by Obregon, Compl. ¶¶ 32–43, Doc. No. 1; (2) federal

constitutional violations by Elliott and the city, id. ¶¶ 44–57; (3) state constitutional

violations by all defendants, id. ¶¶ 58–63; (4) negligence by all defendants, id. ¶¶ 64–66; (5)

the tort of outrage by Elliott and the city, id. ¶¶ 67–72; and (6) wrongful death, id. ¶¶ 73–74.

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. Doc. No. 16.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Once the moving party

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demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-moving party may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleadings. Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336,

340 (8th Cir. 2011). Instead, the non-moving party must produce admissible evidence

demonstrating a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial. Id. All reasonable inferences must

be drawn in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holland v. Sam’s Club, 487

F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007). The evidence is not weighed, and no credibility

determinations are made. Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiffs’ federal claims are

dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiffs’ state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.

A. Federal Constitutional Violations: Corey Obregon

Plaintiffs have failed to address the purported Fourteenth Amendment violations by

Obregon; therefore, summary judgment is granted on this issue. See Satcher v. Univ. of Ark.

at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009) (“failure to oppose a basis for

summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument”). Also, even if the Fourteenth

Amendment argument has not been waived, plaintiffs’ claims asserting federal constitutional

violations by Obregon are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and not the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).

Plaintiffs present three principal arguments as to why they believe Obregon committed

Fourth Amendment violations. First, plaintiffs argue that the jury could reasonably find that

Obregon did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Jayden because Obregon did not, in fact,

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smell marijuana. See Pls.’ MSJ Resp. 7–13. Second, plaintiffs argue that even if Obregon

smelled marijuana, he did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Jayden. See id. at 14–15.

Third, plaintiffs argue that Obregon used excessive force in arresting and killing Jayden. See

id. at 15–19. Each argument fails because Obregon is immune from suit.

1. Did Obregon smell marijuana?

“The smell of marijuana can support, at a minimum, a finding of reasonable suspicion

to detain a suspect.” Ross v. City of Helena-W. Helena, Ark., No. 2:17-cv-00031-KGB, 2020

WL 7034479, at *9 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 30, 2020) (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs dispute a material fact—that is, that Obregon smelled marijuana. This

dispute is not enough to overcome summary judgment, however, because this dispute is

neither genuine nor reasonable. This is true because plaintiffs’ bald statement that Obregon

did not smell marijuana, taken alone, is not enough to create an issue of fact because it is self

serving and totally unsupported by anything else in the record. See Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (for an issue of fact to be genuine, the

non-moving party must show more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”);

Viewpoint Neutrality Now! v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 109 F.4th 1033, 1038 (8th

Cir. 2024) (plaintiffs may not merely rely on unsupported self-serving allegations, but must

have sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in their favor; the purpose of

summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims). Indeed, when

“opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of

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the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372, 380 (2007); see Thompson v. Hubbard, 257 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Gardner v. Buerger, 82 F.3d 248, 252 (8th Cir. 1996)) (“plaintiffs may not stave off

summary judgment ‘armed with only the hope that the jury might disbelieve witnesses’

testimony’”)

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ “arguments and suggestions that [Obregon] did not actually

smell marijuana or acted pretextually do not convince the Court that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment should be denied.” Ross, 2020 WL 7034479, at *12. Thus, on “the

undisputed facts in this case, this Court concludes that an objectively reasonable police

officer with Officer [Obregon’s] training and experience could have reasonably believed that

he smelled marijuana [on Jayden], giving [Obregon], at a minimum, reasonable suspicion to

detain” Jayden. Id. at *14. Additionally, it was objectively reasonable for Obregon to detain

Jayden based on his belief that he smelled marijuana. See id. “Plaintiffs have not cited this

Court to a case in which an arresting officer was denied qualified immunity in analogous

circumstances, and this Court has found none.” Id. “More than evidence of a mistake is

required to deny a public official qualified immunity from § 1983 damage liability.” Id.

2. Did Obregon have reasonable suspicion to detain Jayden?

Obregon had reasonable suspicion to detain Jayden based on the odor of marijuana

coupled with Jayden’s flight, so Obregon did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he

chased after Jayden and seized him. See United States v. Wright, 844 F.3d 759, 762–63 (8th

Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 2010)) (“Once the

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uniformed officer detected an odor of marijuana coming from Wright’s person, the officer

had probable cause to arrest Wright and, a fortiori, reasonable suspicion to detain him for

further investigation.”); United States v. Velazquez-Rivera, 366 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 2004)

(citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)) (“flight is factor that, together with

other factors, supports conclusion of reasonable suspicion”).

Indeed, “[t]he law distinguishes between a seizure and a stop.” United States v.

Gannon, 531 F.3d 657, 661 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968)).

“While police must have probable cause in order to arrest (or seize) a person, they need only

have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot to stop someone.” Id. “There is no

‘neat set of legal rules’ that governs the determination whether the police had reasonable

suspicion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Barker, 437 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 2006)). “An

officer’s suspicion is reasonable if he ‘knows particularized, objective facts that lead to a

rational inference that a crime is being or has been committed.’” Id. (quoting United States

v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 327 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 2003)). “But reasonable suspicion is

more than an inarticulable hunch, it must instead be based on specific and articulable facts,

which taken together with rational inferences, support the stop.” Id. In determining whether

the police had reasonable suspicion, the court examines the totality of the circumstances

“through the eyes of the officers, because they are trained to cull significance from behavior

that would appear innocent to the untrained observer.” Id. (quoting Barker, 437 F.3d at 790).

Plaintiffs’ “sole attack here is that, in an era of increasing decriminalization, the smell

of marijuana should no longer amount to [reasonable suspicion or] probable cause.” United

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States v. Wright, No. 4:19-cr-00135-DPM, 2021 WL 2556246, at *1 (E.D. Ark. June 22,

2021). That “argument is foreclosed by binding Circuit precedent.” Id. (citing United States

v. Winters, 221 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 2000)); see United States v. Spencer, No. 4:20-cr-

00286-BRW-02, 2024 WL 988849, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 7, 2024) (citing Colen v. Arkansas,

643 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Ark. Ct. App. 2022)) (“after the passage of Amendment 98 to the

Arkansas Constitution in 2016, which legalized medical marijuana in the state, Arkansas

courts have continued to hold that the odor of marijuana justifies a vehicular [or other type

of] search”).

It was therefore objectively reasonable for Obregon to believe that he had reasonable

suspicion to detain Jayden and therefore Obregon is immune on this argument.

3. Did Obregon use excessive force in arresting and killing Jayden?

Although the outcome of the stop was tragic, Obregon is entitled to summary

judgment on plaintiffs’ argument that Obregon used excessive force in arresting and killing

Jayden. This is true because the force used was objectively reasonable given the

circumstances. See Hollingsworth v. City of St. Ann, 800 F.3d 985, 989 (8th Cir. 2015)

(objectively reasonable force is constitutional). Government officials are immune from suit

unless they violate clearly established rights. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

(2009). Immunity attaches even when a government official makes a mistake of law or fact.

Id. Summary judgment is proper, based on qualified immunity, if a defendant, as a matter

of law, could have reasonably believed that his actions were lawful. See Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). Reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a

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reasonable officer on the scene, rather than one with 20/20 hindsight. See Wilson v. Spain,

209 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 2000).

Obregon did not use excessive force in arresting and killing Jayden. As an initial

matter, Obregon did not use excessive force in pushing Jayden to the ground and jumping

on top of him to detain him. See Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975, 981–82 (8th Cir. 2019) (en

banc) (“Where the district court correctly acknowledged that [plaintiff] ‘had been told to stop

but kept walking instead,’ . . . [t]he constitutionality of [defendant’s] takedown was not

beyond debate, and he is thus entitled to qualified immunity.”). Then, after a brief struggle,

Obregon was shot by Jayden’s gun. After this, it was objectively reasonable for Obregon to

use deadly force on Jayden. See Sinclair v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 268 F.3d 594, 596 (8th

Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“no constitutional or statutory right exists that would prohibit a

police officer from using deadly force when faced with an apparently loaded weapon”).

Plaintiffs’ argument that the gun could have gone off accidentally or that Obregon discharged

the gun himself accidentally after taking control of it does not change this. See Fitzgerald

v. Patrick, 927 F.2d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (officers justified in using

deadly force because “a shot had been fired . . . either accidentally or on purpose”). It also

does not matter that Obregon did not know where Jayden’s gun was at the time. See

Thompson, 257 F.3d at 899 (citing Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412, 1419 n. 16 (10th

Cir. 1987)) (“An officer is not constitutionally required to wait until he sets eyes upon the

weapon before employing deadly force . . . .”). Moreover, it was objectively reasonable for

Obregon to believe that Jayden still posed a threat to him after Obregon’s first shot through

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the time he fired the fatal second shot. Indeed, accepting “for purposes of summary

judgment that [Jayden] was neither advancing toward [Obregon] nor holding the [gun toward

Obregon, Jayden] still had been noncompliant and could have caused serious injury or death

in a matter of seconds by repositioning himself and the” gun. Swearingen v. Judd, 930 F.3d

983, 988 (8th Cir. 2019).

Although this entire event is awful, Obregon’s use of force was objectively reasonable

given the circumstances. Therefore, Obregon is immune on this argument, and he is thus

entitled to summary judgment on all of plaintiffs’ federal claims.

B. Federal Constitutional Violations: Rick Elliott and the City of Jonesboro

Summary judgment is granted on plaintiffs’ claims against Elliott and the city because

Obregon committed no underlying federal constitutional violation. See McCoy v. City of

Monticello, 411 F.3d 920, 922–23 (8th Cir. 2005) (city cannot be held liable unless the

defendant police officer is found liable on an underlying substantive claim); Roe v. Humke,

128 F.3d 1213, 1218 (8th Cir. 1997) (police chief cannot be held liable given absence of

underlying violation of constitutional rights). Therefore, the claims against the city and

Elliott must be dismissed with prejudice even if there were improper city rules or regulations.

See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam) (“the fact that the

departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force

is quite beside the point”) (emphasis in original).

C. State Law Claims

Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims for state constitutional violations, negligence,

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the tort of outrage, and wrongful death are dismissed without prejudice because the balance

of factors to be considered in whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—points towards declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484

U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

Plaintiffs’ federal claims are dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiffs’ state law claims are

dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of August, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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