The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
EDWIN TURLINGTON and )
EDWIN HARDEE TURLINGTON II, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25-CV-0013-CVE-MTS
)
JOHNNY DAVIS, Major General, TYLER )
FLECK, CHRISTIANE TURLINGTON, )
LANCE TURLINGTON, and AARON NEAL, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant Aaron Neal’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 16) and
Defendant United States Army Lieutenant General Johnny Davis’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim (Dkt. # 20). Defendant Johnny Davis argues that he is mentioned in only one
allegation of the complaint, and he asks the Court to dismiss the claims against him under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dkt. # 20. Defendant Aaron Neal argues that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims asserted against him, and he also contends that plaintiff has failed to
assert a colorable claim under any theory. Dkt. # 16. Plaintiff Edwin Turlington1 has not responded
to Davis’ motion to dismiss, but he argues that he has adequately alleged that Neal is liable for
causing harm to plaintiff’s son, Hardee Turlington. Dkt. # 24.
1 All further references to “plaintiff” in this Opinion and Order will refer to Edwin Turlington.
The Court Clerk has added plaintiff’s son, Edwin Hardee Turlington, II (Hardee Turlington),
as a named plaintiff, and plaintiff’s allegations suggest that he intends to assert claims on
behalf of his son. However, the Court will subsequently explain in this Opinion and Order
that a pro se party such as plaintiff may not attempt to represent any other party, including
his children, and the only properly named plaintiff is Edwin Turlington. See infra at 5.
Plaintiff Edwin Turlington alleges that he resides near Miami, Oklahoma with his wife and
children, and his wife, Julie Turlington, is a teacher for Miami Public Schools. Dkt. # 1, at 3-4.
Plaintiff’s son, Hardee Turlington, transferred to Miami Public Schools and, on January 26, 2022,
school staff contacted child protective services after finding Hardee Turlington in possession of a
journal containing violent images. Id. at 4. Some of the images or depictions suggested that Hardee
Turlington had been the victim of physical abuse, and social worker Aaron Neal interviewed Hardee
Turlington about the images in the journal. Id. Hardee Turlington told Neal that the violent images
in the journal were “fiction” and that he had a very close relationship with his father. Id. Neal
interviewed other family members and school staff, but no one reported seeing evidence of abuse
or neglect. Id. at 5. When Neal interviewed Julie Turlington, plaintiff alleges that Neal told Julie
Turlington to “take the children and leave [plaintiff], press charges against [plaintiff], and file a
Protective Order against [plaintiff] and receive ‘services’ from the Department of Human Services
(DHS),” or Neal would take action to remove all of the Turlington’s children from their home. Id.
Julie Turlington and the children moved out of the family home and moved in with her mother-in-
law. Id.
Julie Turlington moved back into the family home about a week later, but she was concerned
that Hardee Turlington was making up stories of violence or abuse that would affect her professional
reputation. Id. at 6. Plaintiff and his wife determined that Hardee Turlington should temporarily go
to Kentucky to live with his uncle, Lance Turlington, and much of the complaint is devoted to
describing the negotiations to establish Hardee Turlington’s guardianship arrangement with Lance
Turlington. Id. at 7-11. Plaintiff alleges that Lance and Christiane Turlington allowed Hardee
Turlington to engage in inappropriate behavior and watch television shows that plaintiff found
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offensive. Id. at 12-13, 21-25. Hardee Turlington was expelled from his school and sent to an
alternative school due to his disruptive behavior. Id. at 16-18. It appears that plaintiff is involved
in legal proceedings in Kentucky to regain custody of Hardee Turlington, and he claims that Lance
and Christiane Turlington are opposing plaintiff’s actions by seeking to intervene in the custody
dispute. Id. at 21.
On January 7, 2025, plaintiff filed this case alleging claims of human trafficking, fraud, abuse
of process, educational neglect, and civil conspiracy. Id. at 26-27. Plaintiff could also be asserting
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
although it is not clear against which defendants he asserts such claims. Id. at 2. Plaintiff has named
Christiane and Lance Turlington, Neal, Tyler Fleck, and Davis as defendants. Davis is mentioned
only once in the complaint, and the complaint merely lists Davis’ business address in Fort Knox,
Kentucky. Lance Turlington has retained counsel and filed an answer, but it is unclear whether
Christiane Turlington and Tyler Fleck have been served. Davis and Neal have filed motions to
dismiss the claims against them.
Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) “generally take one of two forms. The moving party
may (1) facially attack the complaint’s allegations as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction,
or (2) go beyond allegations contained in the complaint by presenting evidence to challenge the
factual basis upon which subject matter jurisdiction rests.” Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v.
Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072, 1074 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Where a
motion to dismiss is based on a facial attack, as here, courts “apply the same standards under Rule
12(b)(1) that are applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action.” Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010).
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In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must determine
whether the claimant has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss is
properly granted when a complaint provides no “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). A complaint must contain enough “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
and the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing
any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 562. Although decided
within an antitrust context, Twombly “expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009). For the purpose of making the dismissal determination,
court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact,
and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to a claimant. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555; Alvarado v, KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Moffett v. Halliburton
Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002). However, a court need not accept as true
those allegations that are conclusory in nature. Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 263
F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2001). “[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual
averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (10th Cir. 1991).
Davis argues that plaintiff has failed to make any factual allegations that would give him
notice of the basis for plaintiff's claims against him, and Davis asks the Court to dismiss plaintiffs
claims against him. Neal argues that plaintiff's suit against him in his official capacity is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment and by plaintiffs failure to comply with the Oklahoma Governmental Tort
Claims Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 151 et seq. (OGTCA). Neal also contends that plaintiff has failed
to state a colorable claim against him. Plaintiff has failed to respond to Davis’ motion to dismiss and
plaintiff’s complaint plainly fails to state a claim against Davis. The complaint contains no
allegations giving Davis notice of the factual or legal basis for his inclusion in this lawsuit, and
Davis’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 20) should be granted.
Before proceeding to Neal’s arguments, the Court notes that plaintiff appears to be alleging
claims on behalf of himself and his minor son, Hardee Turlington. See Dkt. # 24, at 2 (alleging that
Neal failed to provide “competent care” to Hardee Turlington, and Neal’s violation of the standard
of care harmed plaintiff and Hardee Turlington). The Court notes that Edwin Hardee Turlington,
II is listed as a party on the docket sheet. The Tenth Circuit has clearly held that a non-attorney
parent may not bring claims on behalf of a minor child, although there is a limited exception to this
rule when the parent is seeking to recover social security disability benefits on behalf of a minor
child. Adams ex rel. D.J.W. v. Astrue, 659 F.3d 1297, 1299-1301 (10th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff Edwin
Turlington is not attempting to recover social security disability benefits for his son, and plaintiff is
not permitted to represent his son, Edwin Hardee Turlington, II, in this case. Any claims asserted
on behalf of Hardee Turlington must be dismissed, and plaintiff must be represented by an attorney
in order for any claims to brought on behalf of or by Hardee Turlington.
Neal argues that plaintiff has sued him for actions taken in his official capacity as an
employee of DHS, and these are treated as claims for money damages against the state of Oklahoma.
Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, states and state agencies that
qualify as arms of the State generally possess sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. See
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 616 (2002) (“The Eleventh
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Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States and by its
own citizens as well”); Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1252-53 (10th Cir.
2007). This immunity applies to a State entity whether a plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, or
monetary relief. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765
(2002). The Supreme Court has recognized two instances in which an individual may sue a state:
(1) where the suit is authorized by Congress, and (2) where a State voluntarily waives its sovereign
immunity. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670
(1999). Sovereign immunity is a limitation on the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and the Court
must address this issue even if not raised by the parties. Clymore v. United States, 415 F.3d 1113
(10th Cir. 2005).
DHS is an arm of the state for the purpose of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and a suit
against a DHS employee in his official capacity is treated as a claim against the state of Oklahoma.
Pietrowski v. Town of Dibble, 134 F.3d 1006, 1009 (10th Cir. 1998); McKinney v. State of
Oklahoma, Dept. of Human Services, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991). The complaint alleges
that Neal visited Miami Public Schools in his capacity as a social worker to interview Hardee
Turlington after receiving notification about the contents of Hardee Turlington’s journal. Dkt. # 1,
at 4. Neal conducted additional interviews concerning the alleged abuse or neglect of Hardee
Turlington, and Neal allegedly told Julie Turlington to remove the children from the family home
and divorce plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff’s response to Neal’s motion to dismiss also suggests that plaintiff
intends to sue Neal in his official capacity. Plaintiff states that Neal’s breach of his professional duty
to Hardee Turlington caused harm to his “client,” as well as to the client’s mother and father, and
plaintiff claims that Neal is “civilly liable” for his “flawed or inferior services.” Dkt. # 24, at 3.
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Plaintiff is clearly alleging claims against Neal for actions undertaken in his official capacity as a
social worker, and this type of claim is treated as a claim against Neal’s employer, DHS. DHS is an
arm of the state of Oklahoma and plaintiff's claims against Neal are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Davis’ and Neal’s motions to dismiss are granted, and they will be terminated as defendants.
The Court has also reviewed the docket sheet and it appears that defendants Tyler Fleck and
Christiane Turlington have not been served. Plaintiffs complaint was filed on January 7, 2025, and
plaintiff's deadline to serve the defendants was April 6, 2025. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Plaintiff shall
be required to show good cause for failing to serve Tyler Fleck and Christiane Turlington, and he
is advised that failure to respond to this order or show good cause will result in the dismissal of his
claims against these defendants.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Aaron Neal’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.
# 16) and Defendant United States Army Lieutenant General Johnny Davis’s Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. # 20) are granted. Johnny Davis and Aaron Neal are terminated as
defendants.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Edwin Hardee Turlington II is terminated as a party
plaintiff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Edwin Turlington shall show good cause for
his failure to timely serve Christiane Turlington and Tyler Fleck no later August 26, 2025.
DATED this 12th day of August, 2025.
Cerin ¥ bafpl—
CLAIREV.EAGAN (J)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE