State v. Brown

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State

v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-2804.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2025-OHIO-2804

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BROWN, APPELLANT.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as State v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-2804.]

Criminal law—Venue—R.C. 2923.32—Venue for prosecution of defendant for

engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32 proper

in county where any member of drug-selling enterprise conducted activity

on behalf of the enterprise, even if defendant did not himself conduct activity

on behalf of the enterprise in that county—Court of appeals’ judgment

affirmed.

(No. 2024-0474—Submitted May 14, 2025—Decided August 12, 2025.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Henry County, No. 7-23-05,

2024-Ohio-627.

__________________

KENNEDY, C.J., authored the opinion of the court, which DEWINE,

BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined. FISCHER, J., concurred

in judgment only.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

KENNEDY, C.J.

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the Third District Court of Appeals,

we consider whether venue in Henry County was appropriate for appellee the State

of Ohio’s prosecution of appellant, Kenneth Brown, for engaging in a pattern of

corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32 as a member of a criminal enterprise.

To answer that question, we must determine whether another member of the

enterprise participated in the affairs of the enterprise in Henry County.

{¶ 2} We conclude that because Alexandria Armijo participated in the

affairs of an enterprise of which Brown was also a member by selling cocaine in

Henry County, venue in Brown’s criminal case was proper there. Accordingly, we

affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} The Southside Gangster Disciples is a violent gang in the City of

Toledo in Lucas County. Its members have committed murder, robbery, assaults,

and other crimes. Brown, a Lucas County resident, along with his nephews

Anthony and Michael Lawrence, are members of the Tecumseh Street Gang. The

Tecumseh Street Gang is a subset of the Southside Gangster Disciples, whose

members primarily sell cocaine on the 800 block of Tecumseh Street in Lucas

County. They also had other sellers on Tecumseh who sold cocaine for them.

{¶ 4} The Tecumseh Street Gang’s drug activity eventually caught the

attention of law enforcement. A confidential informant had relayed to Special

Agent Brad Doolittle, an agent with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation who

is assigned to the Drug Enforcement Agency’s task force in Toledo, that Armijo

was a cocaine distributor based out of Lucas County and was dealing drugs for the

Tecumseh Street Gang.

{¶ 5} As part of its investigation, law enforcement set up a controlled buy

between the confidential informant and Armijo, during which the informant would

2

January Term, 2025

purchase cocaine from Armijo at her residence in Lucas County. After that first

controlled buy, Armijo offered to drive to the City of Napoleon in Henry County,

where the confidential informant lived, to sell the informant more cocaine.

{¶ 6} Part of the investigation leading to the second controlled buy included

surveilling Armijo. Law enforcement observed Armijo drive from her home to the

800 block of Tecumseh Street, where she purchased cocaine from Anthony. She

then drove to Henry County where she resold the cocaine to the confidential

informant before returning to Lucas County. Law enforcement repeated the same

operation for a third time a few weeks later.

{¶ 7} For the fourth controlled buy, law enforcement had an undercover

agent purchase an increased quantity of cocaine from Armijo in Henry County.

After completing the sale, she began driving back to Lucas County. Law

enforcement coordinated with the Ohio State Highway Patrol to pull Armijo over

for a traffic stop in Henry County, during which they found the “buy money” from

the transaction with the undercover agent and arrested her. During Armijo’s

interview with law enforcement, she explained that each time she sold cocaine in

Henry County, Anthony had sold it to her. She also explained that Anthony would

“front” her the cocaine, meaning that he sold it to her on credit: under that

arrangement, Armijo would keep a $500 profit from the sale after paying Anthony

the purchase price.

{¶ 8} Law enforcement requested Armijo’s cooperation in its investigation,

and she agreed to participate in a controlled buy from Anthony. After Armijo

agreed to cooperate, she drove from Henry County to Lucas County where she met

Anthony in a parking lot and paid him for the fronted drugs with money that law

enforcement had marked. Anthony returned to 807 Tecumseh Street and

surveillance for that day ended.

{¶ 9} Law enforcement then installed surveillance cameras on the 800 block

of Tecumseh Street. Surveillance revealed Brown participating in many “hand-to-

3

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

hand” exchanges of cocaine on Tecumseh Street with Anthony and Michael, as well

as others. Brown and his nephews started selling cocaine on the 800 block of

Tecumseh Street every day at 8 or 9 o’clock in the morning and stayed there until

7 to 10 o’clock at night.

{¶ 10} Ultimately, Brown was arrested and charged in the Henry County

Court of Common Pleas with one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity

in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) and (B)(1).

{¶ 11} At trial, Brown argued that the State had not established venue in

Henry County, because Armijo was not part of the Tecumseh Street Gang enterprise

in Lucas County. The trial court disagreed and denied Brown’s Crim.R. 29 motion

for acquittal. The jury found Brown guilty of engaging in a pattern of corrupt

activity and found that venue was proper in Henry County. Brown appealed.

{¶ 12} Before the Third District, Brown raised two assignments of error

concerning venue: he argued that the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish

that he was part of an enterprise engaging in a pattern of corrupt activities in Henry

County and that the jury’s venue finding was against the manifest weight of the

evidence because the acts that took place in Henry County were not part of an

enterprise to which Brown belonged. See 2024-Ohio-627, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.).

{¶ 13} The Third District disagreed, concluding that a reasonable juror

could find (1) that Brown was involved with Anthony and Michael in a drug-

dealing enterprise operating on the 800 block of Tecumseh Street in Lucas County,

id. at ¶ 30, (2) that the evidence at trial regarding Anthony’s fronting drugs to

Armijo that she then resold in Henry County brought her into the enterprise, id. at

¶ 31-34, and (3) that “[b]y fronting to Armijo, the enterprise came to have a direct

interest in the proceeds from the drugs sold to the buyer in [Henry County] and was,

therefore invested in the outcome of the transaction in Henry County,” id. at ¶ 34.

According to the Third District, venue was thus proper in Henry County.

4

January Term, 2025

{¶ 14} Brown appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction over his

sole proposition of law:

When the state shows that a wholesaler sold drugs to a

retailer who controlled her own work, the state has not met its

burden to prove that the retailer was part of the wholesaler’s

“enterprise” as defined by R.C. 2923.31 and 2923.32. As a result,

when venue is based solely on the county to which the retailer chose

to travel, the evidence of venue in that county is insufficient and a

guilty verdict against the wholesaler is against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

See 2024-Ohio-2373.

Law and Analysis

{¶ 15} On appeal, Brown challenges the jury’s finding that venue was

proper in Henry County, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence to

link Armijo’s drug-dealing activity in Henry County to the Tecumseh Street Gang’s

enterprise in Lucas County. He also argues that the jury’s decision was against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

Sufficiency of Evidence

{¶ 16} Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction is

a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Groce, 2020-Ohio-6671,

¶ 7. The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and

asks whether “‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Dean, 2015-Ohio-4347,

¶ 150, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the

syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated

in State v. Smith, 1997-Ohio-355, ¶ 49, fn. 4.

5

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 17} The appropriate standard of review for a sufficiency-of-the-evidence

challenge is “whether, if believed, the evidence can sustain the verdict as a matter

of law.” State v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, ¶ 13. When reviewing whether the

State met its burden of production, “an appellate court does not ask whether the

evidence should be believed but, rather, whether the evidence, ‘if believed, would

convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

State v. Pountney, 2018-Ohio-22, ¶ 19, quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the

syllabus.

{¶ 18} Brown does not contest that he was part of the Tecumseh Street

Gang’s drug-selling enterprise in Lucas County, but he disputes that the State

presented sufficient evidence establishing that Armijo’s sale of cocaine in Henry

County was part of that enterprise. If Armijo and Brown were part of the same

enterprise, then venue was proper in Henry County. See United States v. Crozier,

259 F.3d 503, 519 (6th Cir. 2001).

{¶ 19} R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) provides that “[n]o person employed by, or

associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly,

the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity.” (Emphasis

added.) The definition of “[e]nterprise,” which is “remarkably open-ended,”

includes “‘any organization, association, or group of persons associated in fact

although not a legal entity.’” State v. Beverly, 2015-Ohio-219, ¶ 8, quoting R.C.

2923.31(C)(1).

{¶ 20} The General Assembly modeled R.C. 2923.32 after a federal law,

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. 1961

et seq. See State v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 332 (1997).

{¶ 21} One way the State can show that a person was employed by or

associated with an enterprise is by showing that the person entered into a conspiracy

with another person who was a member of that enterprise. See United States v.

Godwin, 765 F.3d 1306, 1323 (11th Cir. 2014), citing United States. v. Browne,

6

January Term, 2025

505 F.3d 1229, 1264 (11th Cir. 2007). That is because an associated-in-fact

enterprise “shares important characteristics with the traditional conspiracy of

criminal law.” United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1981). A person

who merely agrees “to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise

through a pattern of racketeering activity brings [him or her] within the conspiracy.”

United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991).

{¶ 22} Of course, not all drug sales involve a conspiracy. See United States

v. Bostick, 791 F.3d 127, 139 (D.C.Cir. 2015). Someone who buys drugs from

another person but does not have an agreement with that person to resell the drugs

has not formed a conspiracy with the seller. See United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d

993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2013).

{¶ 23} But when a buyer agrees with the seller to distribute the drugs that

the buyer purchased, a conspiracy forms because “there is an agreement beyond the

mere sale for personal consumption.” United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 808

(7th Cir. 1994).

{¶ 24} The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that the trust

involved in selling drugs on credit (i.e., “fronting” drugs) “suggests more than a

buyer-seller arrangement” between the parties to the transaction. United States v.

Nesbitt, 90 F.3d 164, 167 (6th Cir. 1996). Ultimately, “evidence of fronting

coupled with evidence of repeat drug purchases is sufficient ‘to distinguish a

conspiracy from a nonconspiratorial buyer-seller relationship.’” United States v.

Gallegos, 784 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir. 2015), quoting United States v. Johnson,

592 F.3d 749, 755, fn. 5 (7th Cir. 2010).

{¶ 25} We now turn to the question whether Armijo was associated with the

same drug-sale enterprise as Brown. The State presented ample evidence

demonstrating that Armijo (1) had knowledge of the Tecumseh Street Gang’s drug-

selling enterprise, (2) knew and interacted with multiple members of the gang,

(3) had an agreement with Anthony and the enterprise to resell drugs on behalf of

7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

the enterprise, and (4) had purchased drugs from a member of the enterprise on

credit for resale purposes, meaning that she participated in the enterprise’s affairs

through a pattern of corrupt activity.

{¶ 26} Under the agreement Armijo had with Anthony, she purchased drugs

on credit from him to resell: she made several drug purchases from Anthony for the

purpose of resale, and at least once she purchased cocaine from him on credit,

making a $500 profit when she sold the cocaine to another party—that alone was

enough to form a conspiracy. See Gallegos at 1360. Armijo testified that she

purchased and resold drugs under that agreement between three and eight times.

And when Anthony was unavailable, she purchased drugs from other people in the

Tecumseh Street Gang.

{¶ 27} This evidence is sufficient to show that Armijo was associated with

the Tecumseh Street Gang’s drug-selling enterprise. Therefore, because Armijo

associated with the same enterprise as Brown, and because her conduct extended to

Henry County, venue for Brown’s trial was proper there.

Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 28} Within Brown’s single proposition of law, he also argues that his

conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State failed

to establish venue. This court does not ordinarily consider challenges to the

manifest weight of the evidence in noncapital cases. See State v. Tenace, 2006-

Ohio-2417, ¶ 36; State v. Were, 2008-Ohio-2762, ¶ 131; State v. Sanders, 2001-

Ohio-189, ¶ 56; State v. Stewart, 176 Ohio St. 156, 160 (1964). And we ordinarily

expect a proposition of law to be limited to a discrete legal issue that “could serve

as a syllabus for the case if the appellant prevails,” Rule 16.02(B)(4).

{¶ 29} Nonetheless, despite the irregular manner by which Brown’s

manifest-weight argument has reached us, we will—in this instance—address the

argument. But we caution future litigants that we expect such arguments to be

raised separately and that we do not ordinarily consider manifest-weight arguments

8

January Term, 2025

in noncapital cases.

{¶ 30} In a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, sitting as the

“thirteenth juror,” this court looks at the entire record and ‘“weighs the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines

whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed

and a new trial ordered,’” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 25, quoting State v.

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).

{¶ 31} We will vacate a jury’s verdict and order a new trial “‘only in the

exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction,’”

Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting Martin at 175. Accordingly, we review the record to

determine whether the “jury clearly lost its way,” Thompkins at ¶ 25. Brown argues

that Armijo’s testimony that she was not a member of the Tecumseh Street Gang,

that she retained the profits from her drug sales, and that the Tecumseh Street Gang

did not tell her who to sell to demonstrate that the jury’s finding that Armijo was

part of the Tecumseh Street Gang’s enterprise was against the manifest weight of

the evidence.

{¶ 32} But Armijo did not need to be an official member of the Tecumseh

Street Gang to join its drug-selling enterprise. Like the federal act, R.C. 2923.32 is

designed “broadly enough to encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking

many different forms and likely to attract a broad array of perpetrators operating in

many different ways,” H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229,

248-249 (1989). A reasonable juror could conclude from the evidence presented,

including the fact that Armijo purchased cocaine from Anthony on credit, that

Armijo was associated with the Tecumseh Street Gang’s drug-selling enterprise and

that she participated in its affairs through a pattern of corrupt activity. We therefore

conclude that the jury did not “clearly los[e] its way,” Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52,

at ¶ 25.

9

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Conclusion

{¶ 33} Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we

hold that there was legally sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Armijo

participated in the affairs of the Tecumseh Street Gang’s enterprise, of which

Brown was a member. As for Brown’s manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge,

a review of the record gives us no reason to believe that the jury mistakenly found

that venue was proper in Henry County. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the

Third District Court of Appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

__________________

Gwendolyn Howes-Gebers, Henry County Prosecuting Attorney, for

appellee.

Elizabeth R. Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick,

Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Steven L. Taylor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting

Attorneys Association.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Mathura J. Sridharan, Solicitor General, and

Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae

Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.

__________________

10