Mozdziak v. Romeo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ee ee ee et ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee eee HH HX

STEFAN MOZDZIAK,

Plaintiff,

24-cv-8579 (LAK)

-against-

ARIANNE ROMEO, et al.,

USDS SDNY

Defendants. DOCUMENT

ee ee ee et ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee eee HH HX

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

DOC #:

MEMORANDUM OPINION DATE FILED: 08/11/2025

Appearances:

Brett Harris Klein

BRETT H. KLEIN, ESQ., PLLC

Attorney for Plaintiff

Mark Robert Ferguson

Assistant Attorney General

LETITIA JAMES

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Attorney for Defendants

LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Stefan Mozdziak brings claims under Section 1983 arising from his expulsion

from State University of New York Maritime College (“SUNY Maritime”) and arrest by New York

State University Police — Maritime (“UPD”) officers. Defendants Arianne Romeo, Mark Martinez,

Richard Paulino, and Michael Perdoncin (collectively, “Defendants”) move to dismiss the complaint.

2

Facts1

Mozdziak alleges that, on September 21, 2021, a SUNY Maritime building official

contacted UPD to report that a racial epithet had been etched into the door of a dorm elevator.2 The

next day, a student “N.T.” emailed the UPD stating that he had observed the etching when he moved

into the dorm on August 23, 2021.3 On October 1, 2021, Assistant Dean Arianne Romeo received

statements from two students alleging they saw Mozdziak carve the epithet into an elevator on

August 29, 2021,4 six days after N.T. recalled having seen the etching. SUNY Maritime initiated a

disciplinary proceeding against Mozdziak and, after conducting a hearing, expelled him on November

12, 2021.5 Plaintiff alleges that “defendants withheld the exculpatory email known to them since

September 22, 2021 that confirmed that the racial epithet had been present on the elevator at least

a week before the two students claimed to have seen plaintiff carving it, and prior to plaintiff’s arrival

on campus.”6

About a week after his expulsion, Mozdziak was arrested by UPD officers Martinez,

Paulino, and Perdoncin (the “Officer Defendants”) and processed on charges of criminal mischief and

1

At this stage, the Court assumes the truth of the well-pleaded factual allegations of the

complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Palin v. N.Y. Times

Co., 940 F.3d 804, 809–10 (2d Cir. 2019).

2

Dkt 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 13.

3

Id. ¶ 14.

4

Id. ¶¶ 7, 16.

5

Id. ¶ 17.

6

Id. ¶ 18.

3

making graffiti.7 Mozdziak was issued a desk appearance ticket and later was charged by the Bronx

County District Attorney’s office.8 Those charges were dismissed and sealed on February 3, 2022.9

Mozdziak alleges that the UPD officers caused the prosecution to be commenced without probable

cause and withheld exculpatory information from prosecutors.10

While the criminal process was ongoing, Mozdziak filed an Article 78 proceeding in

New York state court challenging his expulsion.11 Mozdziak states that the New York Appellate

Division, First Department, annulled his expulsion based on the withholding of the purportedly

exculpatory statement from N.T.12

Mozdziak now brings claims against Romeo, the Officer Defendants, and unnamed

“officers and/or under agents of SUNY Maritime and/or UPD”13 (the “Unnamed Defendants”) under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest/unlawful imprisonment, malicious prosecution, violation of his right

to a fair trial/due process, failure to intervene, and supervisory liability.14

7

Id. ¶ 20.

8

Id. ¶ 21, 23.

9

Id. ¶ 25.

10

Id. ¶¶ 22–24.

11

Id. ¶ 27.

12

Id. ¶ 28.

13

Id. ¶ 9.

14

Id. ¶¶ 32–50.

4

Discussion

I. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”15

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”16 In deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.17

II. Personal Involvement

“It is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant's individual liability in a suit

brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant’s personal involvement in the

alleged constitutional deprivation.”18 “A complaint based upon a violation under Section 1983 that

does not allege the personal involvement of a defendant fails as a matter of law.”19 Defendants argue

that the complaint does not allege the personal involvement of any of the individual defendants in the

15

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)).

16

Id. at 678.

17

See Levy v. Southbrook Int’l Invs., Ltd., 263 F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 2001).

18

Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013).

19

Singleton v. DeMarco, No. 11-CV-2772 JS ETB, 2011 WL 2532928, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June

22, 2011).

5

constitutional violations alleged.

With respect to defendant Romeo, the complaint alleges that she received written

statements alleging Mozdziak’s involvement in carving the racial epithet.20 It does not allege that she

received or knew of the email from N.T.,21 nor does it allege that she was involved in the disciplinary

proceeding against Mozdziak. The only other allegation about her involvement is that she, along with

the Officer Defendants, “either directly participated in and/or supervised the false arrest, malicious

prosecution, withholding of exculpatory information, and due process violations detailed herein, or

failed to intervene in said constitutional violations despite being present for and/or aware that said

violations were occurring.”22 This vague, conclusory allegation fails to allege Romeo’s personal

involvement in the alleged deprivation of Mozdziak’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, the

complaint does not state a viable claim against Romeo.

With respect to the Officer Defendants, the complaint alleges that they arrested

Mozdziak, caused the filing of criminal charges against him without probable cause, and withheld

exculpatory information from prosecutors.23 The complaint thus alleges the personal involvement of

all three officers in these alleged constitutional violations.

20

Compl. ¶ 16.

21

The Complaint does allege that “defendants withheld [the N.T. email] known to them since

September 22, 2021,” id. ¶ 18, but it states only that the email was sent to UPD on that date

and does not otherwise allege facts giving rise to the reasonable inference that Romeo received

or knew of the email at that time.

22

Id. ¶ 30.

23

Id. ¶¶ 22–24.

6

III. Group Pleading

Defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed because it “consists almost

entirely of improper group pleading that fails to distinguish the specific acts of each Defendant.”24

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) “requires, at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant ‘fair notice of what

the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests.’”25 A complaint fails this standard where

it “lump[s] all the defendants together in each claim and provid[es] no factual basis to distinguish their

conduct.”26

Here, the allegations in the complaint do not distinguish among the Officer

Defendants. Nevertheless, “specificity as to each . . . [d]efendant’s individual actions is not required

where, as here, the complaint ‘gives each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the

ground upon which it rests.’”27 Accordingly, the complaint does not run afoul of the prohibition on

group pleading.

IV. Section 1983 Claims

The complaint alleges five claims under Section 1983: (1) false arrest/unlawful

24

Dkt 16 at 4.

25

Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App'x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Ferro v. Ry.

Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961)).

26

Id.

27

Buari v. City of New York, 530 F. Supp. 3d 356, 390–91 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (cleaned up)

(quoting Southerland v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 10-CV-5243 (SLT), 2010 WL 4916935,

at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2010)).

7

imprisonment, (2) malicious prosecution, (3) violation of the right to a fair trial/due process, (4)

failure to intervene, and (5) supervisory liability.28

A. Documents to be Considered

As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether the Court’s probable cause analysis

is limited to the face of the complaint, or whether the Court may consider the UPD police report

related to Mozdziak’s arrest. The police report includes copies of sworn statements from two

students alleging they saw the etching take place and implicating Mozdziak.29 Defendants argue that

the Court may take judicial notice of the police report because it was attached to Mozdziak’s verified

petition in the Article 78 proceeding, which was referenced in the complaint.30 Mozdziak argues that

this document is not incorporated into the complaint and cannot be considered.

“A court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court ‘not for the

truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation

and related filings.’”31 Here, defendants do not rely on the police report to establish the truth of the

matters asserted therein, nor do they rely on it merely to establish the fact of the parallel litigation or

the existence of the police report. Instead, they ask the Court to consider the contents of the police

28

Id. ¶¶ 32–50.

29

See Dkt 17-1. One statement names Mozdziak as the perpetrator, Dkt 17-1 at 3, while the

other refers to the perpetrator as “our teammate.” Id.

30

Compl. ¶ 27.

31

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir. 1992)

(quoting Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991)).

8

report in its probable cause analysis — consideration that is neither prohibited nor authorized

explicitly by Second Circuit precedent.

In Kramer v. Time Warner Inc.,32 the Second Circuit ruled that a court could consider

publicly filed documents in deciding whether to dismiss a securities fraud claim. In so ruling, the

court noted that the documents were “relevant not to prove the truth of their contents but only to

determine what the documents stated.”33 Here, the police report is relevant to determine what the

sworn statements say, not whether they are true. Kramer thus supports the view that the police

report may be considered for the purpose it was offered by defendants.

The Second Circuit’s decision Taylor v. Vermont Department of Education,34 offers

further support for this conclusion. There, the Second Circuit held that a court could take judicial

notice of the terms of a state court divorce decree in deciding a motion to dismiss.35 This notice was

not limited to the mere existence of a decree — the court relied on the terms of the decree in

adjudicating plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.36 Taylor thus indicates that a court, in taking judicial

notice of a state court document, is not limited to noticing the fact that a given document exists, but

32

937 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1991).

33

Id. at 774.

34

313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002).

35

Id. at 776.

36

Id. at 792 (noting that “[t]he divorce decree clearly states that all legal rights over education

lie with the father” and concluding that the mother’s “right to seek a hearing to challenge the

content of her daughter's academic files has therefore been ‘specifically revoked’” by the

decree such that she did not have a right to sue under the applicable statute).

9

may also consider the contents of that document so long as it does not consider it for the truth of the

matters asserted therein.

The permissibility of taking judicial notice of the contents of the sworn statements in

the police report is further reinforced by Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), which provides that a court “may

judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it can be accurately and readily

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Here, the fact that the

sworn statements were made “can be accurately and readily determined” from the police report.

Mozdziak does not dispute the accuracy of the police report as to the existence of the sworn

statements. Indeed, Mozdziak quoted the sworn statements in his Article 78 petition and attached

the police report to it.37

Mozdziak cites a report and recommendation in Regeda v. City of New York,38 for the

proposition that “[w]hile courts regularly take judicial notice of publicly filed documents in assessing

motions to dismiss, they make their determination of probable cause based on the allegations on the

face of the complaint.”39 But Regada is not persuasive here.

First, Regeda is distinguishable because the public records there at issue did not

“parallel the allegations in the complaint.”40 Here, in contrast, the Article 78 petition to which the

37

Dkt 24-1 at ¶¶ 53, 55.

38

No. 09-CV-5427 (KAM) (VVP), 2012 WL 7157703 (Sept. 7, 2012), report and

recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 619567 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013).

39

Id. at *3.

40

Id.

10

police report is attached does parallel the allegations made in this case.

Second, several other district courts in this Circuit have taken judicial notice of public

records for purposes analogous to those present here.41

Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the UPD police report and the contents

of the sworn witness statements contained therein but not for their truth.42

B. False Arrest

To state a claim for false arrest under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that “(1)

the defendant intended to confine [him]; (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) the

plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.”43

“The only element seriously at issue here is whether the confinement was privileged.

41

See King v. City of New York, No. 12-cv-2344 (NGG)(RER), 2014 WL 4954621, at *18–19

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (taking judicial notice of the contents of documents that were part

of a plaintiff’s state court criminal case file in resolving whether there was probable cause to

arrest); Wiltshire v. Williams, No. 10-cv-6947, 2012 WL 899383, at *10 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

16, 2012) (taking judicial notice of the contents of an order issued and an affidavit filed in

state court); Harris v. New York State Dep’t of Health, 202 F. Supp. 2d 143, 173 (S.D.N.Y.

2002) (taking judicial notice of the contents of an order in an Article 78 proceeding); 5-Star

Mgmt., Inc. v. Rogers, 940 F. Supp. 512, 518–19 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (taking judicial notice of

statement contained in a state court hearing transcript).

42

Defendants argue also that “[e]ven where a document is not incorporated by reference, the

court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect,

which renders the document integral to the complaint.” Dkt 16 at 2 n.2 (quoting Mangiafico

v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006)). It is not evident from its face that the

complaint relies heavily upon the terms and effect of the police report. In any event, in light

of the Court’s holding with respect to judicial notice, the Court need not resolve whether the

police report is integral to the complaint.

43

Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Broughton v. State

of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1975)).

11

If probable cause existed, [the Officer Defendants] would be privileged to make an arrest. An officer

has probable cause to arrest when he has ‘knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts

and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the

person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.’”44 “When information is received from

a putative victim or an eyewitness, probable cause exists, unless the circumstances raise doubt as to

the person’s veracity.”45

The parties dispute whether the N.T. email raises doubt as to the purported

eyewitnesses’ veracity sufficient to negate probable cause.. Defendants argue that the Officer

Defendants could “presume to rely upon the sworn statements of two eyewitnesses with no apparent

motive to falsify to establish probable cause for the arrest of Plaintiff.”46 They cite Streater v. West

Haven Police Department47 for the proposition that “the law governing arrests allows police officers

to credit one witness's version of events over another’s, as long as there is a reasonable basis to do

so.”48 Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the reasonableness of the Officer Defendants’

reliance on the sworn statements presents an issue of fact that goes directly to the existence of

probable cause.

44

Jocks v. Tavernier, 135 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.

1996)).

45

Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001).

46

Dkt 16 at 8.

47

2022 WL 1720355 (D. Conn. May 27, 2022).

48

Id. at *4.

12

Drawing all inferences in Mozdziak’s favor, as the Court must at this juncture, the

N.T. email arguably raised sufficient doubt as to the existence of probable cause. But that issue need

not be decided here, as even a determination of an absence of probable cause would not suffice to

sustain plaintiff’s false arrest claim. Even in that case, he would be obliged to defeat the qualified

immunity defense raised by defendant in order for the claim to be sustained.49

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for his discretionary

actions if his “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.”50 “Even if probable cause to arrest is ultimately found not

to have existed, an arresting officer will still be entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for damages

if he can establish that there was ‘arguable probable cause’ to arrest. Arguable probable cause exists

‘if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b)

officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.’”51

Here, two sworn statements from purported eyewitnesses indicated that Mozdziak had

committed a crime. Although the N.T. email undercut those statements because it indicated that the

etching had taken place earlier, it was unsworn and did not reflect an eyewitness account of the

incident. Mozdziak does not identify authority clearly establishing with the requisite “high degree of

49

See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2004) (qualified immunity defense may

“be asserted on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as long as the defense is based on facts appearing on

the face of the complaint”).

50

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

51

Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Golino v. City of New Haven,

950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991)).

13

specificity”52 that probable cause did not exist in such circumstances. At the very least, arguable

probable cause existed because officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the

probable cause test was met. Mozdziak is “entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts

alleged,” including “those that defeat the immunity defense.”53 But, taking into account the facts

alleged and the police report, it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts” that

would prove that there was not arguable probable cause.54

Accordingly, the Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the false

arrests claims as alleged.

C. Malicious Prosecution

“To succeed on a claim for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show that a

prosecution was initiated against him, that it was brought with malice but without probable cause to

believe that it could succeed and that the prosecution terminated in favor of the accused plaintiff.”55

“[C]ontinuing probable cause is a complete defense to a constitutional claim of malicious

prosecution.”56 As with the false arrest claim, a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity for a

52

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018).

53

McKenna, 386 F.3d at 436.

54

See Citibank, N.A. v. K–H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1494 (2d Cir. 1992).

55

Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2003).

56

Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2014).

14

malicious prosecution where there was arguable probable cause.57

For the reasons set forth above, there was arguable probable cause to arrest Mozdziak.

The complaint does not allege that any information arose nullifying that arguable probable cause

before the charges against Mozdziak were dismissed.58

Accordingly, the Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the

malicious prosecution claims as alleged.

D. Fair Trial

To state a claim for denial of a fair trial, a plaintiff must allege that “an (1)

investigating official (2) fabricates information (3) that is likely to influence a jury’s verdict, (4)

forwards that information to prosecutors, and (5) the plaintiff suffers a deprivation of life, liberty, or

property as a result.”59 “[I]n addition to the fabrication of evidence, ‘[p]olice officers can be held

liable . . . if they withhold exculpatory evidence from prosecutors.”60 “[A] Section 1983 claim for the

denial of a right to a fair trial based on an officer’s provision of false information to prosecutors can

57

Id. at 83.

58

See Kinzer v. Jackson, 316 F.3d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (“In order for probable cause to

dissipate, the groundless nature of the charge must be made apparent by the discovery of some

intervening fact.” (quoting Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1996)).

59

Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d 265, 279 (2d Cir. 2016).

60

Moroughan v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 514 F. Supp. 3d 479, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (second alteration

in original) (quoting Bermudez v. City of New York, 790 F.3d 368, 376 n.4 (2d Cir. 2015)).

15

stand even if the officer had probable cause to arrest the Section 1983 plaintiff.”61

Here, Mozdziak alleges that the Officer Defendants withheld exculpatory evidence,

the N.T. email, from prosecutors.62 But he does not allege that he was deprived of life, liberty, or

property. The Second Circuit has held that “a criminal defendant can bring a fair trial claim even

when no trial occurs at all.”63 But the plaintiff in that case suffered a deprivation of liberty because

the allegedly false testimony resulted in his three-and-a-half-year pretrial detention.64 Mozdziak does

not allege that he was subject to pretrial detention.65

Accordingly, Mozdziak has not alleged sufficiently a claim for denial of his fair trial

rights.66

61

Garnett, 838 F.3d at 277–78.

62

Compl. ¶ 24.

63

Frost v. New York City Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 249 (2d Cir. 2020).

64

Id. at 239, 249–50.

65

Mozdziak alleges that he was detained pursuant to his arrest. Compl. ¶ 33. But he does not

allege that he was detained pursuant to any charges filed by prosecutors allegedly caused by

the withholding of allegedly exculpatory information.

66

Defendants argue also that this claim should be dismissed because it is contradicted by the

police report, which references and attaches the N.T. email. See Dkt 17-1 at 2. However, it

is not clear from the face of the police report or the complaint that prosecutors had access to

the document at the time they charged Mozdziak. Defendants argue that “[p]laintiff’s baseless

assumption that the police paperwork was not provided to the prosecutors is a conclusory

allegation.” Dkt 23 at 8. But the Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences in

plaintiff’s favor at this stage, and plaintiff’s allegation that prosecutors did not have access

to the police report is at least plausible.

16

E. Failure to Intervene and Supervisory Liability

“A plaintiff cannot succeed ona claim for failure to intervene under § 1983 when there

is no underlying constitutional violation.” And where “there was no underlying constitutional

violation, there is also no supervisory liability.”°* Here, Mozdziak has not alleged sufficiently that

there was an underlying constitution violation for which he is entitled to relief.

Accordingly, the failure to intervene and supervisory liability claims must be dismissed.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt 15) is granted. This

ruling is without prejudice to a motion, filed no later than August 25, 2025, for leave to amend the

complaint. Any such motion must include (1) a clean copy of the proposed amended complaint, (2)

a redlined version of the proposed amended complaint showing all changes from the complaint, and

(3) a memorandum addressing why the amendments would not be futile.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2025 / /

[

Lewis A. Kaplan

United States District Judge

Kayo v. Mertz, 531 F. Supp. 3d 774, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Wieder v. City of New

York, 569 Fed. App'x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order)).

68

Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 129 (2d Cir. 2014).