Diehl v. Pennsylvania Parole Board

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES T. DIEHL, No. 4:25-CV-00019

Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AUGUST 11, 2025

Petitioner Charles T. Diehl initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for

a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges several denials of

parole, claiming that the decisions by the Pennsylvania Parole Board violated his

procedural and substantive due process rights. Because Diehl has not established a

constitutional violation, the Court will deny his Section 2254 petition.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Diehl is currently serving an aggregate 25- to 50-year sentence.1 That

sentenced is comprised of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration for aggravated assault and

arson (10 to 20 years’ incarceration for each offense, to be served consecutively),2

and attempted rape (5 to 10 years’ incarceration, to be served consecutively to

1 See Doc. 3-10; Doc. 8-2 at 2.

sentences for aggravated assault and arson).3 These sentences were entered in

1989 by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, and the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, respectively. His

controlling minimum date was December 2, 2013, and his maximum incarceration

date is December 2, 2038.4

Diehl has been denied parole in 2013, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2020, and

2024.5 The only parole denial he challenged in state court appears to be the 2024

decision.6 The Parole Board dismissed Diehl’s administrative challenge as

unauthorized, explaining that the regulation authorizing administrative relief does

not apply to discretionary decisions denying parole.7 Diehl sought review in the

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which likewise dismissed his challenge.8

In its August 12, 2024 decision, the Commonwealth Court concluded that it was

3 See Commonwealth v. Diehl, CP-51-CR-0422441-1988 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl., Phila. Cnty.); Doc.

3-10. On Diehl’s May 11, 2002 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) DC-16E

“Sentence Status Summary,” (Doc. 8-2), it states that on May 10, 2002, there was a clarification

of sentence” as to the Philadelphia County attempted rape offense, explaining that Diehl was

“originally sentenced in Philadelphia County on 9/28/89 to Attempted Rape” but that “[u]pon

reconsideration of sentence on 10/19/89 the charge was changed to Rape.” See Doc. 8-2 at 1.

Diehl attached as an exhibit a copy of the DOC’s DC-300B form for this October 19, 1989

reconsideration of sentence. See Doc. 3-1. However, Diehl has provided an updated DC-16E

form, dated May 10, 2023, which states that the Philadelphia County offense was indeed for

attempted rape and explicitly notes that “Version 3” of the DC-16E form was “created to reflect

the addition of offense code 901 [criminal attempt]” to the Philadelphia County rape offense.

See Doc. 3-10.

4 See Doc. 3-10.

5 See Doc. 8 ¶¶ 5-12.

6 See Doc. 3-12; Doc. 8-11.

7 See Doc. 3-13.

8 See Doc. 8-11.

without jurisdiction to entertain his challenge to the Parole Board’s 2024

discretionary decision to deny parole.9

Diehl unsuccessfully attempted to seek reconsideration of the

Commonwealth Court’s decision,10 and eventually sought review in the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania (although he had to seek allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc

due to administrative delays at the Commonwealth Court and with the prison mail

system).11 While his petition to appeal nunc pro tunc was pending, Diehl filed the

instant Section 2254 petition in this Court.12 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

ultimately denied Diehl’s petition to appeal nunc pro tunc on April 10, 2025.13

Diehl’s Section 2254 is now fully briefed and ripe for review. For the

following reasons, the Court finds that no habeas relief is due.

II. DISCUSSION

Diehl raises two grounds for relief in his Section 2254 petition. He first

contends that the Parole Board violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due

process rights by informing him at various parole denials that it would consider

“treatment-oriented goals” at future parole interviews, but then proceeded to deny

parole based on reasons that he claims are related to his original crimes of

9 See id.

10 See Docs. 3-18, 3-19, 3-26.

11 See Docs. 3-30, 3-35.

12 See generally Doc. 1.

13 See Doc. 17 ¶ 3.

conviction.14 Second, he contends that the Parole Board violated his Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process rights by relying on “erroneous information”

regarding the attempted rape conviction and the “negative recommendation of the

prosecuting attorney,” a negative recommendation he claims does not exist.15

Respondent raises a host of defenses to Diehl’s petition, asserting that many

of his challenges are barred by the statute of limitations, that he failed to exhaust

state-court remedies, and that the claims fail on the merits. Diehl, for his part,

spends nearly his entire 25-page memorandum of law discussing the factual

background of his case and the minutia of his attempts to exhaust state-court

remedies rather than the merits of his claims.16 Indeed, the first 21 pages of his

memorandum of law are devoted solely to those two subjects,17 and only a single

paragraph discusses the specific due process claims at issue.18

The Court, however, need not consider whether Diehl exhausted state-court

remedies or whether any specific challenge to the parole denials is barred by

14 See Doc. 3 at 1.

15 See id.

16 See Doc. 3 at 1-21.

17 See id.

18 See id. at 22-23. In his memorandum of law, Diehl purports to incorporate by reference his

May 2024 memorandum of law submitted to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. See id.

at 21. Yet that memorandum, too, is bereft of any real analysis of his due process claim (only

ground one of the instant Section 2254 petition was presented to the Commonwealth Court),

and instead primarily focuses on whether the claim is reviewable. See generally Doc. 3-14 at

5-13. When Diehl does discuss his specific due process claim, he simply asserts, in conclusory

fashion, that the way his parole reviews were handled violated his due process rights under the

state and federal constitutions. See id. at 5-6, 11-12.

Section 2254’s statute of limitations. That is because Diehl’s Fourteenth

Amendment claims do not warrant federal habeas relief.

1. Procedural Due Process Claim

In his first ground for relief, Diehl argues that his procedural due process

rights were violated when the Parole Board told him that certain “treatment-

oriented goals” would be considered in future parole interviews and then—even

when Diehl achieved those goals—the Parole Board denied parole based on other

“unchanging” factors related to his crimes of conviction.19 As examples of

“treatment-oriented goals,” he asserts that the Parole Board stated that, at future

interviews, it would consider whether he had received a favorable institutional

recommendation for parole and maintained a clear conduct record.20

A Pennsylvania inmate who is eligible for parole is entitled to have his

parole application “fairly considered.”21 Diehl appears to contend that, because he

successfully achieved the “treatment-oriented goals” mentioned by the Parole

Board but was still denied parole, his parole applications were not fairly considered

and thus his procedural due process rights were violated.22

19 See Doc. 14 at 1-4.

20 See id. at 2.

21 See Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 783 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn,

321 F.3d 374, 393 (3d Cir. 2003); Jamieson v. Commonwealth, Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 495

A.2d 623, 627 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (“[A] prisoner does have the right to apply for parole

. . . and have that application fairly considered by the Board.”)).

22 See Doc. 14 at 3.

This contention is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, Diehl has

proffered no evidence that his favorable institutional recommendation for parole

and clear conduct record were not considered by the Parole Board. Nor does he

allege or establish that his parole was denied because the Parole Board erroneously

determined that he had failed to achieve these “treatment-oriented goals.”

Second, simply because Diehl achieved the “treatment-oriented goals” does

not entitle him to parole, nor does it prevent the Parole Board from considering

other factors in its decision. To the contrary, under Pennsylvania’s parole statute,

61 PA. CONS STAT. § 6135, the Parole Board must consider numerous factors,

including the nature and circumstances of the offense(s), any recommendations by

the trial judge or prosecuting attorney, the “general character and background of an

inmate,” any victim statement submitted, the sentencing hearing notes of testimony

regarding “the nature and circumstances of the offense committed,” the conduct of

the person while incarcerated, the prisoner’s mental and behavioral condition and

history, history of family violence, and the inmate’s “complete criminal record.”23

The Parole Board, in its at-issue denials, averred that it had considered these

foregoing factors, reviewed Diehl’s file, and conducted an interview.24 Thus, it

may well be possible that the Parole Board “fairly considered” Diehl’s

rehabilitation accomplishments in prison and yet denied parole based on other

23 61 PA. CONS STAT. § 6135(a).

24 See Docs. 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-9, 3-11.

factors that it was statutorily required or permitted to consider. Indeed, the parole

denials in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2024 reflect that the Parole Board did just that.25

Accordingly, Diehl has failed to establish that his parole applications were not

“fairly considered” by the Parole Board, and thus he has not shown that the parole

denials violated procedural due process.

2. Substantive Due Process Claim

In his substantive due process claim, Diehl asserts that the Parole Board

relied on inaccurate information when it denied his parole applications.

Specifically, Diehl contends that Parole Board relied on a conviction for rape

instead of attempted rape, as well as a nonexistent “negative recommendation”

from the prosecuting attorney.26

The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause “contains a substantive

component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of

25 See Doc. 3-6 (2018 decision citing, inter alia, risk and needs assessment indicating level of

risk to the community; reports, evaluations, and assessments of risk indicating risk to the

community); Doc. 3-7 (2019 decision citing, inter alia, risk and needs assessment indicating

level of risk to the community; reports, evaluations, and assessments of risk indicating risk to

the community, minimization/denial of the offenses committed, refusal to accept

responsibility, lack of remorse, nature of the case); Doc. 3-9 (2020 decision citing, inter alia,

risk and needs assessment indicating level of risk to the community; reports, evaluations, and

assessments of risk indicating risk to the community, lack of remorse); Doc. 3-11 (2024

decision citing, inter alia, risk and needs assessment indicating level of risk to the community;

reports, evaluations, and assessments of risk indicating risk to the community, nature of crime).

The 2018 parole decision appears to be the first time that Diehl received a positive

recommendation for parole from the Department of Corrections. Compare Docs. 3-3, 3-4, 3-

5, with Doc. 3-6.

26 See Doc. 14 at 4.

the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”27 With respect to parole

determinations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held

that a parole board’s decision can violate an inmate’s substantive due process

rights if it applies “standards that are divorced from the policy and purpose of

parole” or other “impermissible criteria.”28 Specifically, the specter of a

substantive due process violation is raised only when “a parole board considers a

factor that ‘shocks the conscience.’”29 If, however, there is “some basis” for the

parole board’s decision, and that basis is not “constitutionally impermissible” or

conscience-shocking, a substantive due process challenge will fail.30

Diehl’s assertions in ground two are not without factual support. From the

DOC’s varying versions of its DC-16E forms, it appears that Diehl’s conviction for

attempted rape was inaccurately identified as rape from May 2002 until it was

corrected in May 2023. Furthermore, Diehl has undertaken extensive investigation

to determine the nature and substance of the purported “negative recommendation”

27 Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.

113, 125 (1990)).

28 See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 & n.2, 238, 240 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Burkett v. Love,

89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In Block, the . . . panel majority concluded that in [using

arbitrary criteria for denying parole], the [Parole Board] violated substantive due process in

grounding its action on constitutionally impermissible reasons.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

29 Holmes v. Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Newman, 617 F.3d at 782).

30 See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001).

from the prosecuting attorney, resulting in what appears to be Respondent’s

concession that no such negative recommendation exists.31

Had these inaccurate factual predicates been the sole basis for Diehl’s

denials of parole, he may very well have established a substantive due process

violation by the Parole Board.32 His due process claim falls short, however,

because (1) there is no evidence that the Parole Board was influenced by the

inaccurate offense identification; and (2) while the Parole Board may have relied

on a nonexistent “negative recommendation from the prosecuting attorney,” that

was not the only basis for the at-issue parole denials.

Initially, Diehl has not proffered any evidence that the inaccurately reported

offense of rape (rather than attempted rape) adversely affected the at-issue parole

decisions. There is nothing in the parole denials reflecting such an effect, nor has

Diehl offered any other proof that the Parole Board based its denials on a rape

conviction rather than a conviction for attempted rape. Indeed, Diehl’s singular

31 See Doc. 3-8 (decision by Pennsylvania Office of Open Records granting Diehl’s appeal and

requiring Delaware County District Attorney’s Office to disclose any “negative

recommendation letter from the prosecuting attorney” regarding parole in 2016 and 2018);

Doc. 8-10 (revised June 10, 2024 Parole Board decision removing the “negative

recommendation made by the prosecuting attorney” factor from its April 5, 2024 denial).

32 See, e.g., Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that United States

Parole Commission lacked rational basis to deny parole based on prisoner’s alleged but

unfounded membership in an organized crime family) (citing Campbell v. U.S. Parole

Comm’n, 704 F.2d 106, 109 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Commission may not base its judgment as

to parole on an inaccurate factual predicate.”)); Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1441-42

(11th Cir. 1991) (holding that parole board’s reliance on “knowingly false information” to deny

parole constitutes arbitrary and capricious state action that violates substantive due process).

focus on rape versus attempted rape ignores his other serious offenses: aggravated

assault and arson. Furthermore, it strains credulity to believe that a conviction for

attempted rape would be viewed in a dramatically different fashion than a

conviction for the completed offense, at least with respect to a prisoner’s potential

risk to the community and fitness for parole.

Second, while the Parole Board may have relied on a nonexistent “negative

recommendation” from the prosecuting attorney in its parole denials from 2016,

2018, 2020, and April 2024 (before the June 2024 revision), this was not the only

basis for those denials. In its 2016 decision, the Parole Board additionally relied

on the risk and needs assessment indicating level of risk to the community; reports,

evaluations, and assessments of risk indicating risk to the community; and the

negative recommendation from the DOC. In its 2018 decision, the Parole Board

additionally listed the risk and needs assessment indicating level of risk to the

community; as well as reports, evaluations, and assessments of risk indicating risk

to the community. In its 2020 decision, the Parole Board additionally cited the risk

and needs assessment indicating level of risk to the community; reports,

evaluations, and assessments of risk indicating risk to the community; and lack of

remorse. And finally, it its 2024 decision, the Parole Board noted the risk and

needs assessment indicating level of risk to the community; reports, evaluations,

and assessments of risk indicating risk to the community; and the nature of the

crime.

Thus, while it appears that as part of several denials, the Parole Board may

have relied on inaccurate information regarding the prosecuting attorney’s parole

recommendation, it cannot be said that the Parole Board’s denials were solely

driven by that particular factor. Diehl’s case, therefore, materially differs from

cases where a substantive due process violation was found because the parole

authority based its denial of parole entirely on an inaccurate factual predicate.33

“[F]ederal courts, on habeas review, are not to ‘second-guess parole boards,’

and the requirements of substantive due process are met if there is some basis for

the challenged decision.”34 Despite what likely could be considered inaccurate

information regarding the prosecuting attorney’s negative parole recommendation,

the Parole Board nevertheless provided “some basis” for its parole denials in 2016,

2018, 2020, and 2024 that did not rest on this challenged information. Diehl,

therefore, has failed to establish a substantive due process violation.

33 Cf. Gambino, 134 F.3d at 162 (improperly denying parole based on unfounded membership in

organized crime family); Monroe, 932 F.2d at 1441-42 (improperly denying parole based on

knowingly false information regarding prior alleged sexual assault); Kohlman v. Norton, 380

F. Supp. 1073, 1074-75 (D. Conn. 1974) (improperly denying parole based on unfounded

allegation of armed robbery when there was no evidence defendant was armed during offense).

34 Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Coady, 251 F.3d at 487).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Diehl’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court likewise declines to issue a

certificate of appealability, as Diehl has failed to make a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right,35 or that “jurists of reason would find it debatable”

whether this Court’s procedural rulings are correct.36 An appropriate Order

follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

35 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

36 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).