Payne v. Gossage

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

KRAIG PAYNE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.: 3:24-cv-03215-JEH

)

)

NATHAN GOSSAGE and )

ANDREW HILL, )

)

Defendants. )

Order

This cause is before the Court on the Parties’ pending motions.

Plaintiff Keith Payne is an inmate with the Illinois Department of

Corrections (IDOC). Currently, Plaintiff is housed at the IDOC’s Lawrence

Correctional Center, but during the relevant time, Plaintiff was housed at the

IDOC’s Western Illinois Correctional Center (Western Illinois). Also during the

relevant time, Defendant Nathan Gossage was a Correctional Officer at Western

Illinois, and Defendant Andrew Hill was a Correctional Sergeant at Western

Illinois.

Plaintiff has filed three motions that need the Court’s attention. Defendants

have moved for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion. The Court will

address the Parties’ motions seriatim.

I

A

On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging a violation of his Constitutional rights. On September 19, 2024, the Court

conducted a merit review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, which is required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A, and found that Plaintiff’s Complaint stated a claim for a violation of his

Eighth Amendment rights based upon the Western Illinois officials’ failure to

protect him from the attack of another inmate(s) on January 29, 2024. But because

Plaintiff had failed to name a proper defendant to his § 1983 suit, the Court added

Western Illinois Warden Brittany Greene as a placeholder Defendant. The Court

advised Plaintiff that he would, at some point in the litigation, need to file an

amended complaint in which he identified, by name, the person or persons who

allegedly violated his Eighth Amendment rights because he did not allege facts

showing that Warden Greene was personally involved in violating his Eighth

Amendment rights and because the Court was only allowing the case to proceed

against Warden Greene so that he could use the discovery tools contained within

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to identify and to name a proper defendant(s)

to his claim.

On February 20, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend,

allowed Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint, and added C/O Gossage and Sgt.

Hill as party Defendants to this lawsuit. Defendants have now moved for

summary judgment based upon the issue of exhaustion.

B

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because

Plaintiff failed to exhaust properly his administrative remedies before he filed this

lawsuit as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Defendants

contend that Plaintiff submitted only two grievances to the Administrative Review

Board (ARB) related to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim as he

alleged in the Amended Complaint. The first Grievance is dated March 14, 2024.

The second Grievance is dated May 3, 2024.

Defendants argue that neither grievance satisfied Plaintiff’s exhaustion

requirements under the PLRA because neither grievance identified them by name

so that they were placed on notice of Plaintiff’s claim against them. In fact,

Defendants note that the ARB returned Plaintiff’s March 14, 2024 grievance to him

because “no staff were named/described for follow up” and because “[n]o other

individual was named, thereby not allowing this office to confirm that grievant

was placed near a KSF (keep separate from).” D/E 40-4. Defendants assert that

Plaintiff never re-submitted his March 14, 2024 grievance or otherwise provided

the information to the ARB that was necessary for the ARB to resolve his grievance.

Finally, because his May 3, 2024 grievance only tangentially mentions the attack

against him from other inmates and because Plaintiff never submitted any other

grievance(s) that is/are s related to the facts contained within his Amended

Complaint, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because

Plaintiff failed to exhaust properly his administrative remedies before he filed this

lawsuit as required by the PLRA.

C

Plaintiff argues that he did, in fact, exhaust his administrative remedies

before he filed this lawsuit. In support of his argument that he exhausted his

administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff filed a document on

April 29, 2025, that he entitled “Proof of Execution.” D/E 30. Plaintiff argues that

this document demonstrates that he exhausted his administrative remedies. This

document is the ARB’s response to Plaintiff’s grievance dated March 14, 2024.

Plaintiff argues that he referred to “correctional officers” in his March 14, 2024

grievance because he did not know the names of the two correctional officers—at

the time—who failed to protect him from the other inmate’s physical assault.

Therefore, Plaintiff states that he simply referred to correctional officers as having

violated his rights when he submitted his March 14, 2025 grievance, which he

appealed to the ARB and which the ARB denied.

In short, Plaintiff contends that he did all that he could in order to follow

Illinois’ grievance process, and to the extent that he failed to follow the process

correctly, the blame should go on the staff at Western Illinois, not on him.

Accordingly, Plaintiff asks the Court to deny Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the issue of exhaustion.

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall

be granted if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a);

Ruiz-Rivera v. Moyer, 70 F.3d 498, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1995). The moving party has the

burden of providing proper documentary evidence to show the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must come forward

with specific evidence, not mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, which

demonstrates that there is a genuine issue for trial. Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck,

N.V., 112 F.3d 291, 294 (7th Cir. 1997). “[A] party moving for summary judgment

can prevail just by showing that the other party has no evidence on an issue on

which that party has the burden of proof.” Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives

Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, the non-movant cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must

designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or

admissions that establish that there is a genuine triable issue; he must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 261 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)

(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986));

Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1999). Finally, a scintilla

of evidence in support of the non-movant’s position is not sufficient to oppose

successfully a summary judgment motion; “there must be evidence on which the

jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

III

A

The PLRA requires an inmate to exhaust the available administrative

remedies before filing a § 1983 lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner . . . until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”); Massey v. Wheeler, 221

F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000). Exhaustion is mandatory. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 95 (2006) (“The benefits of exhaustion can be realized only if the prison

grievance system is given a fair opportunity to consider the grievance. The prison

grievance system will not have such an opportunity unless the grievant complies

with the system’s critical procedural rules.”); Dole v. Chandler, 43 F.3d 804, 809 (7th

Cir. 2006).

No futility, sham, or substantial compliance exception exists to this

requirement, and a plaintiff seeking only monetary damages for ongoing

conditions must still utilize the grievance procedure in place before filing suit.

Massey, 259 F.3d at 646 (inmate alleging failure to repair a hernia timely must

exhaust administrative remedies even though surgery was performed and only

money damages claim remained); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736-37 (2001) (the

PLRA requires administrative exhaustion even where grievance process does not

permit award of money damages, if “some action” in response to a grievance can

be taken). Likewise, the exhaustion requirement includes claims that only seek

equitable relief. Falcon v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 52 F.3d 137, 139 (7th Cir.

1995).

Exhaustion means properly and timely taking each step in the

administrative process established by the applicable procedures. Pozo v.

McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (failure to file timely administrative

appeal constitutes failure to exhaust administrative remedies and bars a § 1983

suit). “[I]f a prison has an internal administrative grievance system through which

a prisoner can seek to correct a problem, the prisoner must utilize that

administrative system before filing a claim.” Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733

(7th Cir. 1999). A dismissal for failure to exhaust is without prejudice, so

reinstatement is not barred unless the time for exhaustion has expired. Walker v.

Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2002). If issues of fact exist in determining

whether an inmate has exhausted his administrative remedies, a judge should

hold a hearing and resolve these factual disputes, so long as the exhaustion issues

are not intertwined with the merits questions. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742

(7th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025).

Illinois has established an internal administrative grievance system for

prisoners to complete in order to correct a problem that the prisoner encounters

within the prison setting. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810 et seq. Under the current

grievance procedures, a prisoner may file a written grievance with his grievance

officer within sixty (60) days of discovery of the dispute. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §

504.810(a). The grievance should include “factual details regarding each aspect of

the offender’s complaint, including what happened, when, where, and the name

of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint

. . . [or] as much descriptive information about the individual as possible.” Id.

The grievance officer is then required to review the grievance and report

findings and recommendations to the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”). 20

Ill. Adm. Code § 504.810(c). The prisoner then has the opportunity to review the

CAO’s response. 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.830(e). If the prisoner is unsatisfied with

the institution’s resolution of the grievance, he may file an appeal to the Director

through the AR within thirty (30) days of the CAO’s decision. 20 Ill. Adm. Code §

504.850. The ARB is required to make a final determination of the grievance within

six months after receiving it. Id. Completion of this process exhausts a prisoner’s

administrative remedies.

B

The Court finds that Defendants have failed to carry their burden of

showing that they are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of the exhaustion

of his administrative remedies by Plaintiff. Smallwood v. Williams, 59 F.4th 306, 315

(7th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e must bear in mind that failure to exhaust is an affirmative

defense, and as such the burden of proof is on the defendants to establish that

administrative remedies were not exhausted, and not on the prisoner to show that

administrative remedies were unavailable.”); Schaefer v. Bezy, 336 F. App’x 558, 560

(7th Cir. 2009) (“Because the prison employees bear the burden on exhaustion,

they must do more than point to a lack of evidence in the record; rather they must

‘establish affirmatively’ that the evidence is so one-sided that no reasonable

factfinder could find that Schaefer was prevented from exhausting his

administrative remedies.” (citation omitted)). The Court agrees with Defendants

that Plaintiff’s March 14, 2024 grievance is the only grievance that is relevant to

this case. D/E 40-4. The Court also agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff failed to

identify them, by name, in his March 14, 2024 grievance as required by the

grievance process. Id.; 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(c). Finally, the Court agrees

with Defendants that the undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff did not re-

submit this grievance to the ARB, nor did Plaintiff subsequently provide the

information that the ARB noted was lacking in his March 14, 2024 grievance.

Haywood v. Baylor, 804 F. App’x 401, 403 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Because refiling was

available to him, Haywood’s failure to exhaust is not excusable.”).

Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s March 14, 2024 grievance

satisfied Plaintiff’s exhaustion requirements. In making this determination, the

Court is guided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s

holding in Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 2020). In Reid, the inmate plaintiff

appealed the denial of his grievance to the ARB, but the ARB appeal denied his

grievance because it did not include a copy of the counselor’s response. Id. at 328.

Despite not providing all of the information required, the Seventh Circuit

found that the inmate plaintiff’s actions had satisfied his exhaustion requirement

because, in denying the grievance, the ARB did not check the additional box on

the form that would invite the inmate plaintiff to re-submit his appeal with the

counselor’s form. Id. As a result, the Seventh Circuit found that the ARB’s

communication with the inmate plaintiff so obscured the administrative process

that it became unknowable to the inmate plaintiff, and therefore, the

administrative review process was unavailable to him for exhaustion-of-

administrative-remedies purposes. Id. at 330; Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,

957 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir. 2020) (noting that the ARB checked boxes indicating the

inmate had not properly followed standard procedure by including copies of his

counselor and grievance officer responses, but the ARB did not check the box

simply inviting more information); Butler v. Orenstein, 2024 WL 4379569, * 3 (7th

Cir. Oct. 3, 2024) (reiterating that if the ARB checks a box for an appeal missing

attachments, but does not give instructions on next steps, then further redress is

unavailable).

In the instant case, the ARB simply noted that Plaintiff had failed to provide

the names of the staff members who failed to protect him from the inmate’s assault.

D/E 40-4. The ARB further noted that Plaintiff’s failure to name the individuals

involved had deprived the ARB from allowing it to confirm whether Plaintiff had

been placed in proximity with another inmate against whom he had a “keep safe

from” order. Id.

But the ARB’s resolution of Plaintiff’s March 14, 2024 grievance did not

direct him to re-submit his Grievance. Id. The ARB’s resolution of Plaintiff’s March

14, 2024 grievance did not direct Plaintiff to provide the missing information. Id.

Instead, the ARB resolved Plaintiff’s March 14, 2024 grievance by indicating that

the ARB had “DENIED” his grievance, and then, the ARB provided that grounds

for doing so. Id.; Reid, 962 F.3d at 327–30 (finding remedies were unavailable to a

prisoner because officials’ communications left the prisoner with no conceivable

next steps since the ARB checked the box for the prisoner to submit missing

documents but did not check the box for him to return the grievance with the

additional information requested); Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 957 F.3d

828, 833-34 (7th Cir. 2020) (concluding that a prisoner exhausted all available

remedies when the ARB returned the appeal as insufficient due to missing

documents, but did not check the box to provide the missing materials).

Exhaustion is not intended to provide individual notice to each prison

official who might later be sued; it is designed to provide the prison with notice of

the problem and give them an opportunity to fix it. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709,

722 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)); Turley v. Rednour,

729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). As such, an inmate must provide enough

information to serve the grievance’s function of giving “prison officials a fair

opportunity to address [an inmate's] complaints.” Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722.

Plaintiff alleged in his March 14, 2024 grievance that “correctional officers”

failed to protect him from another inmate’s attack on January 29, 2024. This

information was sufficient to place the officials at Western Illinois on notice that

Plaintiff was alleging that correctional officers at the prison were involved in

violating his rights on January 29, 204. This information was sufficient to allow the

officials at Western Illinois to investigate Plaintiff’s claim and to address his claim

at the institutional level. This fact, when coupled with the fact that the ARB denied

Plaintiff’s appeal of his March 14, 2024 grievance rather than holding a decision in

abeyance until he provided additional information or rather than telling Plaintiff

that he should re-submit his grievance with the additional information, leads the

Court to find that Defendants have failed to carry their burden on summary

judgment of showing that they are entitled to summary judgment based upon the

issue of exhaustion. Therefore, Defendants’ motion is denied.

IV

Plaintiff’s motions are similarly denied.

A

In his first motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to compel the setting of a trial.

Plaintiff asserts that his claim should be heard by a jury, not dismissed on

summary judgment.

Plaintiff’s motion is denied. Although the Court has denied Defendants’

motion for summary judgment based upon the issue of exhaustion, the Court will

not deprive Defendants of the opportunity to file a motion for summary judgment

on the merits if they believe that such a motion is justified at the conclusion of the

period established for discovery.

B

In his second motion, Plaintiff does not ask the Court for any specific relief.

Instead, Plaintiff cites the requirements for filing motions and for taking other

actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois and

in Illinois state court. Because he has not asked the Court to take any specific action

in this motion, Plaintiff’s second motion is denied.

C

In his third motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to transfer this case to the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiff argues that he

has another case pending in the Northern District that is related to this case.

Plaintiff contends that the Northern District is capable of resolving Defendants’

motion for summary judgment that is pending in this case and that because both

of his claims in both cases involve hate crimes, it would be more convenient to

consolidate this case with his case in the Northern District of Illinois. Accordingly,

Plaintiff asks the Court to transfer this case.

Plaintiff’s motion is denied. Contrary to his contention, the Court does not

believe that his two case are sufficiently related so as to warrant a transfer.

Plaintiff’s claim in this case arose out of a violation of his Constitutional rights at

Western Illinois. Plaintiff’s claim in his Northen District case, as the Court

understands his motion, arose out of actions that occurred at the Stateville

Correctional Center. Moreover, Plaintiff chose to file this case in this District, and

he has failed to show why the Court should transfer the case now.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of

exhaustion [40] is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s motion to compel [45] is DENIED.

3. Plaintiff’s motion based upon the Local Rules [46] is DENIED.

4. Plaintiff’s motion to transfer [47] is DENIED.

It is so ordered.

Entered: August 11, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge