United States of America upon the relation and for the use of the Tennessee Valley Authority v. An Easement and Right -of-Way over 0.98 Acre of Land, More or Less, in Knox County Tennessee

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, upon relation )

and for the use of the TENNESSEE VALLEY )

AUTHORITY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 3:24-CV-00037-DCLC-DCP

)

AN EASEMENT AND RIGHT-OF-WAY OVER )

0.98 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, IN )

KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE, and JOYCE )

FRITTS, Trustee of the Joyce Fritts Family Trust, )

a Revocable Living Trust, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Tennessee Valley Authority’s Motion in

Limine [Doc. 93], the TVA’s Memorandum in Support [Doc. 94], Defendant Joyce Fritts’s

Response [Doc. 108], and the TVA’s Reply [Doc. 116].

Last year, the TVA initiated this action for the taking of property under the power of

eminent domain. [Compl., Doc. 1]. Specifically, it condemned a permanent easement and right-

of-way over Ms. Fritts’s property—0.98 acres in Knox County—for “the erection, operation,

and maintenance of electric power transmission circuits and communication circuits,” [id. at

1], and it filed a declaration of taking and a deposit of $112,100.00 as its estimation of just

compensation under the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3114−3118, [Pl.’s Decl. of

Taking, Doc. 1-3, at 1]. ]. The TVA’s condemnation of Ms. Fritts’s property is part of the Hardin

Valley Transmission Project, which affects seventy-nine other properties. The easement on the

condemned portion of Ms. Fritts’s property essentially bisects her property, so that remnants of

her property abuts either side of the easement:

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The sole dispute between the parties is whether the TVA’s compensation is just. See

Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 233 (2003) (“When the government physically

takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to

compensate the former owner[.]” (quotation omitted)). Ahead of the upcoming trial on this

dispute, the TVA makes twenty-one separate requests to exclude evidence in limine, and Ms.

Fritts contends that the Court should grant in part and deny in part the TVA’s motion.

A district court’s authority to rule on an evidentiary motion in limine comes from its

“inherent authority to manage the course of trials,” rather than a specific provision of the Federal

Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38,

41 n.4 (1984) (citation omitted). A district court’s choice to grant or deny a motion in limine is,

therefore, “purely discretionary.” United States v. Certain Land Situated in Detroit, 547 F.

Supp. 680, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1982). The function of a motion in limine is to bar evidence that is

“clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Contract Mgmt., Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Tech. Servs.

Y-12, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-110, 2012 WL 2529214, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. June 29, 2012) (quoting Ind.

Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846–47 (N.D. Ohio 2004)). “Unless evidence

meets this high standard,” a district court will not exclude evidence in limine. Id. The party

moving to exclude evidence in limine has the burden of meeting this high standard. Smith v.

Highland Park Ruritan Club, No. 3:06-CV-351, 2008 WL 2669107, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. June 27,

2008).

1. TVA’s First Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s first request in limine, it maintains that the Court should preclude Ms.

Fritts from offering witnesses or exhibits that she did not disclose under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(a). [Pl.’s Mem. at 5–6]. Ms. Fritts states that she does not “not generally oppose”

the TVA’s request—an equivocal statement that reads neither as opposition nor non-opposition.

[Def.’s Resp. at 4]. In any case, the TVA does not identify any specific witnesses or exhibits

that Ms. Fritts has failed to timely disclose under Rule 26(a). The TVA’s first request in limine

is therefore DENIED. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(b) (“Briefs shall include . . . the factual and

legal grounds which justify the ruling sought from the Court” (emphasis added)).

2. TVA’s Second Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s second request in limine, the TVA argues that the Court should limit

Ms. Fritts’s expert appraiser Gregory Bonneville’s testimony so that it conforms to the Court’s

forthcoming ruling on the parties’ pending dispute under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and

703 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Corp., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). [Pl.’s Mem. at

6]. Ms. Fritts opposes this request because the “TVA’s showing, at this point, is insufficient to

allow the Court to determine that all Mr. Bonneville’s testimony is clearly inadmissible on all

potential grounds.” [Def.’s Resp. at 6].

United States Magistrate Judge Debra C. Poplin recently recommended that the Court

exclude Mr. Bonneville’s opinion on just compensation, and Ms. Fritts has timely objected to

Magistrate Judge Poplin’s recommendation, which is pending the Court’s adjudication. [Def.’s

Objs., Doc. 137]. “A ruling on a motion in limine is no more than a preliminary, or advisory,

opinion,” United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted)), and the

Court, which intends to address her recommendation on the merits in short order, can fathom

no reason to offer an advisory opinion on that recommendation here on a motion in limine. The

Court therefore reserves ruling on the TVA’s second request in limine, which it will effectively

address in resolving Ms. Fritts’s objections.

3. TVA’s Third Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s third request in limine, it argues that the Court should bar Ms. Fritts

from testifying because she previously stipulated that she would not testify. [Pl.’s Mot. at 6]. Ms.

Fritts does not oppose this request so long as Garner Fritts, Ms. Fritts’s son, whom Ms. Fritts

describes as “a resident of the property” and the “next in line to be the trustee,” may offer lay

testimony about the value of the property at issue. [Def.’s Resp. at 6].

The Court will not permit Ms. Fritts to renege on her stipulation or render it conditional

in any way. “Stipulations voluntarily entered by the parties are binding, both on the district court

and on [the Sixth Circuit],” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 942 F.2d

1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 1991), and in a document that Ms. Fritts’s attorney jointly signed with the

TVA and filed with the Court, the parties stipulated as follows:

STIPULATION REGARDING DISCOVERY OF AND EVIDENCE

PROFFERED BY DEFENDANT

Plaintiff and Defendant stipulate for all purposes in this action, including trial, that (1)

Plaintiff will not take the deposition of Joyce Fritts and (2) Joyce Fritts will not testify or

proffer evidence for any purpose.

[Joint Stipulation, Doc. 26, at 1]. This stipulation is pellucid, and Ms. Fritts’s effort to extricate

herself from it is problematic both legally and ethically. “If a trial judge can . . . ignore a clear

stipulation of the parties, the incentive to enter stipulations is eliminated,” and “[w]orse yet, it

offers a whole new ground for strategic behavior, as the parties can try to get the trier of fact

to pass on matters that have already been agreed to.” Id. at 1038. The TVA’s third request in

limine is therefore GRANTED, and the Court will bar Ms. Fritts from testifying at trial.

4. TVA’s Fourth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s fourth request in limine, it contends that the Court should bar Garner

Fritts from giving lay testimony about the value of the property at issue because he is “not

competent” to offer this testimony. [Pl.’s Mot. at 6–7]. Ms. Fritts counters this contention by

asserting that Garner Fritts is her successor as trustee of the property, has lived at the property

since it was built, and will offer “an opinion as to [its] value based upon more than mere

conjecture.” [Def.’s Resp. at 6, 7]. “Witnesses testifying as to value must appear to have some

peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct judgment beyond what is presumed to be

possessed by persons generally,” and “triers of fact may take counsel of their own experience

and knowledge of like subjects.” Welch v. TVA, 108 F.2d 95, 101 (6th Cir. 1939).

In this vein, Garner Fritts’s testimony may be admissible as a lay opinion—i.e., as an

opinion that he forms from his “commonly understood considerations of worth flowing from

his perceptions and knowledge of the property.” United States v. Easements & Rights-of-Way

over a Total of 15.66 Acres, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2018); see U.S. ex rel. & for

Use of TVA v. Easement & Right of Way 200 Feet Wide, 405 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1968)

(“Regarding the competency of witnesses in cases of this nature, opinion evidence usually may

be admitted from those who are not strictly experts, the test being whether it can be shown the

witness knows the land and its surroundings and has an opinion as to value based upon more

than mere conjecture.” (citations omitted)); see also United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87, 92

(10th Cir. 1966) (“It is the general rule that an owner, because of his ownership, is presumed

to have special knowledge of the property and may testify as to its value.” (citations omitted));

Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir. 1935) (“It is also well settled

that value may be shown by the opinion of any competent person having knowledge of the facts,

whether an expert or an ordinary witness.”). But importantly, a lay witness who testifies about

a property’s value “may not substitute [his] inexperienced opinions for those of witnesses of

special knowledge.” Welch, 108 F.2d at 101 (citation omitted); see Sowards, 370 F.2d at 92

(“[T]he owner’s qualification to testify does not change the ‘market value’ concept and permit him

to substitute a ‘value to me’ standard for the accepted rule[.]’”).

So while a lay witness may offer his opinion about his property’s value under Federal

Rule of Evidence 701, he does not have “carte balance to espouse any opinion he pleases on the

value of his land, free from the constraints of Rule 702 and Daubert.” Easements & Rights-of-

Way over a Total of 15.66 Acres, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 1371–72. The Court, therefore, will permit

Garner Fritts to testify about “commonly understood considerations of worth flowing from his

perceptions and knowledge of the property,” id. at 1372, but it will not permit him to “cross[]

into expert testimony,” i.e., any testimony based on “technical or specialized knowledge more

broadly,” id. The TVA’s fourth request in limine is therefore DENIED.

5. TVA’s Fifth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s fifth request in limine, the TVA argues that the Court should exclude

evidence that is “inconsistent” with its Declaration of Taking [Pl.’s Mot. at 7 at 2], in which it

states that it intends to use the property for “the erection, operation, and maintenance of electric

power transmission circuits and communication circuits,” [Decl. of Taking, Doc. 1-3, at 2]. In

the TVA’s view, any evidence that shows a different use from “the plans referenced in the

declaration of taking” is speculative, hypothetical, and therefore not relevant. [Id.]. Ms. Fritts

opposes the TVA’s effort to exclude this evidence in limine, arguing that the TVA has already

departed from its declared use of the property in the Declaration of Taking. [Def.’s Resp. at 9].

The Court reserves ruling on the TVA’s fifth request in limine until it hears the evidence at trial.

See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934) (indicating that any circumstances that are

“fairly shown to be reasonably probable” in affecting a property’s value are not speculative).

6. TVA’s Sixth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s sixth request in limine, the TVA urges the Court to exclude evidence

of its “construction activities,” “project plans,” and “costs,” arguing that it “has no relevance to

the value” of the property. [Pl.’s Mot. at 8]. The TVA points out that United States Magistrate

Judge Debra C. Poplin has already ruled that discovery of the TVA’s construction activities,

project plans, and costs are not relevant. [Id.]. Ms. Fritts, however, notes that she has objected

to Magistrate Judge Poplin’s ruling and that her objections are pending the Court’s adjudication.

[Def.’s Mot. at 9–10]. The Court reserves ruling on the TVA’s sixth request in limine, which it

will address in resolving Ms. Fritts’s objections.

7. TVA’s Seventh Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s seventh request in limine, the TVA maintains that the Court should

exclude evidence of any witness’s age, physical condition, and marital status because it is not

relevant to the jury’s determination of just compensation. [Pl.’s Mot. at 8]. Ms. Fritts opposes

this request, arguing that the TVA fails to show that “such evidence is clearly inadmissible on

all potential grounds.” [Def.’s Resp. at 12]. The lone issue in this case is just compensation.

Just compensation is the fair market value of property on the date of the TVA’s taking, United

States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1943), and “[t]he correct measure of compensation for

an easement, as for any partial taking, is the difference in fair market value of the whole tract

before and after the taking,” U.S. ex rel. TVA v. 1.72 Acres of Land in Tenn., 821 F.3d 742, 756

(6th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

Although relevant evidence is expansively defined as evidence that “has any tendency”

to make a fact or consequence “more or less probable than it would be without the evidence,”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 401(a), a witness’s age, physical health, and marital status are simply of no

consequence to a determination of the property’s fair market value, see Fed. R. Evid. 401(b)

(stating that relevant evidence must be “of consequence in determining the action”). Ms. Fritts

argues otherwise, asserting that the age of the property’s occupants is relevant because it is “a

key factor” to the property’s utility. [Def.’s Resp. at 12]. Maybe so, but it is of no consequence

in a condemnation action. See Olson 292 U.S. at 708 (stating that just compensation “does not

depend upon the uses to which [the owner] has devoted his land”); U.S. ex rel. TVA v. Easement

& Right of Way 100 Feet Wide, 447 F.2d 1317, 1319 (6th Cir. 1971) (“[J]ust compensation is

not the value to the owner for his peculiar purpose.” (citing United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327

U.S. 372, 378 (1946)). The TVA’s seventh request in limine is therefore GRANTED.

8. TVA’s Eighth and Ninth Requests in Limine

As to the TVA’s eighth and ninth requests in limine, the TVA seeks the exclusion of

evidence and argument as to Ms. Fritts’s unaccepted offers for the purchase of the property and

future plans for the development of the property. [Pl.’s Mot. at 9]. Ms. Fritts’s does not oppose

these requests, [Def.’s Resp. at 12], and they are therefore GRANTED.

9. TVA’s Tenth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s tenth request in limine, the TVA argues that the Court should exclude

evidence of Ms. Fritts’s and future buyers’ personal fears and health-related concerns about the

erection of transmission lines and their generation of electromagnetic fields (“EMFs”) [Pl.’s

Mot. at 10]. Ms. Fritts pushes back against this request because, in her view, “EMF’s do impact

market value.” [Def.’s Resp. at 14]. EMFs are indeed relevant to a property’s market value if

they affect it in the eyes of the “buying public.” Easement & Right of Way 200 Feet Wide, 405

F.2d at 309 (emphasis added).

Ms. Fritts’s personal fears and health-related apprehensions about EMFs are therefore

irrelevant, but prospective buyers’ fears and health-related concerns are potentially relevant. If

Ms. Fritts wishes to elicit testimony from a qualified witness who will testify about how EMFs

will affect the property’s market value from the perspective of prospective buyers, she may do

so, so long as she has made the requisite disclosures under Rule 26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)

(“If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the

party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply on a motion, at a hearing, or at

a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”). So to the extent the TVA

moves to exclude evidence that Ms. Fritts has personal fears and health-related concerns about

EMFs, the TVA’s tenth request in limine is GRANTED, but to the extent the TVA moves to

exclude evidence that “certain segments of the buying public may [be] apprehensive of these

high voltage lines, and therefore might be unwilling to pay as much for the property as they

otherwise would,” the TVA’s tenth request in limine is DENIED. Easement & Right of Way

100 Feet Wide, 405 F.2d at 309.

10. TVA’s Eleventh Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s eleventh request in limine, the TVA asks for the exclusion of evidence

and argument relating to its deposit of $112,100.00, which it made as its estimation of just

compensation under the Declaration of Taking Act, [Pl.’s Mot. at 11]. Ms. Fritts does not oppose

this request, [Def.’s Resp. at 15], and it is therefore GRANTED.

11. TVA’s Twelfth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s twelfth request in limine, the TVA seeks the exclusion of evidence of

its pre-condemnation appraisal of the property, arguing that “it is not relevant to the issue of

compensation.” [Pl.’s Mot. at 12]. Ms. Fritts opposes this request, arguing that the TVA relies

on case law that is off point because it cites only cases in which courts have held that a deposit

under the Takings Act is irrelevant to fair market value. [Def.’s Resp. at 15]. She is correct in

her assessment of the cases that the TVA cites. See [Pl.’s Mot. at 12].

Appraisals are, of course, highly relevant evidence in condemnation cases. See U.S. ex

rel. TVA v. 1.72 Acres of Land in Tenn., 821 F.3d 742, 747 (6th Cir. 2016) (referring to the

testimony of the TVA’s appraiser); U.S. ex. rel. TVA v. Tree-Removal Rights with Respect to

Land in McNair Cnty., No. 15-1008, 2015 WL 549943, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 16, 2015) (stating

that an appraisal is dispositive when it is uncontested); United States v. Block 44, 177 F.R.D.

687, 690 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (recognizing that the United States’s “precondemnation appraisal” is

“designed to determine the fair market value of the property”). The TVA provides the Court with

no basis to view its own appraisal any differently, and as the movant with the burden of showing

that its appraisal is “clearly inadmissible for any purpose,” Contract Mgmt, 2012 WL 2529214 at

*1 (quotation omitted), the TVA fails to meet that heavy burden. Its twelfth request in limine is

therefore DENIED.

12. TVA’s Thirteenth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s thirteenth request in limine, the TVA seeks the exclusion of evidence

and argument relating to the parties’ negotiations and settlement offers. [Pl.’s Mot. at 13]. Ms.

Fritts opposes this request, but unpersuasively. [Def.’s Resp. at 16–17]. The TVA’s thirteenth

request in limine is GRANTED. See Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341, 348–49 (1903) (“It

is, at most, a species of indirect evidence of the opinion of the person making such offers as to

value the land,” and “it is of a nature entirely too uncertain, shadowy, and speculative to form

any solid foundation for determining the value of the land which is sought to be taken in

condemnation proceedings.”); see also Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land

in Montgomery Cnty., 548 F.2d 1130, 1131 (4th Cir. 1977) (“[A] landowner who rejects a pre-

condemnation offer . . . may not introduce that offer as proof of value when the government

condemns the property.”); Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes–Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 545

(5th Cir. 1974) (“It is clear that as a general rule, unaccepted offers are improper evidence by

which to estimate value.” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Regents of N.M. Sch. of Mines, 185

F.2d 389, 391 (10th Cir. 1950) (“The primary reasons underlying the rule are that evidence of

that kind is often speculative, usually no opportunity is offered for cross-examination of the

persons said to have made the offers, and collateral inquiries are injected into the case which

may tend to confuse the main issue.”).

13. TVA’s Fourteenth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s fourteenth request in limine, the TVA maintains that the Court should

exclude evidence of attorneys’ fees and costs. [Pl.’s Mot. at 14]. Ms. Fritts agrees. [Def.’s Resp.

at 17]. The TVA’s fourteenth request in limine is therefore GRANTED.

14. TVA’s Fifteenth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s fifteenth request in limine, the TVA seeks the exclusion of evidence of

its other condemnations, namely its acquisitions of easements in other cases, which it contends

are irrelevant to this case. [Pl.’s Mot. at 14]. Ms. Fritts opposes the TVA’s request. [Def.’s Mot.

at 17]. The Court cannot conclude, at this time, that the TVA’s acquisitions of easements in

other cases, to the extent those acquisitions involve the Harden Valley Transmission Project,

are clearly inadmissible for any purpose. See infra [The TVA’s seventeenth request in limine

and accompanying text]. The Court therefore reserves ruling on the TVA’s fifteenth request in

limine until it hears the evidence at trial.

15. TVA’s Sixteenth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s sixteenth request in limine, the TVA moves to exclude all evidence

and argument as to its “acquisition of parcels of land for transmission line projects other than

the subject property.” [Pl.’s Mot. at 15]. Ms. Fritts opposes the TVA’s request. [Def.’s Resp. at

19]. The Court cannot conclude, at this time, that the TVA’s acquisitions of land other than

Ms. Fritts’s, to the extent those acquisitions involve the Harden Valley Transmission Project,

are clearly inadmissible for any purpose. See infra [The TVA’s seventeenth request in limine

and accompanying text]. The Court therefore reserves ruling on the TVA’s sixteenth request in

limine until it hears the evidence at trial.

16. TVA’s Seventeenth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s seventeenth request in limine, the TVA seeks the exclusion of maps,

diagrams, photographs, and drawings of other properties that have transmission lines or are

undergoing the construction of transmission lines. [Pl.’s Mot. at 15]. Ms. Fritts opposes the

TVA’s request, arguing that transmission lines on adjacent properties will affect her property’s

value. [Def.’s Resp. at 19]. The construction of the transmission lines on Ms. Fritts’s property

may well have a depreciative effect on the market value of her property—an issue that is the

subject of the TVA’s eighteenth request in limine, and that issue is properly before the jury. But

to the extent that other transmission lines on other properties—i.e., properties that Ms. Fritts

does not own, whether nearby or adjacent to her property—may have a depreciative effect on

Ms. Fritts’s property is irrelevant. See Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 372 (1924)

(rejecting a landowner’s argument that he was entitled to damages from “the uses made and to

be made of” adjacent properties that the government had “acquired from others” (emphasis

added)); U.S. for Use & Benefit of TVA v. Stewart, 429 F. Supp. 658, 661 (E.D. Tenn. 1976)

(recognizing that “adjoining parcels may be considered as a unit with that affected by the

condemnation where there is common ownership” (emphasis added)); U.S. ex rel. TVA v.

Easement and Right-of-Way Over 1.0 Acre of Land, 248 F. Supp. 702, 703–04 (W.D. Tenn.

1965) (“[T]he owner cannot claim such damage to the extent that it is based on that part of the

[power] line not on its property.”).

The Court, however, cannot conclude that maps, diagrams, photographs, and drawings

of other properties are clearly inadmissible for any purpose. Maps, diagrams, photographs, and

drawings of other properties may constitute res gestae evidence necessary to tell the story of

the Hardin Valley Transmission Project, for the purposes of which the TVA has condemned

Ms. Fritts’s property. See United States v. Churn, 800 F.3d 768, 779 (6th Cir. 2015) (“This court

‘ha[s] recognized the admissibility of res gestae, or background evidence” that “has a causal,

temporal or spatial connection with” the claim. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted));

West v. United States, 258 F. 413, 419 n.2 (6th Cir. 1919) (“Matters constituting a part of the

res gestae are admissible in evidence, the rules as to admissibility, and as to what constitutes the

res gestae, being the same in criminal as in civil cases.”).

So to the extent the TVA seeks the exclusion of maps, diagrams, photographs, and

drawings of other properties because they are irrelevant to show a depreciation in value of Ms.

Fritts’s property, the TVA’s seventeenth request in limine is GRANTED. But to the extent the

TVA seeks the exclusion of maps, diagrams, photographs, and drawings of other properties for

any purpose, its request is DENIED.

17. TVA’s Eighteenth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s eighteenth request in limine, the TVA contends that the Court should

exclude all evidence of torts for physical damage to the property, [Pl.’s Mem. at 16], and Ms.

Fritts opposes this request, [Def.’s Resp. at 20–21]. This request is the subject of a contentious,

consequential discovery dispute between the parties, on which Magistrate Judge Poplin has

ruled. Ms. Fritts has objected to Magistrate Judge Poplin’s ruling, and her objection is pending

the Court’s adjudication. See [Def.’s Objs., Doc. 47, at 3–4]. The Court reserves ruling on the

TVA’s eighteenth request in limine, which it will address in resolving Ms. Fritts’s objections.

18. TVA’s Nineteenth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s nineteenth request in limine, the TVA moves the Court to exclude

evidence of the property’s, and other property’s, tax assessments. [Pl.’s Mem. at 18]. Ms. Fritts

does not oppose this request. [Def.’s Resp. at 22]. The TVA’s nineteenth request in limine is

therefore GRANTED.

19. TVA’s Twentieth Request in Limine

As to the TVA’s twentieth request in limine, the TVA claims that Ms. Fritts’s attorney

“has employed overtly pejorative language” to characterize TVA, its witnesses, and its attorneys,

and the TVA “anticipates that [his] rhetoric is likely to persist during trial.” [Pl.’s Mem. at 18].

The TVA asks for the exclusion of any “pejorative characterizations” at trial. [Id.]. Ms. Fritts

agrees. [Def.’s Resp. at 22]. The TVA’s twentieth request in limine is therefore GRANTED.

20. TVA’s Twenty-First Request in Limine

Finally, as to the TVA’s twenty-first request in limine, it seeks to reserve the right to

file further motions in limine “based upon the outcome of the[] pending motions” in the record,

[id. at 19], and Ms. Fritts agrees with this request, [Def.’s Mot. at 23]. The TVA’s twenty-first

request in limine is GRANTED only to the extent that it can show good cause for the filing of

additional motions in limine, the deadline for which has now expired. See [Scheduling Order,

Doc. 33, at 3]; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good

cause and with the judge’s consent.”).

SO ORDERED:

s/ Clifton L. Corker

United States District Judge