KING v. DICKERSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ROBERT CHARLES ANTHONY )

KING, )

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:23-cv-00730

BRANDON DICKERSON and

CALVIN PHILLIPS, )

Defendants. )

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a pro se civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Robert Charles

Anthony King (“Plaintiff’), a former pretrial detainee at the Alamance County Detention

Center, against Detention Officers Brandon Dickerson and Calvin Phillips (collectively,

“Defendants”). Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants [Doc.

#61]; two Motions to Seal by Defendants [Doc. #63, #75]; two Motions to Strike by

Defendants [Doc. #59, #79]; and a Motion [Doc. #84] by Plaintiff that the Court construes

as Plaintiffs sur-reply to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set out

below, the Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted,

and that the case be dismissed. In addition, the Court orders that Defendants’ Motions to

Seal are granted, Defendants’ Motions to Strike are denied as moot, and Plaintiffs final filing

be construed as his sut-reply and terminated to the extent it was docketed as a motion.

I. PLAINTIFP’S CLAIMS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs claims are set out in his Complaint [Doc. #2], which describes a use of force

incident that occurred the morning of January 7, 2022, and names as defendants Brandon

Dickerson (“Officer Dickerson”) and Calvin Phillips (“Officer Phillips’), detention officers at

Alamance County Detention Center (““ACDC”), where Plaintiff was held as a pretrial detainee.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Officers Dickerson and Phillips used excessive force in

violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by striking Plaintiff in the hand and knee

to prevent Plaintiff from retrieving family pictures that were taken during a search of his cell,

causing Plaintiffs hand to bruise and swell, and resulting in an injury to Plaintiffs right knee

that required extended treatment and surgery. (Compl. at 3, 5-8.)

On November 14, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.

#61]. On December 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Plaintiffs Motion of

Summary Judgment in Lieu of filing of Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Answer

to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment” [Doc. #67], along with various supporting

documents [Doc. #68 to Doc. #71]. It was unclear whether Plaintiffs Motion was a Response

to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or was instead Plaintiffs own motion for

summaty judgment; treating the Motion as a response in opposition to summary judgment,

Defendants subsequently filed a Reply [Doc. #74], and treating the Motion as Plaintiffs

motion for summaty judgment, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike [Doc. #79] and a

Response in Opposition [Doc. #81]. On January 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document entitled

“Motion of 24 response to Reply Memorandum of Law In Supporting of Motion Summary

Judgment” [Doc. #84], in which he indicated that he had not yet moved for summary

judgment, and that his Motion filed on December 13 was intended only as a response to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. In light of Plaintiffs clarification, the Court

considers Plaintiffs December 13 Motion [Doc. #67] to be Plaintiffs response to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment, and construes Plaintiff's January 31 Motion to be a sur-reply

to Defendants’ reply as to their Motion for Summary Judgment.

IL. FACTS AND EVIDENCE

Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment, the facts below are set out in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff. During the underlying events in January 2022, Plaintiff

was a pretrial detainee at ACDC. (Fortner Decl., Doc. #65-6, { 4.)! While at ACDC, Plaintiff

was involved in numerous physical altercations with other inmates—by Plaintiffs own count,

117 different fights with other inmates—and was often verbally and physically aggressive with

detention officers, scteaming threats and profanities in officers’ faces. (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2

at 12, 14; Fortner Decl., Doc. #65-6, | 4; McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, J] 8; Young Decl., Doc.

#65-7, 7 9.) Due to Plaintiffs aggression towards other detainees and detention officers,

Plaintiff was considered a security risk, and detention officers were requited to use caution

during their interactions with Plaintiff. (Young Decl., Doc. #65-7, § 11-12; McClure Decl.

Doc. #65-8, J 9.)

Plaintiff is deaf, and he communicates with others using sign language, or by writing

back and forth on a notepad or by text, and he can lip-read with 75 to 80 percent accuracy and

can speak. (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 3, 9.) While he was detained at ACDC, Plaintiff usually

1 For ease of reference, cited page numbers will refer to the sequential numbers generated by the Court’s

Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system.

communicated with detention officers through lipreading and writing notes on a notepad. (Pl.

Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 9.) However, lipreading could be challenging, particularly in

circumstances where an officer’s facial hair covered their mouth or lips, when multiple people

were talking at once, and, given that Plaintiff was detained during the height of the COVID-

19 pandemic, when officers wore face masks. (PI. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 9-10.)

Plaintiff was familiar with, and read, ACDC’s Jail Facility Handbook, which governed

detainees’ conduct at ACDC. (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 10-11; Young Decl., Doc. #65-7, § 8.)

He was aware that detainees were prohibited from keeping more than six pictures in their cell,

from tampering with or covering the lights in their cell with any obstructions, from hanging

pictures on the walls in their cell, and from “misusing” toothpaste. (Handbook, Doc. #65-6

at 416, 430; Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 11.)

On January 6, 2022, Sergeant Sherman Summers observed dozens of pictures stuck to

the lights, walls, and ceiling in Plaintiff's cell with toothpaste. (Fortner Decl., Doc. #65-6, {| 5;

Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 13; Phillips Decl., Doc. #65-9 Ex. A.)? According to ACDC tecords,

Sergeant Summers repeatedly directed Plaintiff to remove the pictures, but Plaintiff refused.

(Fortner Decl., Doc. #65-6, J 5-6.) In his Response, Plaintiff states that he had the “tight to

refuse ot consent to labor” and they did not offer him wages or gaintime. (Pl. Resp., Doc.

#67 at 7.) Plaintiff also states that he had the “right to stand his grounds.” (Pl. Resp., Doc.

#67 at 7.)

2 Tn an attachment to his response, Plaintiff references 33 family pictures that were taken from his cell. (Pl.

Resp., Doc. #67 at 13.)

The following morning, January 7, Lieutenant Tiffany McClure? met with Detention

Officers Phillips, Dickerson,* Erika Blechert, and Marcus Moote, and informed them that they

would be directing Plaintiff to remove the pictures from the lights, walls, and ceiling of his

cell. If Plaintiff refused, the team would remove the pictures for him. (McClure Decl., Doc.

#65-8, Jf] 10-11.) At approximately 11:30 a.m., Lieutenant McClure and her team arrived at

Plaintiffs cell with a round trash barrel. (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, 4 11.) Upon arriving at

Plaintiffs cell, Lieutenant McClure directed Plaintiff to remove the pictures from the lights

and walls and ceiling. (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, § 11.) Plaintiff refused. By Plaintiffs

account, he challenged the officers, saying “You can’t do that.” (Pl. Dep., Doc. #62-2 at 14.)

Lieutenant McClure then directed Plaintiff to exit his cell so that the detention officers could

remove the pictures. (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, §] 14.) Plaintiff refused, stating that he

wanted to “stand and watch,” (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 16), and indicated to Lieutenant

McClure that she would have to “make him” leave the cell (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, 15).

After refusing several direct orders to leave, Plaintiff finally exited his cell but continued to

3 Lieutenant McClure has been promoted to Captain and now uses the surname “Smith.” (McClure Decl., Doc.

#65-8, J 2-3.) Because the record evidence refers to Lieutenant McClure by her former rank and name, the

Court will do the same when discussing the evidence.

+ Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint and asserted throughout his briefing that Officers Phillips and Dickerson

were “maintenance men” with ACDC. (Compl. at 2, 5; see Pl. Resp., Doc. #67 at 4.) As evidence, Plaintiff

points only to the video footage submitted by Plaintiff and discussed in more detail zu/ra reflecting that several

officers, presumably Officers Phillips and Dickeson, were dressed in non-uniform pants, with an ACDC shirt.

(PL Resp., Doc. #67 at 4-5.) However, Officers Phillips and Dickerson have submitted sworn affidavits

confirming that they are detention officers at ACDC, with responsibility for maintaining safety and security at

ACDC for inmates, staff, and the public, and eliminating the introduction of contraband at ACDC. (Phillips

Decl., Doc. #65-9, 9] 2-3; Dickerson Decl., Doc. #65-10, fff 2-3.) Lieutenant McClure, a supervising officer

at ACDC, also identifies Officer Dickerson and Officer Phillips as detention officers who were part of her

platoon. (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, J 11.) Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to establish that they are

not detention officers ot to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the status of Officer Dickerson and

Officer Phillips as detention officers.

“verbally challenge” the detention officers, (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 14), shouting profanities

and making physical threats (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, J 17). Because Plaintiff continued

to shout profanities and make physical threats towards detention officers after exiting the cell,

detention officers positioned themselves between Plaintiff and the cell doorway to prevent

him from reentering the cell. (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, □ 18.)

With Plaintiff outside the cell, Lieutenant McClure directed Officers Phillips and

Dickerson to remove the pictures from the walls and ceiling. (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8,

421.) Because Plaintiffs pictures were adhered to the wall using toothpaste and had been

converted into wall and ceiling hangings, Lieutenant McClure determined that they had been

altered from their original state and were thus considered contraband subject to disposal.

Lieutenant McClure directed Officers Phillips and Dickerson to dispose of the pictures in the

trash barrel. (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, {J 20-21; Handbook, Doc. #65-6 at 415.) As

Officers Phillips and Dickerson removed the pictures from the walls and placed them in the

trash barrel, Plaintiff became increasingly aggressive and began to yell threats that he would

get his pictures back “one way or the other” even if he had to “beat every one” of the officers,

and stated that when the detention officers exited the cell and passed by him with the trash

barrel, he was going to do “whatever [he] had to” do to get the pictures back. (McClure Decl.,

Doc. #65-8, §] 22.) Plaintiff agrees that he was angry, that “if theyre rude to me, ’m rude

back,” that he “challenged” them, and that he was “frustrated” and “loud” and “cussing.” (PL.

Dep., Doc. #65-2, at 14, 15.)°

5 During his deposition, Plaintiff explained that he suffered a traumatic brain injury while putting up a fence in

2015 or 2016, which resulted in some changes in his behavior including “anger issues, frustration, stress,” and

he noted that medications made his anger and emotional control issues worse. (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 7-8)

After Officers Dickerson and Phillips finished removing the pictures from the walls

and ceiling, they exited Plaintiffs cell, followed by Lieutenant McClure with the trash barrel.

(McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, § 26.) At this point, Plaintiff broke through the barrier of officers

that surrounded his cell and quickly moved towards the trash barrel. Plaintiff contends that

“no one said anything [to him] at all,” and that he did not “hear or see anything,” such as

officers ordering him to stop. (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 17.) Plaintiff grabbed the side of the

trash barrel with both hands, and then put one hand in to grab the pictures (Pl. Dep., Doc.

#65-2 at 17-18), and Officer Phillips and Lieutenant McClure ordered Plaintiff to let go,

(McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, § 29), which Plaintiff contends he could not hear (Pl. Dep., Doc.

#65-2 at 15,17). To get Plaintiff to let go, Officer Phillips administered three quick strikes to

PlaintifPs hand.6 (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, J] 30; see Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 17.) Plaintiff

briefly let go of the trash barrel with one hand, but he kept one hand on the barrel, and “cussed

[the officer] out,” yelling, “Is that all you got, is that all you got? Pll f*** you up!” (McClure

Decl., Doc. #65-8, J] 31; Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 17-18.) According to Lieutenant McClure,

officers again ordered Plaintiff to let go of the trash barrel, and Plaintiff again refused.

(McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, 99] 34-36.) Plaintiff agrees that at that point, Officer Phillips was

trying to prevent Plaintiff from getting the pictures, and all the officers knew what was going

on because Plaintiff was “screaming.” (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 17.) Plaintiff agrees that he

was angry and that after Officer Phillips hit his hand, Plaintiff said, “is that — what the f**

6 Plaintiff disputes where Officer Phillips struck Plaintiff, contending that Officer Phillips “hit my hand, not

my arm, my hand.” (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 15, 17.) Officer Phillips states that he struck Plaintiff's radial

nerve in an effort to get Plaintiff to let go of the trash can. (Phillips Decl., Doc. #65-9, 17.) Whether Officer

Phillips struck Plaintiffs hand versus his arm is not material to this Court’s decision.

you got ort something like that.” (PI. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 18). Plaintiff also agrees that after

Officer Phillips hit him in the hand, he knew that Officer Phillips wanted him to back away

from the trash can. (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 18.) Plaintiff also agrees that he nevertheless

continued to hold onto the trash barrel for “balance.” (PI. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 18.) Officer

Dickerson, in another attempt to get Plaintiff to let go of the trash barrel, placed his right hand

on Plaintiffs right forearm and executed a foot sweep to take Plaintiff to the ground.

(McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, §] 37.) Plaintiff describes this as being kicked in the back of the

leg, and later that day explained to medical providers that his “leg was locked and he was

pushed to the floor” and “heard a pop.” (Medical Records, Doc. #68 at 78.) Once Plaintiff

was on the ground, the use of force ceased, and Lieutenant McClure instructed Plaintiff not

to move and tadioed for medical assistance. (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, § 41.) A nurse

attived on scene, examined Plaintiffs right leg, and escorted Plaintiff to the medical office in

a wheelchair for further evaluation. (McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, J] 42-43; Medical Records,

Doc. #68 at 78.)

In his response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff largely does

not dispute Defendants’ description of the use-of-force incident. Plaintiff only contends that

the responding officers wore face masks during the duration of the altercation, which made it

hard for Plaintiff to understand what they were saying or ordering him to do,’ and that the

injuries Plaintiff suffered to his hand and right knee are more significant than Defendants

7 At his deposition, Plaintiff conceded that there were “maybe one or two [detention officers] that were

respectful enough to remove their mask ot lower theit masks so I could read theit lips,” at least when they first

came into his cell. (Pl. Dep., Doc. #62-5 at 14.)

contend. Notably, Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ evidence that Plaintiff repeatedly

failed to comply with orders and was verbally and physically aggressive towards detention

officers throughout the incident.

Plaintiff also submitted video footage of the Q-Block common area on the morning of

Januaty 7, 2022. ‘The video shows that at approximately 11:35 on Januaty 7, a group of

detention officers, presumably Lieutenant McClure and her team, entered the cell block with

a trash barrel. (Video, 11:34:22-33.)8 As they entered the block, all of the officers were wearing

face masks. The group proceeded to a cell, presumably Plaintiffs, and opened the doot.

Several seconds later, Plaintiff's cellmate exited the cell and sat at a table in the common area,

whete he remained for the duration of the events. (Video, 11:35:02.) Plaintiff exited the cell

approximately 40 seconds later and sat on top of the same table outside the cell. (Video,

11:35:42.) Plaintiff remained at the table for approximately two minutes, at which point he

jumped off the table and moved swiftly towards the open door to his cell, where a guard

standing outside prevented him from entering. (Video, 11:37:17.) At this point, three other

guards responded to Plaintiffs cell and positioned themselves between Plaintiff and the cell

door, presumably to prevent him from entering. (Video, 11:37:28-45.) For approximately the

next ten minutes, Plaintiff remained standing in the common atea outside his cell, appearing

to converse with the officers, often face to face at a close distance, pointing at officers and

raising his hands over his head, and drawing the attention of several additional detention

8 Footage from the camera is assigned an exhibit number in PlaintifPs Response Brief and thus has a

corresponding exhibit “page” on the docket [Doc. #67-2]. That exhibit was provided to the Coutt via flash

drive. The flash drive has two files, each of which contains footage from the same camera on the same date.

The fitst file includes footage from 11:34 to 11:49 a.m., and the second file includes footage from 11:49 to

11:57 a.m. When citing to the video footage, the Coutt will reference the timestamp on the video.

officers and other inmates who were also in the common atea walking around and watching

the incident unfold. (Video, 11:37:45-11:47:56.) A few seconds before 11:48, Plaintiff

appeared to walk through a group of officers towards his cell door. (Video, 11:47:56.) Due

to the distance between the camera and Plaintiffs cell, and the location of Plaintiffs cell

behind a staircase, the ensuing altercation is nearly impossible to see. (Video, 11:47:56-

11:49:12.) The video only depicts a cluster of detention officers, presumably with Plaintiff

somewhere in the midst. About 20 seconds later, an individual standing inside the entrance

to Plaintiffs cell appears to place his or her arm on another individual, raise their leg, and

appears to use their knee to strike the other individual in the knee, causing the other individual

to fall to the ground. (Video, 11:48:16-18.) While this altercation was presumably Officer

Dickerson’s foot sweep movement, the video quality is such that none of the individuals are

identifiable. After the individual was subdued, detention officers remained outside Plaintiff's

cell for several minutes, and at 11:53, a nurse entered the cellblock and proceeded towards

Plaintiffs cell. (Video, 11:53:05-15.) Several minutes later, the nurse left (Video, 11:55:33-35)

and returned with a wheelchair (Video, 11:56:57). Plaintiff was taken out of the cellblock in

the wheelchair at 11:57, bracing his right knee with his hands. (Video, 11:57:43-49.)

Plaintiff also submitted copies of his medical records to support his allegations that

Officer Dickerson’s use of force caused an injury that ultimately required surgery. According

to these records, immediately following the use-of-force incident on January 7, Plaintiff was

seen by medical staff. During the exam, he indicated that his leg was locked and that he was

pushed to the floor and heard a “pop”, that he was experiencing pain in his right leg from his

hip to his ankle, and that he was unable to extend his tight leg. (Medical Records, Doc. #68

10

at 78.) Plaintiff was prescribed Ibuprofen for the pain, and x-rays of Plaintiffs right knee were

otdered, which were negative for fracture and dislocation. (Medical Records, Doc. #68-1 at

34, 47.) Following continued complaints of lower-leg pain, Plaintiff was seen by medical staff

again two days later on January 9, 2022. (Medical Records, Doc. #68 at 77-78.) At this visit,

Plaintiffs lower right leg was visibly swollen, and medical staff ordered x-rays of Plaintiffs

tibia and fibula (Medical Records, Doc. #68 at 77-78), which revealed “no dislocation” but

“suspect unchanged chronic lateral tibial plateau avulsion fracture” (Medical Records, Doc.

#68-1 at 32). Plaintiff was prescribed Mobic for the pain. (Medical Records, Doc. #68 at 77-

78.) During the weeks following the January 7 incident, Plaintiff periodically followed up with

medical staff complaining of right knee pain and swelling. (Medical Records, Doc. #68 at 76;

see e.g., Doc. #68-1 at 8-10, 15-16, 18-19, 26, 28.) At some point, Plaintiff was provided with

ctutches and a knee brace. (See Medical Records, Doc. #68 at 76.) Progtess notes from a

visit on March 24, 2022 indicate that the pain and swelling had improved since January but

that his knee would “give[] out” at times, and noted slight edema and tenderness. (Medical

Records, Doc. #68 at 76.) On April 8, 2022, Plaintiff had an MRI of his right knee, which

revealed that Plaintiff had a “right ACL tear, medial meniscus tear, and lateral meniscus teat.”

(Medical Records, Doc. #68 at 98, 105, #68-1 at 1.) Plaintiff underwent surgery on May 9,

2022, to repair the knee injuries. (Medical Records, Doc. #69-6 at 43-65.)

Ill. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine

11

issue of material fact exists if the evidence presented could lead a reasonable fact-finder to

return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255 (1986). A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all facts and

draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence before it in a light most favorable to the non-

moving party. Id. The proponent of summary judgment “bears the initial burden of pointing

to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Temkin v. Frederick Cnty. Comm’rs, 945

F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). If the

movant carries this burden, then the burden “shifts to the non-moving party to come forward

with facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.” Id. at 718-19 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 247-48).

As noted above, Plaintiff has submitted video evidence in his opposition to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Video evidence presents an “added wrinkle” on

summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 380 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

In a typical case, defendants often rely on video evidence to support summary judgment, and

“when a video quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by the plaintiff... so that

no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for the

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Simmons v. Whitaker, 106 F.4th

379, 385 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotations and brackets omitted); Witt v. W. Va. State Police,

Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2011). However, when a video “does not blatantly

contradict” the non-moving partty’s account of the facts, it “must be taken in the ight most

favorable to [the non-moving party] at summary judgment.” Simmons, 106 F.4th at 385-86

(citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-80).

12

B. Discussion

Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against Defendants for excessive force in violation of his

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.? In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a

plaintiff “must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Applicable here, the Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Clause “protects pretrial detainees from “governmental action’ that

is not ‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose’ or that is ‘excessive

in relation to that purpose.” Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 608-09 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)

(“In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that

implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, we

think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the

detainee.”). In Kingsley, “|t]he Supreme Court provided a non-exhaustive list of factors courts

must use to determine objective reasonableness:

[1] [T]he relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of

force used; [2] the extent of the plaintiffs injury; [3] any effort made by the

officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; [4] the severity of the security

problem at issue; [5] the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and [6]

whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.

9 In Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff additionally contends that Defendants’

actions on Januaty 7 were taken in retaliation for Plaintiff filing a § 1983 lawsuit against ACDC and its

employees, and that Defendants’ actions were a result of bias against Plaintiff based on his prior suit. (PL Resp.,

Doc. #67 at 13.) However, there is no record of Plaintiff filing a § 1983 action against ACDC or its staff prior

to January 7. (See Clerk’s Letter, Doc. #84-1). Moreover, no such claims were raised in the Complaint in this

case, and Plaintiff has not moved to amend to add any such clatms.

13

Simmons v. Whitaker, 106 F.4th 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397).

In addition, a court must consider the “legitimate interests that stem from the government’s

need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,” including the “policies and

ptactices that in the judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve internal order and

discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (citation and

internal brackets omitted). Objective reasonableness must be assessed “from the perspective

of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the

20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.; Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that

when a court considers the reasonableness of the officet’s actions, the court must consider the

“facts at the moment that the challenged force was employed”).

Here, Defendants contend that their actions were related to a legitimate nonpunitive

interest in preserving safety and security at ACDC, and that their use of force was objectively

reasonable. (Defs.’ Br., Doc. #65 at 16-23.)

Turning to the first Kingsley factor, the relationship between the need for the use of

force and the amount of force used, Defendants contend that the amount of force used was

ptopottional given Plaintiffs repeated lack of compliance with legitimate directives, his

attempts to physically intercept officers, and his repeated threats and escalating violent

behavior. (Defs.’ Br., Doc. #65 at 17-18.) The Court agrees. The undisputed evidence

indicates that Plaintiff was classified as a security risk with, by his own admission, over 100

physical fights with other inmates (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 12)!° and a history of arguments

10 As Plaintiff explained in his deposition:

Q. How many times in total were you involved in violence in the jail?

A. Meaning?

14

and conflicts with correctional officers. (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 14.)!! The undisputed

evidence further reflects that from the moment the officers entered his cell, Plaintiff disobeyed

direct orders from officers to remove the pictures and to exit the cell, and instead “challenged”

the officers, told them “you can’t do that,” (PL Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 14), and did not

immediately exit even though he understood that he was supposed to step back when officers

were seatching his cell to let them do their job (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 11). When Plaintiff

finally exited the cell, he continued to “verbally challenge” the officers by shouting profanities

and making threats. (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 14; McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, Jf 15, 17.) Even

assuming, as Plaintiff contends, that he could not hear or understand the officers’ orders to

remove the pictures from the wall, Plaintiff admitted in deposition that the officers “asked

[him] to leave the cell with the other guy in the cell,” (PI. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 16), and Plaintiff

Q. A fight, having a shank, anything like that.

A. Yes, I —I did have that on me.

Q. So how many fights were you involved in?

Q. 117 different fights? And how many different times did you use bottles full of fecal matter tn

those fights?

A. One, because the other two inmates, they had a weapon — a real weapon, and I had no choice

but to defend myself.

(PL Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 12.)

11 As Plaintiff explained in his deposition:

Q. But you’re aware that you're not allowed to have things hanging from the ceilings?

A. I was making a picture, because I moved from another cell and was — the only picture I had up

there on the ceiling in front of the vent to dry a toothpick — or toothpaste with it, and they never

bothered to — I became an asshole, because I was fighting for my freedom.

Q. Against the correctional officers?

A. If you know how they run the place, I wish the FBI would get involved.

Q. So you had to fight for yourselfp

A. Yes.

Q. Like with the officers?

A. Thers was a lot of arguments, yes, conflicts, because — because they wanted to force me to do

things, and I would try to force them to do their job. P’m not playing. I’m not going to sit back

and say, okay, okay. I will challenge.

(Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 14.)

15

knew that when an officer was searching his cell, he was supposed to “[s]tep back and let them

do their job” (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 11).

PlaintifPs aggressive behavior did not cease once he exited the cell. As Defendants

removed the pictures from Plaintiffs wall and ceiling, Plaintiff continued to yell threats.

Plaintiff agrees that he was angry, that he “challenged” them, and that he was “frustrated” and

“loud” and “cussing.” (PL Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 14, 15.) When Defendants emerged from

Plaintiffs cell with the trash barrel, Plaintiff broke through a barrier of detention officers that

had positioned themselves to prevent Plaintiff from re-entering his cell, and Plaintiff grabbed

onto the side of the trash barrel. Plaintiff admits that he walked toward the trash barrel and

reached in to get the pictures. (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 17.) Officers ordered Plaintiff to let

go of the trash barrel, and although Plaintiff again argues that he did not hear these orders, it

appears that it would have been apparent to Plaintiff based on context—Plaintiff had just

batteled through a line of guards preventing Plaintiff from reaching the very item he

etabbed—that he would not have been permitted to grab the trash barrel and retrieve the

pictures. Indeed, Plaintiff admits that officers were trying to prevent him from getting the

pictures, that he was angry and frustrated and “screaming”, and that he was reaching in the

trash can to tetrieve the pictures that officers had placed there. (Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 17.)

2 Tn addition, the Court notes that in his deposition, Plaintiff testified that there had been an earlier search, tn

which the pictures were not taken, and with respect to the second search at issue here:

Q. [W]hen the officers came to yout cell, they told you to take those items down?

A. On the second time.

(Pl. Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 14.) Plaintiff also stated in his response brief that he did not take the pictures down

eatlier when asked to because he has the “right to refuse or consent to labor” and officers did not offer him

wages or gaintime. (Pl. Resp., Doc. #67 at 7.) Plaintiff also states that he has the “right to stand his grounds.”

(Pl. Resp., Doc. #67 at 7.) Thus, by Plaintiffs own testimony it appeats that Plaintiff was aware that he had

been instructed to take the pictures down. Moreover, it clearly became apparent officers were taking down the

pictures, and Plaintiff did not then acquiesce, but instead testified that he “challenged” the officers, as discussed

above.

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In the circumstances, Officer Phillips’ strikes to Plaintiff's right hand were justified in light of

Plaintiffs repeated noncompliance and escalating behavior, and were proportional to his

legitimate efforts to get Plaintiff to let go of the trash barrel and the pictures, which were

considered contraband. Even after Officer Phillips struck PlaintifPs hand, Plaintiff still

continued to hold onto the trash barrel and “cussed [Officer Phillips] out” and said, “Is that

all you got? ll f** you up!” or “[I]s that — what the f*** you got or something like that.” (PL.

Dep., Doc. #65-2 at 17-18; McClure Decl., Doc. #65-8, § 31.)!8 When Officer Phillips’ use

of force was still insufficient to secure Plaintiffs compliance, Officer Dickerson’s foot sweep

maneuver was both necessary and proportional to bring Plaintiff to the ground and into

compliance. In sum, given Plaintiffs ongoing belligerence, repeated refusal to obey ordets,

and the cleat threat he posed to officers and potentially to other inmates on the block,

Defendants’ use of force was teasonable and proportional.'4 See Belton v. Fields, No.

1:23CV169, 2025 WL 1455814, at *19 (M.D.N.C. May 21, 2025).

The second Kingsley factor, the extent of Plaintiffs injury, is a closer call. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants’ use of force caused his right hand to swell and bruise, and resulted in

setious injury to his knee, which caused significant swelling and bruising and ultimately

In an earlier filing, Plaintiff explained that after the officer struck his hand, Plaintiff responded by saying

‘What the f***! Is that all you got? F*** you I’m getting my sh*t.” (Pl. Motion, Doc. #19 at 9.)

4 Defendants’ use of force also appears to have complied with ACDC’s use of force policy, which permits the

use of force through a “control hold,” such as when an officer uses “planned kicks and blows to non-vital areas

of the inmates/detainees [sic] body to take down the inmate/detainee” to gain compliance. (Policy Manual,

Doc. #65-6 at 279-80.) Officers Phillips and Dickerson both utilized control holds, striking Plaintiff's hand

and knee, two non-vital areas, in an effort to regain Plaintiff's compliance. See Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d

756, 766 (4th Cir. 1996) (compliance with prison policy provides “powerful evidence that the application of

force was tempered and that the officers acted in good faith”).

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required sutgety. (Compl. at 7.)!° The Court notes, however, that a torn ACL is not an

expected or anticipated injury from the force used to bring Plaintiff down; indeed, sweeping a

detainee’s leg to bring them to the ground and into compliance is a common procedure, see,

e.g., Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949, 955 (6th Cir. 2010); Montoe v. Riverside Reg’l Jail, No.

1:21cv524, 2022 WL 433130, at *9 (E.D. Va. Feb. 11, 2022), and the extent of Plaintiffs injury

appeats largely due to the unfortunate way he fell onto his knee, rather than a natural result of

the force used. Thus, the extent of Plaintiffs injury does not necessarily reflect the extent of

the force used, making this factor a closer call. See Griffin, 604 F.3d at 952, 955 (finding that

defendant detention officet’s use of a leg-sweep maneuver was not wanton or excessive where

another officer “accidentally fell on [plaintiff]’s leg as a result of the leg sweep,” which resulted

in plaintiff breaking her tibia and needing “surgery, eight screws, and a metal plate to fix” the

injury). Nevertheless, given the extent of Plaintiffs knee injury, the Court will treat the second

Kingsley factor as weighing in Plaintiff's favor.

The third Kingsley factor, effort to temper or limit the amount of force, weighs in

Defendants’ favor. As described above, Defendants repeatedly tried to de-escalate the

situation prior to administering force by issuing verbal commands and increasing officer

presence in the cell block and around the cell, but Plaintiff remained combative and

15 PlaintifPs medical records do not indicate that Plaintiff suffered any significant injury to his hand during the

January 7 incident, or that he subsequently sought treatment for a hand injury, so the Court focuses here on

Plaintiff's allegations regarding his knee.

Defendants contend that expert testimony would be required to establish causation. However, expert testimony

is not necessarily required. See Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 378-79 (4th Cir. 1993). Particularly given

Plaintiffs pro se status, the Court would not intend to resolve this second Kingsley factor based on a lack of

expert testimony. The Court instead assumes that the injury on January 7 caused the torn ACL that was

discovered 3 months later and resulted in subsequent surgery in May.

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disobedient. See Belton, 2025 WL 1455814, at *20. Further, as noted above, even after

Officer Phillips’ hand strikes, Plaintiff continued to hold onto the trash barrel and yell

profanities and threats at officers, leading to the need for additional efforts to bring Plaintiff

under control. The subsequent foot-sweep maneuver finally brought Plaintiff into submission,

and it is undisputed that after that maneuver brought Plaintiff to the ground, no additional

force was used.

The fourth and fifth Kingsley factors, the severity of the security problem at issue and

the threat reasonably perceived by the officers, also weigh in Defendants’ favor. Plaintiff's

status as a security risk because of his history of aggression towards officers and other

detainees required officers to use caution when engaging with Plaintiff, and increased the

sevetity of the potential threat that the officers faced. In addition, as described above, Plaintiff

etew increasingly aggressive and hostile, and physically and verbally threatened the officers

while other detainees walked around the area. In light of these facts, it was objectively

reasonable for Defendants to perceive that Plaintiffs behavior constituted a security threat,

and that given Plaintiffs violent history, he might plausibly carty out his threats of violence.

Belton, 2025 WL 1455814, at *20 (quoting Wilson v. Laureano, No. 3:22CV692, 2024 WL

1683616, at *11 (E.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2024)) (finding that the fourth and fifth Kingsley factors

weighed in defendant’s favor where plaintiff was a known security risk and repeatedly

threatened to fight defendant and refused to follow his orders). These factors weigh in

Defendants’ favor.

Finally, the sixth Kingsley factor, whether Plaintiff was actively resisting, also favors

Defendants. As described at length above, the evidence indicates that Plaintiff did not

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passively refuse to comply; instead, Plaintiff by his own account, challenged officers, did not

leave the cell as directed, continued to verbally challenge the officers loudly with profanities

and threats, charged through a group of officers towards a barrel of contraband, removed

items that he knew they wete trying to prevent him from getting, and even after being struck

in the hand still continued to grab the barrel and yell threats and profanities at officers. See

Belton, 2025 WL 1455814, at *20; Terry v. Jarrell, No. 3:22CV774, 2023 WL 2588456, at *6

(E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2023).

The video evidence of the incident that Plaintiff submitted does not create a genuine

issue of material fact, given the undisputed facts included in Plaintiffs deposition. The video

footage does not include any audio, does not show the inside of Plaintiff's cell, and, due to the

location of the camera, does not show much of the area outside of Plaintiff's cell because it is

largely obscured by a staircase. As a result, the video does not clearly depict the events giving

tise to the use of force, nor the actual incident. To the limited extent that the events are

captured, the footage appears to support Defendants’ version of events: while Plaintiff is

visible, he is shown moving his arms above his head, attempting to re-enter his cell, and

charging towatds the trash barrel. "The Court does not use the video to reject or contradict

Plaintiff's version of events, Simmons, 106 F.4th at 385-86, but viewing the video in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, it does not create an issue of fact that would preclude summary

judgment in light of the undisputed evidence discussed above.

In sum, five of the six Kingsley factors weigh in Defendants’ favor. The undisputed

evidence indicates that Defendants’ use of force was related to a legitimate nonpunitive

interest in regaining order, and that the force applied was objectively reasonable in the

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citcumstances.!° See Stewardson v. Titus, 126 F.4th 1264, 1275-77 (7th Cir. 2025); McCroden

v. Cnty. of Volusia, 724 F. App’x 768, 771-72 (11th Cir. 2018); Shafer v. Toman, No.

5:21CV14, 2022 WL 4134774, at *5 (W.D. Va. Sept. 12, 2022); Mills v. Rich, No. 7:13CV138,

2015 WL 5139198, at *4-5 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2015). Plaintiffs claims against Defendants

should be dismissed.

Moreover, even if there were a genuine issue of material fact regarding the use of force,

the Court also concludes that Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity in this

circumstance. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability unless “the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right” and “the right was ‘clearly established’ at

the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A right is clearly established when “the

contouts of a right ate sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood

that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741 (quotations and brackets

omitted). Thus, “[qJualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make

reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Id. at 743. In this case,

Plaintiff has not established a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, nor

has he established that every reasonable official would have understood that the actions

16 Plaintiff argues that because he was issued a disciplinary ticket for a “minor infraction,” Defendants’ use of

force was objectively unreasonable. (Pl. Resp., Doc. #67 at 10-11; Disciplinary Ticket, Doc. #70-9 at 1-2.)

However, the fact that Plaintiffs disciplinary proceeding classified the infraction as “minor” is not, as

Defendants correctly argue, per se evidence that the use of force was objectively unreasonable. As described at

length above, Plaintiffs behavior posed clear threats to jail security and the safety of the officers and other

inmates in the cell block, and Defendants’ assessment of the threat that Plaintiff posed and the subsequent use

of force deployed was reasonable to gain Plaintiff's compliance, regardless of the level of discipline Plaintiff

subsequently received. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (directing that objective reasonableness be assessed “from

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the

20/20 vision of hindsight”).

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violated a constitutional tight. Thus, Officers Dickerson and Phillips are entitled to qualified

immunity.

IV. MOTIONS TO SEAL

Defendants have filed two motions to seal [Doc. #63, #75] seeking to seal limited

portions of Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Summary

Judgement and their Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgement; portions of the Declarations of Lieutenant McClure and Officers Phillips

and Dickerson; and Plaintiffs medical records, attached as Exhibits 2-4 to their Memorandum

of Law in Support of Summaty Judgment. The public right of access to judicial records is

based in both common law and the First Amendment. See Rushford v. New Yorker Mag.,

Inc., 846 F.3d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988). With respect to the documents and information at

issue in the present case, the Fourth Circuit has “squarely held that the First Amendment right

of access attaches to materials filed in connection with a summary judgment motion.” Doe v.

Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Rushford, 846 F.2d at 252-53). When

the First Amendment is implicated, the court may grant a motion to seal only upon a showing

of a compelling interest, and only if the sealing is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See

Va. Dep’t of State Police v. Washington Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004). “A district

court must ... weigh the appropriate competing interests under the following procedure: it

must give the public notice of the request to seal and a reasonable opportunity to challenge

the request; it must consider less drastic alternatives to sealing; and if it decides to seal it must

state the reasons (and specific supporting findings) for its decision and the reasons for rejecting

alternatives to sealing.” Id. at 576; see also Gonzalez v. Cuccinelli, 985 F.3d 357, 376 (4th Cit.

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2021) (“To seal a document, the district court must (1) give the public adequate notice of a

request to seal and a reasonable opportunity to challenge it, (2) consider less drastic alternatives

to sealing, and (3) if it decides to seal, state the reasons, supported by specific findings, behind

its decision and the reasons for rejecting alternatives to sealing.”).

Defendants seek to file under seal Plaintiffs unredacted medical records in support of

their Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as limited portions of their Memorandum of Law

in Support of Summary Judgment, their Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary

Judgment, and portions of several declarations, all of which contain Plaintiffs medical

information. The medical records include Plaintiffs treatment and provider notes while

incarcerated at ACDC and during a period of safekeeping in Raleigh, and the portions of

Defendants’ briefs and declarations includes reference to one of Plaintiffs medical conditions.

Here, Defendants’ Motions to Seal were publicly docketed on November 14, 2024 and

December 27, 2024. Interested parties have therefore had a reasonable amount of time to

contest the sealing of the information at issue, although no party has done so. Accordingly,

the notice requirement has been met. The proposed sealed exhibits contain Plaintiffs

“confidential sensitive and personal medical information, the protection of which serves an

important governmental interest.” Fulp v. Columbiana Hi Tech, LLC, No. 1:16CV1169, 2018

WL 1027159, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 21, 2018). Finally, the sealing that Defendant seeks is

nattowly tailored. Nearly all of Exhibits 2 through 4 contain sensitive information, such that

less drastic alternatives are not feasible. In addition, Defendants’ redactions to their briefs and

declarations ate vety minor, and limited only to information about Plaintiffs medical

condition. To the extent the information was relevant to the Court’s decision, it is included

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in this Order and Recommendation, which is public. Balancing the compelling interest to

protect Plaintiffs private medical information with the First Amendment right of access, the

Court will grant the motion to seal as it is narrowly tailored, and there is sufficient public

information to explain the Court’s reasoning.

V. REMAINING MOTIONS

Pending before the Court ate also two Motions to Strike by Defendants seeking to

strike Plaintiffs expert witnesses [Doc. #59] and Plaintiffs Motion entitled “Plaintiff's Motion

of Summary judgment and in Lieu of filing of Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert

Answer to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment” [Doc. #79]. With respect to

Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs experts, in light of the Court’s recommendation that

Plaintiff's claims be dismissed, Defendants’ Motion to strike Plaintiffs experts is moot. In

addition, because the Court has consttued Plaintiffs motion entitled “Plaintiffs Motion of

Summaty judgment and in Lieu of filing of Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert

Answet to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment” as a response to Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment, not Plaintiffs own motion for summary judgment, the Court denies

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs filing. To the extent Defendants seek attorney’s fees

under Rule 37 in connection with filing these motions, considering plaintiffs pro se status, the

Court declines to award attorney’s fees in this instance.

Finally, Plaintiff has filed a motion entitled “Motion of 2°¢ Response to Reply

Memorandum of Law in Supporting of Motion Summary Judgment” [Doc. #84]. As noted

above, the Court consttues this motion as a sut-teply to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

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Judgment and has considered it, but to the extent that it is docketed as a separate motion, the

motion may be terminated on the docket.

VI. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. #61] be GRANTED, and that all claims in this case be dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that the Motions to Seal by Defendants [Doc. #63, #75] ate

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motions to Strike by Defendants [Doc. #59,

ate DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs “Motion of 294 Response to Reply

Memorandum of Law in Supporting of Motion Summary Judgment” [Doc. #84] is construed

as a Sut-Reply to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and can be terminated on the

docket.

This, the day of August, 2025.

Lala

nited States Magistrate Judge

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