concluding that dismissal “is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that dismissal “is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ROY GLENN CHAMBLESS, §
Dallas County No. 25008204 §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:25-cv-1792-E-BN
§
STATE OF TEXAS, §
§
Defendant. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Roy Glynn Chambless, an inmate in the Dallas County Jail,
submitted a pro se filing that has been construed as a civil complaint. See Dkt. No. 3.
And United States District Judge Ada Brown referred Chambless’s construed
complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial
management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis
(that is, without payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint
(or any portion of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam).
And, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), where prisoners
(whether incarcerated or detained pending trial) seek relief from a governmental
entity or employee, a district court must, on initial screening, identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that “is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or “seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b). This language also tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).
And “[i]t is well-established that a district court may dismiss a complaint on
its own motion under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
granted.” Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171 (5th
Cir. 2006)), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff’d, 763 F.
App’x 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142 (2019).
A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint
on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll,
470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted).
“[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to
dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano
v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v.
Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court
may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’
More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention
and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.”
(citations omitted)).
And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while
the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett,
2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted).
A district court’s authority to dismiss an action that “fails to ‘state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face’” extends to dismissal of “claims that are ‘clearly
baseless,’ including ‘claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.’” Starrett, 763
F. App’x at 383-84 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, then Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)
(concluding that dismissal “is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of
the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable
facts available to contradict them”)).
A review of Chambless’s filing [Dkt. No. 3] and the judicially noticeable facts
available from review of the dockets for his pending state criminal cases for a parole
violation and possession of a controlled substance reflect that the complaint presents
claims and allegations that qualify as clearly baseless, irrational, or wholly
incredible.
Chambless’s claims appear to be (1) that the federal court should intervene in
his state court cases because of a misspelling in his middle name, (2) a conclusory
claim that he was approached arbitrarily and told the officers they did not have
reasonable suspicion to search him, and (3) that he has a right to a mental health-
mental retardation (“MHMR”) attorney and to be tried in a MHMR court. See
generally id. Chambless’s conclusory or baseless claims require dismissal with
prejudice.
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint
before dismissal, but leave is not required when he has already pled his “best case.”
Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Chambless has failed to state
or suggest a cognizable claim or any facts from which a cognizable claim can be
inferred. Based on the most deferential review of his complaint, it is highly unlikely
that, given the opportunity, Chambless could allege cogent and viable legal claims.
Thus, the undersigned concludes that granting leave to amend under these
circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay.
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: July 11, 2025
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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