Jenkins-Parks v. Credit Collection Services

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

SHANETTE JENKINS-PARKS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 25-cv-2204-SHL-tmp

)

CREDIT COLLECTION SERVICES, )

)

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is pro se plaintiff Shanette Jenkins-

Parks’s complaint.1 Because Jenkins-Parks is proceeding in forma

pauperis, the undersigned must screen the complaint pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).2 For the reasons below, the undersigned

finds that the complaint fails to state a claim, and recommends

that Jenkins-Parks be given leave to amend her complaint in lieu

of dismissal.

I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

Jenkins-Parks filed her complaint on February 24, 2025,

alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),

1Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been

referred to the United States magistrate judge for management of

all pretrial matters for determination or report and

recommendation, as appropriate.

2The undersigned granted Jenkins-Parks leave to proceed in forma

pauperis on July 11, 2025. (ECF No. 7.)

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (ECF No. 2.) She alleges that

defendant Credit Collection Services (“CCS”) “is a debt

collection agency.” (Id. at PageID 2.) Jenkins-Parks states that

she “reviewed [her] Experian credit report and discovered that

CCS had furnished inaccurate information regarding an alleged

Progressive account.” (Id.) She alleges that “[t]he account

. . . contained erroneous balance information and a collection

status that was inaccurate,” including: “Account Name: Credit

Collection Services[;] Original Creditor: Progressive[;] Date

Opened: August 14, 2023[;] Balance: $69[;] Status: Collection

Account[;] Reported Payment History: Multiple incorrect reports

of collection status in November 2023, December 2023, January

2024, and February 2024.” (Id. at PageID 3.) She does not state

how that information is inaccurate. She claims that she “never

received proper validation of this alleged debt and disputed the

account directly with CCS and Experian,” but “CCS failed to

conduct a reasonable investigation and continued to report

inaccurate data.” (Id.) As a result, she claims that she

“suffered credit score damage, emotional distress, and economic

harm, including difficulty obtaining credit and financial

opportunities.” (Id.)

Based on this conduct, Jenkins-Parks alleges that CCS

willfully and negligently violated § 1681s-2(b).3 (Id.) As

relief, she requests actual, statutory, and punitive damages, as

well as costs for filing this suit. (Id. at PageID 4.)

II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Legal Standard

This court is required to screen in forma pauperis

complaints and must dismiss any complaint, or any portion

thereof, if the action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). To avoid

dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6). “A

claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Ctr.

for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369

3Jenkins-Parks also seeks to bring claims for violations of §

1681n and § 1681o. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 3-4.) However, those

sections govern damages for willful and negligent noncompliance

with the FCRA, respectively, and are not standalone claims.

(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Without

factual allegations in support, mere legal conclusions are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally

construed. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)

(citing Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2002)).

Even so, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989), and the court cannot create a claim that has not been

spelled out in a pleading, see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x

608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x

836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003).

B. Analysis

Jenkins-Parks alleges that CCS violated § 1681s-2(b) by

failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into disputed

information. “[Section] 1681s–2 is designed to prevent

‘furnishers of information’ from spreading inaccurate consumer-

credit information.”4 Boggio v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 696 F.3d

4“While § 1681s-2 does not define ‘furnisher,’ courts have

defined the term as ‘any entity which transmits information

concerning a particular debt owed by a particular customer to

consumer reporting agencies.’” Carter v. Holzman L., PLLC, No.

CV 24-11990, 2025 WL 1065379, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2025),

report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 868615 (E.D. Mich.

Mar. 20, 2025) (quoting LaBreck v. Mid-Mich Credit Bureau, 2016

WL 6927454, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2016)).

611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012). “[It] works in two phases.” Id. First,

under § 1681s-2(a), “it imposes a duty to provide accurate

information.” Carter, 2025 WL 1065379, at *4 (citing LaBreck,

2016 WL 6927454, at *2). Second, under § 1681s-2(b), it imposes

“a duty to undertake [a reasonable] investigation upon receipt

of notice of dispute from a [consumer reporting agency].” Id.

(citing LaBreck, 2016 WL 6927454, at *2).

“A private cause of action against a furnisher of

information [under § 1681s-2(b)] does not arise until a consumer

reporting agency provides proper notice of a dispute.” Brown v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 507 F. App'x 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2012)

(citing Boggio, 696 F.3d at 615-16). Thus, to plausibly state a

claim under § 1681s-2(b), a plaintiff must at least allege that

they disputed an inaccuracy with a consumer reporting agency,

that the consumer reporting agency then notified the furnisher

of that dispute, and that the furnisher then violated a

statutory duty under § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E). See Rajapakse v.

Credit Acceptance Corp., No. 19-1192, 2021 WL 3059755, at *2

(6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2021) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-

(E); Boggio, 696 F.3d at 616-18) (affirming dismissal of

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiff “did not allege

that [defendant] violated any of the statutory duties to

investigate and properly report information once notified of her

dispute related to [defendant]”); see also Green v. Cont.

Callers, Inc., No. 3:21-CV-2005, 2022 WL 2209436, at *2 (N.D.

Ohio June 21, 2022) (citing Rajapakse, 2021 WL 3059755, at *2)

(finding that plaintiff failed to state a § 1681s-2(b) claim).

Here, Jenkins-Parks vaguely alleges that CCS “furnished

inaccurate information,” she disputed that inaccurate

information with Experian and CCS, and CCS then failed to

conduct a reasonable investigation. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 2-3.)

But these allegations fall short for at least two reasons.

First, she has not alleged specific facts as to how the disputed

information was inaccurate. See Settles v. Trans Union, LLC, No.

3:20-CV-00084, 2020 WL 6900302, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 24, 2020)

(“[T]o establish any FCRA violation Plaintiff must show that the

credit report is patently incorrect or materially misleading”;

finding that plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that the

reported information was inaccurate and dismissing for failure

to state a claim).

Second, a § 1682s-2(b) claim requires that the consumer

reporting agency notify a furnisher of information of a dispute.

Rajapakse, 2021 WL 3059755, at *2 (“The consumer bears the

burden to show that a furnisher of information was notified by a

credit reporting agency of the consumer's disputed debt[.]”

(citing Boggio, 696 F.3d at 618)). While Jenkins-Parks alleges

that she disputed the information with both Experian and CCS

individually, this allegation is not sufficient to plead that

Experian notified CCS of the dispute. See Scott v. First S.

Nat'l Bank, 936 F.3d 509, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2019) (“A consumer's

complaining directly to a furnisher of information . . . does

not trigger the furnisher's duty to investigate under the

FCRA.”). Absent this allegation, Jenkins-Parks has not plausibly

alleged that CCS’s duty to investigate was triggered. See Green,

2022 WL 2209436, at *2 (“[Plaintiff] has not alleged Defendant

received notice from a [consumer reporting agency] pursuant to

section 1681i(a)(2) and, therefore, he has not plausibly alleged

Defendant had a duty to investigate the disputed information.”

(citation modified)). Despite these deficiencies, because

Jenkins-Parks alleges at least some elements of a § 1681s-2(b)

claim, the undersigned recommends that she be given leave to

amend her complaint in lieu of dismissal.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that

Jenkins-Parks be given thirty days to amend her complaint.

Respectfully submitted,

s/Tu M. Pham

TU M. PHAM

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

July 11, 2025

Date

NOTICE

WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE AND FILE

SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS. ANY PARTY MAY RESPOND TO ANOTHER PARTY’S

OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A

COPY. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); L.R.

72.1(g)(2). FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS

MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTIONS,

EXCEPTIONS, AND FURTHER APPEAL.