Sullivan v. Orleans Parish Prison

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAVAL NOLAN SULLIVAN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-0657

ORLEANS PARISH PRISON, ET AL. SECTION “J” (2)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Laval Nolan Sullivan filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was

referred to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing, including an evidentiary hearing,

if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and recommendations for disposition, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), § 1915e(2), and § 1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(c)(1) and(2). Having considered the record and the applicable law, the Court has

determined that this matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Complaint (ECF No. 4)

Sullivan, a pretrial detainee, filed this pro se and in forma pauperis complaint pursuant 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Orleans Parish Prison (“OPP”) and the SID Tact Team. ECF No.

4 at 1; id., ¶III(B), at 6. Sullivan claims that on October 23, 2024, the SID Tact Team performed a

shakedown on Pod-3 Charlie and pulled he and his cellmate out of their cell. Id., ¶IV, at 6. When

he returned to his cell, Sullivan noticed all of his property including a book, poems, and songs he

wrote were gone. He stated he wrote several ARPs to every high-ranking officer to get his property

back. Id. at 7. As relief, Sullivan requests compensatory damages and for the individuals involved

to be held accountable.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Statutorily Required Screening

As soon as practicable after docketing, the court must review a prisoner’s § 1983 complaint

for a cognizable claim, or dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous and/or fails to state a claim.1 A

claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.”2 A claim lacks an arguable basis in

law if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the

violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.”3 A factually frivolous claim alleges only

facts that are “‘clearly baseless,’ . . . are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional’ . . . [or] rise to the

level of the irrational or wholly incredible . . . .”4 A court may not dismiss a claim simply because

the facts are “unlikely.”5

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the factual

allegations do not rise above a speculative level, with the assumption that all factual allegations in

the complaint are true, even if doubtful.6 The Rule 12(b)(6) analysis is generally confined to a

review of the complaint and its proper attachments.7 The Fifth Circuit has summarized the

standard for Rule 12(b)(6):

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” A claim

for relief is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” A claim for relief is implausible on its face when “the well-

1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Martin, 156 F.3d at 579-80.

2 Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998); Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). The law

“accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual

contentions are clearly baseless.” Macias v. Raul A., 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).

3 Davis, 157 F.3d at 1005 (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997)).

4 Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)).

5 Id.

6 Garrett v. Thaler, 560 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007)).

7 Walch v. Adjutant Gen.’s Dep’t, 533 F.3d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

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pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct.”8

When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded

facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.9 Thus, the court should

assume the veracity of all well-pleaded allegations, viewing them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, “‘and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’”10

In comparing a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(b)(6), Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 319, held that a claim that is dismissed under one rule does

not “invariably fall afoul” of the other.11 If an in forma pauperis complaint lacks even an arguable

basis in law, dismissal is appropriate under both Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(e).12 “When a complaint

raises an arguable question of law which the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved

against the plaintiff, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate; however, dismissal under [§

1915(e)’s] frivolousness standard is not.”13

B. Required Elements of a § 1983 Claim

Section 1983 creates a damages remedy for the violation of federal constitutional or

statutory rights under color of state law:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

8 Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544).

9 Id. at 803 n.44 (quoting True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted)); accord

Murchison Capital Partners, L.P. v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 625 F. App’x 617, 618 n.1 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Wood

v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.5 (2014)); Maloney Gaming Mgt., L.L.C. v. St. Tammany Par., 456 F. App’x 336, 340

(5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff’s Ofc., 530 F.3d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 n.10 (5th Cir. 2017)).

10 Jabary v. City of Allen, 547 F. App’x 600, 604 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664); see also Dorsey v.

Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)).

11 Moore, 976 F.2d at 269 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (current version at 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)).

12 Id.

13 Id.

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secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law . . . .14

“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using their badge of authority to deprive

individuals of federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”15

A plaintiff must satisfy three elements to establish § 1983 liability:

(1) deprivation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law;

(2) that occurred under color of state law; and

(3) was caused by a state actor.16

Because § 1983 merely provides a remedy for designated rights, rather than creating any

substantive rights, “an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability.”17

This requires the plaintiff to identify both the constitutional violation and the responsible person

acting under color of state law.18 “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law

requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state

law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”19

III. ANALYSIS

A. Improper Defendants

Sullivan named OPP and the SID Tact Team as defendants in this matter. ECF No. 4 at 1;

id., ¶III(B), at 6. As outlined below, OPP and the SID Tact Team are not proper defendants and the

claims against them must be dismissed as frivolous and otherwise for failure to state a claim for

which relief can be granted.

14 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

15 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978)).

16 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

17 Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

18 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).

19 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); accord

Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 1984).

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A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 complaint is required to identify both a constitutional

violation and the responsible person acting under color of state law.20 OPP, however, is not

recognized as a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.21 In Louisiana, a jail facility is not an

entity “legally empowered to do” anything independent of either the responsible parish officials

or the parish sheriff.22 Since a jail is not a juridical entity under state law, “a prison or jail or its

administrative departments are not entities that can be sued under Section 1983 . . .” and jails “are

not persons for purposes of suit under Section 1983 as the statute and case law define that term.”23

As one division of this Court has noted, a parish jail is “not an entity, but a building.” 24

As for the SID Tact Team, groups of people or teams are also not properly named

defendants. Instead, a § 1983 action must be filed against an actual identified person who violated

a constitutional right, not a department or general staff group at the jail.25 Sullivan has failed to

name as a defendant any individual members of the SID Tact Team who would be responsible for

any purported constitutional violation.

For these reasons, OPP and the SID Tact Team are not a person or suable entity to be held

liable under § 1983. Thus, the claims against OPP and the SID Tact Team are frivolous and

20 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).

21 See Douglas v. Gusman, 567 F. Supp. 2d 877, 892 (E.D. La. June 9, 2008) (Order adopting attached Report and

Recommendation).

22 Roberts v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans, 634 So. 2d 341, 347 (La. 1994).

23 Douglas, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 892; see FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b).

24 See Jones v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, 4 F. Supp.2d 606, 613 (E.D. La. May 8, 1998) (dismissing with prejudice

the St. Tammany Parish Jail as an improper defendant); see also Kerr v. Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office Prison, No.

15-0746, 2015 WL 4755174, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2015).

25 See, e.g., Allen v. Gusman, No. 05-1633, 2006 WL 286007, at *3 n.8 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2006) (“Medical Staff” is

not a juridical entity capable of being sued; the specific medical personnel must be named); Carter v. Strain, No. 09-

3401, 2009 WL 2390808, at *3 (E.D. La. July 31, 2009) (citing August v. Gusman, No. 06-3962, 2008 WL 466202,

at *7 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 2008); Staritz v. Valdez, No. 06- 1926, 2007 WL 1498285, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2007);

and Banks v. United States, No. 05-6853, 2007 WL 1030326, at *11 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2007)).

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otherwise fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted and should be dismissed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915, § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

B. Missing Personal Property

Sullivan claims his personal property consisting of a book, poems, and songs he had written

were taken by prison officials during a shakedown and not returned. Even if Sullivan could

identify a proper defendant, his claims are still frivolous because the loss of property is not

actionable under § 1983 for the following reasons.

A state actor's negligence that results in an unintentional loss of property does not violate

the Constitution because negligence is not actionable under § 1983.26 And an intentional

deprivation of personal property likewise does not state a viable constitutional claim if the prisoner

has access to an adequate post-deprivation state remedy.27 Louisiana law provides an inmate with

an adequate post-deprivation remedy through its expansive tort laws.28 Thus, Plaintiff’s alleged

deprivations of personal property does not implicate constitutional due process concerns as state

law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy.29

In short, an official's actions—whether negligent or intentional—that result in a loss of

property give rise to a state tort action rather than a federal civil rights claim. As constitutional

concerns are not implicated by Sullivan’s claimed loss of items from his cell, it is unnecessary to

26 See Simmons v. Poppell, 837 F.2d 1243, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); see also Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707,

712 (5th Cir. 1995) (concluding negligence is not actionable under § 1983).

27 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see also Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 583 (5th Cir. 2014)

(per curiam) (citations omitted) (“An inmate's allegation that his personal property was lost, confiscated, or damaged

does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even when prison officials acted intentionally.”)

28 Marshall v. Norwood, 741 F.2d 761, 764 (5th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. La. Dept. of Pub. Safety and Corrs., 61 F.

App’x 919, 2003 WL 1109690, at *1 (5th Cir. 2003); Arnold v. Inmate Accounts, 48 F. App’x 105, 2002 WL

31017153, at *1 (5th Cir. 2002).

29 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a

negligent act of an official causing unintended loss or injury to life, liberty or property.”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517 (1984) (intentional deprivations); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (unauthorized deprivations).

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afford him an inherently futile opportunity to amend to name specific officials as defendants.

Even if he could, the facts do not state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of property.*!

IV. RECOMMENDATION

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that plaintiff Laval Nolan Sullivan’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims against defendants Orleans Parish Prison and the SID Tact Team be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE, and without leave to amend, as frivolous and otherwise fail to state a claim for

which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and

recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days

after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from

attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by

the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will

result from a failure to object.*?

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of July, 2025.

ae ud yy. CURRAULT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

30 See, e.g., Smith v. Terrebonne Par. Crim. Just. Complex, No. 14-2207, 2014 WL 5780696, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 4,

2014) (holding that amendment not required because it was clear that underlying claim was frivolous and/or failed to

state a claim on which relief may be granted); see also Martzen v. McLane, 764 F. App’x 402, 403 (Sth Cir. 2019)

(noting that a plaintiff need not be given an opportunity to amend if he has already alleged his best case and any further

amendment would not state a valid § 1983 claim).

31 Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (th Cir. 2005); Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 583 (Sth Cir. 2014) (“when

an inmate’s property is taken without compensation, his remedy is in state court, not federal court.”’).

Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996). Douglass referenced the previously

applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended

to extend the period to fourteen days.