pleading standards set forth in Starr v. Baca govern municipal 28 liability claims
How later courts described this case
- pleading standards set forth in Starr v. Baca govern municipal 28 liability claims
- “actionable cause” “requires showing both but for and proximate 4 causation”
- denial of leave of amend appropriate where further amendment would be 2 || futile
- “Government officials 1 may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a 2 theory of respondeat superior”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 JASON ROBERT HYATT, Case No. ED CV 25-1337-MWC(E)
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER DISMISSING
13 v. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
14 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
SHERIFF CHAD BIANCO, ET AL.,
15
Defendants.
16
17
18 For the reasons discussed below, the First Amended Complaint is dismissed with
19 leave to amend. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A.
20
21 BACKGROUND
22
23 On May 27, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42
24 U.S.C. section 1983. On June 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
25 (“FAC”). The FAC names as Defendants: Sheriff Chad Bianco; the Riverside County
26 Sheriff’s Department (“Department”); the County of Riverside (“County”); and John Does
27 ///
28 ///
1 1 through 6 (FAC, p. 3).1 At all relevant times, Sheriff Bianco and John Does 1 through
2 6 assertedly were employees of the Department (id., p. 3-4). Plaintiff sues Sheriff
3 Bianco and John Does 1 through 6 in their individual and official capacities (id., p. 3).
4 The Court granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on July 14, 2025.
5
6 SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
7
8 The FAC alleges:
9
10 Plaintiff “was at the time of th[e] incident[s] relevant to this action a
11 pre-trial detainee in custody of the [Department].” On October 16, 2020,
12 Plaintiff arrived at the Smith Correctional Facility in Banning, California.
13 Deputies subjected Plaintiff to five separate body scans in a TEK-84
14 scanner and twice sent Plaintiff to the hospital for x-rays, all in an effort to
15 search Plaintiff for contraband. When deputies attempted to place Plaintiff
16 in the TEK-84 scanner a sixth time, Plaintiff refused to comply. As a
17 result, Plaintiff “was placed against a wall where a Riverside County sheriff
18 began to berate and insult Plaintiff for refusing to be scanned and then
19 proceeded to assault Plaintiff by repeatedly kicking Plaintiff in the left
20 ankle where Plaintiff had a 2 1/2 inch open wound injury. . . . Plaintiff was
21 also stripped naked in front of female staff and placed in a padded cell
22 until Plaintiff gave a bowel movement. This incident lasted over a two day
23
24 1 A plaintiff may name a fictitious defendant in his or her complaint if the plaintiff does
not know the true identity of the defendant prior to the filing of the complaint. Wakefield
25
v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). However, before the Court can order
26 service of process by the United States Marshal upon any fictitious Defendant, Plaintiff
must provide identifying information sufficient to permit the United States Marshal to
27 effect service of process upon the Defendant, including the Defendant’s full name and
address.
28
1 period.”
2
3 Subsequently, Plaintiff was transferred to the Robert Presley
4 Detention Center in Riverside, California. On May 15, 2021, deputies
5 “removed everyone from their cell in a mass search.” Plaintiff and other
6 inmates were taken down to the basement and placed in a line against the
7 wall. Plaintiff’s hands were cuffed behind his back. “When Plaintiff’s turn
8 came to be placed inside the TEK-84 scanning machine, Plaintiff
9 attempted to explain that there are other methods available [to screen for
10 contraband] other than being placed in the scanner.” Plaintiff also
11 “explained that there was a prior incident involving the TEK-84 scanner
12 and asked not to be placed inside it.”
13
14 After deputies ignored Plaintiff, he “attempted to resist being placed
15 in the machine by going completely limp.” John Doe 2 then forcibly placed
16 Plaintiff into the scanner. Plaintiff “kicked the TEK-84 to prevent Plaintiff
17 from any more inhumane treatment.” Plaintiff then “was lifted off his feet
18 turned in midair slammed to the concrete face first,” which caused injury to
19 Plaintiff’s neck and face. Plaintiff lay face down on the concrete with his
20 face bleeding. Plaintiff did not resist verbally or physically, yet John Does
21 2 through 5 held Plaintiff down and refused to provide medical treatment.
22 John Doe 1, a sergeant, instructed John Does 2 through 5 to strap
23 Plaintiff into a restraining device. Plaintiff continued to request medical
24 attention, but deputies ignored Plaintiff’s request.
25
26 Deputies moved Plaintiff to a cell, where Plaintiff remained for
27 approximately an hour. Deputies then removed the restraining device and
28 placed Plaintiff in a padded cell. Plaintiff “repeatedly asked for medical but
1 Plaintiff was completely ignored throughout the entire time inside the cell.
2 After some time had passed sheriffs came inside and placed hand covers
3 over Plaintiff[’]s hands and it was some time after this that Plaintiff had an
4 attack, a type of seizure.” Plaintiff again “continuously called out for
5 medical,” but deputies ignored Plaintiff. When Plaintiff “crawled to the
6 door and pounded on it and ask[ed] for medical,” John Doe 6 “sprayed
7 Plaintiff in the face underneath the door.” Plaintiff remained in the padded
8 cell for two days “until he gave a bowel movement.” Plaintiff then was
9 taken to the hospital and given medical attention. “Plaintiff had a
10 contusion to his E-5 part of his neck, two black eyes, a laceration above
11 his left eye, [and] had suffered a seizure fit.” After Plaintiff returned from
12 the hospital, deputies carried and dragged Plaintiff up the stairs and
13 pushed Plaintiff into his cell.
14
15 Deputy Maldonado falsely accused Plaintiff of possessing five
16 grams of heroin, which resulted in a criminal charge against Plaintiff for
17 drug possession. The criminal charge was dismissed when the substance
18 allegedly found in Plaintiff’s possession tested negative for heroin. The
19 Department “knew [Plaintiff] had no drugs but knowingly and falsely
20 claimed that [Plaintiff] did and charged Plaintiff for the purpose to cause
21 harm to Plaintiff.”
22
23 (FAC, pp. 1-11).
24
25 Plaintiff apparently attempts to assert claims for “unreasonable, unnecessary and
26 excessive force, cruel and unusual punishment, and deliberate indifference,” in alleged
27 violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (id., p. 1). Plaintiff seeks, inter alia,
28 ///
1 compensatory and punitive damages and attorney’s fees2 (id., p. 21).
2
3 DISCUSSION
4
5 I. The FAC Does Not Comply With Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
6 Procedure.
7
8 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement
9 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant
10 fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic v.
11 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted; original ellipses). “Each allegation
12 must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Conclusory allegations are
13 insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009).
14
15 “Experience teaches that, unless cases are pled clearly and precisely, issues are
16 not joined, discovery is not controlled, the trial court’s docket becomes unmanageable,
17 the litigants suffer, and society loses confidence in the court’s ability to administer
18 justice.” Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations
19 and quotations omitted); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (a plaintiff must allege
20 more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation”; a pleading
21 that “offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
22 action will not do”) (citations and quotations omitted).
23
24 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
25 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation
26 and internal quotations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
27
2 A pro se litigant such as Plaintiff cannot recover attorney’s fees in a civil rights action.
28 Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991).
1 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
2 is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). “Factual allegations must be
3 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
4 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
5
6 The FAC fails to comply with Rule 8. In particular, Plaintiff fails to allege what
7 each Defendant did or did not do to violate Plaintiff’s rights. To state a cognizable
8 section 1983 claim, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that
9 an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v.
10 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999). A
11 complaint is subject to dismissal if “one cannot determine from the complaint who is
12 being sued, for what relief, and on what theory. . . .” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,
13 1178 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Bonnette v. Dick, 2020 WL 3412733, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June
14 22, 2020) (allegations insufficient where they “fail to adequately describe specific actions
15 taken by each of the defendants named in the complaint”); Moreno v. Penzone, 2020
16 WL 1047068, at *2 (D. Ariz. March 4, 2020) (“To state a valid claim under § 1983,
17 plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of
18 a defendant and show an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that
19 defendant.”) (citation omitted); Chevalier v. Ray and Joan Kroc Corps. Cmty. Ctr., 2012
20 WL 2088819, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2012) (complaint that failed to “identify which
21 wrongs were committed by which Defendant” insufficient).
22
23 Plaintiff has not asserted facts in a single document adequately describing each
24 Defendant’s alleged actions. Plaintiff has not asserted facts plausibly demonstrating an
25 affirmative link between each Defendant’s alleged actions and any claimed injury to
26 Plaintiff. Plaintiff makes assertions regarding the alleged conduct of individuals who are
27 not named as Defendants. Plaintiff also makes assertions regarding alleged incidents at
28 an institution other than the institution where John Does 1 through 6 assertedly were
1 present. Again, it is unclear whom Plaintiff is attempting to sue, for what relief, and on
2 what theory. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d at 1178. Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory
3 allegations do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
4
5 II. The FAC Does Not Sufficiently Allege Any Municipal Liability Claim.
6
7 Plaintiff purports to bring claims against the County and the Department, as well
8 as Sheriff Bianco and John Does 1 through 6 in their official capacities (see FAC, pp. 2-
9 3). Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Sheriff Bianco and John Does 1 through 6
10 are tantamount to claims against the County. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
11 165-66 (1985) (official capacity claim against municipal employee is a claim against the
12 municipality). Plaintiff may not sue a municipal entity such as the County or the
13 Department on a theory of respondeat superior, which is not a theory of liability
14 cognizable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60
15 (2011); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325
16 (1981). A municipal entity may be held liable only if the alleged wrongdoing was
17 committed pursuant to a municipal policy, custom or usage. See Board of County
18 Comm’rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402-04 (1997); Monell v.
19 New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
20
21 Conclusory allegations do not suffice to plead a municipal liability claim. See
22 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
23 banc), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 982 (2012) (“allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may
24 not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient
25 allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to
26 defend itself effectively”); see also AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d
27 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (pleading standards set forth in Starr v. Baca govern municipal
28 liability claims). A plaintiff “must set forth factual allegations to show that the execution
1 of a specific policy, ordinance, regulation, custom or the like was the actionable cause of
2 any alleged constitutional violation.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1146
3 (9th Cir. 2012) (“actionable cause” “requires showing both but for and proximate
4 causation”); Rivas v. City of Santa Ana Jail, 2020 WL 6541988, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31,
5 2020) (“In order to state a claim arising from the execution of a local entity’s policy or
6 custom, plaintiff must set forth factual allegations to show that the execution of a specific
7 policy, ordinance, regulation, custom or the like was the actionable cause of any alleged
8 constitutional violation.”) (citation and quotations omitted).
9
10 The FAC contains no allegations sufficient to plead a cognizable municipal liability
11 claim. See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
12 569 U.S. 904 (2013) (affirming dismissal of municipal and supervisor liability claims
13 which “lack[ed] any factual allegations that would separate them from the ‘formulaic
14 recitation of a cause of action’s elements’” deemed insufficient by the United States
15 Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly). Although Plaintiff alleges a failure to
16 supervise, discipline or train the deputies allegedly responsible for the asserted
17 constitutional injuries to Plaintiff (FAC, p. 3), Plaintiff fails to assert facts plausibly
18 demonstrating that “the execution of a specific policy, ordinance, regulation, custom or
19 the like was the actionable cause of any alleged constitutional violation.” See Tsao v.
20 Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d at 1146. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a
21 cognizable claim against the County, the Department, or Sheriff Bianco or John Does 1
22 through 6 in their official capacities.
23
24 III. The FAC Does Not Sufficiently Allege a Claim Against Any Supervisory
25 Defendant.
26
27 Plaintiff may not sue a supervisor for violation of a constitutional right on a theory
28 of respondeat superior. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Government officials
1 may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a
2 theory of respondeat superior”). A supervisor “is only liable for his or her own
3 misconduct,” and is not “accountable for the misdeeds of [his or her] agents.” Id. at 677.
4 Mere knowledge of a subordinate’s alleged misconduct is insufficient. Id. Thus, a
5 constitutional claim against a government official must allege facts showing the official’s
6 personal involvement with the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between
7 each defendant and the constitutional deprivation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d at 1207;
8 Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991). The FAC does not allege such
9 facts with respect to some of Plaintiff’s alleged claims. For example, Plaintiff names
10 Sheriff Bianco as a Defendant, but Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that Sheriff
11 Bianco was personally involved with or otherwise caused the alleged constitutional
12 deprivations.
13
14 IV. The FAC Fails to Allege a Cognizable Eighth Amendment Claim.
15
16 Plaintiff claims that Defendants inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on Plaintiff
17 in asserted violation of the Eighth Amendment (see FAC, pp. 1-2, 4, 12, 14-20).
18 However, “the Eighth Amendment only prevents the imposition of cruel and unusual
19 punishment on convicted prisoners.” Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir.
20 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16
21 (1979)); see also Vazquez v. County of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2020).
22 Plaintiff alleges that he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged constitutional
23 violations (see FAC, p. 2). Thus, Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable Eighth Amendment
24 claim.3
25
26
3 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs excessive force
claims brought by pretrial detainees. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989);
27 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979). To prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force claim, a plaintiff must establish that the “force purposely or knowingly
28 used against him was objectively unreasonable,” considering the facts known to the
1 ORDER
2
3 The First Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff still
4 wishes to pursue this action, he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Order
5 within which to file a Second Amended Complaint. Although the Court does not
6 necessarily deem insufficient all of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court does require that any
7 Second Amended Complaint be complete in itself and not refer in any manner to any
8 prior Complaint or court filing. The Second Amended Complaint must identify clearly
9 and consistently in the caption and the body of the pleading all Defendants whom
10 Plaintiff intends to sue in this action. Failure timely to file a Second Amended Complaint
11 in conformity with this Order may result in the dismissal of the action. See Pagtalunan v.
12 Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 909 (2003) (court
13 may dismiss action for failure to follow court order); Simon v. Value Behav. Health, Inc.,
14 208 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir.), amended, 234 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
15 U.S. 1104 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541
16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 985 (2007) (en banc) (affirming dismissal without leave
17 to amend where plaintiff failed to correct complaint’s deficiencies, court had afforded
18 plaintiff opportunities to do so, and court had given plaintiff notice of the substantive
19 problems with his claims); Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40, County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d
20 432, 439 (9th
21 ///
22 ///
23 ///
24 ///
25 ///
26 ///
27
defendants at the time and the government’s legitimate interests in institutional safety
28 and security. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015).
1 || Cir. 1997) (denial of leave of amend appropriate where further amendment would be
2 || futile).
3
4 IT IS SO ORDERED.
5
6 DATED: August 8, 2025.
W (We
(nun
9 HON. MICHELLE WILLIAMS COURT
10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
41 || PRESENTED this 4th day of
42 || August, 2025 by:
IS/
14 CHARLES F. EICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
11