Butler v. Dassault Systemes Americas Corp.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

YOLANDA BUTLER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:24-cv-2324-JSS-NWH

DASSAULT SYSTEMES AMERICAS

CORP.,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

ORDER

Defendant moves to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim.

(Dkt. 18.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Dkt. 19.) Upon consideration, for the

reasons outlined below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff is an African American woman with twenty-five years of leadership

experience in the technology industry. (Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 6, 8–9.) In March 2011, Defendant

hired Plaintiff, and her pay grade was classified as a career level grading (CLG) of 400.

(Id. ¶ 10.) Beginning in 2018, Plaintiff repeatedly discussed her interest in a promotion

with her direct supervisor. (Id. ¶ 12.) In February 2019, Plaintiff was promoted to

senior department manager for Defendant’s American division. (Id. ¶ 13.) In that

1 The court accepts the well-pleaded, non-conclusory factual allegations in Plaintiff’s amended

complaint (Dkt. 12) as true and construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Williams v.

Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).

role, she developed a program to train employees in bid management. (Id.) Plaintiff

provided bid management training to employees in France, including Catherine

Gayet. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 17.)

Plaintiff informed Defendant’s managers of her interest in the worldwide bid

manager position, but she was not selected to interview for the role. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 23–24.)

In January 2022, Defendant announced that Ms. Gayet was promoted to the position.

(Id. ¶ 17.) Following the announcement, Plaintiff complained to a senior

manager/vice president about alleged unfair and biased treatment in the promotion

process. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 50.) After complaining, Plaintiff claims she was assigned to a

cybersecurity officer position, which she contends is constructively a demotion. (Id.

¶¶ 20, 51.)

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that despite her qualifications and exemplary

performance, she received inaccurate and low performance evaluations. (Id. ¶ 28.)

Her annual evaluations affected whether she would be promoted to the next pay grade

level, CLG 500. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, she was not promoted to level CLG 500

until after she complained and filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). (Id. ¶ 43.)

Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action under the Florida Civil Rights

Act (FCRA), Fla. Stat. §§ 760.01-11:2 failure to promote her to worldwide bid manager

based on race and national origin (counts one and three), unfair performance

evaluation and pay based on race and national origin (counts two and four), failure to

promote from pay grade level CLG 400 to CLG 500 based on race and national origin

(counts five and six), and retaliation (count seven). (Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 21–51.) Defendant

moves to dismiss all counts. (Dkt. 18.)

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Generally, when analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a

court considers only the four corners of the complaint. See Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th

564, 583 n.27 (11th Cir. 2023). The court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint

as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Henley v.

Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2019). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[D]etailed

2 The amended complaint brings claims under chapter 760 of the Florida Statutes without specifying

which part of the chapter forms the basis of Plaintiff’s claims, (Dkt. 12 at 1). Defendant assumes that

the amended complaint refers to the FCRA, (Dkt. 18 at 2 n. 2), and Plaintiff seems to equate chapter

760 with the FCRA, (Dkt. 19 at 4 n. 1). Accordingly, the court construes Plaintiff’s claims as arising

under the FCRA.

factual allegations” are generally not required, but “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

ANALYSIS

The FCRA prohibits discrimination against any person with respect to

“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of race,

color, . . . [or] national origin.” Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). “[D]ecisions construing Title

VII are applicable when considering claims under the FCRA, because the FCRA was

patterned after Title VII.” Harper v. Blockbuster Ent. Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th

Cir. 1998). Further, discrimination claims under Title VII and the FCRA are analyzed

under the same framework. Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 n.6

(11th Cir. 2015). “Like Title VII, chapter 760 is remedial and requires a liberal

construction to preserve and promote access to the remedy intended by the

Legislature.” Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000). The court

discusses Plaintiff’s claims in turn.

A. Counts One and Three

In counts one and three, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant discriminated against

her based on her race and national origin by promoting Ms. Gayet, a white woman,

to the worldwide bid manager position. (Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 21–25, 30–36.) Defendant argues

that these counts should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to allege facts about the

comparator’s prior experience or the requirements for the position, provided

unsupported conclusions that the comparator was less qualified, and failed to allege

facts supporting that Plaintiff had more relevant experience within the company. (Dkt.

18 at 11–14.) As a result, Defendant argues, the court cannot reasonably infer

intentional discrimination. (Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff has provided ample factual allegations to support her claim, and more

extensive details about the comparator’s prior experience or the requirements for the

position are not necessary at the motion to dismiss stage. See Ambus v. Autozoners, LLC,

938 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1235 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (“As to the failure to promote claims,

[the defendant] argues [the plaintiff] has only alleged that he had more recent

experience than [the] comparators . . . . At this point in the proceedings, however, the

duties of the job have not been established with evidence, so [the] . . . allegation that

the plaintiff had more recent experience is sufficient.”). Plaintiff sufficiently alleges

she has 25 years of leadership experience in the technology industry and trained the

person selected for the position. (Dkt. 12 ¶ 9, 14.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that she

was more qualified for the position, but the comparator received the position

nonetheless. (Id. ¶ 20.) The court accepts these allegations as true. See Williams v. Bd.

of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).

Defendant maintains that even if Plaintiff plausibly alleges sufficient facts to

infer intentional discrimination, the court cannot reasonably infer intentional

discrimination because businesses have “wide latitude to exercise their business

judgment, including in deciding whether and which of its employees to elevate.” (Dkt.

18 at 12.) In support of this proposition, Defendant cites Denney v. City of Albany, in

which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment

when the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent. 247

F.3d 1172, 1177 (11th Cir. 2001). By arguing a non-discriminatory basis for the failure

to promote, Defendant correctly identifies the standard appropriate at summary

judgment. See Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (“The burden

that shifts to the defendant . . . is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by

producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”). However, at the motion to dismiss stage,

Plaintiff need only “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)

Defendant also appears to ask the court to give weight to Plaintiff’s omissions of

“oral or written statements by Defendant or its employees suggesting discrimination,”

and of allegations that “Defendant promotes white or non-U.S. citizen employees in

disproportionate numbers, relative to its work force.” (Dkt. 18 at 13.) However,

Plaintiff’s discrimination claims satisfy the plausibility standard even considering these

omissions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff “need not prove [her] case on the pleadings

– [her] amended complaint must merely provide enough factual material to raise a

reasonable inference, and thus a plausible claim, that” Defendant intentionally

discriminated against her. See Speaker v. United States Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs. for

Disease Control and Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1386 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Howard v.

Bayrock Mortg. Corp., No. 09-0820-WS-M, 2010 WL 4628120, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 4,

2010) (“[P]laintiffs need not support . . . facts with secondary facts, tertiary facts, ad

infinitum . . . to satisfy [the plausibility standard.”).

Plaintiff alleges that she is African American and was born in and lives in the

United States. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 31.) She was allegedly “abundantly qualified” for the

worldwide bid manager position. (Id. ¶ 23.) Despite her qualifications, her request to

interview for the position was rejected. (Id. ¶ 17.) The person chosen for the position

was white and a French national, and Plaintiff allegedly was more qualified than the

person selected because she trained her. (Id. ¶ 24.) Presuming these factual allegations

to be true, the court can reasonably infer intentional discrimination based on race and

national origin. Therefore, the motion is denied as to counts one and three.

B. Counts Two, Four, Five, and Six

In counts two and four, Plaintiff alleges that she received an unfair annual

performance evaluation due to race and national origin discrimination, which led to

an annual pay raise that was not commensurate with her contributions. (Dkt. 12

¶¶ 26–29, 37–40.) In counts five and six, Plaintiff alleges that she was not promoted

from pay grade level CLG 400 to CLG 500 when she became eligible due to race and

national origin discrimination. (Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 41–48.)

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s “general pronouncements about ‘Non-African

American’ employees [and] ‘her [w]hite colleagues,’ getting larger annual raises or

getting better promotions or ‘accurate annual performance evaluations’ while

supposedly adding less value,” cannot support a reasonable inference of intentional

discrimination. (Dkt. 18 at 11–12.) Plaintiff does not directly address this assertion

but cites Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012), to suggest

that detailed facts are not required at the pleading stage. (Dkt. 18 at 8–9.) The court

agrees with Defendant as to these claims.

A claim is plausible on its face where the alleged facts are “more than merely

possible,” not “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability.” Chaparro, 693 F.3d at

1337 (cleaned up). Although the court “must take all the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, [it is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). An allegation is not a

legal conclusion when it includes “descriptions of specific, discrete facts.” Watts v.

Ford Motor Co., 519 F. App’x 584, 587 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Feliciano v. City of

Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013)). Plaintiff’s allegations that other

non-African American employees were treated more favorably for pay raises and

promotions are conclusory because they are not supported by specific, discrete facts.

See Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding

plaintiffs’ pleading that they were “denied promotions and treated differently [from]

similarly situated white employees solely because of race,” as a “statement [that]

epitomizes speculation and therefore does not amount to a short and plain statement

of their claim.” (alterations adopted)); Arafat v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 549 F. App’x

872, 874 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming a motion to dismiss when the plaintiff “generically

referenced younger males” but did not identify comparators for her claims of

discrimination based on race, national origin, and religion); Farrukh v. Univ. of S. Fla.

Bd of Tr., No. 21-13345, 2022 WL 3973703, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 2022) (finding in

a Title VI case that “allegations that [the defendant’s] employees treated [the p]laintiff

less favorably than they treated” students outside his national origin were conclusory

because the plaintiff “identifie[d] no student who was treated more favorably than [the

p]laintiff under comparable circumstances.”)

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff generally alleges that “her employer treated

similarly situated employees outside her class more favorably.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529

F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). Instead of specific allegations identifying similarly

situated employees, Plaintiff relies upon broad generalities. (Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 40, 44.) These

allegations constitute the sort of recitals that Twombly and Iqbal prohibit. See Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Uppal v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 394, 398 F. App’x

at 396 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal where the plaintiff failed to recite “even a

brief description of how the alleged comparator employees were outside of her

protected class”). The categories of employees Plaintiff identifies as “non-African

American” and “qualified to be promoted” are too broad to suggest a factual basis for

potential comparators. Cf. Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2022)

(“[O]rdinarily a similarly situated comparator and the plaintiff will: have engaged in

the same basic conduct or misconduct, be subject to the same employment policies,

have the same supervisor(s), and share an employment or disciplinary history.”).

Accordingly, the court need not consider these allegations when drawing a reasonable

inference of intentional discrimination. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice”). Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, without more, fail to “nudge[] [her]

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See Twombly, 556 U.S. at 570;

Compare McManus v. Amerijet Int’l, Inc., No.23-13554, 2024 WL 4003391, at*4 (11th

Cir. Aug. 30, 2024) (vacating dismissal of the pro se plaintiff’s discrimination claims

where the plaintiff alleged she shared responsibilities with three other managers, who

were outside of her protected classes, but was the only manager terminated for a failure

in shared responsibilities), with Uppal, 482 F. App’x at 396 (affirming dismissal of

plaintiff’s discrimination claims finding the repeated allegation that similarly situated

employees outside the plaintiff’s protected classes were treated better was merely the

recital of an element). Accordingly, the motion is granted as to counts two, four, five,

and six.

C. Retaliation (Count Seven)

To plead retaliation under the FCRA, a “plaintiff must show that (1) [she] engaged

in statutorily protected expression, (2) [she] suffered an adverse employment action,

and (3) there is some causal relation between the two events.” Pennington v. City of

Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted); see also Buade v.

Terrea Group, LLC, 259 So. 3d 219, 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). Before filing a

FCRA action, however, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing

a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations

(FCHR). See Jones v. Bank of Am., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2013). Thus,

a “plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation,

which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.”

Hillemann v. Univ. of Cent. Fla., 167 F. App’x 747, 749 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Gregory

v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004)). While courts will

“allow judicial claims that ‘amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus’ the EEOC

complaint allegations,” unexhausted claims raising allegations of new acts of

discrimination in the judicial action are procedurally barred. Hillemann, 167 F. App’x

at 749.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s failure to include her alleged constructive

demotion to cybersecurity officer in her EEOC charge requires dismissal for non-

exhaustion. (Dkt. 18 at 15.) Plaintiff responds that her retaliation claim was

reasonably related to her EEOC charge and, as a result, dismissal is unwarranted.3

(Dkt. 19 at 11.)

3 Plaintiff also contends that the court cannot consider her EEOC charge in ruling on Defendant’s

motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) without converting it to a motion for summary

judgment. The “court may properly consider a document not referred to or attached to a

complaint . . . if the document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claims[] and (2) undisputed, meaning that

its authenticity is not challenged.” Johnson v. City of Atlanta 107 F.4th 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2024). A

document is central to a plaintiff’s claims, “when it is ‘a necessary part of [the plaintiff’s] effort to make

out a claim.’” Kalpakchian v. Bank of Am. Corp., 832 F. App’x 579, 583 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Day

v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005)). Plaintiff’s charge is central to Plaintiff’s argument

that her retaliation claim is “reasonably related” to and not “materially” different from her charge.

See Wu, 863 F.2d at 1547; Croley v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-4722-ELR-JFK, 2018 WL

11486862, at n. 1 at *1 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 24, 2018) (“Report and recommendation noting that [the

p]laintiff’s EEOC documents are properly considered in evaluating the instant motion particularly

given the administrative exhaustion issue.”); Issac v. Argos U.S.A. LLC, No. 1:18-cv-05242-WMR-

LTW, 2019 WL 13276691, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2019) (“Courts in the Eleventh Circuit regularly

consider EEOC documents attached to a motion to dismiss in employment discrimination cases either

because they are central and undisputed or under the public records exception.” (collecting cases)).

Additionally, neither party disputes the authenticity of the EEOC charge. (Dkt. 18 at 14–15, Dkt. 19

at 9–11.) Accordingly, the court considers Plaintiff’s EEOC charge of discrimination.

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “strict compliance with Title VII[’s

exhaustion requirement] is unnecessary” “where the plaintiff has filed a charge with

the EEOC, but in her judicial action the plaintiff raises related issues as to which no

filing has been made.” Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1989). The court

has explained: “As long as allegations in the judicial complaint and proof are

‘reasonably related’ to charges in the administrative filing and ‘no material differences’

between them exist, the court will entertain them.” (Id. at 1547 (quoting Ray v.

Freeman, 626 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1980)).

Here, Plaintiff’s retaliation allegation, (Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 49–51), is reasonably related and

not materially different from the allegations in her EEOC charge (Dkt. 1–3 at 6). See

Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (explaining that judicial claims that are “like or relate[] to,

or [grow] out of, the allegations contained in [an] EEOC charge,” are actionable).

First, Plaintiff checked the boxes for retaliation, race, and national origin

discrimination as the bases of her charge. (Dkt. 1–3 at 5.) Second, Plaintiff’s claim of

retaliation does not rely on new allegations but on the instances of discrimination

described in her EEOC charge. (Compare Dkt. 1–3, with Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 4–20, 49–51.)

Plaintiff alleges that her constructive demotion occurred after she expressed

disappointment about not being selected for the worldwide bid manager position and

complained about unfair and biased treatment. (Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 20, 50.) As “the scope of

an EEOC complaint should not be strictly interpreted,” the court determines that

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is reasonably related to her charge of discrimination. See

Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 465 (quotation omitted).

As to the merits of the retaliation claim, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to

plausibly allege that she engaged in protected activity and that she suffered an adverse

employment action. (Dkt. 18 at 16–18.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff fails

to show a causal link between her alleged protected activity and alleged adverse

employment action. (Id. at 16–20.) Plaintiff responds that, at the pleading stage, she

has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that she engaged in protected activity and

experienced an adverse employment action that is not entirely unrelated to that

activity. (Dkt. 19 at 14–15.) The court discusses protected activity, adverse action,

and causation in turn.

Defendant maintains Plaintiff conclusorily alleges that she engaged in protected

activity when she complained to management about unfair and biased treatment.

(Dkt. 18 at 16–17.) However, construing Plaintiff’s allegations in the light most

favorable to her, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges she engaged in protected activity at this

stage. See Rollins v. Fla. Dep’t of Law Enf’t, 868 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he

protection afforded by [the FCRA] is not limited to individuals who have filed formal

complaints, but extends as well to those . . . who informally voice complaints to their

superiors or who use their employers’ internal grievance procedures.”); Walton–Horton

v. Hyundai of Ala., 402 F. App’x 405, 408 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Statutorily protected

expression includes internal complaints of discrimination to superiors, complaints

lodged with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and discrimination-

based lawsuits.”).

With respect to adverse action, construing Plaintiff’s allegations in the light most

favorable to her, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged an adverse employment action at this

stage. Cf. Robertson v. Ala. Dep’t of Econ. & Cmty Affs., 902 F. Supp. 1473, 1481 (M.D.

Ala. 1995) (holding that a plaintiff who went from having subordinates to no

subordinates in her new position sufficiently established an adverse employment

action).

Regarding causation, “a plaintiff making a retaliation claim must establish that his

or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the

employer.” Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013); see

also Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Wright, 217 So. 3d 163, 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

(“The FCRA must be given the same construction as Title VII post-Nassar.”). Plaintiff

alleges that “[a]fter she complained about unfair and biased treatment, she was

assigned to a position that was a constructive demotion.” (Dkt. 12 ¶ 51.) Plaintiff’s

allegations suggest a chronological relationship but fail to sufficiently allege that her

protected activity was a but-for cause of her constructive demotion. See Ounjian v.

Globoforce, Inc., 89 F.4th 852, 860 (11th Cir. 2023) (dismissing retaliation claim under

the Federal Private Whistleblower Act where defendant “engaged in the practices that

prompted [the plaintiff’s] resignation despite his objections, not because of them”).

Given this pleading deficiency, Defendant’s motion is granted as to count seven.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 18) is GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part.

2. The motion is GRANTED insofar as counts two, four, five, six, and seven of

Plaintiffs amended complaint (Dkt. 12 §§ 26-29, 37-51) are DISMISSED

without prejudice. The motion is otherwise DENIED.

3. If Plaintiff can do so in good faith, she may file a second amended complaint

on or before August 29, 2025, correcting the deficiencies identified in this order.

4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff.

ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on August 8, 2025.

( fa _ a shoe ae

JUMIE S. SNEED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Yolanda Butler

7521 Solstice Circle, Apt. 408, Orlando, FL 32821.

-15-