Miller v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-CV-80907-RLR

CHANON MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

RIC BRADSHAW, in his official capacity as

Palm Beach County Sheriff;

JUAN F. RAMIREZ, in his individual capacity;

STEVEN L. MURRAY, in his individual capacity;

DANIEL S. FELLOWS, in his individual capacity;

IRA S. PESKOWITZ, in his individual capacity;

BRISA LANDA, in her individual capacity; and

NICOLE A. BITNER, in her individual capacity,

Defendants.

_________________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [DE 52] filed by Defendants

Juan F. Ramirez, Steven L. Murray, Daniel S. Fellows, Ira S. Peskowitz, Brisa Landa, and Nicole

A. Bitner (collectively, “Defendants”), who were all sued in their individual capacities as Palm

Beach County Sheriff’s Office deputies. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the Response [DE

55], the Reply [DE 56], and the record, and is fully advised in the premises. For the reasons set

forth below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court accepts as true the following allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint. DE 48. In 2021, Plaintiff Chanon Miller and her ex-fiancé, Eric McGregor, purchased

and moved into their home in Florida with their one-year-old child. Id. ¶¶ 28–29. In November

2021, McGregor began acting erratically and abusively: he was using drugs, erupting into loud

outbursts, and carrying and displaying a firearm in an unsafe manner. Id. ¶ 30. Due to Plaintiff’s

concerns for her and her child’s safety, she installed interior surveillance cameras. Id. ¶ 31.

Plaintiff ended her relationship with McGregor in December 2021, but the two continued to

cohabitate in the home. Id. ¶ 34. McGregor would respond with threats and abuse whenever

Plaintiff attempted to discuss selling the home and separating. Id. ¶¶ 35–40.

On January 3, 2022, after McGregor acted angrily and erratically when Plaintiff once again

attempted to discuss selling the home, Plaintiff called 911 for the first time. Id. ¶ 40. Palm Beach

County Sheriff’s Office (“PBCSO”) deputies responded but informed Plaintiff that there was

nothing they could do after Plaintiff denied that McGregor got physical with her. Id. ¶ 43.

On January 8, 2022, after continued incidents with McGregor, Plaintiff checked her cell

phone application connected to the home’s interior security cameras. Id. ¶ 49. Plaintiff discovered

she could not access the saved recordings and knew this meant that McGregor had disconnected

the interior security cameras. Id. Plaintiff drove to her home to try to retrieve the security hard

drives before McGregor destroyed any evidence of his abusive behavior. Id. ¶¶ 50–51. McGregor

began yelling at Plaintiff to get out, grabbed Plaintiff very roughly by her arm, pulled on Plaintiff,

and scratched her. Id. ¶¶ 52–53. At around 6:54 p.m., Plaintiff called 911 for the second time. She

reported that there was a gun in the house, that she believed McGregor had been using drugs, that

it was getting physical, and that she already had a case number from the prior 911 call on January

2, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 54–55.

PBSO deputies, including Defendants Ramirez, Murray, Peskowitz, and Bitner, asked

Plaintiff what had occurred. Id. ¶ 63. McGregor misled the deputies into believing that Plaintiff

was a scorned ex-girlfriend. Id. ¶ 64. Defendant Murray concluded that the call was a civil issue

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and that Plaintiff needed to address it in the court system. Id. ¶ 69. Defendants asked Plaintiff and

McGregor whether they had a place to stay to cool off. Id. ¶ 70. Plaintiff voluntarily drove to her

mother’s home. Id. ¶ 71.

Shortly after Plaintiff arrived to her mother’s house, she realized she had not retrieved the

hard drives for the home’s interior surveillance footage. Id. ¶ 72. Plaintiff returned to her home to

search for the hard drives. Id. ¶¶ 73–76. The situation between Plaintiff and McGregor escalated:

Plaintiff locked herself in the bathroom because she feared for her safety. Id. ¶ 76. Plaintiff

continued searching for the hard drives, and when she grabbed one of her bags, she saw

McGregor’s gun in it. Id. ¶ 78. McGregor confronted Plaintiff and pushed her from behind,

causing Plaintiff to fall down the stairs. Id. ¶ 79.

At around 8:41 p.m., Plaintiff called 911 a third time. Id. ¶ 80. She reported that she was

battered and in fear of McGregor, that she found his gun in the house, and that he tackled her down

the stairs. Id. ¶¶ 80–82. Plaintiff explained the entire situation to the 911 operator. Id. ¶¶ 83–91.

During this time, McGregor called another 911 operator and stated that Plaintiff hit him with a

glass, that Plaintiff grabbed his firearm and ran outside with it, that Plaintiff tackled him down the

stairs, and that Plaintiff did not live at the home because McGregor had asked her to leave a week

ago. Id. ¶¶ 93, 97–98.

Defendants Ramirez, Murray, Fellows, Peskowitz, Land, and Bitner responded to

Plaintiff’s third 911 call. Id. ¶ 100. Plaintiff explained her history to the deputies, but McGregor

misled the deputies into believing that he was the one who had called the police earlier. Id. ¶¶ 100–

101. Defendants arrested Plaintiff, but not McGregor. Id. ¶ 120. All charges against Plaintiff were

eventually dropped. Id. ¶¶ 125–126.

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II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint against Defendants on March 27, 2025.

Plaintiff asserts that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Defendants caused her false

arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. DE 48 ¶ 1. Plaintiff attached fourteen

exhibits to her operative complaint, including photographs, text messages, and transcripts of

Plaintiff’s 911 calls. Ric Bradshaw, sued in his official capacity as Sheriff, filed an answer and

affirmative defenses on April 11, 2025. DE 51.

The remaining Defendants, sued in their individual capacities, moved to dismiss based on

qualified immunity. DE 52. Defendants’ Motion attached a transcript of McGregor’s 911 call and

the PBCSO offense reports from the incident in question. Id.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may grant a motion to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

should be granted only when the pleading fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must contain more than labels, conclusions, a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action, and naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement. Id. The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that the

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plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully”).

A court ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint accepts the well-pled factual allegations

as true and views the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d

843, 850 (11th Cir. 2017). The court need not accept legal conclusions couched as factual

allegations. Diverse Power, Inc. v. City of LaGrange, 934 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th Cir. 2019).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate “only if it is clear that no relief could be granted

under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the [plaintiff’s] allegations.” Hishon v.

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

Finally, “when the exhibits contradict the general and conclusory allegations of the

pleading, the exhibits govern.” Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1206 (11th

Cir.2007). When “a plaintiff attaches documents and relies upon the documents to form the basis

for a claim or part of a claim, dismissal is appropriate if the document negates the claim.”

Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Thompson v. Illinois Dept. of

Professional Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir.2002)).

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has sued the individual Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. DE 48. Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s Complaint against them must be dismissed because they had probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff, and therefore are shielded from individual liability by qualified immunity. DE 52. The

Court first sets forth the standard for qualified immunity, the standard for probable cause—that is,

whether a seizure was lawful—and then applies those standards.

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A. Qualified Immunity Standard

Qualified immunity shields “government officials performing discretionary functions . . .

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Although the defense of qualified immunity is usually raised

at the summary judgment stage, it may be raised and considered on a motion to dismiss. Corbitt v.

Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334,

1337 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994) (requiring that

the issue of qualified immunity be resolved “at the earliest possible stage in litigation”). Once

qualified immunity is raised by a defendant, and it is established that the government official was

acting within his/her discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified

immunity is not appropriate. Baker v. City of Madison, Alabama, 67 F.4th 1268, 1278 (11th Cir.

2023). The scope of the inquiry then concerns whether (1) the defendant violated a constitutional

right and (2) the violated right was clearly established. Id.

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants “acted within the course and scope of their

employment.” DE 48 ¶ 47. The Court therefore focuses its qualified immunity analysis on the

question of whether, as pled, Defendants conducted an unreasonable seizure of Plaintiff and

therefore violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the incident.

B. Probable Cause Standard

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). The existence of probable cause is a complete

defense to a claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. See Case v.

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Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2009); Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir.

2002); Butler v. Smith, 85 F.4th 1102, 1112–13 (11th Cir. 2023). “[P]robable cause exists if the

totality of the circumstances could persuade a reasonable officer that there is a substantial chance

of criminal activity by the person who is arrested. A substantial chance is all that is required, not

an actual showing of such activity.” Harris v. Hixon, 102 F.4th 1120, 1126 (11th Cir. 2024)

(quotation marks and citations omitted). Probable cause “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States,

571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014).

In a claim for false arrest, the plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate the absence of

probable cause for the alleged false arrest. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1436 (11th Cir. 1998),

cert denied, 525 U.S. 823 (1998). That is, an officer needs only “arguable” probable cause to

assert the qualified immunity defense against a false arrest claim. Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176,

1186 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010)).

The Court must make its probable cause determination based upon the facts that were known to

the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. Id. at 1184. An officer must possess only “sufficient

probability, not certainty” to meet “the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth

Amendment.” Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971).

With these principles in mind, the Court turns next to the parties’ arguments.

C. Application

Defendants argue that probable cause existed for Plaintiff’s arrest because the case

concerns alleged domestic violence between Plaintiff and McGregor. DE 52 at 12. Both parties

claimed to be the victim of the other’s violent behavior. Id.; DE 48 ¶¶ 80–98. Defendants argue

that when officers are making probable cause determinations, they are not required “to rule out a

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suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts.” Defendants cite to a transcript of McGregor’s

911 call, DE 55-1, as well as the deputies’ offense reports, DE 55-2, which the Court considers

under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1300

(11th Cir. 2024) (stating that a court may properly consider a document not referred to in a

complaint if the document is central to the plaintiff’s claims and undisputed, meaning that its

authenticity is not challenged).

In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not have arguable probable cause given

the events leading up to Plaintiff’s arrest. DE 55 at 8. Plaintiff emphasizes that courts must look

at the “totality of the circumstances” in conducting a probable cause analysis. Id. (citing Garcia,

75 F.4th at 1187–88). Plaintiff argues that Defendants seemed to willfully ignore recent events:

Defendants had responded multiple times to calls regarding McGregor’s violence toward Plaintiff

before her arrest; on the day of her arrest, Plaintiff had called 911 and provided detailed

information; Defendants should have known that Plaintiff feared for her safety given McGregor’s

abusive history and the physical abuse Plaintiff endured that day; and Plaintiff tried to provide

Defendants evidence to corroborate McGregor’s behavior. Id. at 10. Plaintiff argues that

Defendants conducted an “incompetent, biased investigation” and therefore lacked probable cause.

Id. at 12.

Based on the Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff’s exhibits, and Defendants’ exhibits, the facts

known to the arresting officer at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest were as follows. When the

Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s and McGregor’s 911 calls later in the evening of January 8,

2022, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s previous concerns about her safety and that she agreed

earlier that evening to go to her mother’s house to “cool off.” DE 52 at 13; DE 52-2 at 2–3.

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Defendants knew that Plaintiff was told to call law enforcement if she needed to return to the house

for any reason, so that law enforcement could accompany Plaintiff for her safety. DE 52-2 at 3.

Defendants knew that Plaintiff then voluntarily returned to the house without notifying the police.

Id. at 4. And Defendants knew that Plaintiff entered the property and took McGregor’s firearm

without his permission. Id.; DE 48 ¶¶ 72–76. Defendants heard Plaintiff’s version of the story:

“She said that she came to the house to grab the cameras from the house to use them as evidence

against [McGregor]. . . . In the process, she grabs the brown bag containing the gun. And

proceeded to take without his permission.” DE 55-2 at 4. Defendants heard McGregor’s version

of the story: Plaintiff refused to give up the brown bag containing McGregor’s gun; the two fought

over the gun, causing both to fall down some stairs; both were on the phone with 911 during the

altercation; and during the altercation, Plaintiff kicked McGregor in the stomach. Id.

Although the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s plight, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized

that domestic disputes often involve conflicting evidence in volatile circumstances: “Deference to

on-the-spot, reasonable judgments made by officers ‘may be particularly warranted in domestic

disputes’ because they ‘require police to make particularly delicate and difficult judgments

quickly’ and ‘violence may be lurking and explode with little warning.’” Davis v. City of Apopka,

78 F.4th 1326, 1337 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. City of Apopka, Fla., 144 S.

Ct. 2528 (2024) (quoting Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 1999)).

Here, Plaintiff has not met her burden to demonstrate the absence of arguable probable

cause for the alleged false arrest. Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1436; Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186. Defendants

may arrest a person without a warrant when there is “probable cause to believe that the person has

committed an act of domestic violence.” Fla. Stat. § 901.15(7). Given McGregor’s claim that

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Plaintiff had kicked in the stomach, given that Plaintiff had taken his firearm without his

permission, and given that Plaintiff had returned to the home after Defendants advised her not to

return without law enforcement, Defendants had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for

“simple battery (domestic).” DE 55-2 at 4; Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a)(1) (defining the offense of

battery as when a person actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the

will of the other). “Reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same

knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest” Plaintiff.

Wilkerson v. Seymour, 736 F.3d 974, 977–78 (11th Cir. 2013).

Therefore, because Defendants had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, Plaintiff was

not unreasonably seized in violation of her clearly established Fourth Amendment right. Because

“[q]ualified immunity shields government officials from individual-capacity suits for actions taken

while performing a discretionary function so long as their conduct does not violate a ‘clearly

established’ constitutional right,” the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Montanez v. Carvajal, 889 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 2018).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Dismiss

[DE 52] by Defendants Juan F. Ramirez, Steven L. Murray, Daniel S. Fellows, Ira S. Peskowitz,

Brisa Landa, and Nicole A. Bitner is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are

DISMISSED, and the Court’s dismissal is without leave to amend.1

1 Plaintiff has amended her complaint twice, and the Court has previously ruled on a motion to dismiss. When the

Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend a second time in a prior order, the Court’s leave included leave for Plaintiff to

remove the attachments from her pleading that formed the basis for Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff declined

to remove the attachments, and the Court previously informed Plaintiff that the Court was not inclined to rule on the

legal sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleading twice more—once with the attachments and once without. Thus, the Court

informed Plaintiff that if she elected to amend her complaint again (and she did), it would be Plaintiff’s final

opportunity to amend her pleading. DE 47 at 4. For this reason, the Court denies Plaintiff further leave to amend.

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This case shall proceed against Defendant Ric Bradshaw, in his official capacity as Palm

Beach County Sheriff, who filed an answer on April 11, 2025.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, West Palm Beach, Florida, this 8th day of August,

2025.

>).

Feb A Derry,

ROBIN L. ROSENBERG C,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to Counsel of Record

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