Searles v. City of Houston

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT August 09, 2025

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

MIA SEARLES, et al., §

§

Plaintiffs, §

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-1534

§

CITY OF HOUSTON, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

In April 2022, Houston police officers pursued Jalen Randle to execute active felony

warrants for aggravated assault of a family member, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and

evading arrest in a motor vehicle. The officers attempted a traffic stop using the siren and lights,

but the car in which Randle was a passenger drove away. When the officers were able to stop and

block Randle’s car, he got out of the passenger side, then reached into the passenger side door and

emerged holding an unidentified object. One of the officers got out of his police car yelling “show

me your hands” and shot Randle. The shot was fatal.

Randle’s family filed this lawsuit. The parties conducted discovery on qualified immunity.

Privette now moves for summary judgment, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity as a

matter of law. (Docket Entry No. 61). Based on the record, the motions, the summary judgment

evidence—including the footage from Privette’s body-worn camera—and the applicable law, the

court grants Privette’s motion for summary judgment. The reasons for this ruling are set out below.

I. Background

The facts in this section are largely drawn from the deposition of Officer Shane Privette

and from his body-worn camera footage, both part of the summary judgment record. On April 27,

2022, Privette, a member of the Houston Police Department Narcotics Tactical Team, was part of

an operation to find and arrest Jalen Randle. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 4; Docket Entry No. 61-1;

Docket Entry No. 61-5 at 3). Randle had three active felony warrants—for aggravated assault of

a family member, being a felon in possession of a weapon, and evading arrest in a motor vehicle—

stemming from an incident a little over a month earlier. (Id.; Docket Entry Nos. 61-2 to 61-4).

Privette was in a police car driven by Officer Mansker. (Docket Entry No. 61-5 at 3). They saw

Randle getting into the passenger’s seat of a Chevy Equinox. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 5; Docket

Entry No. 61-5 at 4; Docket Entry No. 63-1 at 28). The officers activated the lights and sirens to

signal the driver of the Chevy Equinox to stop. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 5; Docket Entry No. 63-

1 at 29). When the Chevy Equinox failed to stop and instead drove away, the officers pursued.

(Docket Entry No. 61 at 5; Docket Entry No. 63-1 at 29).

To stop the Chevy Equinox, Mansker executed a “precision immobilization technique.”

(Docket Entry No. 61 at 5; Docket Entry No. 61-5 at 3; Docket Entry No. 63-1 at 29). This

technique is used to stop a fleeing vehicle by causing it to spin out and come to a stop. The

maneuver resulted in the Chevy Equinox spinning 180 degrees and rolling to a stop facing the

police car. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 5; Docket Entry No. 61-5 at 4; Docket Entry No. 63-1 at 29).

Mansker and Privette then tried to stop the Chevy from driving away by using a “controlled

contact” at a low speed. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 5; Docket Entry No. 63-1 at 29, 39). Randle got

out of the passenger side of the Chevy. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 5). Privette got out of the police

car. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 5). Privette testified that he saw Randle begin to run away, then stop,

turn back towards the Chevy, and reach into the front passenger side. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 5;

Docket Entry No. 61-5 at 5). Privette testified that he saw Randle emerge from the passenger side

holding a dark-colored oblong object that Privette reasonably believed was or contained a firearm.

(Docket Entry No. 61 at 5; Docket Entry No. 61-5 at 5; Docket Entry No. 63-1 at 29). Privette

testified that Randle turned toward him and Mansker while holding the object. (Docket Entry No.

61 at 5; Docket Entry No. 61-5 at 5; Docket Entry No. 63-1 at 30; Docket Entry No. 61-7 at 78:2-

3). Privette testified that he perceived an imminent threat of Randle shooting at him and Mansker.

(Docket Entry No. 61 at 6; Docket Entry No. 61-5 at 5; Docket Entry No. 63-1 at 30; Docket Entry

No. 61-7 at 97:10-11, 125:16-127:10). Privette yelled at Randle, “Let me see your hands!”

(Docket Entry No. 61 at 6; Docket Entry No. 61-5 at 5; Docket Entry No. 61-7 at 88:1-11). Almost

simultaneously, Privette fired, hitting Randle in his neck. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 6; Docket Entry

No. 61-5 at 5; Docket Entry No. 63-1 at 30; Docket Entry No. 61-9). After the shooting, officers

recovered the object that Randle had retrieved from the vehicle and was holding when he was shot.

(Docket Entry No. 61 at 6). It was a bag that contained a loaded firearm. (Id.; Docket Entry No.

61-7 at 82:16-83:8; 137:13-15).

The plaintiffs allege that the summary judgment evidence shows that after Randle got out

of the car and prepared to flee, he turned back to retrieve a toiletry bag—not a gun—from the car.

(Docket Entry No. 66 at 8). The plaintiffs argue that when Privette shot Randle, his hand was at

his waist, holding the bag, and that he was not raising his arms, reaching into the bag, pointing any

object at the officers, “or mak[ing] any other threatening gestures or movements.” (Id.). The

plaintiffs allege that Privette fired his weapon without giving Randle time to comply with Privette’s

order to “show me your hands.” (Id. at 9).

Privette attaches footage from his body-worn camera to his motion for summary judgment.

(Docket Entry No. 61-8). The footage is of little help. Until the moment that Privette shoots,

Randle is largely out of view or the view of him is obscured. The footage begins in the interior of

Privette’s moving police car. It is daylight. The driver—Mansker—tells Privette to “get ready to

run.” (Docket Entry No. 61-8 (video) at 2:31).1 Privette responds, “yeah, I am.” (Id. at 2:32).

Privette and another officer discuss their locations on their dispatch radios, (id. at 2:33-2:52), and

Privette says, “he [referring to Randle] ain’t gonna leave this neighborhood.” (Id. at 2:53-2:54).

Another officer speaking over the radio says, “I’m going to pin him in just a second, so you guys

get ready.” (Id. at 2:57-3:00). Mansker says, “I’m going to box him in.” (Id. at 3:10). Privette

says, “Clear.” (Id. at 3:11). Privette then says, “He’s going to go back to that house.” (Id. at

3:20). Over the radio, an officer tells Mansker and Privette that the vehicle Randle is in is traveling

“westbound.” (Id. at 3:19-3:21).

The body-worn camera footage shows that Privette begins to remove his seatbelt as his

police car stops. (Id. at 3:21-3:26). Privette opens the passenger side door and begins to step out

of the car with his weapon drawn. (Id. at 3:27-3:28). Randle can be seen facing Privette. (Id.).

Because Privette is holding his firearm with his arm extended, the view of Randle is obscured. It

is unclear that he is holding an object, much less what it might be. Privette yells, “let me see your

hands” and fires a shot before he finishes saying the word “hands.” (Id. at 3:29-3:30). Randle

falls over onto the curb, and an object that he was apparently holding falls to the ground. (Id.).

Privette yells “oh shit” and runs towards Randle with his gun still drawn. (Id. at 3:30-3:34).

Several officers turn Randle over onto his stomach and begin to handcuff him. (Id. at 3:35-

3:40). The video shows that Randle is barefoot. (Id. at 3:47). A gray bag is visible on the ground

next to Randle’s body. (Id. at 3:56-4:01). Privette drags Randle away from the curb and lays him

on the grass and sidewalk. (Id. at 4:05-4:10). Randle, bleeding from the left side of his neck, is

seen struggling to move his mouth while several officers discuss calling for medical help and

whether they can safely move Randle. (Id. at 4:28-4:48). The officers prepare to treat Randle with

1 Times refer to the start of the quoted language or described event and are approximate.

items that they pull out of a medical kit. (Id. at 4:47-5:11). Privette says, “keep breathing buddy,

keep breathing”; “keep breathing, bud, keep breathing.” (Id. at 4:37-4:39; 5:09-5:10). Privette

and the other officers apply gauze and pressure to Randle’s neck wound. (Id. at 5:13-5:32).

Someone says, “whose shot?” (Id. at 5:29). Privette responds, “my shot” and raises his

hand. (Id. at 5:30). He gets up and goes to talk to another officer. (Id. at 5:31-5:37). Privette tells

the other officer, “He went back to that vehicle” . . . “and then he came out.” (Id. at 5:39). Another

officer tells Privette, “you can turn off your body worn camera now.” (Id. at 5:53-5:56). Privette

says, “All right, Sergeant Medina says I can turn off my body worn camera.” (Id. at 5:57-6:00).

The footage ends. (Id. at 6:00).

The summary judgment issue is whether there are factual disputes material to determining

Privette’s qualified immunity. The court finds that there are not, and that summary judgment on

qualified immunity is appropriate, because the only—if limited—evidence in the summary

judgment record shows that Privette’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the

circumstances, and because the plaintiffs have not shown that Privette violated clearly established

law.

II. The Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

“Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”

Springboards to Educ., Inc. v. Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Indep. Sch. Dist., 33 F.4th 747, 749 (5th

Cir. 2022) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of

the suit.’” Thomas v. Tregre, 913 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (Jan. 25, 2019) (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A factual dispute is genuine ‘if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id.

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the

court “must consider all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party”

and “must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Ion v. Chevron USA,

Inc., 731 F.3d 379, 389 (5th Cir. 2013).

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of

the basis for its motion” and pointing to record evidence demonstrating that there is no genuine

dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(c). “When ‘the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial,’ a party moving for summary

judgment ‘may merely point to the absence of evidence and thereby shift to the non-movant the

burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is a dispute of material

fact warranting trial.’” MDK S.R.L. v. Proplant Inc., 25 F.4th 360, 368 (5th Cir. 2022) (alteration

adopted) (quoting Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enterprises, Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th

Cir. 2015)).

“Once the moving party has initially shown that there is an absence of evidence to support

the non-moving party’s cause, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing a

genuine factual issue for trial.” Houston v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 17 F.4th 576, 581 (5th Cir. 2021)

(quotation marks and quoting reference omitted). “[A] party cannot defeat summary judgment

with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” Jones v.

Gulf Coast Rest. Grp., Inc., 8 F.4th 363, 368 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and quoting

reference omitted). Rather, the nonmovant “must identify specific evidence in the record and

articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports [its] claim.” Shah v. VHS San

Antonio Partners, L.L.C., 985 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2021) (alteration adopted) (quotation marks

and quoting reference omitted).

The movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when “the nonmoving party has

failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it]

has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. But “[i]f ‘reasonable minds could differ’

on ‘the import of the evidence,’ a court must deny the motion.” Sanchez v. Young County, 956

F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250).

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity operates to protect police officers from liability in the reasonable

performance of their duties. “Even if a police officer’s conduct falls short of the Fourth

Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, the officer, like other public officials sued under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, is protected by the qualified immunity doctrine.” Singleton v. Casanova, 2024 WL

2891900, at *8 (5th Cir. June 10, 2024). “It is an affirmative defense; once properly raised by the

defendant, the ‘plaintiff has the burden to negate the assertion of qualified immunity.’” King v.

Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Collier v. Montgomery, 569 F.3d 214, 217

(5th Cir. 2009)). The doctrine “balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

“A plaintiff can overcome a qualified immunity defense by showing ‘(1) that the official

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time

of the challenged conduct.’” Allen v. Cisneros, 815 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)

(quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). Courts have discretion to decide which

of the two elements to address first. Vincent v. City of Sulphur, 805 F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 2015).

III. Analysis

A. The Reasonableness of Privette’s Use of Deadly Force

The parties agree that there is not “much of a dispute” about “the events leading up to the

shooting itself.” (Docket Entry No. 79 at 7:11-13). The question is whether “whether Mr. Randle

did anything for Officer Privette to reasonably perceive that he posed an immediate and serious

threat of harm.” (Id. at 7:21-22).

Privette argues that his actions were objectively reasonable under the totality of the

circumstances and established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 6-7).

Privette emphasizes that when he shot Randle, he knew that Randle was a fugitive with three active

felony warrants for violent offenses, including being a felon in possession of a firearm; Randle

had fled by car from pursuing officers; and when officers stopped that car, Randle got out and

appeared prepared to run, but then turned back towards the car, reached into the front passenger

door, and stood up holding an object that Privette described as dark-colored and oblong. (Id. at 7).

Privette testified that he reasonably believed that the object was a firearm and posed a significant

and immediate threat to the safety of the officers at the scene. (Docket Entry No. 66-1 at 91:1-2

(“At the time I shot Mr. Randle, I thought the bag was a firearm.”)).

The plaintiffs argue that the record supports finding that Privette did not reasonably

perceive an imminent deadly threat when he shot Randle. (Docket Entry No. 66 at 13). The

plaintiffs argue that Privette is not entitled to qualified immunity because he violated clearly

established law holding that efforts to apprehend a suspect who poses no immediate threat of

serious bodily harm to officers or the public do not justify the use of deadly force. (Id. at 22, 24).

The court first turns to whether, under the totality of the circumstances, Privette’s use of

force was objectively reasonable or excessive. To prevail on a claim for excessive force under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must show “(1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force

that was excessive to the need, and (3) the use of force that was objectively unreasonable.” Bush

v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 501 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396

(5th Cir. 2004)). Because Privette used deadly force against Randle, “injury and causation are

established, leaving only the ‘excessive’ and ‘reasonableness’ elements.” McVae v. Perez, 120

F.4th 487, 492 (5th Cir. 2024).

“To determine whether the force used on a suspect was excessive, we consider the three

Graham factors: (1) the severity of the suspected crime; (2) whether the suspect posed an

immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others; and (3) whether the suspect was actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. “When an excessive force claim

involves deadly force, the threat-of-harm factor ‘typically predominates,’ and the excessive and

reasonableness elements become two sides of the same coin.” Id. (quoting Harmon v. City of

Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021)). “An officer’s use of deadly force is not

excessive, and thus no constitutional violation occurs, when the officer reasonably believes that

the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the officer or to others.” Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d

839, 843 (5th Cir. 2009).

Factors such as “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of

force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit

the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived

by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting,” as well as other relevant

circumstances, “may bear on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used.” Kingsley

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015).

Recently, the Fifth Circuit has emphasized additional factors, including: the speed with

which an officer resorts to using force rather than verbal commands; the amount of time that an

officer has to decide the type and amount of force to use; whether the officer responds with

“measured and ascending” actions corresponding with the suspect’s “escalating verbal and

physical resistance” or aggression; whether the suspect ignored any of the officer’s prior

commands; whether the suspect has a weapon or acts in a manner suggesting the intended use of

a visible—or hidden—weapon; whether the suspect moves outside the officer’s line of vision;

whether the suspect acts in an erratic, unexplained manner; and whether the suspect moves toward

or away from an officer. See Singleton v. Casanova, 2024 WL 2891900, at *5 (5th Cir. June 10,

2024).

The Supreme Court recently held that in evaluating claims for excessive force, courts must

look beyond the “moment of threat” to consider whether earlier facts and circumstances may have

influenced a reasonable officer’s actions at the time of the use of deadly force. See Barnes v. Felix,

145 S. Ct. 1353 (2025). Because “[p]rior events may show, for example, why a reasonable officer

would have perceived otherwise ambiguous conduct of a suspect as threatening,” under the

totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, courts must also consider “historical facts.” Id. at 1358,

1359. While “the situation at the precise time of the shooting will often be what matters most,”

the Court emphasized that “‘the totality of the circumstances’ inquiry into a use of force has no

time limit.” Id. at 1358.

Under the first Graham factor, the court considers the severity of the crime. Randle was a

convicted felon who was wanted on three active felony warrants, including for aggravated assault

of a family member, for being a felon in possession of a weapon, and for evading arrest in a motor

vehicle. (Docket Entry Nos. 61-2, 61-3, 61-4). The warrants stemmed from an incident that had

occurred over a month earlier, but the relevant point is that Privette and the other officers involved

in pursuing and apprehending Randle knew that he had a history of violence and of illegally

possessing firearms. The crimes for which Privette and the HPD sought to apprehend Randle were

felonies demonstrating a propensity for violence.

Under the second Graham factor, the issue is whether Randle was actively resisting arrest

or attempting to evade arrest by fleeing when he was shot. The parties do not dispute that Randle

had tried to evade arrest, first by refusing to stop his vehicle and leading the police on a chase,

then by appearing ready to run when the police blocked his car before he turned back to the car

and retrieved an object from the passenger side when Privette shot him. This factor also weighs

in favor of finding that Privette’s use of force was reasonable.

The “threat-of-harm” factor is the most critical. “[I]t is manifestly unreasonable for an

officer to seize a suspect the officer knows is unarmed and not aggressive by shooting him dead.”

Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2023). “But if the officer believes the suspect has a gun,

the calculation changes—even if there was never, in fact, a gun.” Id. “Uses of force may be

reasonable when the officer could reasonably believe the suspect was reaching for or had a gun.”

Winder v. Gallardo, 118 F.4th 638, 646 (5th Cir. 2024). “The question is whether the officer’s

belief that he saw a gun was sufficiently reasonable to justify the use of deadly force in light of all

the surrounding circumstances.” Allen, 65 F.4th at 744. “To show a triable issue, a plaintiff must

generally ‘present competent summary judgment evidence that the arrestee did not reach . . . for

what the officer reasonably perceived to be a weapon.’” Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 387 (5th

Cir. 2021) (quoting Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 2016))

(alterations adopted).

Under Barnes v. Felix, the court must consider not only the events that occurred just before

Privette shot Randle, but also the circumstances that would have caused Privette to reasonably

believe that Randle was reaching for a gun when Privette shot him. It is undisputed that Privette

knew that Randle was subject to arrest warrants for aggravated assault on a family member,

illegally possessing a firearm, and evading arrest as recently as a month earlier. It is undisputed

that the car Randle was in refused to comply with the attempted traffic stop by the marked police

vehicle and instead drove away, pursued by the police vehicle. When the police officers stopped

the car Randle was in, he got out of the passenger side, turned away from the car, then turned back,

reached into the passenger side, and emerged carrying an unidentified object. Privette testified

that when Randle first got out of the car, Privette could not see what was in Randle’s hands, only

that he held an unidentified object. Privette testified that it was only when Randle turned towards

Privette and Mansker that Privette could see that the object Randle held in front of him was large

enough to be or hold a gun. (Docket Entry No. 66-1 at 88:7-11). Those facts weigh in favor of

finding that the use of force was reasonable.

The court next turns to the body-worn camera footage. “[A] court should not discount the

nonmoving party’s story unless the video evidence provides so much clarity that a reasonable jury

could not believe his account.” Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 2018).

Privette attaches still shots from the body-worn camera footage that he claims show that Randle

got out of his car when the officers blocked it, prepared to flee on foot, then returned to the car and

retrieved an object from the front passenger seat. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 14-16). The body-worn

camera footage is inconclusive but not inconsistent with Privette’s testimony. Both the still shots

and the body-worn camera footage do not clearly reflect the positioning of Randle’s hands when

he was shot or whether he was holding an object (or what that object was). The officers’

conversation just before Randle is shot is focused on preventing Randle from fleeing into a nearby

house to avoid arrest, not on their fear that Randle might be armed. The object Randle was holding

when Privette shot him was later discovered to be a closed bag. The fact that the bag contained a

loaded firearm was not known to the officers when the shooting occurred. (Docket Entry No. 66-

1 at 140:14-18).

“[M]erely having a gun in one’s hand does not per se equate to dangerousness or a

threat.” Rainwater v. Sikes, 2018 WL 1916566, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018) (citing Graves v.

Zachary, 277 F. App’x 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008)). “If the officer could reasonably use less than

deadly force, he must.” Allen, 65 F.4th at 745. The footage from the body-worn camera shows

that: (1) Privette shot Randle a split second after Privette ordered Randle to show his hands; and

(2) Privette did not wait for Randle to comply with that order before shooting him. Giving a

suspect an order without giving time to comply does not support using deadly force based on the

suspect’s failure to comply. Privette did not give a meaningful warning before he shot Randle.

See, e.g., Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 745 (5th Cir. 2023) (“even when a suspect is armed, a

warning must be given, when feasible, before the use of deadly force”) (alterations adopted)

(quoting references omitted); Angulo v. Brown, 978 F.3d 942, 950–51 (5th Cir. 2020) (“use of

force is more likely to be reasonable when officers use ‘measured and ascending’ actions that

correspond to a suspect’s level of compliance or resistance.”). Providing a warning before utilizing

deadly force against a suspect has been described by the Fifth Circuit as “a critical component of

risk assessment and de-escalation.” Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2019). These

facts weigh against finding that the use of force was reasonable.

In Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 2009), another case in which the Fifth Circuit

has considered qualified immunity, an officer used deadly force against a suspect. After the

shooting, the officer discovered that the suspect was not holding a gun when he was killed. The

officer had repeatedly ordered the suspect to show his hands, but instead of complying, the suspect

reached under the driver’s seat of his car to retrieve an object and “then moved as if he had obtained

the object he sought.” Id. at 842, 844. The appellate court held that the use of deadly force was

reasonable, regardless of whether a gun was actually found, because when the officer fired, the

suspect had: (1) defied multiple orders from officers to show his hands; (2) moved his hands out

of the line of sight of the officers; and (3) appeared to retrieve an object that the officers reasonably

believed to be a weapon. Id. at 845.

In this case, the summary judgment evidence is that Randle had similarly defied orders to

stop, attempted to escape, and retrieved an object that the officers reasonably believed to be a

weapon. But in contrast to Manis, Privette gave Randle no time to comply with the order to show

his hands before firing. Nonetheless, “[a]n officer’s duty to warn a suspect before using deadly

force depends on whether that officer has time to do so.” Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d 594, 600

(5th Cir. 2020). If Privette reasonably believed that Randle had turned towards him holding a gun

in his hand, it may not have been feasible for Privette to adequately warn Randle before shooting

him.

The plaintiffs cite Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420 (5th Cir. 2021), but it is not

helpful to them. Poole involved an unarmed individual experiencing a mental-health crisis. Id. at

422. The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s rejection of the officer’s qualified immunity

defense after determining that a jury could conclude that the plaintiff, Poole, was visibly empty-

handed when shot. Id. at 426. The court distinguished Poole from cases in which the suspect

made “furtive gesture[s],” causing the apprehending officer to “reasonably fear that

the suspect was about to pull a gun from a waistband or other hidden location.” Id. at 425. The

parties also disputed whether the officer gave Poole any warning before the officer shot Poole and

whether Poole turned away from the officer just before he was shot. Id. The court held that under

the circumstances, a jury could conclude that the officer’s use of force was objectively

unreasonable. But unlike Randle, Poole had no known criminal history or a history of possessing

a weapon, and he was not wanted for offenses involving violence. Poole was apprehended solely

because the police saw him driving erratically and pursued him. Id. at 422. Poole is

distinguishable.

Privette also cites several cases that he argues show that his actions were not objectively

unreasonable. (Docket Entry No. 82). In Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, an officer pulled over

Salazar, who was driving a vehicle with three passengers. 826 F.3d at 275. During the stop, the

officer tried to handcuff Salazar, who was intoxicated and resisted. Id. After a brief struggle,

Salazar walked along the passenger side of his truck. Id. The officer pulled out his handgun and

ordered Salazar to stop. Id. Salazar did not comply and took “one or two” more steps. Id. The

officer testified that Salazar reached toward his waistband in an action “consistent with a suspect

retrieving a weapon from his waistband.” Id. at 276. The officer shot Salazar, who proved to be

unarmed. Id. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The

court held that the officer’s actions were not unreasonable, considering Salazar’s resistance,

intoxication, his disregard for the officer’s orders, and the threat he and the other three men in his

truck posed to the officers. Id. at 279. Salazar-Limon is distinguishable on the basis that Salazar

and the officer had had a physical struggle, and the officers had given Salazar an opportunity to

obey the officer’s orders to surrender, which he disobeyed, before he was shot.

In Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, a police officer fatally shot Ontiveros while executing a

high-risk felony warrant for his arrest. 564 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2009). Earlier that day,

Ontiveros had threatened to kill two men while brandishing a firearm, pistol-whipped one victim,

and fired a weapon before making additional threats while armed with both a pistol and rifle. Id.

Officers arrived at Ontiveros’s home, where they observed someone close a bedroom door. Id.

When the officers kicked down the door, they found Ontiveros holding an object over his head.

Id. The officer ordered Ontiveros to show his hands and shot him after seeing him reach for what

the officer believed was a weapon. Id. A search of the room revealed that Ontiveros was unarmed.

Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity. The court

held that the officer’s use of deadly force was not clearly unreasonable, because Ontiveros had

made violent threats, appeared to be blocking the bedroom door, moved out of sight when the door

was opened, and was reaching into a boot where a weapon could be concealed. Id. at 383-85.

Ontiveros had threatened to kill and had assaulted multiple people with firearms on the day he was

shot. The immediacy of the threat he posed to officers and to others could not reasonably be

disputed. The officers in this case sought to apprehend Randle for assaults and other crimes that

he had allegedly committed over a month earlier. Those offenses had not taken place on the same

day Randle was shot.

In Garcia v. Blevins, Garcia was fatally shot while holding a gun after refusing a police

officer’s orders to put down his weapon. 957 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020). An officer

investigating a fight at a restaurant found Garcia holding a pistol. Id. The officer unholstered his

own weapon and ordered Garcia to drop the gun. Id. Garcia refused, walked toward his friend,

and tried to hand him the gun. Id. at 599. The friend stepped away with his hands up. Id. There

were conflicting accounts as to whether Garcia raised his gun toward the officer or kept it pointed

down, but it was undisputed that Garcia did not disarm as instructed. Id. The officer then shot

Garcia. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity. While there may have been a constitutional violation, the law was not clearly

established at the time that Garcia was shot. Id. at 600. The court emphasized that Garcia was

holding a gun and refused to comply with commands to drop his weapon, which he could have

turned on the officer or others nearby at any time. Id. at 601-2. The court emphasized that officers

are not required to wait until a suspect turns toward them with a weapon before using deadly force

to ensure their safety. Id. at 602. But that case is distinguishable on the basis that Garcia was shot

after he clearly had an opportunity to comply with the officer’s directive to disarm, which he

refused to do. Here, the body worn camera footage clearly reflects that Randle was not given

adequate time to comply with the warning to show his hands.

In Carnaby v. City of Houston, two police officers fatally shot Carnaby after a traffic stop

and high-speed car chase. 636 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 2011). After Carnaby’s car ran out of gas,

officers surrounded the car and tried to persuade him to get out. Id. Carnaby refused, and the

officers broke the car windows. Id. Carnaby then opened the driver’s door and leaned toward the

floor. The officers could not see his hands for a brief period before he started to get of car while

swinging his hands towards the officers. Carnaby held an unidentified object in one hand. Id. at

186-87. The officers fired shots at Carnaby. It was discovered that he was not holding a gun, but

that he had several guns in his vehicle, including one within reach of the driver’s seat of the car.

Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on qualified immunity. Id. at 187. Given

Carnaby’s actions, the preceding high-speed chase, and the officers’ knowledge that he possessed

a handgun license, it was objectively reasonable for officers to believe Carnaby was reaching for

a firearm when his hands disappeared from view and he quickly got out of the vehicle while

swinging his hands toward one of the officers, including the hand holding an unidentified object,

toward an officer. Id. at 188. In many ways, the facts in Carnaby resemble the facts here.

In Batyukova v. Doege, an off-duty deputy encountered the suspect’s vehicle on the side of

the highway at midnight. 994 F.3d 717, 722 (5th Cir. 2021). The deputy activated his lights,

parked behind the suspect’s vehicle, and called 911. Id. When the suspect got out of the vehicle,

the deputy opened his door and ordered her to show her hands and put them on the hood. Id.

Instead of complying, the suspect shouted expletives and began walking toward the deputy’s

vehicle. Id. at 722-3. The deputy backed up his vehicle to maintain distance and drew his weapon,

ordering the suspect to get on the ground and to show her hands. Id. at 723. The suspect then

reached her other hand behind her back toward her waistband, causing her hand to disappear from

the deputy’s view. Id. The deputy fired his gun. Id. The suspect turned out to be unarmed. Id.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The court reasoned

that the deputy’s use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances because the suspect

had disobeyed commands and reached toward her waistband in what the officer reasonably

perceived as a reach for a weapon. Id. at 726-7. In that case, it was undisputed that the suspect

was given a chance to comply with an order to surrender; by contrast, here, Randle was not.

Privette also cites Argueta v. Jaradi, 86 F.4th 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 2023). (Docket Entry

No. 82 at 3). That case is closely on point. In that case, Officer Jaradi fatally shot Argueta, who

was armed with a handgun. Argueta, 86 F.4th at 1086-87. Despite dashboard camera footage

showing Argueta driving with his lights on and stopping at all stop signs, the officers contended

that Argueta’s headlights and taillights were off and that he rolled through several stop signs. Id.

After the officers turned on their emergency lights, Argueta, “quickly exited the car, turned his left

side towards the officers, and ran toward a vacant lot across the street.” Id. Argueta ran with his

right arm pressed against his side, concealing it from the officers. Id. Approximately five seconds

after Argueta got out of his vehicle, Officer Jaradi shot him. Id. The district court denied summary

judgment on qualified immunity.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that “[a]n officer’s use of deadly force is not

unreasonable when the officer has reason to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm

to the officer or to others.” Id. at 1088. Noting that there were factual disputes as to whether Jaradi

could see that Argueta held a weapon, whether Argueta raised a gun or otherwise made a

threatening motion towards the officers, or whether Argueta received any warning before Jaradi

shot him, the court nonetheless found that the factual disputes were not material to determining

qualified immunity. “Even if Argueta never touched his gun and his gun remained completely

concealed from the moment he exited the vehicle until after he was shot, that fact is immaterial:

Argueta did not need to raise (or even show) his gun or make a threatening motion towards the

officers because, by suspiciously concealing his right arm as he fled in a way that objectively

suggested he was armed and dangerous, he engaged in a furtive gesture justifying deadly force.”

Id. at 1093. The court noted that there was no case law clearly establishing that “a furtive gesture

signaling an immediate threat to officers followed by deadly force without warning constitutes a

violation of the suspect’s federal rights.” Id. at 1093.

As in Argueta, in this case the summary judgment evidence is that Privette shot Randle

after Privette saw that Randle had turned away from the vehicle, apparently about to run, then

reached back into the vehicle, then stood back up and turned back to face the officers with an

unidentified object held in front of his body. As a result, Privette reasonably believed that Randle

was holding a weapon. The plaintiffs’ argument that Randle turned back to retrieve a bag of

toiletries is undermined by at least two points: first, the implausibility of a man who had tried to

escape the police reaching into a car he had just exited in order to retrieve a bag of toiletries; and

second, the discovery after the shooting that the bag in fact contained a loaded firearm. The

circumstances weigh in favor of finding that Privette reasonably believed that Randle’s reason for

stopping was to be a continued effort to avoid arrest, and that reaching back into his vehicle to

retrieve an object was to arm himself and shoot the officers. When Randle turned to face the

officers, Privette reasonably believed that Randle had reached back into the vehicle to retrieve a

firearm to shoot the officers in his continued effort to evade arrest. Given the circumstances and

the split-second unfolding of events, it was not objectively unreasonable for Privette to shoot

Randle.

While the body-worn camera footage shows that Privette did not give Randle enough time

to comply with the order to show his hands, under Argueta, that fact alone is insufficient to

establish a violation of Randle’s constitutional rights. When Privette shot Randle, Privette knew

that Randle had a recent history of violent crime and had active warrants; had tried to flee the

police; when blocked, had exited the passenger side of the car; and then reached back into the car

to grab an unknown object. By reaching back into the vehicle he had just left, after trying to evade

arrest, Randle’s actions “suggested that he . . . possessed, and might in that moment access, a

firearm.” Argueta, 86 F.4th at 1090.

The fact that Randle was later discovered to have retrieved a bag holding a gun, rather than

just a gun, does not undermine qualified immunity. “Officers are entitled to be mistaken about

circumstances requiring use of force as long as those mistakes are reasonable.” Gonzales v. City

of Austin, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57484, at *52 (W.D. Tex. March 27, 2025) (citing Heien v. North

Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57 (2014)). Randle was known to be a convicted felon and to have

possessed a firearm in the past, was being pursued on felony warrants for violent crimes, had led

police on a high-speed chase, exited the vehicle he was riding in, then turned back and reached

into the passenger side of that vehicle, emerged holding an object in front of him, and then turned

to face the officers. Privette reasonably believed that Randle held a gun that he intended to use on

the officers trying to arrest him. Under these circumstances, Privette’s use of deadly force against

Randle was not objectively unreasonable.

B. Whether Privette Violated a Clearly Established Constitutional Right

Even if the court were to find factual disputes material to determining whether Privette

used unreasonable force, the plaintiffs must also show that Privette’s actions violated clearly

established law to defeat summary judgment on qualified immunity. “When considering a

defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity, [a court] must ask whether the law so clearly and

unambiguously prohibited his conduct that ‘every reasonable official would understand that what

he is doing violates [the law].’” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)

(emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741). “If officers of reasonable

competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff's rights were violated, the officer’s qualified

immunity remains intact.” Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 2005). The court

“must be able to point to controlling authority—or a ‘robust consensus of persuasive authority’—

that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particularity.” Morgan, 659

F.3d at 371–72 (quoting al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742).

Under the second prong of the inquiry, “[a] plaintiff may demonstrate clearly established

law by identifying a case or body of relevant case law in which a violation of the Constitution was

found under factually similar circumstances.” Lewis v. Inocencio, 2024 WL 229274, at *3 (5th

Cir. Jan. 22, 2024) (alterations adopted) (internal quotations omitted). This inquiry is conducted

to determine whether the officer “had fair notice that [his] conduct was unlawful.” Brosseau v.

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). “Before analyzing whether the law is clearly established, ‘we

must frame the constitutional question with specificity and granularity.’” Lewis, 2024 WL 229274

at *3 (citing Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874-75 (5th Cir. 2019)).

Resolving the factual disputes in favor of the plaintiffs, the constitutional question is

whether, in April 2022, it was clearly established that a police officer violates the Fourth

Amendment by using deadly force against a suspect, when: that suspect is a convicted felon with

a history of illegally possessing firearms; has three active felony warrants; the suspect was fleeing

from the police, then turns back to reach into the vehicle he has just exited to retrieve an

unidentified object from the front passenger side; the suspect then turns to face the officers, holding

the object in front of him; one of the officers orders the suspect to show his hands; and that officer

shoots the suspect without giving him adequate time to comply with the order. The plaintiffs cite

the following cases for the principle that shooting a suspect who was not an imminent threat to

officers or others is unreasonable as a matter of law: (1) Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 198 (5th

Cir. 1996); (2) Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d at 453, 455; and (3) Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th

at 422, 425. (Docket Entry No. 81). In order for these cases to show that Privette violated clearly

established law, they must be “factually similar enough to the situation [Privette] faced to have

placed the lawfulness of his actions beyond debate.” Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 246 (5th Cir.

2023), as revised (May 19, 2023).

Privette argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because in April 2022, no precedent

would have placed a reasonable officer in his position on notice that using deadly force under the

circumstances he faced violated a clearly established constitutional right. Privette argues that the

plaintiffs have identified no precedent showing that he violated clearly established law when he

shot Randle, because he reasonably believed that the object Randle held was a firearm and that

Randle, who had been fleeing to avoid arrest, was about to fire at the police officers trying to arrest

him. (Docket Entry No. 61 at 18). After carefully reviewing the cases the plaintiffs cite, the court

agrees. The court has already noted that Poole is distinguishable on the facts because, among other

points, the plaintiff in that case had none of the criminal history that Randle had. Neither Baker v.

Putnal nor Cole v. Carson is sufficiently similar to show that Privette’s actions violated clearly

established law.

In Baker v. Putnal, witnesses told a police officer that one or more individuals in a red

vehicle had a shotgun after a fight broke out on a public beach. Baker, 75 F.3d at 193. The officer

approached a truck with two men sitting inside that was parked near the beach. Id. As the officer

neared the truck, the man sitting in the passenger’s seat of the truck turned toward the officer. Id.

The officer shot and killed the man in the passenger’s seat. Id. A pistol was later found under the

passenger’s seat. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

the officer on qualified immunity. Id. at 198. The court found factual disputes material to

determining qualified immunity, including whether: (1) the decedent took any threatening actions

towards the officer as he approached the truck; (2) whether the officer gave the decedent a warning

before using deadly force; and (3) whether the decedent was holding the pistol or pointing it at the

officer when the officer shot him. Id. The court found that the “only uncontroverted evidence is

that there was a good deal of confusion on the beach and that [the decedent] at least began to face

[the officer] from [the decedent’s] position in the truck.” Id. The court also noted that the decedent

had been shot multiple times, and that his wounds suggested that he had been shot while facing

away from the officer. Id.

In some ways, the facts in Baker are similar to the facts here. In both cases, the officer

believed, but could not clearly tell, that the suspect was armed. And in both cases, a firearm was

found after the shooting. Both cases present the kind of split-second decision that officers must

make in the face of fast-moving events. But in Baker, unlike the present case, the officer had no

information about, and no earlier interaction with, the suspect. Privette, by contrast, knew of

Randle’s criminal history, including a history of illegally possessing a firearm, and had been

pursuing Randle as he attempted to avoid arrest. The court in Baker noted the chaotic scene but

stated that the suspect’s “mere motion to turn and face [the officer] are not compelling reasons to

find that [the officer’s] use of force was not excessive as a matter of law.” Id. By contrast, here,

Privette knew much more information about Randle’s past and just after Randle had attempted to

avoid arrest. That knowledge, and Randle’s actions before the shooting, significantly change the

calculus.

In Cole v. Carson, a suicidal 17-year-old was reported to be walking around a

neighborhood with firearms. Cole, 935 F.3d at 448. A police officer searching for the young man

testified that he overheard a witness stating that the young man had been persuaded to give up one

of two guns in his possession. Id. After searching the area, the officer saw the young man walking

away from other officers while holding a gun to his head. Id. The officers followed to try to

intercept the young man, but two of the officers, including the defendant, fired shots. Id. Viewing

the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the district court found that the officers had

not given the young man a warning that gave him time to respond before shooting him. Id. at 449.

When the officers shot, the young man was facing away from the officers with his own gun still

pointed at his head. Id. The officers who shot did not know that the young man had shot himself

in the temple at the same time. Id. The young man survived, but with severe mental and physical

disabilities. Id. at 450. The police officers sought immunity by arguing that the officer had given

a warning that the young man ignored and instead turned to face the officers and pointed his gun

at them. Id. The ballistics report showed that the young man had instead held the gun to his head

until he shot himself in the temple. The district court denied summary judgment on qualified

immunity, finding unresolved factual disputes.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that the summary judgment facts showed that the young

man posed no threat to the officers or others that would justify shooting him without a warning.

Id. at 453. A reasonable jury could find that he made no threatening or provocative gestures, posed

no immediate harm to anyone but himself, and that, although the officers had time to warn before

shooting, no warning was given. Id. at 455. The court concluded that the shooting violated clearly

established law. Id.

In this case, as in Cole, a reasonable jury could find that Privette did not give an adequate

warning before shooting Randle. But in Cole, the suspect was a suicidal teenager, known to be in

possession of a gun, but with no other violent or criminal history. Here, the suspect had a history

of possessing firearms, had led police on a chase to avoid arrest, and had reached into the passenger

side of the car he had just left and retrieved an object, which he held in front of him as he turned

to face the police officers.

The plaintiffs also cite Sanchez v. Fraley, 376 F. App’x 449 (5th Cir. 2010), Tennessee v.

Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), and Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453 (5th Cir. 2022), for the

principle that shooting a suspect who was not an imminent threat at the time of the shooting, based

on events occurring just before the shooting, is unreasonable as a matter of law. (Docket Entry

No. 66 at 23). Sanchez is an unreported, nonprecedential case. While such cases may “aptly

illustrate[] the established right,” they cannot clearly establish the law for the purpose of the

qualified immunity analysis. Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 525 n.8 (5th Cir. 2016). Crane

involved a suspect who was shot and killed by police as he tried to comply with an officer’s order

to surrender. 50 F.4th at 453. By contrast, Randle had been resisting officers’ efforts to arrest him

and it is unclear whether he would have complied with the order to show his hands when he was

shot. But Crane was decided in October 2022; this shooting happened in April 2022. The officers

did not know of the holding in Crane when Randle was shot.

Garner stands for the general proposition that “[a] police officer may not seize an unarmed,

nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead” unless “the suspect threatens the officer with a

weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction

or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.” Garner, 471 U.S. 1 at 11. At that point, “deadly

force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been

given.” Id. at 11-12. The Supreme Court has held “that Garner and Graham do not by themselves

create clearly established law outside ‘an obvious case.’” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 80 (2017)

(quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam)). This case is not an obvious

case.

The plaintiffs also argue that if a jury determines that Privette shot Randle without a

reasonable belief that he posed a danger of death or serious bodily injury to the officers, then, as a

matter of law, no reasonable officer could believe that firing on Randle would not have violated

Randle’s constitutional rights. (Docket Entry No. 66 at 24). But there can be a constitutional

violation that does not meet the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity test. See

Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d at 599. An officer need only prevail on one of the two prongs to be

entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity. See Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253

(5th Cir. 2010). Here, the court has found that Privette prevails on both prongs.

The plaintiffs have not pointed to sufficient authority clearly establishing that Privette’s

conduct violated the law under the specific circumstances he faced. Privette is entitled to qualified

immunity on this ground as well.

IV. Conclusion

The motion for summary judgment, (Docket Entry No. 61), is granted.

SIGNED on August 8, 2025, at Houston, Texas.

LW bnteo

Lee H. Rosenthal

Senior United States District Judge

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