The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
MONTAE COLLINS,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 25-14328 (RMB-MJS)
v.
OPINION
VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA,
DELAWARE VALLEY, INC.,
Defendant.
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the filing of a Complaint,
Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), and Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction by pro se Plaintiff Montae Collins.
[Docket Nos. 1 (“Compl.”), 1-1, 2.] Plaintiff’s IFP application establishes his financial
eligibility to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and will be granted.
I. SCREENING FOR DISMISSAL
When a person files a complaint and is granted IFP status, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) requires courts to review the complaint and dismiss claims that are: (1)
frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3)
seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Courts,
however, must liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a
claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is the same as that for dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122
(3d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against the Delaware Valley arm of Volunteers of
America (“VOA”), a nonprofit organization that provides shelter services. [Compl. at
1.] He alleges that he was unlawfully removed from a VOA shelter in Camden County
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Id. at Count I.] In the alternative, he brings a claim
against VOA for unjust enrichment. [Id. at Count II.]
III. ANALYSIS
This Court is without jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. To state a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was
committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988). A person acts under color of state law if he “exercise[s] power possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state law.” Id. at 49 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Generally, private entities are not liable under Section 1983. A private entity can only
qualify as a state actor where it performs a “traditional” and “exclusive public
function,” “when the government compels the private entity to take a particular
action,” or “when the government acts jointly with the private entity.” Manhattan
Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 809 (2019).
Plaintiff alleges that VOA is a state actor subject to Section 1983 liability
because it is “funded by state and county agencies” and because it “performs a
traditional and exclusive public function, providing government-funded emergency
shelter to homeless individuals, and acts jointly with state and county agencies in
determining eligibility, funding, and program compliance.” [Compl. at 4.] These
conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand screening under a Rule 12(b)(6)
standard. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–56 (2007) (“Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”)
(citations omitted). But even assuming VOA received funding from the state, that is
not enough to turn private action into state action. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan,
47 F.3d 628, 640 (3d Cir. 1995); Crowder v. Conlan, 740 F.2d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 1984).
(“The actions of a private entity do not become state action merely because the
government provides substantial funding to the private party.”). And the Court will
take judicial notice of other decisions across the country finding that that VOA is not
a state actor for purposes of Section 1983. See Singleton v. Volunteers of Am., 2013 WL
5934647, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013) (examining VOA articles of incorporation
and determining that it was “not a state-run program, but a corporation formed to
operate ‘a religious, missionary and welfare society’”); Tillman v. Mauser, 2011 WL
826794, at *5 n.4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2011 (collecting cases concluding that VOA is
not a state actor); Bassomb v. Volunteers of Am. - Greater New York, 2007 WL 760407, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007) (“Volunteers of America is a private employer that
operates by its own internal rules of conduct.”); S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah
Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999) (“To resolve a 12(b)(6)
motion, a court may properly look at public records, including judicial proceedings, in
addition to the allegations in the complaint.”). Therefore, as alleged, Plaintiff cannot
state a claim under Section 1983. The Court will, however, afford Plaintiff leave to
amend to set forth non-conclusory facts alleging that VOA is a state actor amenable to
federal question jurisdiction under Section 1983.
The Court is also without jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s common law unjust
enrichment claim under the federal diversity statute which requires that the plaintiff
and defendant are from different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff alleges that he is
a New Jersey resident and that VOA, Delaware Valley is a corporation under
organized under the laws of the state of New Jersey. [Compl. at 1.] Although
“residency” is not synonymous with domicile—the relevant determiner of citizenship
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Vanz, LLC v. Mattia & Assocs., 2016 WL 3148400,
at *3 (D.N.J. May 17, 2016) (“The citizenship of a natural person is determined by
their domicile, not their residence”)—it is still prima facie evidence of an individual’s
domicile, Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972) (“Where one lives is
prima facie evidence of domicile[.]”). Because Plaintiff has failed to plead allegations
sufficient to establish diversity of citizenship, the Court will also dismiss the unjust
enrichment claim without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, similarly
with leave to amend.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s IFP application
and DISMISS his Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court will afford
Plaintiff LEAVE TO AMEND to remedy the deficiencies identified herein. The Court
will DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. An appropriate Order follows.
August 8, 2025 s/Renée Marie Bumb
Date RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge