LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA INC v. MOODY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

FLORIDA STATE CONFERENCE

OF BRANCHES AND YOUTH UNITS

OF THE NAACP, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case Nos.: 4:23cv215-MW/MAF

4:23cv216-MW/MAF

CORD BYRD, in his official capacity

as Florida Secretary of State, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

FINAL ORDER ON MERITS

This Order follows a seven-day bench trial in April 2024 in these consolidated

cases. Plaintiffs include third-party voter registration organizations (3PVROs) and

individuals who challenge several amendments to Florida law pursuant to an

omnibus bill known as SB 7050. By separate Order, this Court granted relief on the

merits and entered judgment in a related case, 4:23cv218, which was consolidated

with these cases for trial. In Case No.: 4:23cv218, the Plaintiffs presented narrower

claims addressing a single provision. In the cases still pending before this Court,

Plaintiffs present overlapping claims, along with additional challenges to other

provisions and several different theories of relief.

To summarize, Plaintiffs in Case No.: 4:23cv215 include the Florida State

Conference of Branches and Youth Unites of the NAACP (Florida NAACP), Voters

of Tomorrow Action, Inc. (VOT), Disability Rights Florida (DRF), Alianza for

Progress, Alianza Center, UnidosUS, Florida Alliance for Retired Americans

(FLARA), Humberto Orjuela Prieto,1 Esperanza Sánchez, and Santiago Mayer.2

These Plaintiffs challenge § 97.0575(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2023), which requires

3PVROs to affirm that people collecting voter registration applications on their

behalf are citizens of the United States and makes 3PVROs liable for a $50,000 fine

for each noncitizen who collects or handles voter registration applications on their

behalf in violation of this provision. They also challenge the newly shortened

deadline for 3PVROs to return completed voter registration applications and fines

for late returns and for applications returned to the wrong county Supervisor of

Elections, §§ 97.0575(5)(a)1.–3., Fla. Stat., and the restriction on copying a voter’s

completed voter registration application or retaining the voter’s personal

information, § 97.0575(7), Fla. Stat. They also challenge the new restriction on how

voters can request vote-by-mail ballots, § 101.62(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

1 Humberto Orjuela Prieto has been referred to as various combinations of names in the

record and in Orders by this Court—e.g., Mr. Orjuelo Prieto, Mr. Prieto, Mr. Orjuela, etc. Lest

there be any confusion and given counsel’s repeated reference to him as “Mr. Orjuela” in the trial

transcript, this Court refers to him as such throughout this Order.

2 For ease of reference, this Court refers to these Plaintiffs, collectively, as the NAACP

Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs in Case No.: 4:23cv216 include the League of Women Voters of

Florida, Inc., and the League of Women Voters of Florida Education Fund, Inc.3

They also challenge the citizenship provision, the new voter registration return

deadline and associated fines, and the information retention ban. In addition, they

challenge Florida’s new receipt requirement, § 97.0575(4), Fla. Stat., which requires

3PVROs to provide voters with a receipt upon accepting possession of their

applications. Below, this Court addresses each case in turn.

I

This Court begins with the claims at issue in Case No.: 4:23cv216. But before

this Court addresses the League Plaintiffs’ claims, it must ensure that these Plaintiffs

have standing to challenge each of the provisions. See CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc.

v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1273 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that courts

have an “independent obligation . . . to ensure a case or controversy exists as to each

challenged provision”). The standing requirement is satisfied as long as a single

plaintiff has standing. Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 53 (2006) (“[T]he presence of

one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy

requirement.”). But in applying that principle, this Court must evaluate each

consolidated case separately. See Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1127–29 (2018)

3 For ease of reference, this Court refers to these Plaintiffs, collectively, as the League

Plaintiffs.

(“[C]onsolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in

administration, but does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights

of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another.” (quoting

Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496–97 (1933))).

The Supreme Court has long held that an actual controversy exists when the

parties have “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure

that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues.” Baker v. Carr,

369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Over time, the Supreme Court has developed a three-part

test for determining when such adverseness exists. Under that test, a plaintiff must

show (1) that they have suffered an injury-in-fact that is (2) traceable to the

defendant and that (3) can likely be redressed by a favorable ruling. See Lujan v.

Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

For the individual Plaintiffs, this inquiry is straightforward. But for the

organizational Plaintiffs, the issue is more complex. The organizational Plaintiffs

proceed under two theories—namely, organizational standing and associational

standing. Organizational standing allows an organization to assert claims based on

injuries to the organization itself. See Fla. Democratic Party v. Hood, 342 F. Supp.

2d 1073, 1079 (N.D. Fla. 2004) (“An organization has standing to challenge conduct

that impedes its ability to attract members, to raise revenues, or to fulfill its

purposes.” (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982))).

On the other hand, associational standing allows an organization to sue on its

members’ behalf “when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in

their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s

purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the

participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Greater Birmingham Ministries

v. Sec’y of State of Ala., 992 F.3d 1299, 1316 (11th Cir. 2021) (GBM). To establish

associational standing, Plaintiffs must “make specific allegations establishing that at

least one identified member has suffered or will suffer harm.” Ga. Republican Party

v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 888 F.3d 1198, 1203 (11th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

With these principles in mind, this Court first considers whether at least one

League Plaintiff4 has standing to challenge the above-listed provisions.

A

The League Plaintiffs’ theory of standing for each of their claims is primarily

based on their decision to switch from paper voter registration to online registration

to avoid having to comply with the challenged provisions. Without question, the

League Plaintiffs have diverted resources to make this switch, and it has resulted in

a less efficient method of registering voters. The problem for Plaintiffs is that they

4 These Plaintiffs presented the testimony of only two witnesses at the bench trial—Cecile

Scoon and Dr. Monica Elliott.

try to blame all the challenged provisions for “compelling” them to switch to online

registration. But the evidence does not bear this out.

i

With respect to the receipt requirement, Ms. Scoon’s testimony demonstrates

that it is only possible—not even probable—that Plaintiffs would have switched to

online registration to avoid compliance with this particular provision. ECF No. 289

at 192–93. But at trial, it is Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate, by the preponderance

of the evidence, that they have been injured by each of the challenged provisions.

Testimony about the “possibility” of an alleged chill does not meet this burden.

Moreover, this mere “possibility” is premised on members’ subjective and

speculative fears regarding harassment and potential criminal penalties based on

some hypothetical targeted investigation. But vague references to members’

subjective and speculative fears, and anecdotal incidents involving harassment from

third parties who were not attempting to register to vote for the purposes of harassing

volunteers, fails to demonstrate that any member is chilled from conducting paper

voter registration due to a reasonable fear associated with the receipt provision’s

enforcement. See, e.g., ECF No. 289 at 178–81, 296–97. In short, Plaintiffs’

evidence does not demonstrate that they have associational standing to challenge the

receipt requirement.

Likewise, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a cognizable injury under a

diversion-of-resources theory of organizational standing based on the hypothetical

cost of purchasing customized receipt notebooks and the additional time that

Plaintiffs say they would spend training volunteers to comply with this provision

and filling out the receipts for voters during registration drives. Instead, their

evidence depends on a hypothetical diversion of resources that is both speculative

and self-inflicted. See City of South Miami v. Gov., 65 F.4th 631, 639 (11th Cir.

2023) (“Although an organization can establish standing under a diversion-of-

resources theory, it cannot do so by inflicting harm on itself to address its members’

‘fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.’ ”).

The receipt requirement does not necessitate Plaintiffs’ purchase of materials

that provide a duplicate of each receipt for the organization’s own peace of mind.

Plaintiffs’ decision to pursue this additional cost (if the provision is not enjoined and

if they choose to restart paper registration efforts) is self-inflicted. Next, Plaintiffs’

evidence demonstrates that their pause on paper registration efforts is more likely

based on fears of incurring enormous fines under a different provision at issue in this

case, explained in more detail below, and that they would not otherwise restart paper

registration efforts if only the receipt requirement were enjoined. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that any diversion of time to train volunteers or fill

out receipts is imminent.

In sum, Plaintiffs’ evidence falls short of demonstrating that they have

standing to challenge the receipt requirement, and thus, their claims challenging this

provision are due to be dismissed.

ii

As for the voter information retention ban, the League Plaintiffs’ evidence

also falls short of establishing standing to pursue their claims challenging this

provision. The voter information retention ban makes it a third degree felony for “a

person collecting voter registration applications on behalf of a [3PVRO]” to “cop[y]

a voter’s application or retain[] a voter’s personal information . . . for any reason

other than to provide such application or information to the third-party voter

registration organization in compliance with this section[.]” § 97. 0575(7), Fla. Stat.

As Defendants point out, the League Plaintiffs’ evidence does not demonstrate that

anyone who collects or handles voter registration applications on the League

Plaintiffs’ behalf ever has or ever will copy or retain a voter’s application or personal

information in violation of this provision, and thus, the League Plaintiffs have not

demonstrated that they face a cognizable or imminent injury traceable to any

Defendant’s enforcement of this criminal prohibition. See ECF No. 311 at 84.

Rather, Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates that League members sometimes solicit

information from the public with a yellow pad left out for individuals to provide

their name and contact information and any issues they may be interested in. See

ECF No. 289 at 196. They apparently do not limit this solicitation only to voters—

instead, this appears to be part of the League’s “no-questions-asked” method of

recruiting members and volunteers. Id.; see also id. at 224. But Plaintiffs contend

that this collection of voter information arguably falls within the plain text of the

challenged provision. Not so.

Plaintiffs cannot generate standing by twisting themselves into a pretzel to

force their intended activities within the reach of the information retention ban. They

still must demonstrate that their course of conduct is arguably proscribed by the

challenged provision. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 162–63

(2014). But here, Plaintiffs proceed under a strained reading of the provision to argue

that soliciting contact information from the public on a designated pad of paper—

separate and apart from collecting, copying, or retaining voter information lifted

from a voter’s registration application—is now arguably a felony under Florida law.

Although this Court has already enumerated its concerns regarding the

information retention ban’s lack of clarity in a related preliminary injunction, see

ECF No. 101 in Case No.: 4:23cv215, this Court’s concerns had nothing to do with

whether the statute prohibits collecting voter information when a voter volunteers

their contact information outside of the registration context. Plaintiffs’ overbroad

construction of this provision completely ignores the context of the statute and the

other provisions within section 97.0575 that specifically target voter registration and

registration applications. See, e.g., §§ 97.0575(3) (requiring the Division of

Elections or Supervisors of Elections to make voter registration forms available to

3PVROs), 97.0575(5)(a) (noting that 3PVROs that collect applications serve as

fiduciaries to the applicants and must ensure prompt delivery of the applications to

the division of elections or supervisors of elections), 97.0575(6) (criminalizing the

alteration of a voter registration application without the voter’s knowledge and

consent), 97.0575(11) (prohibiting 3PVROs from mailing or otherwise providing

pre-filled voter registration applications). Given this context, any reasonable reading

of section 97.0575(7) would only reach copying voter registration applications or

retaining information from voter registration applications—something that no

League member or volunteer is known to have done or will ever do. Simply put, the

League Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to demonstrate that their course of

conduct—collecting contact information from members of the public who

voluntarily provide that information on a pad of paper—is arguably proscribed by

the information retention ban.

Naturally, any asserted diversion of resources to respond to this provision,

notwithstanding the fact that the League’s members have never done what’s

proscribed nor intend to do so in the future, amounts to a self-inflicted injury that

cannot support Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge this provision. Accordingly, the

League Plaintiffs’ claims challenging the information retention ban are also due to

be dismissed.

iii

Next, this Court considers the League Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the

citizenship requirement. The League Plaintiffs apparently concede that they do not

have associational standing to challenge this provision given their failure to identify

a noncitizen member who is now prohibited from collecting voter registration

applications on their behalf. ECF No. 317 at 12–13. Instead, they claim to have

organizational standing because the citizenship requirement will reduce the League

Plaintiffs’ existing volunteer force and its ability to recruit new members and

because they have had to divert resources to respond to the provision. Id. at 13.

With respect to the League Plaintiffs’ volunteer force and ability to recruit

new members, the concern does not appear to be the fact that so many members are,

in fact, noncitizens and would not be able to participate in voter registration efforts

moving forward. Instead, Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates that, given the

organizations’ inclusive values, so many members or future volunteers will be

offended if asked whether they are citizens that they will not participate in voter

registration, thus decreasing the number of newly registered voters. See, e.g., ECF

No. 289 at 219 (“We feel that there would be quite a few members who would

absolutely object to asking that question. They would not ask the question, and they

would not want to answer it.”), 220 (“And the whole idea of citizenship, ‘Do you

belong here?’ is like a trigger.”), 223 (“[W]e’d have massive debates over this . . . Is

there a way to do it that doesn’t – creates less offense?”), 226 (“If you start making

people feel bad about that process and feel less than and feel like they are taking in

racism and nationalism and whatever ‘isms’ that we’re trying to fight against, people

are going to withdraw, and they’re not going to be present to do the work.”). But

Plaintiffs identify no authority that supports the notion that an organization can

demonstrate standing based on the perceived insult that compliance with a state

statute may inflict upon an organization or its hyper-sensitive membership. This

theory of organizational standing has no legs. See In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d

756, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.) (“As the Supreme Court has often stated,

mere personal offense to government action does not give rise to standing.”).

As for Plaintiffs’ asserted diversion of resources, the evidence again shows

that this injury is self-inflicted and largely speculative. Much of the time the League

Plaintiffs have diverted to debating over how to respond to the citizenship

requirement appears to be tied to managing the League Plaintiffs’ membership’s

feelings and mitigating any offense taken by inquiring into citizenship status. See

ECF No. 289 at 223. Likewise, Plaintiffs estimate that they may someday have to

spend thousands of dollars printing and distributing declarations for each voter

registration volunteer to affirm their citizenship, if the League Plaintiffs ever restart

paper registration and decide to ask about citizenship. Id. at 223–24. But these

declarations are not required by statute—instead they offer a possible defense if a

3PVRO is fined for violating the citizenship requirement. See Fla. Admin. Code R.

1S-2.042(6)(e) (2023).5 Moreover, Plaintiffs’ evidence does not demonstrate, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that an order enjoining enforcement of the

citizenship requirement would lead Plaintiffs to restart their paper registration

efforts. Instead, Ms. Scoon’s testimony on this point left substantial room for doubt

that Plaintiffs would even need to divert resources to address the citizenship

requirement while other provisions—namely, the increased fines and shortened

return deadline—are to blame for chilling the League Plaintiffs’ paper voter

registration efforts. See ECF No. 289 at 233; see also id. at 154–55, 210–11, 215–

16. Accordingly, this Court finds that the League Plaintiffs have not met their burden

to demonstrate standing to challenge the citizenship requirement.

iv

Lastly, the League Plaintiffs challenge new provisions that shorten the

timeframe for 3PVROs to return voter registration applications to the Division of

Elections or the appropriate Supervisor of Elections, and fines associated with late

5 To be clear, section 97.0575(1)(e) requires 3PVROs to submit a single affirmation stating

that each person collecting or handling voter registration applications on their behalf is a citizen

of the United States and has not been convicted of certain felony offenses. Contrary to Dr. Elliott’s

testimony, ECF No. 289 at 302, this provision does not require every member or volunteer who

collects or handles voter registration applications to also submit such an affirmation to the Division

of Elections.

or erroneous returns. The evidence at trial demonstrates that the League of Women

Voters of Florida Education Fund, Inc. (the League)—the entity that engages in voter

registration activity, see ECF No. 289 at 144–45—has suffered and will continue to

suffer an injury in fact based on the Defendants’ threatened enforcement of the new

deadline and associated fines.

The League’s evidence shows that the shortened deadline would require the

League to overhaul its voter registration operations to avoid crippling fines if it were

to continue conducting paper voter registration drives. For example, Ms. Scoon

testified that the League would have to retrain voter registration volunteers to ensure

applications are turned in by the shortened deadline, avoid registering out-of-county

voters, and make additional trips to Supervisors of Elections offices to hand deliver

applications before the deadline. See ECF No. 289 at 206–10. All of these changes—

particularly the shortened time frame for returns and the switch to making more

frequent deliveries to Supervisors of Elections offices—will likely eat away at

members’ time in the field registering voters, resulting in registering fewer voters.

Id. at 210. In short, the League of Women Voters of Florida Education Fund, Inc.,

has demonstrated a cognizable injury—including the cost of compliance and a

reasonable chill on paper voter registration drives—that is traceable to the Secretary

of State’s and Attorney General’s enforcement authority under sections

97.0575(5)(a) and 97.0575(8), and 97.0575(9). Accordingly, this Court now turns to

the merits of the League’s challenge to section 97.057(5)(a)1.–3., Fla. Stat. (2023).

B

The League challenges the new 10-day return deadline and associated fines

under several theories—none of which merits the requested relief. To be clear, the

challenged provisions shorten the deadline for 3PVROs to return completed voter

registration applications to the Division of Elections or the county Supervisors of

Elections from fourteen to ten days. § 97.0575(5)(a), Fla. Stat. For each day an

application is late, the 3PVRO is liable for $50, up to $2,500. Id. § 97.0575(a)1. If

the 3PVRO willfully returns the application in late, the fine jumps from $50 to

$2,500. Id. If the application is collected before book closing but received after book

closing, the 3PVRO is liable for $100 for each day late, up to $5,000. Id.

§ 97.0575(a)2. If the 3PVRO willfully returns the application in late after book

closing, the fine increases to $5,000. Id. And the 3PVRO is now liable for $500 for

each application that is not submitted to the Division of Elections or the Supervisor

of Elections in the county where the applicant resides. Id. § 97.0575(a)3. Willful

violations of this provisions are subject to a $5,000 fine. Id. Finally, the provision

caps the total aggregate fine applicable to any 3PVRO at $250,000 per calendar year.

Id.

First, the League contends the new deadline and fines violate the League’s

First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive conduct, and association. See ECF

No. 111 in Case No.: 4:23cv216-MW (First Amended Complaint). The League

likens voter registration activity to the circulation of initiative petitions and argues

the new deadline and fines exact a severe burden on the League’s protected political

speech, which violates the First Amendment for the same reasons discussed in Meyer

v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). See ECF No. 301 at 59. But assuming arguendo that

the League’s voter registration activities constitute expressive conduct akin to the

core political speech involved in the collection of signed petitions à la Meyer, the

League has not demonstrated that the shortened deadline and increased fines for

untimely, unreturned, or erroneously returned voter registration applications exacts

a severe burden on the League’s expressive conduct—canvassing to register

voters—that would subject the challenged provisions to exacting scrutiny in this

case. See, e.g., Fla. Decides Healthcare, Inc. v. Byrd, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL

1581267, at *7–8 (N.D. Fla. 2025) (rejecting similar challenge at preliminary

injunction stage in context of citizen initiative petitions); see also League of Women

Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1321–22 (S.D. Fla. 2008).

Next, just because the League asserts the deadline and fines are content- and

viewpoint-based doesn’t make it so. See ECF No. 301 at 68–69. The League’s

paragraph of cherrypicked case quotations offers little in the way of support or

explanation for this argument. Taken to its logical conclusion, the League’s

proposed rule would subject any regulation that incidentally impacts 3PVRO speech

or expressive conduct to heightened scrutiny, since such regulations would “apply

only to those engaged in voter registration drives” who “seek[] to encourage political

participation, not to discourage it.” Id. But that is not the law. See, e.g., League of

Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (N.D. Fla. 2012)

(Hinkle, J.) (“Every court that has addressed a constitutional challenge to provisions

regulation voter-registration drives has concluded that the governing standards are

those set out in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788–90 (1983).”); Browning,

575 F. Supp. 2d at 1323 (“All third-party organizations collecting voter registration

applications are subject to the same regulations regarding the handling of voter

registration applications. Such content neutral election regulations are generally

deemed to be significantly less constitutionally onerous tha[n] the facially

discriminatory statute addressed in LWVF I.”); League of Women Voters of Fla. v.

Cobb, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1331 n.21 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (rejecting argument that

exacting scrutiny applied to 3PVRO regulation and applying Anderson-Burdick

balancing test instead).

More to the point, the fines apply only if applications are turned in late, to the

wrong Supervisor of Elections, or not at all—not based on content or viewpoint

outside of the categorical application to 3PVRO registration. This would be an

entirely different situation if fines were assessed against 3PVROs for every new

voter registered with a particular party affiliation. But that is not this case. In short,

this Court rejects the League’s argument that exacting or strict scrutiny applies

because the challenged provision poses a severe burden or is content- or viewpoint-

based.

This Court is left with the Anderson-Burdick balancing test—namely,

weighing the severity of the burden on the League’s First Amendment rights against

the State’s asserted interests. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S.

351, 358 (1997) (summarizing balancing test). If the new deadline and increased

fines impose only modest burdens on the League’s rights, then State’s important

regulatory interests generally suffice to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory

restrictions on election procedures. Id. (“Lesser burdens, however, trigger less

exacting review, and a State’s important regulatory interests will usually be enough

to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.” (cleaned up)).

Here, although the State has drastically increased the cap on potential fines

for late, unreturned, or erroneously returned applications, the evidence in this record

demonstrates that the new deadline that triggers these fines poses only a modest

burden on the League. In fact, Ms. Scoon testified that regardless of what the

deadline has been—ten or fourteen days—“the League has barely ever missed the

deadline for turning in applications.”6 See ECF No. 289 at 206 (“A. That’s correct.”).

Certainly, the risk of incurring any increased fine may reasonably chill voter

registration activities, particularly while the 3PVRO works out how best to move

forward and update internal procedures to comply with the new deadline. But a

temporary pause in registration activity and the costs associated with retooling your

operation to comply with a return deadline that was previously the law of the land,

and with which you admittedly barely ever violated, is not the sort of burden

warranting heightened scrutiny. Likewise, the evidence demonstrates that this

modest burden on the League’s First Amendment rights is justified by the State’s

weighty interests in ensuring voter registration applications are turned in on time,

either directly to the Division of Elections or to the correct Supervisor of Elections

office. See, e.g., ECF No. 311 at 46–47, 49. In short, the League has not met its

burden to establish that sections 97.0575(5)(a)1.–3. unduly burden the League’s

First Amendment rights.

The League also challenges the fines provisions as unconstitutionally vague

on their face in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The

League asserts the increased fines for “willful” violations do not provide fair notice

of what conduct is prohibited and whether the maximum fine will be imposed along

6 The deadline to return voter registration applications was ten days for several years before

it was decreased to 48 hours, then increased to ten days, see Browning, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1168,

then increased to fourteen days, before it was returned to ten days in 2023.

with the lower fine for non-willful violations. The League offers a slew of

hypotheticals to demonstrate why the “willful” violation provisions do not provide

sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct, but “speculation about possible

vagueness in hypothetical situations not before the Court will not support a facial

attack on a statute when it is surely valid in the vast majority of its intended

applications.” United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1349 (11th Cir 2010)

(quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000)). And here, a person of ordinary

intelligence would understand the fines provision to penalize 3PVROs in the event

applications are turned in late, and to subject 3PVROs to an even higher fine if the

late return is “willful.” Although the term “willful” is undefined, the ordinary

meaning of the term requires an additional element of intentional or deliberate

conduct. See DeSantis v. Dream Defenders, 389 So.3d 413, 424 n.11 (Fla. 2024)

(describing various definitions of adverbial form of the term willful). This makes

sense—intentional violations are punishable by higher fines than unintentional

violations.

This Court is not persuaded that the League has met its burden to demonstrate

the “willful” violations provisions under section 97.0575(5)(a) are facially

unconstitutional in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor has the League

presented any evidence that would support an as-applied vagueness claim. This

claim is due to be dismissed as well.

In sum, the League Plaintiffs’ claims challenging the receipt requirement, the

information retention ban, and the citizenship requirement are DISMISSED

without prejudice for lack of standing. The League’s First and Fourteenth

Amendment challenges to the shortened return deadline and fines provisions are

DISMISSED with prejudice as the League has failed to meet its burden to

demonstrate a constitutional violation with respect to these provisions. In short,

judgment is due in favor of Defendants on all counts in Case No.: 4:23cv216.

Next this Court turns to the NAACP Plaintiffs’ claims in Case

No.: 4:23cv215, starting with whether these Plaintiffs have standing.

II

The NAACP Plaintiffs challenge the voter information retention ban, the

citizenship requirement, the shortened deadline and associated fines, and the mail-

in ballot request restriction. This Court will address each Plaintiff’s standing to

challenge each provision in turn, starting with the NAACP Plaintiffs’ standing to

challenge the voter information retention ban.

A

i

Plaintiffs UnidosUS, Alianza Center, Alianza for Progress, VOT, Florida

NAACP, and DRF challenge the voter information retention ban. First, this Court

addresses those Plaintiffs who have failed to demonstrate standing with respect to

this provision.

Starting with the Alianza Plaintiffs, the only testimony concerning either

Plaintiff’s standing came from Marcos Vilar, the executive director of both Alianza

Plaintiffs. ECF No. 287 at 265. Mr. Vilar testified that Alianza Center—a registered

3PVRO—“may have” scanned completed voter registration applications in the past

for quality control purposes, but now it is not clear to Mr. Vilar what kinds of voter

information Alianza and its employees may permissibly retain going forward. ECF

No. 288 at 28. But Mr. Vilar’s testimony about what may have happened in the

past—absent any evidence demonstrating that any Alianza canvasser is likely to

copy or retain any voter information in the future—falls short of demonstrating, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that these Plaintiffs face an imminent cognizable

injury in fact necessary to challenge the voter information retention ban.

Accordingly, neither Alianza Plaintiff has demonstrated an injury in fact for

purposes of challenging this provision and these claims are due to be dismissed.

The same is true with respect to VOT’s standing to challenge the voter

information retention ban. The only testimony concerning VOT’s standing came

from Santiago Mayer, the organization’s executive director. ECF No. 288 at 268.

According to Mr. Mayer, VOT is not a registered 3PVRO and instead sends

members to register voters in Florida on behalf of other 3PVROs. Id. at 288. After

registering voters, VOT’s members ask those voters if they would like a text message

reminding them about election day or providing polling place information. If so, they

collect voters’ phone numbers to send the requested follow-up texts. Id. at 283. VOT

also obtains voters’ contact information from the voter file. Id. at 287. But Mr. Mayer

offered no evidence demonstrating that VOT members have copied or are likely to

copy any information from voter registration applications. Instead, his testimony

focused on the importance of voter registration drives as forums for generating

enthusiasm and new membership from “people on campus who come to [VOT] and

ask [them] what [they] are doing and how they can get involved, and many times

they will become [VOT’s] volunteers.” Id. at 288. Similar to the League Plaintiffs’

challenge to this provision, VOT’s evidence fails to demonstrate a cognizable injury

in fact. Neither signing voters up for “chaser texts” nor obtaining voters’ information

from the voter file falls within the scope of the voter information retention ban,

which prohibits copying voter registration applications or retaining information from

voter registration applications. VOT’s claims challenging the voter information

retention ban are due to be dismissed for lack of standing.

Likewise, DRF’s evidence falls short of demonstrating, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that the organization has standing to challenge the voter information

retention ban. DRF presented the testimony of Olivia Babis Keller, DRF’s senior

public policy analyst, at trial. ECF No. 289 at 247. Ms. Keller testified that DRF has

been a registered 3PVRO, and in that capacity, DRF has registered one voter. Id. at

250. However, DRF is currently not planning to register voters for several reasons,

including the limited number of people trained to do voter registration work (two

people, including Ms. Keller) and, notably, DRF’s “uncertainty regarding [its]

3PVRO status and [its 3PVRO] number.” Id. at 268. Unlike the other witnesses for

registered 3PVRO Plaintiffs, Ms. Keller testified that DRF was unsure if it was still

a registered 3PVRO under Florida law, and her testimony indicated an unfamiliarity

with the process of registration that gives this Court pause. Id. at 248 (“[I]t was not

clear whether our 3PVRO number stays the same. Are we assigned a new one? Is

this something that changes every time we have to renew? So – we don’t want to put

the wrong number on our forms, so we are looking for clarification for that, and we

need to do some updates with our agents as well.”).

Notwithstanding DRF’s uncertainty regarding the meaning of the voter

information retention ban, DRF does not appear to face an imminent injury based on

this provision as any asserted chill in registration efforts appears to be traceable to

other sources—including DRF’s uncertainty regarding its status as a registered

3PVRO. Given this record, this Court is not persuaded that DRF has met its burden

to demonstrate an imminent, cognizable injury that is traceable to any Defendant’s

enforcement of the voter information retention ban.7 Accordingly, DRF’s claims

challenging this provision are also due to be dismissed.

This leaves UnidosUS and the Florida NAACP. These Plaintiffs each

presented evidence that their organizations copy all or part of completed voter

registration applications at some point in their process. For example, UnidosUS

presented testimony from Jared Nordlund, the organization’s Florida state advocacy

director, ECF No. 286 at 20, who testified that once a completed voter registration

is collected, it is provided to UnidosUS’s quality control employee who scans

completed applications into the 3PVRO’s computer system as part of UnidosUS’s

internal quality control process. Id. at 31–34. Likewise, the Florida NAACP

presented testimony from Cynthia Slater, the organization’s civic engagement chair

and president of the Daytona Beach branch. ECF No. 289 at 96. Ms. Slater testified

that the Florida NAACP is a registered 3PVRO, id. at 99, and that each branch has

a system of retaining voter contact information from collected applications, id. at

126. However, Ms. Slater also testified that no volunteers who collect completed

applications on behalf of the Florida NAACP are personally copying or retaining

voter information. Id. at 129.

7 Likewise, DRF has failed to demonstrate that any canvasser has ever or will ever copy or

retain a voter’s information from a voter registration application, as opposed to someone else

within DRF who is working on building the accessible Get Out the Vote platform. See, e.g., ECF

No. 289 at 273–74. As explained, infra, this Court agrees with Defendants’ reasonable reading of

the statute to the limited extent that it only prohibits canvassers from copying or retaining

information.

As the Secretary points out in his written closing argument, the challenged

provision only reaches conduct by individuals “collecting voter registration

applications on behalf of a third-party voter registration organization,” § 97.0575(7),

Fla. Stat., not folks farther up the chain of custody who are reviewing completed

applications prior to submission to the Supervisors of Elections or Division of

Elections. See ECF No. 311 at 34. Plaintiffs contend the statute applies more

broadly, citing this Court’s preliminary injunction, ECF No. 101, and a portion of

the implementing regulation, Fla. Admin. Code R. 1S-2.042(5)(g). But this Court

concludes that Defendants have the better of the argument.

This Court’s prior Order is not definitive evidence that a statute applies to

Plaintiffs’ purported conduct. Indeed, at the preliminary-injunction stage,

Defendants never presented this argument regarding the scope of the voter

information retention ban’s reach. Having considered the arguments and a full

presentation of the evidence, this Court agrees with Defendants that the challenged

provision only targets canvassers who copy applications or retain certain information

from them for felony prosecution. Moreover, a portion of the rule that Plaintiffs fail

to cite mirrors this language focusing on individuals collecting voter registration

applications. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 1S-2.042(5)(f). But here, Plaintiffs have

offered no evidence demonstrating that any of their canvassers are likely to copy or

retain voters’ information from their voter registration applications and thus subject

to an imminent threat of enforcement. In short, no Plaintiff has demonstrated that

they have standing to challenge the voter information retention ban. Their claims

challenging this provision are due to be dismissed and this Court’s preliminary

injunction is due to be vacated in part based on this conclusion.

ii

Next, this Court considers the Florida NAACP Plaintiffs’ standing to

challenge the new deadline and fines provisions. Plaintiffs UnidosUS, Alianza

Center, Alianza for Progress, VOT, Florida NAACP, and DRF challenge the new

deadline and associated fines. This Court begins with those Plaintiffs who have not

met their burden to demonstrate standing to challenge these provisions, starting with

VOT.

Mr. Mayer’s testimony on behalf of VOT demonstrates that the organization

faces only speculative harm based on the new deadline and associated fines

provisions. VOT is not a registered 3PVRO—instead, in March and April of 2023,

VOT began “actively researching what steps [it] would need to take to become a

3PVRO,” ECF No. 288 at 274, but VOT members “learned of SB 7050, which

brought all those efforts to a complete stop,” id. Mr. Mayer testified that “the

potential fines . . . really sort of chilled [VOT] from continuing towards becoming a

3PVRO,” id. at 275, only because VOT is “a smaller organization” which does not

“have a budget big enough to cover some of the potential fines,” id. However, Mr.

Mayer offered no testimony demonstrating that, had VOT moved forward with

registration, it was likely that VOT would incur any fines for late or erroneously

returned voter registration applications. Instead, the asserted chill is based entirely

on the hypothetical and speculative fear of being fined for turning in late applications

or for returning them to the wrong Supervisors of Elections offices. Such speculative

harm does not give rise to a concrete injury in fact, and thus, VOT has not met its

burden to demonstrate standing to challenge the new deadline and associated fines

provisions.

Likewise, UnidosUS failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that it faces an

imminent injury in fact with respect to the deadline and fines provisions. Instead,

UnidosUS’s evidence demonstrates that since UnidosUS became a registered

3PVRO it has only ever been fined once for a late return of applications, which

occurred five years before the trial in this case. ECF No. 286 at 62. UnidosUS offered

no evidence concerning the impact the shortened deadline to return applications has

on the organization. Instead, Mr. Nordlund’s testimony on behalf of UnidosUS

focused only on the hypothetical downstream cost of higher potential fines on the

organization and its ability to register more voters. Id. at 107–08. Moreover, Mr.

Nordlund also testified that UnidosUS now only mails completed applications to the

Department of State, thus it never risks returning applications to the wrong

Supervisor’s office and incurring any associated fine for doing so. Id. at 59–60. In

short, UnidosUS introduced evidence demonstrating that it has almost never been

fined for any 3PVRO violation in Florida since 2011 and it switched to mailing

applications to the Secretary of State before SB 7050 was enacted. But there is no

evidence demonstrating that it is more likely than not that UnidosUS will return

applications in late or incur any future fines under the challenged provisions. Thus,

the impact that potential future fines has on UnidosUS’s ability to register more

voters is a purely hypothetical and speculative harm. UnidosUS has not met its

burden to demonstrate standing to challenge the deadline and fines provisions.

The same is true with respect to the Florida NAACP. Although Ms. Slater’s

testimony on behalf of the Florida NAACP demonstrated that the organization was

“concerned” about the new deadline to return voter registration applications, ECF

No. 289 at 111, it has switched to doing online voter registration because of SB 7050

more generally, id. at 116. Ms. Slater also testified that the Florida NAACP was once

fined in 2016 for returning a few late applications. Id. at 119. But Ms. Slater offered

no testimony concerning the Florida NAACP’s ability to comply with the new

deadline or the likelihood that it would face increased fines in the future as a result.

In short, notwithstanding the single fine the Florida NAACP incurred seven years

before trial, the Florida NAACP has not met its burden to demonstrate an imminent

injury in fact based on the challenged deadline and associated fines provisions. Thus,

the Florida NAACP lacks standing to challenge these provisions as well.

DRF has also failed to demonstrate a cognizable injury in fact that is traceable

to Defendants’ enforcement of the new deadline and fines provisions. For starters,

as mentioned above, any asserted chill in registration efforts appears to be traceable

to other sources—including DRF’s uncertainty regarding its status as a registered

3PVRO. Moreover, Ms. Keller testified that DRF has never received any type of

fines for its registration activities in the past, ECF No. 289 at 268, and she offered

no testimony demonstrating that DRF is likely to turn in any applications late or to

the wrong Supervisor’s office in the future. At most, DRF’s evidence demonstrates

that DRF may have to divert resources to train members about the requirements of

the deadline and fines provisions if it restarts its 3PVRO voter registration efforts.

But, again, this is a hypothetical and speculative harm and fails to constitute a

cognizable injury in fact. DRF’s claims challenging the deadline and fines provisions

are also due to be dismissed for lack of standing.

Finally, this Court considers the Alianza Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the

deadline and fines provisions. To start, although Mr. Vilar testified that Alianza for

Progress is a registered 3PVRO, it has never conducted voter registration activities

in Florida. ECF No. 288 at 44. Likewise, Mr. Vilar suggested that, based on how the

organizations are funded, only Alianza Center will be doing voter registration work

in Florida. ECF No. 287 at 281. Accordingly, inasmuch as Alianza for Progress is

not likely to conduct any voter registration activities in Florida, it does not face an

imminent injury based on the threatened enforcement of the challenged deadline and

fines provisions. Alianza for Progress’s claims challenging these provisions are due

to be dismissed for lack of standing.

As for Alianza Center, Plaintiff’s evidence demonstrates that it was fined for

a few late deliveries out of the 7,000 voters it registered during its first year

conducting voter registration in Florida in 2022, but this was due to a new office in

Hillsborough County where the staff “were struggling with the process with keeping

everything, you know, up to date.” ECF No. 287 at 305. However, Alianza Center

“decided to close down the operations in Hillsborough County.” Id. at 306.

Accordingly, the closed operation in Hillsborough County will not endanger Alianza

Center with respect to potential fines going forward.

Aside from registering Alianza Center’s general disagreement with the need

for a shorter return deadline, Mr. Vilar did not testify that Alianza Center would be

unable to comply with the ten-day deadline without retooling its operations or that

Alianza Center was otherwise diverting any resources to respond to the challenged

provisions. Indeed, Mr. Vilar testified that Alianza Center would not change its

operations to comply with the challenged provisions. Id. Instead, Alianza Center has

decided to simply stop registering voters rather than risk increased fines. But, again,

this testimony fails to demonstrate an imminent injury under the new deadline and

fines provisions. Alianza Center has essentially chilled its registration work for fear

of incurring future fines—and, apparently, out of general disagreement with the

challenged provisions—even though it has not demonstrated that it is likely to

violate the new deadline, incur any fines in the future, or be forced to expend

resources to comply with the challenged provisions. This record fails to demonstrate

that Alianza Center is suffering or will suffer an imminent injury in fact traceable to

any Defendant’s enforcement of the deadline and fines provisions. Accordingly,

Alianza Center has also not met its burden to demonstrate standing to challenge these

provisions.

Having concluded that no Plaintiff has demonstrated standing to challenge the

deadline and fines provisions, this Court turns to the Florida NAACP Plaintiffs’

standing to challenge the mail-in ballot request provision.

iii

Plaintiffs UnidosUS, Alianza, DRF, and FLARA assert they have

associational standing to challenge the mail-in ballot request restriction as preempted

by Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. ECF No. 304 at 94. This provision requires

Supervisors of Elections to “accept a request for a vote-by-mail ballot only from a

voter or, if directly instructed by the voter, a member of the voter’s immediate family

or the voter’s legal guardian.” § 101.62(1)(a), Fla. Stat. However, as explained

below, no Plaintiff has met its burden to demonstrate that any member or constituent

is likely to face an imminent, cognizable injury in fact.

For starters, neither Alianza Plaintiff introduced any evidence concerning the

mail-in ballot request restriction. Accordingly, these Plaintiffs have not met their

burden to demonstrate standing to challenge this provision.

As for UnidosUS, Mr. Nordlund testified that in the past, UnidosUS would

assist voters with requesting a vote-by-mail ballot by providing the elections office

hotline number to voters, emailing voters with more information, helping translate

the written request form or instructions, or assisting with a three-way call with the

Supervisor of Elections office. ECF No. 286 at 110–12. Ms. Sánchez, an individual

Plaintiff and canvasser for UnidosUS, testified that she has personally never assisted

a voter with the vote-by-mail process. Id. at 191. At most, UnidosUS’s evidence

demonstrates that UnidosUS’s members have assisted voters with requesting a vote-

by-mail ballot in the past, but that assistance is limited to translation, providing

additional information, or connecting the voter with their Supervisor of Elections

office. But even if such “assistance” could be construed as to run afoul of the

restriction under section 101.62(1)(a), UnidosUS has offered no evidence

demonstrating that any member has suffered an injury or will imminently suffer an

injury going forward based on this restriction. Accordingly, UnidosUS has not met

its burden to demonstrate standing to pursue its preemption claim.

The same is true for FLARA. At trial, FLARA relied on the testimony of

William Sauers, the state president of FLARA. ECF No. 289 at 320. Mr. Sauers

testified that FLARA is a membership organization with roughly 191,000 members

in the State of Florida, including him. Id. at 322. Mr. Sauers also testified that many

of FLARA’s members are elderly and disabled and have had to enlist help to request

mail-in ballots in the past. Id. at 324–25, 328. Aside from his testimony concerning

FLARA’s members requesting mail-in ballots, generally, Mr. Sauers expressed his

concerns about how the mail-in ballot request restriction “might” impact voters

going forward and his disagreement with Florida’s policy choice in this matter. Id.

at 329–30. But this testimony fails to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that any identifiable FLARA member is likely to suffer an imminent injury

based on the mail-in ballot request restriction. Without evidence demonstrating that

any member has been or will be injured by the challenged provision, FLARA cannot

demonstrate associational standing to challenge this provision. Accordingly,

FLARA’s preemption claim is due to be dismissed for lack of standing.

Finally, DRF also challenges the mail-in ballot request restriction but falls

short of demonstrating a cognizable injury in fact for associational standing. DRF

relies on Ms. Keller’s testimony, which described all the reasons why DRF’s

constituents may not have access to immediate family or legal guardians to assist

them in requesting mail-in ballots. However, when it comes to actual members or

constituents who are likely to face an imminent injury under this provision, this

Court is left with only three potential options—Ms. Keller, herself, Ms. Keller’s

childhood friend in Polk County, and Lara Minutello—DRF’s other public policy

analyst. ECF No. 289 at 277–78. But Ms. Keller is married, and her husband counts

as “immediate family” under the challenged provision. Id. at 277. She is not

restricted from requesting a mail-in ballot with the help of her husband and is

therefore not likely to suffer an injury under the challenged provision. See

§ 101.62(1)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (defining “immediate family” to include the voter’s

spouse, among others). As for Ms. Keller’s childhood friend in Polk County, there

is no evidence demonstrating that this individual is a registered voter, and, even if

she is, whether she plans to request a mail-in ballot in the future. Accordingly, any

injury to her is merely speculative at this juncture. As for Ms. Minutello’s plans to

request a mail-in ballot, Ms. Keller testified that she has requested one in writing in

the past, but Ms. Keller only “possibly” knows if she plans to request one in the

future. ECF No. 289 at 278. In other words, it’s anyone’s guess if Ms. Minutello

plans to request a mail-in ballot going forward, thus subjecting herself to the

restrictions under section 101.62 if she requires assistance. Such speculative harm

does not give rise to an injury in fact for associational standing.

Given that DRF has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that any constituent is likely to suffer an imminent cognizable injury under the

challenged provision, DRF has not established standing to pursue its preemption

claim. This claim is due to be dismissed for lack of standing.

As noted above, no Plaintiff has demonstrated standing to challenge the mail-

in ballot request restriction, and thus, these claims will be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction. Next, this Court addresses Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the final

remaining provision, the citizenship requirement.

iv

With respect to the citizenship requirement, this Court first considers those

Plaintiffs who failed to meet their burden to demonstrate standing at trial, starting

with Esperanza Sánchez. Prior to the start of trial, Ms. Sánchez became a citizen of

the United States of America. ECF No. 286 at 178. Accordingly, she is no longer

prevented from registering voters on behalf of a 3PVRO under the citizenship

requirement. Her claims challenging this requirement are, in effect, moot.8

As for Mr. Mayer, he testified that he is a permanent resident who has

permission to live and work in the United States. ECF No. 288 at 289. He also

testified that he has not previously worked as a paid canvasser in Florida but had

wanted to do so beginning in the second quarter of 2024 as VOT’s chapters started

registering voters for the 2024 cycle. Id. at 289–90. To prepare for this, Mr. Mayer

started comparing dates for when VOT’s chapters would participate in registration.

Id. at 290. However, he offered no other specific plans for future registration

8 Likewise, Ms. Sánchez has not demonstrated that she is prohibited from associating with

anyone under the citizenship requirement and thus has not established an injury in fact with respect

to her free association claim.

activities in Florida. Instead, he testified about his concerns that the citizenship

requirement will give rise to “copycat bills across the country,” making it harder for

Mr. Mayer to find employment “in the civic and political space.” Id. at 290–91.

Given this record, this Court is not persuaded that Mr. Mayer has met his

burden to demonstrate an imminent, cognizable injury in fact. Instead, his testimony

only demonstrates a hypothetical injury based on speculation that at some point in

2024 he would to travel to Florida to participate in canvassing work with a registered

3PVRO (in the event VOT had not yet registered as a 3PVRO), or that at some point

in the future he would be denied employment based on some hypothetical copycat

law enacted in another state. But the chill on Mr. Mayer’s amorphous plans to

register voters in Florida in the future does not constitute a concrete injury in fact for

standing purposes. See LaCroix v. Lee Cnty., Fla., 819 F. App’x 839, 841–43 (11th

Cir. 2020). And Mr. Mayer’s concerns about the independent actions of third parties

that are contingent on the passage of a hypothetical copycat bill do not constitute a

cognizable injury in fact. Accordingly, Mr. Mayer’s claims challenging the

citizenship requirement are due to be dismissed for lack of standing.

As for DRF and FLARA, Ms. Keller’s and Mr. Sauers’s testimony on the

organizations’ behalf is notably devoid of any reference to the citizenship

requirement or its impact on the organizations or their members and constituents.

Given this dearth of evidence, DRF and FLARA have not demonstrated that they

have standing to challenge the citizenship requirement.

As for Plaintiff Alianza for Progress, the record demonstrates this

organization is a registered 3PVRO, but that it has never conducted voter registration

activities in Florida. ECF No. 288 at 44. Mr. Vilar offered no testimony indicating

that this organization plans to conduct voter registration activities in Florida going

forward or that these activities are otherwise affected by the citizenship requirement.

Accordingly, Alianza for Progress’s claims challenging the citizenship requirement

are due to dismissed as Plaintiffs have not met their burden to demonstrate this

organization has or will suffer an imminent injury in fact under the challenged

provision.

As for Alianza Center, Mr. Vilar testified that it conducts voter registration

activities in Florida as a registered 3PVRO, but it has halted its registration efforts

in response to the passage of SB 7050 and its discovery that Alianza Center was “on

a list of organizations that had been fined.” ECF No. 287 at 284–85. Mr. Vilar

testified that both Alianza organizations have members who are not citizens and that

Alianza Center has recruited noncitizens from Venezuela, Colombia, and the

Dominican Republic in the past to work as canvassers for its 2022 voter registration

campaign. Id. at 273, 279–80, 282. If successful in this action, Alianza Center would

continue registering voters in Osceola, Orange, Hillsborough, Polk, Pinellas,

Volusia, and Brevard Counties. Id. at 285. But Mr. Vilar’s testimony did not indicate

whether Alianza Center would again recruit noncitizens to work as canvassers for

future voter registration campaigns or if any noncitizen members would also

participate in the future.9 In short, Alianza Center has left open the question of

whether it is more likely than not that any noncitizen would collect or handle voter

registration applications on its behalf going forward. This Court will not fill in the

blanks for Plaintiff. Accordingly, Alianza Center has also not met its burden to

demonstrate an imminent injury in fact based on the citizenship requirement.

With respect to VOT, Mr. Mayer testified that the organization’s Florida

chapter has at least three noncitizen members. ECF No. 288 at 278. However, he did

not testify that any of these noncitizen members are active volunteers who plan to

engage in voter registration on behalf of other 3PVROs, inasmuch as VOT is not a

registered 3PVRO, itself. In addition, Mr. Mayer testified that, as a noncitizen, he

would not be able to register voters, either. Id. at 279. But as explained above, Mr.

Mayer’s asserted injury is speculative at this juncture given his “someday intentions”

to come to Florida to participate in paper voter registration drives. Moreover, VOT’s

evidence demonstrated that the “much more relevant” harm to VOT flowing from

9 For the same reason, this Court is not persuaded by Alianza Center’s arguments that it

has demonstrated “employer standing.” See ECF No. 304 at 96–97. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ arguments

point out the dearth of record evidence regarding Alianza Center’s recruitment intentions and

current workforce, as Plaintiffs point to only Mr. Nordlund’s testimony on behalf of UnidosUS to

support these arguments. Id.

the citizenship requirement is that the organization’s citizen members “would not

want their backgrounds checked,” or VOT “even asking them if they are citizens.”

Id. at 280. But, as explained above with respect to the League of Women Voters,

“personal offense to government action does not give rise to standing.” See In re

Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d at 763 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.). Finally, VOT’s

reliance on a diversion-of-resources theory for standing to challenge the citizenship

requirement is unsupported by any evidence demonstrating where resources are

being diverted to and for what purpose. Simply asserting that an organization may

have to defund other programs to “fund additional efforts in Florida,” ECF No. 288

at 282, without any details concerning what those additional efforts are, does not

satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate a concrete injury in fact. Moreover, this

injury is admittedly speculative at this juncture. See id. at 280 (“[W]e would have to

at least temporarily pause and figure out how we’re continuing. I think there is a

possibility we might just not continue. And if we do, we would have to make a very

difficult decision to remove resources from other states to bring them into Florida or

to even entirely defund other states to bring those resources into Florida.”). In short,

VOT has not met its burden to demonstrate a cognizable injury in fact and therefore

lacks standing to challenge the citizenship requirement.

Next, this Court considers the Florida NAACP’s evidence for standing. Ms.

Slater testified that the Florida NAACP is a registered 3PVRO whose membership

is roughly 90% African American. ECF No. 289 at 98–99. The organization does

not ask members or volunteers about citizenship status or work authorization, id. at

122, although Ms. Slater testified that the Florida NAACP does have noncitizen

members, including international students engaged in college chapters, id. at 102.

Ms. Slater further testified that the Florida NAACP is concerned about the

citizenship requirement because “noncitizens . . . [have been] very helpful and useful

in us doing voter registrations.” Id. at 110. Now, however, the Florida NAACP has

limited its voter registration activities to simply handing out blank applications and

assisting voters with online registration. Id. at 116. But the problem with the Florida

NAACP’s standing argument is that Plaintiffs offered no evidence demonstrating

that any identifiable, noncitizen member likely would have engaged in paper voter

registration in the future if not for the citizenship requirement.

The facts that (1) the Florida NAACP is a registered 3PVRO, (2) it has

members who are noncitizens, and (3) it has conducted voter registration drives in

the past with the assistance of noncitizen volunteers do not prove that it is more

likely than not that any single noncitizen member would have joined in voter

registration activities going forward.10 Accordingly, the Florida NAACP has

10 Indeed, the undisputed fact that the Florida NAACP’s noncitizen members include

international college students tends to show that such members may only be in the United States

for a limited time—during school—and thus, in the absence of additional evidence, this adds little

in the manner of proof that such members are likely to participate in voter registration drives in

the foreseeable future.

demonstrated only that its chilled registration activities are based on mere

speculation that the challenged provision will be enforced against it based on the

chance that a noncitizen member or volunteer collects or handles a voter registration

application on its behalf sometime in the future. This is not a cognizable, concrete

injury, and thus, the Florida NAACP has not met its burden to demonstrate standing

to challenge the citizenship requirement.11

This leaves only Mr. Humberto Orjuela Prieto and UnidosUS. Mr. Orjuela

testified that he is a legal permanent resident originally from Colombia. ECF No.

286 at 151, 171. He lives in Osceola County, Florida, and works as a canvasser for

Poder Latinx. Id. at 151–52. Although Mr. Orjuela continues to register voters while

this Court’s preliminary injunction remains in place, if the citizenship requirement

were enforced against him, he would lose his job as a canvasser. Id. at 164–65. Based

on this testimony, this Court concludes that Mr. Orjuela has demonstrated that he

faces an imminent injury in fact under the citizenship requirement, because the

provision essentially prohibits his current employment.

11 This Court is also not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ arguments that they have demonstrated

third-party standing on behalf of potential voters who they would otherwise have registered to vote

or updated their registrations, insofar as the Florida NAACP and the Alianza Plaintiffs have failed

to demonstrate the threshold showing that they have Article III standing for themselves. See Trump

v. CASA, Inc., 145 S.Ct. 2540, 2565–66 (2025) (Alito, J., concurring) (“But at a minimum, we

have said that a litigant seeking to assert the legal rights or interests of others must demonstrate

ordinary Article III standing for itself and answer the additional ‘threshold question whether it has

standing to raise the rights of others.’ ”).

The same is true with respect to UnidosUS. Mr. Nordlund’s testimony on

UnidosUS’s behalf demonstrates that UnidosUS is a registered 3PVRO in Florida

that employs paid canvassers for voter registration, and that roughly 70% of its paid

canvassers were noncitizens prior to the enactment of the citizenship requirement.

ECF No. 286 at 22, 79. UnidosUS currently operates in Miami-Dade, Orange, and

Osceola Counties. Id. at 22. Notwithstanding the preliminary injunction in this case,

UnidosUS has since shifted towards trying to hire more U.S. citizens as paid

canvassers, id. at 81, although UnidosUS has continued to employ noncitizens as

paid canvassers in the interim. UnidosUS has also had to bring on an HR specialist

to work as a full-time recruiter and trainer for new canvassers. Id. at 80–81. If the

citizenship requirement were enforced going forward, UnidosUS would have to

completely retool its operations to avoid having its large, noncitizen workforce touch

any completed voter registrations to avoid violating the challenged provision. Id. at

81–82. Given this evidence demonstrating the costs of compliance with the

challenged provision and the prohibition on UnidosUS from continuing to employ

its most effective paid canvassers, this Court is persuaded that UnidosUS has met its

burden of demonstrating an imminent and concrete direct injury to the organization.

Both Mr. Orjuela’s and UnidosUS’s injuries are fairly traceable to

Defendants’ enforcement authority. With respect to Secretary Byrd, by prior Order,

this Court granted partial summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ Equal

Protection claim, concluding that these injuries are traceable to Secretary Byrd’s

authority to refer suspected violations of registration restrictions to the Attorney

General for enforcement, the Secretary’s authority to cancel a 3PVRO’s registration

for continued failure to comply with the citizenship requirement, and the Secretary’s

authority to enforce the civil penalty provisions associated with the citizenship

requirement. See ECF No. 251 at 6–7. The facts and law have not changed with

respect to Secretary Byrd’s role in enforcing the challenged provision. Accordingly,

this Court incorporates by reference its earlier analysis regarding traceability with

respect to Secretary Byrd. See id. at 7 (citing ECF No. 101 at 19–20). This Court

finds that Plaintiffs Orjuela and UnidosUS have demonstrated that their injuries are

fairly traceable to Secretary Byrd’s threatened enforcement of the challenged

provision.

Likewise, Plaintiffs Orjuela and UnidosUS have demonstrated that an

injunction prohibiting Secretary Byrd from enforcing the citizenship requirement

would redress their injuries. Neither the facts, nor the law has changed with respect

to Secretary Byrd’s enforcement of the challenged provision. For the same reasons

this Court has determined that removing the threat of enforcement by Secretary Byrd

would redress Plaintiffs’ injuries, see ECF No. 101 at 20 and ECF No. 251 at 7, this

Court finds that Plaintiffs Orjuela and UnidosUS have demonstrated standing to

proceed against Secretary Byrd with respect to their challenges to the citizenship

requirement.

As for the Attorney General, this Court denied summary judgment in an

abundance of caution, given the Attorney General’s dispute as to whether Plaintiffs’

injuries are traceable to the Attorney General’s enforcement authority. See ECF No.

251 at 8. Ultimately, “[t]o establish traceability . . . in a lawsuit seeking to enjoin a

government official from enforcing the law, a plaintiff must show ‘that the official

has the authority to enforce the particular provision being challenged . . . .’ ” Dream

Defenders v. Governor of the State of Florida, 57 F.4th 879, 888–89 (11th Cir. 2023)

(quoting Support Working Animals, Inc. v. Governor of Fla., 8 F.4th 1198, 1201 (11th

Cir. 2021)).

Here, the record is clear that if the citizenship requirement were enforced, Mr.

Orjeula can no longer work as a paid canvasser in Florida. Similarly, UnidosUS can

no longer continue to employ the majority noncitizen canvassers with the

institutional knowledge that makes them so effective at registering voters on its

behalf. And the Attorney General has the authority to enforce the citizenship

requirement. Specifically, section 97.0575(8), Florida Statutes, provides:

If the Secretary of State reasonably believes that a person has

committed a violation of this section, the secretary may refer the matter

to the Attorney General for enforcement. The Attorney General may

institute a civil action for a violation of this section or to prevent a

violation of this section. An action for relief may include a permanent

or temporary injunction, a restraining order, or any other appropriate

order.

§ 97.0575(8), Fla. Stat.

The Attorney General asserts this enforcement authority is expressly limited

by the first sentence of this provision, which allows the Secretary of State to refer

suspected violations of section 97.0575 to the Attorney General for enforcement.

See ECF No. 312 at 3. Plaintiffs’ evidence at trial confirms this is how the Statewide

Prosecutor interprets this provision, see ECF No. 288 at 147, and that the Office of

the Attorney General has stipulated that it interprets this provision to require a

referral from the Secretary of State before it can initiate any civil enforcement under

section 97.0575. But the Plaintiffs argue that nothing in the statute prevents the

Attorney General from independently pursuing enforcement against suspected or

anticipated violations absent a referral from the Secretary of State—the first sentence

of this provision simply authorizes the Secretary to refer suspected violations as he

deems fit, while the following sentence authorizes the Attorney General to pursue

enforcement through civil actions as he deems fit. For that matter, it appears the

parties agree that neither the current Attorney General, nor any future Attorney

General, are bound by the Attorney General’s current interpretation. In short, the

parties’ dispute over standing boils down to whether the Attorney General’s

proffered interpretation of this provision effectively insulates his office from suit

unless and until the Secretary of State refers a suspected violation of Florida law to

the Attorney General.

Considering the record before this Court and the parties’ disagreement, which

involves a question of law rather than fact, this Court agrees with Plaintiffs that

section 97.0575(8) does not limit the Attorney General’s enforcement authority

solely to enforcement of suspected violations that the Secretary of State refers to

him. To interpret this provision as requiring a referral before the Attorney General

is authorized to institute a civil enforcement action against suspected violators of the

Citizenship Provision—as the Attorney General does—requires this Court to rewrite

the provision to expressly condition the Attorney General’s authority to enforce the

citizenship requirement upon a referral from the Secretary. But the plain text of the

statute requires no such referral before “[t]he Attorney General may institute a civil

action for a violation of this section or to prevent a violation of this section.”

§ 97.0575(8), Fla. Stat.

This Court is unpersuaded by the Attorney General’s suggestion that this

interpretation is the only reasonable reading of the statute in light of the

“Harmonious-reading canon” and the “Whole-Text canon.” ECF No. 312 at 3–5.

These “canons are meant to help [courts] carry out our primary task: discerning the

text’s ordinary public meaning.” Heyman v. Cooper, 31 F.4th 1315, 1319 (11th Cir.

2022). But when “a wooden application of the canons would supplant rather than

supply ordinary meaning . . . . [courts] remain obligated to the text—not to what the

canons might suggest about the text.” Id. (emphasis added). This Court’s “obligation

is to the text and not the canons per se . . . .” Id. at 1321–22. Moreover, by artificially

limiting enforcement authority to post-violation referrals, the Attorney General’s

interpretation appears to nullify the statutory text that authorizes the Attorney

General to commence a civil enforcement action “to prevent a violation of this

section.” See § 97.0575(8), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

Here, the Florida Legislature saw fit to expressly authorize the Secretary of

State to refer suspected violations of the citizenship requirement to the Attorney

General for enforcement. The Florida Legislature also expressly authorized the

Attorney General to pursue civil actions to enforce the citizenship requirement

against suspected violators or to prevent future violations. Had the Florida

Legislature saw fit to limit the Attorney General’s enforcement authority to only

those suspected violations that have been referred by the Secretary, it would have

said so. But the plain text requires no such referral before the Attorney General may

pursue a civil enforcement action.

Nor does this plain reading of the statute’s text nullify the Secretary’s

authority to refer suspected violations to the Attorney General. The Secretary, the

State’s Chief Elections Officer (who is likely in the best position to learn of

suspected violations of the citizenship requirement), remains authorized to refer

violations to the Attorney General for enforcement by the Attorney General’s office,

while the Attorney General—an independent constitutional state officer—retains

authority to pursue civil enforcement actions whether or not the suspected violation

comes across the Attorney General’s desk through referral from the Secretary or

from some other source. Accordingly, given the Attorney General’s express

authority to pursue civil enforcement actions for past violations and to prevent future

violations of the citizenship requirement, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a causal

connection between their injuries and Defendant’s conduct. See Dream Defenders,

57 F.4th at 888–89.

As both sides agree, traceability and redressability often travel together. Here,

given that Plaintiffs’ injuries are traceable to the Attorney General because the

Attorney General has authority to pursue civil enforcement actions against suspected

violators of the challenged provision, an injunction prohibiting the Attorney General

from exercising this enforcement authority would effectively redress Plaintiffs’

injuries as it would remove the very real threat of a civil enforcement action. See

Dream Defenders, 57 F.4th at 889 (holding that to establish traceability and

redressability, Plaintiffs must demonstrate “that the official has the authority to

enforce the particular provision being challenged, such that the injunction

prohibiting enforcement would be effectual” (citation omitted)). In short, Plaintiffs

Orjuela and UnidosUS have proved they have standing to proceed against the

Attorney General with respect to their claims challenging the citizenship

requirement.

In sum, the Florida NAACP’s claims are due to be dismissed for lack of

standing, with the exclusion of Mr. Orjuela’s and UnidosUS’s challenges to the

citizenship requirement. Now this Court turns to the substantive merits of those

claims.

B

In granting partial summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ Equal

Protection claim, this Court has already determined that the citizenship requirement

facially discriminates against noncitizens in violation of the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment. See ECF No. 251; see also ECF No. 101. Having

previously concluded, as a matter of law, that the challenged provision is facially

unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds and now having also found that

Plaintiffs Orjuela and UnidosUS have established standing to challenge both the

Secretary of State and Attorney General’s enforcement of the citizenship

requirement, this Court need not interrogate Plaintiffs’ alternative theories for

challenging the citizenship requirement under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. See League of Women Voters of Fla. Inc. v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 66

F.4th 905, 948 (11th Cir. 2023) (“We have already held that the second phrase in the

challenged clause is unconstitutionally vague, so we need not reach the question of

overbreadth as to the second phrase.”); Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1316 (declining to

reach alternative constitutional claims challenging county policy after concluding

that the challenged policy “violates the principle of denominational neutrality found

at the heart of the Establishment Clause”); Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett, 791 F.3d

684, 695 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Because we find that the ballot-retention statute is facially

unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, we need not decide whether it

also violates the First Amendment.”). Instead, this Court incorporates by reference

its prior analysis with respect to the unconstitutionality of the citizenship

requirement as if fully set forth herein, ECF No. 251 at 17 (citing ECF No. 149 at

7–14 in Case No.: 4:23cv218-MW/MAF).

In short, only Plaintiffs Orjuela and UnidosUS are entitled to relief with

respect to their Equal Protection claim challenging the citizenship requirement

inasmuch as it is facially discriminatory with respect to alienage. Next, this Court

considers the appropriate relief.

* * *

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. ECF No. 302 at

55–56. To obtain a permanent injunction, Plaintiffs “must satisfy a four-factor test.”

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 159 (2010) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Plaintiffs must show (1) that they have “suffered an irreparable

injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to

compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of hardships between the

plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest

would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Ga. Advoc. Off. v. Jackson, 4

F.4th 1200, 1208 (11th Cir. 2021).

Here Plaintiffs have suffered—and continue to suffer—irreparable injuries.

Indeed, Mr. Orjuela has been unconstitutionally discriminated against based on his

noncitizen status. Smith v. South Dakota, 781 F. Supp. 2d 879, 887 (D.S.D. 2011). If

the citizenship requirement were enforced, this discrimination prevents Plaintiffs

from registering new voters—a lost opportunity that cannot be remedied with

monetary damages. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 863 F. Supp.

2d 1155, 1167 (N.D. Fla. 2012) (Hinkle, J.) (“[W]hen a plaintiff loses an opportunity

to register a voter, the opportunity is gone forever.”). “The public has no interest in

enforcing an unconstitutional” law—especially one that facially discriminates based

on alienage. KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th Cir.

2006). On the other side of the ledger sits Mr. Orjuela’s and UnidosUS’s employees’

rights to equal protection under the law. There is no comparison. Plaintiffs are

entitled to an injunction.

Having determined that Plaintiffs Orjuela and UnidosUS are entitled to relief

on the merits of their Equal Protection claims challenging the citizenship

requirement as facially discriminatory on the basis of alienage, this Court turns to

the scope of relief to which they are entitled. The Supreme Court recently held that

district courts lack authority to universally enjoin the enforcement of an executive

or legislative policy. See Trump, 145 S.Ct. at 2554. In other words, this Court cannot

enjoin Defendants’ enforcement of the citizenship requirement against anyone,

anywhere. Although this Court awarded broader relief in a related case, see ECF No.

199 in Case No.: 4:23cv218, this Court did not have the benefit of the Supreme

Court’s later-decided analysis in Trump v. CASA Inc. when it rendered its decision

in that case. Here, following Trump v. CASA Inc., the scope of relief afforded to

Plaintiffs is limited to as-applied relief to the parties now before this Court with

standing to seek permanent injunctive relief.12

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. This Court declares that § 97.0575(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2023), as amended by

SB 7050, is unconstitutional.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment in Case No.: 4:23cv215, stating:

12 This Court recognizes that the preliminary injunction in Case No.: 4:23cv215, ECF No.

101, is currently subject to an interlocutory appeal. This Court also acknowledges that the Eleventh

Circuit has stayed ruling on an appeal of the final judgment in Case No.: 4:23cv218 pending entry

of final judgment in Case Nos. 4:23cv215 and 4:23cv216. By entry of judgment in Case No.:

4:23cv215, this Court apparently moots the pending interlocutory appeal of this Court’s

preliminary injunction, inasmuch as the preliminary injunction order “inherently merges with the

permanent injunction order.” In re: Chiquita Brands International, Inc., 965 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th

Cir. 2020). In short, notwithstanding the interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction in Case

No.: 4:23cv215, this Court retains jurisdiction to enter final judgment in Case No.: 4:23cv215—

indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that it is awaiting this Court’s decision before taking

further action in a related appeal.

Plaintiffs’ claims challenging the information retention ban, the

mail-in ballot request restriction, and the ten-day deadline and

associated fines provisions are DISMISSED for lack of standing.

Defendant Byrd is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1981

claim, which is DISMISSED with prejudice.

This Court hereby DECLARES that the Citizenship

Requirement described in section 97.0575(1)(f), Florida Statutes

(2023), as amended by SB 7050, violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This Court

GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction. Neither

Defendant Byrd nor Defendant Uthmeier, nor their successors in office,

deputies, officers, employees, agents, nor any person in active

participation or concert with Defendants Byrd and Uthmeier shall

enforce, nor permit enforcement of, the Citizenship Requirement

provision described in section 97.0575(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2023),

as amended by SB 7050, against Plaintiff Humberto Orjuela Prieto or

his 3PVRO employer and UnidosUS. Defendants Byrd and Uthmeier,

and their successors in office, as well as their deputies, officers,

employees, agents, and any other person in active participation and

concert with Defendants Byrd and Uthmeier shall take all practicable

measures within the scope of their official authority to ensure

compliance with the terms of this Order.

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment in Case No.: 4:23cv216 stating, “Judgment is

entered in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims challenging

the ten-day deadline and associated fines provisions. Plaintiffs’ claims

challenging the information retention ban, receipt requirement, and

citizenship requirement are DISMISSED for lack of standing.”

4. This Order incorporates all prior rulings in these cases on motions to dismiss

and motions for summary judgment.

5. This Court retains jurisdiction in these cases for purposes of determining

entitlement to and amount, if any, of attorneys’ fees.

6. The Clerk shall close the file.

SO ORDERED on August 8, 2025.

s/Mark E. Walker ____

United States District Judge