The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION
KENNETH DERRELL BROWN, JR., )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 7:24-cv-00872-MHH-NAD
)
CHRISTOPHER GORDY, Warden, )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On June 4, 2025, the magistrate judge entered a report in which he
recommended that the Court dismiss Kenneth Derrell Brown Jr.’s petition, filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as unexhausted. (Doc. 33). The magistrate judge
advised Mr. Brown of his right to file specific, written objections within 14 days.
(Doc. 33). On June 27, 2025, the Court received a document labeled “Affidavit of
Facts: Notice of Right to Object” from Mr. Brown, which Mr. Brown seems to have
dated June 15, 2025. (Doc. 39, p. 15).1 Due to a Clerk’s Office error, this document
did not appear in the electronic court docket until July 25, 2025. The Court considers
1 The date on page 15 is smudged and is difficult to read.
Mr. Brown’s submission, (Doc. 39), as timely filed objections to the report and
recommendation.2
A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A
district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the
[magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3)
(“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s
disposition that has been properly objective to.”). A district court’s obligation to
“‘make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made,’” 447 U.S. at 673 (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)), requires a district judge to “‘give fresh consideration to those
issues to which specific objection has been made by a party,’” 447 U.S. at 675
2 Mr. Brown filed a “Letter Rogatory” on which he wrote “(This is not a Motion).” (Doc. 34). In
that document, Mr. Brown, proceeding as “Ali Yair Yamin,” states that he seeks to “offset all
unpaid obligations of DEBTOR KENNETH DERREL BROWN JR.” (Doc. 34). Because that
submission is not relevant to Mr. Brown’s habeas claim and does not contain objections to the
report and recommendation, the Court has not considered it. Mr. Brown has filed other
submissions including a motion for protective order, a “Notice of Default,” a “Notice of
Complaint,” and copies of prison disciplinary actions. (Doc. 35). Because those submissions
relate to his conditions of confinement and his pending civil action, the magistrate judge ordered
the Clerk of Court to remove the “Motion for Protective Order” and its attachments, (Doc. 35),
from this habeas case and re-docket those submissions in Mr. Brown’s civil action, Brown v.
Walker, 7:24-cv-01160-RDP-NAD. (Doc. 36).
(quoting House Report No. 94-1609, p. 3 (1976)). United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667 (1980) (emphasis in Raddatz).
Mr. Brown’s affidavit and notice of right to object, (Doc. 39), do not address
the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation. Instead, Mr. Brown appears to contend that he is Prince Yair
Yamin Ali, a Moorish American Hebrew Israelite National, and that “Kenneth
Brown” is a federally created corporate fiction. (Doc. 39, pp. 2, 13-14). Mr. Brown
then lists court opinions, treaties, and constitutional provisions, (Doc. 39, pp. 3-7,
15), which do not concern federal habeas law. Mr. Brown also asserts that the State
of Alabama has wrongfully assumed “wardship authority” over him, apparently
based on legal instruments that he has disclaimed. (Doc. 39, pp. 7-8). Finally, Mr.
Brown argues that he has not surrendered his liberty under treaties and the
constitution to be free from unauthorized physical restraint. (Doc. 39, p. 9).
In his amended habeas petition, (Doc. 6), Mr. Brown challenges his 2022
convictions and sentence for failing to register as a sex offender. (Doc. 6, pp. 1-2,
5). As discussed in the report and recommendation, Mr. Brown did not exhaust his
state court remedies before he filed his habeas petition in this matter. (Doc. 33 at 6-
8). In his current submission, (Doc. 39), Mr. Brown has not addressed this
procedural bar to his habeas petition.
After consideration of the electronic record in this case, Mr. Brown’s
objections, and the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the Court
overrules the objections, adopts the report, and accepts the recommendation.
Consistent with the recommendation, by separate order the Court will dismiss Mr.
Brown’s petition for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice based on his failure to
exhaust his state court remedies.
Because the petition does not present issues that are debatable among jurists
of reason, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000); Rule 11(a), Rules
Governing § 2254 Proceedings. Mr. Brown may request a certificate of appealability
from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); 11th Cir. R. 22-
1.
DONE and ORDERED this August 8, 2025.
adit Hosa
Madi So
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE