The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
Case No. 5:24-CV-00402-M-BM
PAMELA LETTS, )
Plaintiff,
V. ORDER
AVIDIEN TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
□□□
This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff's motion [DE 42] “to reconsider and
reverse” the court’s March 13, 2025 order, which adopted the memorandum and recommendation
of United States Magistrate Judge Brian S. Meyers and granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss on
statute of limitations grounds. See DE 39 at 1-6; DE 35 at 11-18. Plaintiff purports to bring her
motion “pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b).” DE 42 at 1. But Plaintiff
filed her motion 29 days after entry of judgment, rendering any motion under Rule 59(e) untimely.
See id. at 4 (signature page reflecting submission on “this 11th day of April, 2025”); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry
of the judgment.”). Federal courts may “not extend the time to act under” Rule 59(e). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(b)(2); Panhorst v. United States, 241 F.3d 367, 370 (4th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the
court evaluates Plaintiff's motion under Rule 60(b) only. Colter v. Omni Ins. Co., 718 F. App’x
189, 191 (4th Cir. 2018).
“Rule 60(b) allows a court to ‘relieve a party from a final judgment, order or proceeding’
on a limited number of grounds.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. AMH Roman Two NC, LLC, 859
F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)) (internal ellipses omitted). But
because “‘a Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief from a final judgment is not a substitute for a timely
and proper appeal,” a party seeking relief under that rule “first must show timeliness, a meritorious
defense, a lack of unfair prejudice to the opposing party, and exceptional circumstances.” Dowell
State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation mark
omitted). “Once a party has met this threshold, he must then show that he qualifies for relief under
one of the six specific categories listed in Rule 60(b).” Justus v. Clarke, 78 F.4th 97, 105-06 (4th
Cir. 2023). “[T]he party moving for relief ‘must clearly establish the grounds therefor to the
satisfaction of the district court,’” which imposes a sizable “burden of proof.” Jn re Burnley, 988
F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Virgin Islands Nat’] Bank v. Tyson, 506 F.2d 802, 804 (3d
Cir.1974)).
Plaintiff's motion makes no attempt to satisfy the threshold showing. The motion largely
restates the arguments Plaintiff raised in opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss and Judge
Meyers’ recommendation. See DE 42 1-3 (repeating position that she timely filed her Complaint
on June 7, 2024, notwithstanding that she received notice that same day that her state court filing
had been rejected).! Moreover, the motion does not even identify “one of the six specific
categories listed in Rule 60(b)” as grounds for relief. Justus, 78 F.4th at 105-06.
“A party should not expect a court to do the work that it elected not to do.” Hughes v. B/E
Aerospace, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-717, 2014 WL 906220, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2014). “Even in
! Plaintiffs motion appears to assert that equitable tolling should apply because the state court filing system
erroneously rejected her Complaint on June 7, 2024. DE 42 at 3 (describing “state court’s [] misclassification of
Plaintiff's Complaint as a ‘Cover Sheet’” as “a clerical and technical error beyond Plaintiff control”). That is an issue
to take up with the state court. And even accepting the premise of Plaintiff's argument, it does not change the fact
that Plaintiff received notice on June 7, 2024 (two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations) that her
filing had been rejected, and she did not act on that notice until June 11, 2024 (two days after the expiration of the
statute of limitations). Plaintiffs failure to act upon that notice in a timely manner hardly constitutes the sort of
“extraordinary circumstance” that would justify equitable tolling, and neither does it reflect that she had been
“pursu[ing her] rights diligently.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014).
the case of pro se litigants,” district judges cannot be expected to act as “mind readers.” Beaudett
v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). By failing to articulate how her motion
satisfies either the threshold showing under Rule 60(b) or one of the six specific categories
thereunder, Plaintiff has not met her burden to “clearly establish the grounds” for relief. Jn re
Burnley, 988 F.2d at 3. For those reasons, her motion [DE 42] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this _ & day of August, 2025.
ain! Bae 2
RICHARD E. MYERS II
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE