Davis v. Cox

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

JOSEPH ERIC PATRICK DAVIS PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:23-cv-04101-MEF

JAIL ADMINISTRATOR RAMI COX DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a civil rights action filed pro se by Plaintiff, Joseph Eric Patrick Davis (“Davis”),

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 10, 2024, the parties consented to the undersigned conducting

all proceedings in this case, including a jury or non-jury trial and to order the entry of a final

judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. (ECF No. 34). Currently

before the Court is Defendant Cox’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 46).

Plaintiff responded. (ECF No. 50). Defendant replied. (ECF No. 52). The matter is ripe for

consideration.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKROUND

All the events complained of by Plaintiff in his Complaint took place while he was

incarcerated in the Lafayette County Detention Center (“LCDC”) in Lewisville, Arkansas in 2023

as a pretrial detainee. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff filed his original Complaint and Motion for Leave

to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”) on October 16, 2023, in the Eastern District of

Arkansas. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). The Eastern District Court transferred the case to this Court on

October 18, 2023. (ECF No. 3). The Court then ordered Plaintiff to supplement his IFP Motion

and amend his Complaint. (ECF Nos. 6, 7). Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint and completed

IFP Motion on December 4, 2023. (ECF Nos. 9, 10). The Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

on December 5, 2023. (ECF No. 11).

In his Amended Complaint, Davis alleged three claims against two defendants: Rami Cox,

the Jail Administrator of the LCDC, and Jeff Black, the Sheriff of Lafayette County. The Court

dismissed all claims alleged against Sheriff Black at screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”). (ECF Nos. 13, 16). Accordingly, Defendant Cox is the only Defendant

remaining at this juncture.

Davis first claims Defendant Cox denied him medical care and failed to protect him in

February and March of 2023. Specifically, Davis states:

My Jaw and my nose was broken or fractured and I was denied

medical attention on numerous occasions by Rami Cox the jail

administrator. I could not eat solid foods for two months. I’m still

unable to eat like I should and my nose is crooked Then after I was

jumped I was placed back in the same pod. This happened a total of

three times I wrote grievances and request forms to get the proper

help I needed which I was denied by Rami Cox even after the jail

doctor said I needed X-Rays and Medical treatment.

(ECF No. 10, pp. 4-5) (errors in original). In support of his official capacity claim, Davis states:

“Denied Medical treatment, failed to [p]rotect on multiple occasions.” Id. at 5.

In Claim Two, Davis again claims Defendant Cox denied his medical care and failed to

protect him in February and March 2023, pleading:

My nose and my jaw was broken or fractured. Rami Cox denied me

medical attention on numerous occasions. I was injured by several

people jumping on me, then I was put in the same pod with the same

guys three different times.

(ECF No. 10, p. 6) (errors in original). For his official capacity claim, Davis states: “Denial of

medical attention failed to [p]rotect.” Id. at 7.

In Claim Three, Davis once again claims Defendant Cox denied his medical care and failed

to protect him in February and March 2023, stating:

My nose & jaw were broken or fractured the jail doctor said, I

needed X-Rays Ms.Rami Cox denied my medical treatment. I wrote

to get the grievances I filed and she’s telling me she does not have

them. I was injured by several people jumping on me a total of three

times. I was put back in pod each time.

(ECF No. 10, p. 8) (errors in original). For his official capacity claim, Davis again states: “denied

medical treatment failed to [p]rotect.” Id. at 8.

As just illustrated, Davis lists three separate claims in his Amended Complaint, but all three

claims involve the same factual pattern. As such, Davis effectively states only one claim of denial

of medical care and one claim of failure to protect against Defendant Cox in his Amended

Complaint. (ECF No. 10). Therefore, the Court will proceed by referring to the claims as the

“denial of medical care claim” and the “failure to protect claim” rather than Claim One, Two, and

Three as designated in his Amended Complaint.

On March 12, 2024, the Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the limited

issue of exhaustion of remedies. (ECF No. 23). On August 1, 2024, the Court entered an Order

granting in part and denying in part this Motion. (ECF No. 36). Specifically, the Court granted

Defendant Cox summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim, as Davis admitted he

failed to exhaust such claim. Id. The Court, however, found that Davis sufficiently raised genuine

issues of material fact as to whether Defendant Cox prevented his exhaustion of the denial of

medical care claim. Id. Accordingly, the only claim remaining before the Court at that point was

the denial of medical care claim against Defendant Cox in both her individual and official

capacities.

On March 10, 2025, Defendant Cox filed the pending Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment and supporting documents. (ECF Nos. 46, 47, 48). In this Motion, Defendant Cox

concedes there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim

for denial of medical care against her. Thus, Defendant Cox does not move for judgment on

Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim in her individual capacity. She does, however, argue she

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s official capacity claim for denial of medical

care. (ECF No. 46). More specifically, Defendant Cox argues: (1) there is no unconstitutional

policy implemented by Defendant Cox that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (2), to the

extent Davis attempts to allege a custom of not adhering to the official policy, one instance is

insufficient to establish a custom. (ECF No. 47, p. 3-5).

On March 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed his response to Defendant Cox’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment arguing: (1) he can prove Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical need, thus, violating his Eighth Amendment rights; (2) Sheriff Black, as a policy maker,

should have told Defendant Cox to “do something” about Plaintiff’s medical need; and (3) because

Sheriff Black was aware of the problem there should be County liability. (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff

did not attach any exhibits or affidavits to his Response, nor did he properly verify his response or

have it notarized in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1

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1 Summary judgment evidence “must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit made on

personal knowledge setting forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence or a deposition

that meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). Additionally, Plaintiff was

advised in the Court’s Order of April 1, 2024, directing his response to the instant Motion: “At the

summary judgment stage, a plaintiff cannot rest upon mere allegations and, instead, must meet

proof with proof. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). This means the Response must include legal arguments,

as well as affidavits, prison records, or other evidence establishing that there is a genuine issue of

material fact that must be resolved at a hearing or trial. The affidavit must be based upon the

personal knowledge of the person executing the affidavit and must be either: (1) sworn and

subscribed to by a notary public; or (2) executed under penalty of perjury, as provided for by 28

U.S.C. 1746.” (ECF No. 26) (emphasis in original).

Davis also filed a separate document attempting to dispute Defendant Cox’s Statement of

Facts. (ECF No. 51). But Davis did not properly verify this document or include any affidavit or

other evidence for the Court. Accordingly, the Court is limited to considering the facts asserted in

Plaintiff’s verified Amended Complaint2 and in his sworn deposition. (ECF Nos. 10, 48-7).

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On April 1, 2025, Defendant Cox filed a Reply (ECF No. 52) pointing out that Plaintiff’s

Response primarily focuses on the merits of his individual capacity claim against Defendant Cox,

which is not at issue in the pending Motion. Further, Defendant Cox rightly notes Sheriff Black

is no longer a Defendant in this case. Id. Finally, Defendant Cox argues Davis did not allege any

policy, practice, or custom of Lafayette County violated his constitutional rights in his Amended

Complaint or Response. Id.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The material facts related to Plaintiff’s official capacity claim are undisputed. The LCDC

had a policy to provide inmates and detainees with medical care. It specifically reads:

Medical Care:

Medical care will be conducted on an as needed basis.

Inmates/detainees should fill out and turn in a medical request form

in order to receive medical treatment.

Necessary medical treatment will be made available to all

inmates/detainees.

All medications given to inmates/detainees by facility personnel will

be taken immediately, and initialed on the log by inmates/detainees.

2 A verified complaint is the equivalent of an affidavit for summary judgment purposes. See, e.g.,

Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep't., 241 F.3d 992, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2001). As the Court in Roberson

pointed out, “[a]lthough a party may not generally rest on his pleadings to create a fact issue

sufficient to survive summary judgment, the facts alleged in a verified complaint need not be

repeated in a responsive affidavit to survive the summary judgment motion. Id.

Frivolous complaints will not be tolerated. Abuse of medical

treatment may result in disciplinary action, or criminal prosecution.

Only emergency dental attention is available.

If convicted of a crime for which the inmate is incarcerated, a $10.00

charge for each doctor, nurse, dentist visit and a $10.00 charge for

each prescription will be added to the inmate’s restitution report at

the time of conviction. This restitution will be paid to the Lafayette

County Sheriff’s Department.

(ECF No. 48-6).

Davis testified in his deposition he was injured on February 17, 2023, when he was attacked

by a fellow inmate who hit him in the jaw and nose and busted his head on the floor. After the

attack he could not open his jaw, had blood draining out of his nose, and broken teeth sticking

through his gums. Davis also testified he could not eat for months afterward due to the injuries,

and he lost approximately 20 pounds. (ECF No. 48-7, pp. 17, 48, 56). The medical provider at

the LCDC prescribed ibuprofen and requested Davis be sent for x-rays on February 24, 2023.

(ECF No. 48-3, p. 2). Davis testified he was never sent for x-rays nor received any medical care

for what he characterizes as a broken jaw, broken nose, and broken teeth beyond ibuprofen he

could not swallow. (ECF No. 48-7, p. 17, 35, 48, 56).

Defendant Cox attached Plaintiff’s grievance and medical request forms submitted during

the time at issue here.3 On September 29, 2023, Davis submitted a Grievance to Sheriff Black

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stating:

. . . back in march the doctor told me he was going to send me to get

xrays and nose re straightened. I still need to go im having problems

breathing and eating my food. Rami Cox said she wasn’t sending

me cause I wasn’t kicking the door hard enough. I still need medical

treatment. I’ve been denied and its really affecting me especially

my breathing and eating my jaw was fractured back when this

3 Defendant Cox verified these Grievances and Medical Requests with Sheriff Black’s Affidavit,

who is custodian of records at the LCDC, which verifies the Grievances and Requests are true and

accurate copies kept in the ordinary course of business at the LCDC. (ECF No. 48-1, 1).

happened and I was unable to eat anything was denied soft diet and

medical treatment. I lost a lot of weight if it wasn’t for other inmates

giving me their applesauce I would have starved to death. Also,

sheriff black I need ocpies of all grievances, requests and medical

request since I’ve been here.

(ECF No. 48-3, p. 25). Defendant Cox reviewed the Grievance on October 4, 2023, and marked

it resolved on October 9, 2023. Id.

On September 29, 2023, Davis filed a Grievance stating:

I was jumped in February my nose was broke and my jaw was

fractured I’m having problems breathing and my jaw is causing

major pain also I believe I suffered a concussion my equal Librium

is still of I need xrays and cat scan. I need my nose fixed it happened

while I was here in February.

(ECF No. 48-3, p. 26). Defendant Cox reviewed the Grievance on October 4, 2023, and noted it

was printed and in the “Dr’s folder.” Id.

On October 9, 2023, Davis submitted a Grievance stating: “I need to speak to the sheriff

asap I can’t breath properly I’ve been denied medical treatment.” (ECF No. 48-3, p. 27).

Defendant Cox reviewed the Grievance on October 9, 2023 and noted: “He is out of town this

week at training but I will get with him to see you as soon as he gets back.” Id.

Also on October 9, 2023, Davis submitted a Medical Request, stating: “I’m having

problems breathing my nose was broke when I got here. My jaw was broke I’m having trouble

eating.” (ECF No. 48-3, p. 28).

On October 10, 2023, Davis submitted another Medical Request stating:

im having problems eating cause i cant breath and my teeth are

broke because of getting jumped in her not only once but 3 times, i

cant eat anything hard and my nose is blocked off its had a

continuous drain since it was broke.

(ECF No. 48-3, p. 29). On October 11, 2023, Defendant Cox reviewed the Medical Request and

noted: “Printed and in the Dr’s folder.” Id.

On October 25, 2023, Plaintiff again requested to speak with the Sheriff, and Defendant

Cox responded on October 26, 2023, that she would let him know. (ECF No. 48-3, p. 37).4

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Additionally, Defendant Cox submitted Sheriff Black’s Affidavit, in which the Sheriff

stated under oath: (1) that he had no knowledge of any LCDC personnel failing to follow the

written policy; (2) he had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s allegations at issue in this lawsuit; (3) he

was not aware x-rays were not ordered for Plaintiff; and (4) he was not notified of any issues

regarding Plaintiff’s medical care during his incarceration. (ECF No. 48-1). Davis has not

presented any summary judgment evidence to dispute Sheriff Black’s Affidavit.

In his deposition, Davis testified regarding his official capacity claim that, “[t]o be honest

with you … I don’t know nothing about the law, so I don’t know which one to check. … and I

figured it was best if I checked both.” (ECF No. 48-7, p. 58). He added:

It’s a - - it’s a - - it’s a known problem for Lafayette County. Yes,

ma’am. As far as that goes. I mean, ‘cause it ain’t - - don’t let it

happen. I’ve sat there and watched numbers of people be jumped

on and denied medical treatment for one thing or another, or fall out,

have seizures, and denied medical treatment, or just multiple things.

That’s - - that’s, I guess, my point of view of it really on that part.

(ECF No. 48-7, p. 59).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the record “shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Once

4 Defendant Cox also submitted many other Medical Requests and Grievances that are unrelated

to the issues in this Motion. (ECF No. 48-3). Additionally, Defendant Cox submitted Plaintiff’s

medication logs, however, whether Plaintiff received medication is not at issue on this Motion.

(ECF No. 48-4).

a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the

non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine

issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.

1999).

The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607. “A case founded

on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 610.

“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts

for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007).

IV. DISCUSSION

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal capacity, or in his

official capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal and his official

capacities. The type of conduct that is actionable and the type of defense available depend on

whether the claim is asserted against a defendant in his official or individual capacity. Gorman v.

Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). “Claims against individuals

in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they work; they

require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the only type

of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” Id. Here, that means Davis must show

a policy or custom of Lafayette County caused his constitutional violation.

Personal capacity claims “are those which allege personal liability for individual actions

by officials in the course of their duties; these claims do not require proof of any policy and

qualified immunity may be raised as a defense” to these individual capacity claims. Id. To state

a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state

law, and that the actor violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. West

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff has adequately stated an individual capacity claim against Defendant Cox for

denial of medical care, and Defendant Cox admits that genuine issues of material fact exist as to

that claim. The only claim Defendant Cox moves to dismiss in her Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment is Plaintiff’s official capacity claim for denial of medical care against her. Accordingly,

the Court need not address the majority of Plaintiff’s arguments in his Response as they center

around Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against Defendant Cox.

“[I]t is well established that a municipality [or county] cannot be held liable on a

respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Atkinson v. City of

Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013). To establish Lafayette County's

liability under Section 1983, “plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation was committed

pursuant to an official custom, policy, or practice of the governmental entity.” Moyle v. Anderson,

571 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff's official capacity claim

against Defendant Cox is “functionally equivalent” to alleging her employer, Lafayette County,

had “a policy, custom, or [took an] official action” that deprived him of his constitutional rights.

Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Hamilton, 452

F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 2006).

It is undisputed that Lafayette County’s policy regarding medical care states inmates and

detainees will be provided medical care as needed. (ECF No. 48-6). Davis does not argue this

policy is unconstitutional or caused the denial of his medical care. Instead, he argues that “they”

did not follow this policy, thereby violating his constitutional rights by denying him medical care.

(ECF No. 51, pp. 4-5). Further, Davis makes no factual allegation in his Amended Complaint

regarding the LCDC policy or how it may have caused his alleged constitutional violation.

Accordingly, Davis has failed to state a cognizable official capacity claim against Defendant Cox

based on an unconstitutional policy of the LCDC.

That does not end the analysis, because even if the official policy of the LCDC did not

cause Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violation, he may still establish official capacity liability by

showing that a custom of Lafayette County caused the violation. To establish a claim for “custom”

liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional

misconduct by the governmental entity's employees;

2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental

entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the official of that misconduct; and

3) That Plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the government entity’s custom, i.e., that

the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Douglas County Medical Dept., 725 F.3d 825, p. 828 (8th Cir. 2013). But “[a] single

deviation from a written, official policy does not prove a conflicting custom.” Id. at 828-9 (internal

quotation and citation omitted).

Defendant Cox argues Davis has only claimed a single incident – his own denial of medical

care – and that such a single incident cannot establish an unconstitutional custom claim. The Court

agrees. See Perryman v. City of Bloomington, 704 F.Supp.3d 961, 967-68 (D. Minn Dec. 4, 2023)

(citing Quinn v. Doherty, 637 F. Supp. 3d 647, 667 (D. Minn. 2022) (“But Plaintiffs’ specific

allegations relate only to Plaintiffs’ experience. This isolated event does not establish a custom.”);

Yang v. City of Minneapolis, 607 F. Supp. 3d 880, 898 (D. Minn. 2022) (“Alleging a single instance

of misconduct is not sufficient to support an inference of a custom or unofficial policy of the

City.”); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of City of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605, 615 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The

failure to disclaim one single religious exercise surely does not support the existence of a custom

or policy.”)).

While Davis testified in his deposition that he watched “numbers of people” be denied

medical care for various reasons, he did not provide any evidence beyond this conclusory and

vague statement. (ECF No. 48-7, pp. 58-59). Such a statement does not create a genuine issue of

material fact to survive summary judgment. See McClanahan v. Young, 2016 WL 520983, at *3

(D. SD Feb. 5, 2016) (“Conclusory, non-specific statements in an affidavit or verified complaint

do not meet this standard.”); see also Rose-Maston v. NME Hosps., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th

Cir. 1998) (“Conclusory affidavits, standing alone, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact

precluding summary judgment.”). Accordingly, Davis has failed to state a cognizable claim for

an official capacity claim against Defendant Cox based on a custom of Lafayette County.

Finally, Davis argues Sheriff Black knew he was being denied medical care, and this

knowledge by the Sheriff establishes county liability. He argues Sheriff Black should have forced

Defendant Cox to provide him medical care. Plaintiff does not, however, offer any verified

statement of fact to dispute the facts stated in Sheriff Black’s Affidavit. Sheriff Black specifically

stated under oath that he had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical needs. (ECF No. 48-12). And

Davis made no claim of knowledge or personal involvement of Sheriff Black in his Amended

Complaint or in his Deposition.5 Lastly, Sheriff Black is no longer a Defendant in this matter.

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Accordingly, the Court does not find any genuine issues of material fact regarding Sheriff

Black’s knowledge implicating Lafayette County liability here.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons and upon the authorities discussed above, Defendant Cox’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 46) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s official capacity claim

for denial of medical care against Defendant Cox is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This

leaves for further litigation only Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim against Defendant Cox in

her individual capacity.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of August 2025.

/s/

HON. MARK E. FORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

5 Moreover, in response to Defendant Cox’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of

exhaustion, Davis even asserted that Defendant Cox refused to forward his grievances to Sheriff

Black. (ECF No. 36). This factual assertion created a genuine issue of material fact to survive

summary judgment on exhaustion for Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim. Id. Plaintiff may

not now, when it suits his purposes, argue for a contrary factual record where Sheriff Black was in

possession and fully informed of Plaintiff’s medical requests and grievances.