The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
LATONYA CHAMES,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:21-cv-1571-CLM
SHERIFF MATTHEW WADE,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
LaTonya Chames, a black woman, was a Corrections Lieutenant for
former Calhoun County Sheriff Matthew Wade, a white male. Chames
sues Wade for (a) paying her less money because of her race and gender,
then (b) retaliating against her for pointing out the pay disparity. Wade
moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 54). For the reasons stated below, the
court GRANTS Wade’s motion for summary judgment on all counts.
BACKGROUND
Wade’s motion boils down to two questions. First, do the parties
genuinely dispute the explanation for this pay disparity in 2018:
Race & Gender Position Annual Pay Civil
(approx.) Service
Fallon White male Investigations $55,000 No
Hurst Lieutenant
Ronnie White male Patrol $55,000 No
Murray Lieutenant
Latonya Black female Corrections $37,832 Yes
Chames Lieutenant
Second, after Chames complained to her supervisor about the disparity,
did Wade take an “adverse action” against Chames by offering her a
$5,000 raise instead of the $17,000 needed to close the pay gap?
On the first question, Sheriff Wade says the pay gap existed for two
main reasons: (1) patrol and investigation officers perform different roles
that require different credentials and present unique dangers not faced
by corrections officers and (2) Chames was paid within Calhoun County’s
civil service system, which dictates a particular seniority-based pay scale,
while Hurst and Murray were exempt from the civil service system
because they were paid in part with funds outside the civil service system.
As for the second question, Wade says that, after Chames complained
about the gap, Chames was offered a $5,000 raise from funds outside the
civil service system—with the caveat that accepting those funds would
necessarily remove Chames from the civil service system. Chames turned
down the raise because she deemed it insufficient. Because Chames
decided to maintain the status quo, Wade says that he did not take an
“adverse action” that supports a retaliation claim.
Below, the court details the facts, which fall into three categories:
undisputed facts; facts that Chames disputes without a genuine basis;
genuinely disputed facts. When needed, the court explains the difference
and presents the genuinely disputed facts in the light most favorable to
Chames because she is the non-moving party.
A. Calhoun County Civil Service System
The Alabama Legislature created the Calhoun County Civil Service
System to govern the “selection and employment of all individuals in the
service of Calhoun County, Alabama, except for those exempted in Section
45-8-120.01[.]” Ala Code § 45-8-120. This provision covers persons who
work for the “sheriff”. Id. Based on an individual’s ‘exempt’ status under
§ 45-8-120.01, persons who work for the sheriff fall into two categories:
civil service employees and non-civil service employees.
1. Civil service employees: All employees “covered by this article
shall be selected and hold their positions pursuant to this article and the
board’s implementing rules and regulations.” Id. The article goes on to
cover issues like employment applications (§ 120.09), performance ratings
(§ 120.10), employee discipline (§ 120.13), and employer discrimination (§
120.19). The Board’s implementing rules and regulations fill in the gaps.
See (Doc. 56-1, 56-2, 56-3). Relevant here, the implementing rules govern
starting pay (§ 4.7.4), pay for overtime work (§ 9.2.2), pay levels (§ 10.4.1),
pay increases (§§ 10.7.1, 10.7.2), pay upon job reassignment (§ 10.8), and
pay after a break in service (§ 10.5.2). The Board’s implementing rules
dictate strict adherence to the pay scale: “Deviations from the approved
compensation plan and the guidelines contained herein will not be
authorized.” (Doc. 56-3, p. 23, § 10.1.2).
2. Non-civil service employees: To deviate from the pay scale, county
employees must be removed from the civil service system by making them
“exempt” under Ala. Code § 45-8-120.02. Relevant here, an employee can
be exempted from civil service status if he “is not paid exclusively by
Calhoun County.” Ala. Code § 45-8-120.02(i) (emphasis added). So, for
example, if an employee was paid $30,000 by the county, plus $10,000
from a separate fund, that employee is “exempt” from the civil service
rules and regulations because his pay is not exclusively from the county.
Once exempted from the civil service pay scale, the employee is also
exempt from the protections and benefits offered by the Board’s statute
and implementing rules—including the longevity/step increases (§ 10.7.1)
and across-the-board pay increases (§ 10.7.2) provided by funds approved
the County Commission (§ 10.7).
3. Circuit interpretation: The Eleventh Circuit read this statute in
an unpublished opinion stemming from Chames’ lawsuit against the
County Commission. In that decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that even
though Chames was paid by the county, and the county had to approve or
disapprove of Chames’ salary, Sheriff Wade alone was her employer. See
Chames v. Calhoun Co. Comm., 2022 WL 1217652, *3 (11th Cir. Apr. 26,
2022). This court reads the Circuit’s unpublished decision to say that the
County Commission / Civil Service Board was Chames’ “paymaster,” id.,
leaving Wade (her boss) with the discretion to recommend a pay raise as
long as it fit within the civil service statute and its implementing rules.
For example, Wade could recommend Chames be exempted from civil
service status so that he could supplement her pay with other funds, if he
had access to those funds.
B. Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office
Wade was Calhoun County Sheriff from 2016 until 2025. Before and
during his tenure, the Sheriff’s Office was divided into three departments:
patrol, investigations, and corrections. Generally, patrol enforces the laws
across the county; investigations investigates potential violations of the
law; and corrections controls the county jail and cares for its inmates.
The Sheriff’s Department was governed by a chain of command with
the Sheriff and Chief Deputy Sheriff at the top. Below the two executives,
each division was governed by a chain of command that used these
divisional titles from top to bottom: captain, lieutenant, sergeant,
corporal, and officer.
C. Chames’ employment
Chames started working for the Sheriff as a corrections officer, the
lowest rank within the corrections department, in 2002. Upon completing
her provisional period in July 2002, Chames gained civil service status.
In 2008, Chames became a licensed practical nurse (LPN) for the
county jail. Chames was an independent contractor, which is one of the
categories exempted from the civil service statute. See Ala. Code § 45-8-
120.01(f). So Chames was no longer a civil service employee. Chames kept
working as an LPN for more than six years, which resulted in Chames
losing credit for her years of civil service as a corrections officer under the
Board’s implementing rules, §§ 10.5.2 and 10.6.4. (Doc. 56-3, pp. 25-26).
Chames returned to the corrections division as a temporary
corrections lieutenant in 2015, then returned to civil service status in
2016 when the Sheriff hired her as a full-time corrections lieutenant. As
a corrections lieutenant, Chames oversees jail operations, including
supervision of corrections sergeants and officers.
D. Pay disparity and $5,000 raise offer
In 2018, Chames told the corrections captain (her direct supervisor)
that she did not believe that the pay disparity between her (about $37,000)
and the patrol and investigation lieutenants Ronnie Murray and Falon
Hurst ($55,000 each) was fair. She later voiced the same concern to Sheriff
Wade and then Chief Deputy Sheriff Jon Garlick.
The parties agree that in 2019, after Chames met with Wade and
others, Chames was (a) offered a $5,000 raise during a meeting with
Garlick but (b) because the raise would be paid from other funds, Chames
would lose her status as a civil service employee. But the parties dispute
if and how the topic of future raises was addressed. Because the court
must view the facts in the light most favorable to Chames—the court
quotes Chames’ testimony about Garlick’s meeting and assumes it is true:
Q. So let’s focus on the latter half of that part where they
said that they could do something. Can you tell me who
told you -- who was they? Who told you they could do
something?
A. What I remember distinctly is the chief calling me into
the office and having a paper in front of him, and he said
something about the sheriff being able to convince the
commission to give me a $5,000 raise, but there were a
lot of -- there were concessions that I would have to
make and -- yeah.
Q. What were those concessions? Do you recall?
A. In the letter it stated something about I would no longer
be civil service and that I would -- that $5,000 would be
all I would get, and I would have to -- I understood I
wouldn’t get any more raises.
Q. Was there a time limit to that, let’s call it a cap, on your
raises, the $5,000? Is that fair to say? So you wouldn’t
get any more raises after that $5,000? Is that just for
that year, or was it for all time? Do you recall?
A. If I recall correctly, it just said you waive rights to all
future raises. That’s what I think I remember the letter
saying.
Q. Did they explain -- I’m sorry. Did the chief deputy
explain to you why he was giving you this letter?
A. He said that -- something about the sheriff paying out a
discretionary fund or something.
Q. And at that time you were a civil service employee,
correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And did he explain that if you were paid not solely from
county commission funds, that you would then no longer
be considered a civil service employee?
A. He -- I don’t -- he didn’t go into detail about it. He just
-- you know, it was on the paper.
Q. Were you aware at the time that a -- an employee who
is paid not solely from county commission funds would
no longer be a civil service employee?
A. No. Not at the time -- I mean, just when they presented,
I guess, the paper to me.
Q. Have you learned that information since then, or is this
the first you’re hearing about it?
A. At the time, I think there may have been some talk
about it.
Q. What was your response to the letter?
A. I said to him, I said, Chief, I think at the time I was
making 37 or -- and the way that I calculated it, it was
only -- I was going to make -- I was going -- that would
bring my pay to 42,000. I said that is still a substantial
gap and then you’re telling me that you’re -- I will never
get any more raises. I said -- but there’s still a
substantial gap in between what I and this individual,
the other males, the other people, were making. I said
that’s not fair. It’s not -- and that’s what I said to him.
(Doc. 55-1, p. 32). Neither party produced the letter Chames mentioned,
so the court must assume that Garlick presented the offer as Chames
describes. That said, the court notes that Chames didn’t mention a waiver
of future raises when she described her meeting with Garlic to the EEOC.
Rather, consistent with Wade’s account, Chames told the EEOC that the
acceptance letter merely said that Chames had to “waive [her] rights as a
civil service employee,” which necessarily results in the lost pay increases
under Sections 10.7.1 and 10.7.2 of the Board’s rules:
On June 28, 2019, Chicf Deputy Jon Garlic notified me that the Commission decided to offer me a $5,000.00 salary increase.
Chief Deputy Garlic also told me that Sheriff Wade tried to persuade the Commission to offer me a raise that would bring
my salary in line with the white male lieutenants, but the Commission refused. Chicf Deputy Garlic presented me with an
acknowledgement to sign in exchange for the $5,000.00 per year raise. The acknowledgement stated that Sheriff Wade was
financially responsible for my raise and that I agreed to waive my rights as a civil service employee. I refused to sign the
acknowledgment and reported that the document was presented to me in retaliation for reporting race and gender
discrimination. To my knowledge. no other lieutenant has been asked to sign such an acknowledgement.
(Doc. 28-3). The parties agree that Chames “turned down the offer
because, according to her calculations, she would be making $42,000.00 a
year and it did not address the pay gap between her and the other
lieutenants.” (Doc. 57, p. 24) (undisputed fact #108).
E. Litigation
1. EEOC charge: Chames filed her first EEOC charge in November
2019, alleging that the County Commission (a) discriminated against her
based on the pay gap with Hurst and Murray and (b) retaliated against
her by offering a raise that did not completely close the gap. (Doc. 28-1).
Chames later amended the charge to add the Sheriff's Department as an
additional employer. (Doc. 28-3). The EEOC issued Chames a right to sue
letter for the Sheriffs Department on July 22, 2021. (Doc. 1-2).
2. Litigation: Chames sued the County Commission and the
Sheriffs Department separately. As mentioned, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed this court’s (Judge Axon) dismissal of Chames’ case against the
County Commission because the Sheriff, not the Commission, employed
Chames. See Chames, 2022 WL 1217652.
In this case, the court granted the Sheriff’s Department’s motion to
dismiss and allowed Chames to substitute Wade as the defendant. (Doc.
24). After ruling on Wade’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss (doc. 35), these
claims remain: “Chames’ § 1981 claims for race discrimination and
retaliation, Title VII claims for race and gender discrimination, Equal Pay
Act and Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act claims, and Equal Protection claims
for race and gender discrimination[.]” (Doc. 35, p. 14). Wade now seeks
summary judgment on these claims. (Doc. 54).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this court views the
facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. See Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 285
F.3d 962, 966 (11th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate when
there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Chames’ amended complaint pleads nine counts (doc. 9) and has
been the subject of two opinions. In the first, the court dismissed all claims
pleaded against the Sheriff’s Department, which included Counts 4-6 in
whole, and Counts 1-3 in part because those counts also named Sheriff
Wade. (Doc. 24). But the court said it would allow Chames to substitute
Wade for the Sheriff’s Department. In the second opinion, the court
dismissed Count III (Title VII retaliation) because Chames failed to timely
file a charge with the EEOC. (Doc. 35, pp. 8, 14). The court also dismissed
any claims based on vicarious liability; any official capacity claims; and
any claims for punitive damages. (Id., p. 14).
As a result, the following claims against Wade in his individual
capacity are before the court:
o Count 1: Race discrimination under §§ 1981, 1983
o Count 2: Retaliation under § 1981, 1983
o Count 4: Race discrimination under Title VII
o Count 5: Gender discrimination under Title VII
o Count 6: Unequal pay under Equal Pay Act and the Lily
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
o Count 7: Gender discrimination under § 1983
o Count 8: Race discrimination under §§ 1981, 1983
o Count 9: Unequal pay under Equal Pay Act and the Lily
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
As you can see, some of these claims are duplicative (e.g., Counts 6 and 9)
and some plead the same theory under similar statutes (e.g., Counts 1, 4,
and 8). The court thus groups certain claims where appropriate, starting
with the race discrimination claims.
Counts 1, 4, 8: Race Discrimination, § 1981 and Title VII
Chames claims that Wade violated § 1981 and Title VII by refusing
to pay her as much as Murray and Hurst because she was black. Before
the court addresses the merits of Chames’ claim, however, it must address
the proper standard.
1. Proper Standard: The parties brief this issue in part by using the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. But the Eleventh Circuit
has signaled a departure from McDonnell Douglas toward a more basic,
Rule 56-based inquiry: Has the Plaintiff submitted enough evidence to
allow a reasonable juror to find that the Defendant employer acted against
Plaintiff because of her race? See Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84
F.4th 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 2023) (“The legal standard—and the question
for the court at summary judgment—is only whether the evidence permits
a reasonable factfinder to find that the employer retaliated against the
employee”); Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Justice, 88 F. 4th 939, 946-47 (11th
Cir. Dec. 12, 2023) (“This rearticulation of the summary judgment
standard arose in large part because of widespread misunderstandings
about the limits of McDonnell Douglas—the same misunderstandings
that persist today. A ‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence is
simply enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to infer intentional
discrimination in an employment action—the ultimate inquiry in a
discrimination lawsuit.”). In a recent Title VII case, Justice Thomas
likewise criticized McDonnell Douglas’s use in judging Rule 56 motions
and said that “litigants and lower courts are free to proceed without the
McDonnell Douglas framework.” Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 145
S. Ct. 1540, 1555 (2025).
This court will follow the Circuit and Justice Thomas’s lead by
judging Wade’s motion only under Rule 56.
2. Sheriff Wade’s Evidence of Non-Discrimination: Rule 56(a) starts
with the moving party’s burden to show that there is no genuine dispute
about a material fact. Both of Chames’ claims (Section 1981 and Title VII)
require that she prove as a matter of fact that Wade paid her less money
than Murray and Hurst because she is black. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981; §
2000e-2(a)(1).
Wade says that race played no part in the difference between
Chames’ pay and Murray and Hurst’s pay. Rather, Wade says, it cannot
be genuinely disputed that he paid Chames differently than Murray and
Hurst because (a) Chames was subject to the civil service employee pay
scale, while Murray and Hurst were not, and (b) corrections officers like
Chames perform different functions, have different responsibilities, and
require different credentials than investigators and patrol/enforcement
officers. (Doc. 57, pp. 34-35).
The court finds that Wade presents enough evidence to support both
rationales. First, Wade rightly notes that Alabama law and the Board’s
implementing rules and regulations treat differently the salaries of
persons within the civil service system and those exempted from it. And
with regard to civil service employees, the rule is clear: “[d]eviations from
the approved compensation plan and the guidelines contained herein will
not be authorized.” (Doc. 56-38, p. 23, § 10.1.2). Because Chames was a civil
service employee, Wade could not deviate from the requisite pay scale
without removing Chames from the civil service system—as demonstrated
by letters for other employees who received pay increases via other funds
that told the employees that they would lose civil service status:
Lynde Green
Calhoun County Sheriff Department
Lynde Green,
On January 11, 2016, Sheriff Larry Amerson sent a letter (enclosed) to the Calhoun County
Commission requesting a pay increase, for you, from a Sergeant to a Lieutenant. The Sheriff
requested this increase to be funded by the Sheriff's 65% Federal Inmate Fund.
Pte Ca oun County Civil Service Board stated in a letter (enclosed) dated February"s
2016, “If this employee's salary is to be supplemented by the Sheriff's 65% fund, she would
not be paid solely by Calhoun County and not covered under the Civil Service System”,
After reviewing the enclosed Teffers please sign below as Indicated and return to the Payroll
Department.
Bri onary
ee Hpsgions Manager
cayoun unty Commission
Mitt AV) OG I understand and acknowledge the enclosed letters,
I understand and DO NOT acknowledge the enclosed letters.
(Doc. 56-62) (Lynde Green Meeder).
11
Dear Sgt. Stone:
On Dec, 26, 2016 you will be promoted from Sergeant to Lieutenant. The increase in pay will be
funded by the Sheriff's 65% Federal Inmate Fund
efider the Civil Service Rules any individual who is not paid exclusively by Calhoun County is
to be exempted and not covered under the Civil Service System.
By signing this letter you understand and acknowledge that you will not be covered under the
Ci Service.
|!
flax =
a7 1H : i
Set/loseph Stone
Date: 2 -\4~l lb
Mf Wade, Sheriff
(Doc. 56-54, p. 4) (Joseph Stone).
William Carl Moses
400 W 8" Street
Anniston, AL 36201
On October 28, 2019, you have been hired as a Deputy Sergeant. Your pay will be
increased to $50,000 per year. This pay increase will be funded by the Calhoun
County Mental Health Board
Onder the Civil Service Rules any individual who is not paid exclusively by Calhoun
County General Fund is to be exempted and not covered under the Civil Service
System.
By signing this letter you understand and acknowledge that you will not be
covered under the Civil Service System.
□□ □□□
lam Carl Moses
Date: October 28, 2019
(Doc. 56-31, p.2) (Williams Carl Moses).
12
Second, while the title “lieutenant” is the same, the job of a patrol
and investigation lieutenant is different from the job of a corrections
lieutenant. For example, corrections officers like Chames work at the
county jail, while patrol deputies work all over Calhoun County. Further,
patrol and investigation officers have arrest powers that require “APOST”
certification—i.e., a 16-week training course followed by continuing
education. Both Murray and Hurst were APOST certified. Chames neither
needed nor had APOST certification because, as a corrections officer, she
dealt with already-detained individuals. In McDonnell Douglas terms,
Chames was not similarly-situated to either male lieutenant.
In sum, Wade presents evidence that would allow a reasonable juror
to find either or both that (a) Wade had to pay Chames differently than
Murray and Hurst because of civil service statutes and rules and/or
(b) Wade paid Murray and Hurst differently than Chames because they
performed different jobs, that required more qualifications, than Chames.
Thus, to avoid summary judgment, Chames must offer enough evidence
to allow the same reasonable juror to instead find that Wade paid Chames
differently because she was black. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 56(e).
3. Chames’ Evidence of Discrimination: Chames has no direct
evidence of race discrimination. Wade never said that race played a factor
in his hiring and salary decisions, and Chames offers no evidence that
Wade ever made disparaging remarks about a black employee.
As indirect evidence that race mattered to Wade’s payment of the
differing group lieutenants, Chames points to these facts:
• Wade could have given Chames a raise with funds Wade held
outside the civil service system;
• Wade offered to give Chames a $5,000 raise instead of the
$17,000 needed to close the gap with Murray and Hurst;
• Wade conditioned the $5,000 raise on Chames giving up future
raises; and,
• Wade paid her white counterpart, Jordan Luker Shekels, more
money than he paid Chames.
(Doc. 63, pp. 20-27). As discussed below, none of these facts—even if
Chames proved them true—could allow a reasonable juror to find that
race mattered to Chames’ salary. The court starts with Shekels’ pay.
a. Jordan Luker Shekels: Shekels is a white female. Wade promoted
her from to Corrections Sergeant to Corrections Lieutenant—the same
position Chames held—in December 2019. (Doc. 62-7). As Chames puts it:
Since her appointment to Lt. on December 16, 2019. Shekels
has always been paid more than Chames: In 2020 Shekels
made $52,670.01 and Chames made $41,345.41; In 2021
Shekels made $51,426.83 and Chames made $45,946.44; In
2022 Shekels made $54,835.93 and Chames made
$47,428.88; In 2023 Shekels made $58,838.91 and Chames
made $50,417.50; In 2024 Shekels made $60,640.34 and
Chames made $52,875.14. (Doc. 62-4, at p. 1 & 8).
(Doc. 63, p.12). But rather than prove race mattered to Chames’ salary,
Shekels’ pay supports Wade’s point that he paid corrections officers within
the civil service rules and regulations, regardless of race.
Like Chames, Shekels was a non-exempt civil service employee in
the corrections group—not an exempt employee in patrol or investigations
like Hurst and Murray. When Wade promoted Shekels from sergeant to
lieutenant, Wade did not exempt Shekels from civil service status so that
he could pay her $55,000 like his white investigations and patrol
lieutenants, Murray and Hurst. Rather, Wade left Shekels in the civil
service system and paid her the requisite civil service salary—just like he
paid Chames. In other words, Wade treated a similarly situated white
employee like he treated Chames: He paid both corrections lieutenants
within the civil service system. That Shekels made more money than
Chames resulted not from her race, but from extra overtime pay and years
in the civil service system. Compare docs. 56-17, 56-19 (pay scale); with
56-23, 56-40 (Shekels had been employed by Sheriff since 2013); and 58-
23 (Chames’ pay stubs); and 58-31 (Shekels’ pay stubs).
b. Ability to seek raises: Chames next points to Wade’s failure to
offer her a raise even though Wade had the “ability to supplement non-
civil service position salaries with funds he maintains separately from the
Commission or Civil Service Board.” (Doc. 63, p. 24). Wade does not
dispute that he could pay a non-exempt civil service employee like
Chames more money if (a) Wade had funds from another source to cover
the raise; (b) the County Commission approved the change in salary and
status; and (c) the employee understood that accepting the raise would
remove her from civil service status. Indeed, as shown in the letters pasted
above, Wade made that offer to other employees when promoting them to
a new position.
But these facts offer no proof that race mattered to Chames’ pay—
or to the salary of any of the sheriff’s other employees. Chames does not
dispute that many of the sheriff’s employees, including some sergeants
and both corrections lieutenants (one white, one black), are paid within
the civil service system. See (Doc. 57, p. 15) (undisputed facts #73-74). Nor
does Chames dispute that Wade hired a black man, Marcus Wood, to be
Patrol Captain, and used non-county funds to pay him as a non-exempt
employee.
In short, the evidence shows that Wade used his limited non-county
funds to pay certain positions more money. Whether Wade made the right
choice to focus on other positions is irrelevant; neither Title VII nor § 1981
allow this court to judge how Wade chose to spend non-county funds, as
long as race didn’t matter to that choice. As the Eleventh Circuit put it:
Title VII does not require the employer’s needs and
expectations to be objectively reasonable; it simply prohibits
the employer from discriminating on the basis of
membership in a protected class. We do not sit as a ‘super-
personnel department,’ and it is not our role to second-guess
the wisdom of an employer’s business decisions—indeed the
wisdom of them is irrelevant—as long as those decisions
were not made with a discriminatory motive. That is true ‘no
matter how medieval a firm’s practices, no matter how high-
handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the
firm’s managers.’
Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010)
(internal citations omitted).
c. Lowball offer: Chames next argues that Wade’s post-complaint
offer of a $5,000 annual raise—rather than a $17,000 annual raise that
would close the pay gap between Chames, Murray, and Hurst—is
evidence of race discrimination. While it is undisputed that Chames was
offered a $5,000 raise, this fact does not create a genuine issue about the
reason Chames was paid less than Murray and Hurst for two reasons.1
First, Chames presents no evidence that Wade had access to enough
non-county funds to increase her salary by $17,000 per year. If Wade could
not pay Chames $17,000 more per year, then his alleged lowball offer had
nothing to do with Chames’ race; it was a matter of economics that applied
equally to all of Wade’s employees, regardless of race.
Second, as Wade notes, offering Chames a raise is a positive action,
not the adverse action required to prove discrimination. Unless Chames
has evidence that Wade had $17,000 per year to offer (she doesn’t), no
reasonable juror could find that Wade offered to pay Chames $5,000 more
because he wanted to discriminate against a black employee.
d. No future raises: Finally, Chames argues that Wade forcing her
to waive all future raises to accept the $5,000 annual raise—a condition
Wade did not impose on white non-civil service employees—is evidence
that Chames discriminated based on race. (Doc. 25, p. 27). As explained
below, the court finds that Chames fails to properly support this fact
1 As detailed in subpart (d), Chames told a different story to the EEOC: “Sheriff Wade tried to
persuade the Commission to offer me a raise that would bring my salary in line with the white
male lieutenants, but the Commission refused.” (Doc. 28-3, p. 3). That means the EEOC
investigated Chames’ case with Wade as hero, not villain. But Wade does not argue
administrative exhaustion, so the court considers Chames’ present version of the story—i.e.,
Wade intentionally lowballed Chames because she was black.
assertion, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), and thus will not consider it as part
of Chames’ case opposing summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)
(outlining the options for failing to satisfy Rule 56(c)(1)). In fact, the court
finds this sanction relatively minor considering Chames’ 180-degree turn
on this fact issue.
i. Unsupported assertion: When deposed, Wade flatly denied that he
told Chames or anyone else that Chames would not get future raises if she
left civil service status. To the contrary, Wade testified that he would have
sought raises for Chames, along with his other exempt employees:
Q. Did you offer – did you say that she would never get any
more raises?
A. Absolutely not.
. . .
Q. Okay. So you didn’t have a personal conversation with
A. I don’t think so.
Q. You don't believe -- okay.
A. Yeah. I don’t think so because I think I would remember
that, and she would have asked me about the raises. I
would have ensured that that would have been a part of
it, you know. Everybody else that’s ever come out of civil
service gets raises. And there might have been a time 1
or two where somebody -- where they didn’t, and I had
to call up there and correct it, but, you know, that was
part of the deal.
(Doc. 55-2, pp. 33, 42).
Chames does not allege that Wade told her that he would not seek
future raises for her or that the pair even talked about future raises.
Instead, to support her fact assertion that Wade imposed a ‘no future
raises’ condition, Chames cites this portion of her own deposition that
describes a meeting she had with Chief Deputy Garlick—not Wade:
Q. So let’s focus on the latter half of that part where they
said that they could do something. Can you tell me who
told you -- who was they? Who told you they could do
something?
A. What I remember distinctly is the chief calling me into
the office and having a paper in front of him, and he said
something about the sheriff being able to convince the
commission to give me a $5,000 raise, but there were a
lot of -- there were concessions that I would have to
make and -- yeah.
Q. What were those concessions? Do you recall?
A. In the letter it stated something about I would no longer
be civil service and that I would -- that $5,000 would be
all I would get, and I would have to -- I understood I
wouldn’t get any more raises.
Q. Was there a time limit to that, let’s call it a cap, on your
raises, the $5,000? Is that fair to say? So you wouldn’t
get any more raises after that $5,000? Is that just for
that year, or was it for all time? Do you recall?
A. If I recall correctly, it just said you waive rights to all
future raises. That’s what I think I remember the letter
saying.
Q. Did they explain -- I’m sorry. Did the chief deputy
explain to you why he was giving you this letter?
A. He said that -- something about the sheriff paying out a
discretionary fund or something.
Q. And at that time you were a civil service employee,
correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And did he explain that if you were paid not solely from
county commission funds, that you would then no longer
be considered a civil service employee?
A. He -- I don’t -- he didn’t go into detail about it. He just
-- you know, it was on the paper.
Q. Were you aware at the time that a -- an employee who
is paid not solely from county commission funds would
no longer be a civil service employee?
A. No. Not at the time -- I mean, just when they presented,
I guess, the paper to me.
Q. Have you learned that information since then, or is this
the first you’re hearing about it?
A. At the time, I think there may have been some talk
about it.
Q. What was your response to the letter?
A. I said to him, I said, Chief, I think at the time I was
making 37 or -- and the way that I calculated it, it was
only -- I was going to make -- I was going -- that would
bring my pay to 42,000. I said that is still a substantial
gap and then you’re telling me that you’re -- I will never
get any more raises. I said -- but there’s still a
substantial gap in between what I and this individual,
the other males, the other people, were making. I said
that’s not fair. It’s not -- and that’s what I said to him.
(Doc. 55-1, p. 32) (highlight added).2 As you can see, Chames did not
testify that the Chief Deputy told her that Wade conditioned her one-time
$5,000 raise on a waiver of all future raises. Instead, as the highlighted
parts show, Chames testified that she thinks the ‘no future raises’
condition was written on a paper letter, but she wasn’t sure. Neither side
has produced that letter. Assuming that letter exists (as the court must),
2 Chames cites this passage as supporting her fact assertion on pages 11 and 23 of her brief in
opposition. (Doc. 63).
neither side has produced testimony that would establish who added the
‘no future raises’ condition to the paper letter. Perhaps it was the Civil
Service Board or County Commission, thus breaking any tie with Wade,
who denied creating the condition and testified he would not have
enforced it. Without any evidence that Wade played a role in requiring
Chames to waive all future raises if she accepted a $5,000 raise, there can
be no assumption that Wade added the condition because of Chames’ race.
u. Shifting story: In fact, Chames’ assertion that Wade personally
decided to lowball Chames with a $5,000 one-time raise in exchange for a
written waiver of all future raises conflicts with the narrative she gave
the EEOC in 2019 and 2020:
THE PARTICULARS ARE (if aduitional pay is pomdod, attach extra sheer — □
THE PARTICULARS ARE (Ifiadditional paper is needed. attach extra sheet(s)):
In early 2019, 1 met with Sheriff Wade and reported race and gender discrimination. | explained that I was being paid less
than the other lieutenants based on my race and gender. Sheriff Wade agreed that my pay was unfair and told me that he
would petition the Commission to increase my salary. Around April 2019, Sheriff Wade informed me that he had petitioned
the Commission, but the members would not agree to increase my pay. Sheriff Wade told me that he was going to draft a
letter to the Commission to formally request that my pay be increased to an amount comparable to the white male
lieutenants.
| In May 2019, Sheriff Wade informed me that the Commission was considering increasing my salary by 35,000.00 per year.
| A $5,000.00 salary increase would be insignificant when comparing my pay and the other lieutenants’ pay. I informed
| Sheriff Wade that the proposed salary increase did not correct the large gap in my pay and, again, reported discrimination
| based on my race and gender.
| Around the end of May 2019, I spoke with Commissioner Fred Wilson concerning the issues with my pay. Commissioner
| Wilson told me that he could not help me and directed me to speak with the County Administrator, Mark Tyner. After
| reporting my pay inequality to Mark Tyner, he informed me that he would “look into” my claims. To date, Mark Tyner has
| not followed up with me concerning my claims.
On June 28, 2019, Chief Deputy Jon Garlic notified me that the Commission decided to offer me a $5,000.00 salary increase.
Chief Deputy Garlic also told me that Sheriff Wade tried to persuade the Commission to offer me a raise that would bring
my salary in line with the white male lieutenants, but the Commission refused. Chicf Deputy Garlic presented me with an
acknowledgement to sign in exchange for the $5,000.00 per year raise. The acknowledgement stated that Sheriff Wade was
financially responsible for my raise and that I agreed to waive my rights as a civil service employee. I refused to sign the
acknowledgment and reported that the document was presented to me in retaliation for reporting race and gender
discrimination. To my knowledge. no other lieutenant has been asked to sign such an acknowledgement.
(Doc. 28-3, p. 38) (amended charge). As you can see, Chames twice pinned
the blame on the County Commission, not Sheriff Wade. Rather than
paint Sheriff Wade as the villain, Chames told the EEOC that Sheriff
Wade tried but ultimately failed to secure the full $17,000 raise for her.
She also told the EEOC that the written waiver was the same general
waiver of “rights as a civil service rights” included in the previously pasted
letters signed by white non-civil service employees. Chames never
20
mentioned a ‘no future raises’ condition, much less Wade creating the
condition because of racial animus.
Chames pleaded the same pro-Wade narrative in her November
2020 complaint against the County Commission, and her proposed
amended complaint in April 2021 (quoted below):
41. Sheriff Wade agreed that Plaintiff’s pay was unfair and
told her that he would petition the Commission to increase
her salary.
42. Around April 2019, Sheriff Wade informed Plaintiff that
he had petitioned the Defendant to increase her pay, but the
members would not agree to raise her salary.
43. Shortly thereafter, Sheriff Wade told Plaintiff that he
was going to draft a letter to the Commission to formally
request that her pay be increased to an amount comparable
to the white male Lieutenants.
44. In May 2019, Sheriff Wade informed her that the
Commission was considering increasing her salary by
$5,000.00 per year. . . .
50. On June 28, 2019, Chief Deputy Jon Garlick (white male)
notified Plaintiff that the Commission decided to offer her a
$5,000.00 salary increase.
51. Chief Deputy Garlic also told Plaintiff that Sheriff Wade
tried to persuade the Defendant to offer her a raise that
would bring her salary in line with the white male
Lieutenants, but the Commission refused.
52. Chief Deputy Jon Garlick presented Plaintiff with an
acknowledgement to sign in exchange for the $5,000.00 per
year raise.
53. The acknowledgement stated that Sheriff Wade was
financially responsible for Plaintiff’s raise and that Plaintiff
agreed to waive her rights as a civil service employee.
Chief Deputy Garlick also reported that Sheriff Wade had
tried to persuade the County to remedy the pay disparity,
but that the County had refused. (Doc. 1 at 6).
In exchange for her $5,000 pay increase, Lt. Chames was
expected to sign an “acknowledgment stat[ing] that Sheriff
Wade was financially responsible for [Lt. Chames’] raise and
that [Lt. Chames] agreed to waive her rights as a civil service
employee.” (Id.). Lt. Chames refused to sign the document.
(Id.). The other two lieutenants both received a $10,000
raise, exacerbating the pay gap. (Id.).
Chames v. Calhoun County Comm’n, ALND No. 1:20-cv-1826 (Doc. 13-1)
(filed April 28, 2021). Having reviewed both EEOC charges and both case
records, it seems that Chames did not blame Sheriff Wade for the lowball
offer, and never mentioned a ‘no future raises’ condition, until Chames
sued the Sheriff’s Department after (a) Judge Axon dismissed her case
against the County Commission and (b) the EEOC issued Chames a
second right to sue letter, opening the door to sue the sheriff.
iii. Consequence: Rule 56(e)(4) allows the court to enter an
“appropriate order” if the nonmoving party “fails to properly support an
assertion of fact” made in her opposition. The court finds that the
appropriate order is not considering Chames’ fact assertion that Wade
conditioned the $5,000 raise on Chames’ forfeiting all future raises when
judging her discrimination claims. This ruling is warranted because
Chames fails to properly support this assertion, and Wade denies it. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The ruling is appropriate—if not too lenient—
because Chames told a different story to the EEOC and this court, then
changed her tune after losing her case against the County Commission,
leaving only the sheriff to sue.
—
To sum up, Wade presents evidence that would allow a reasonable
juror to find that Chames was paid less than Murray and Hurst for two
nondiscriminatory reasons: (1) Chames’ job was fundamentally different
and required less training and certification, and (2) Chames was employed
within the civil service system, while Murray and Hurst were not. Chames
fails to counter with evidence that would allow the same reasonable juror
to instead find that Wade paid Chames less because of her race.
At best, Chames’ opposition and supporting evidence demonstrate
that she believes that Wade considered race when deciding who to remove
from civil service status. But perception is not evidence, and “an inference
is not reasonable if it is only a guess or a possibility, for such an inference
is not based on the evidence but is pure conjecture and speculation.”
Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1982)
(quotation omitted). And “[s]peculation does not create a genuine issue of
fact; instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a primary
goal of summary judgment.” Cordoba v. Dillard’s Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181
(11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted).
Because Chames fails to create a genuine dispute whether race was
a but-for cause of the pay gap, Wade is entitled to summary judgment on
Counts 1 and 4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 56(e)(3).
Counts 5, 7: Gender Discrimination, § 1983 and Title VII
In Counts 5 and 7, Chames argues that Wade paid her less than
Murray and Hurst because Chames was female. Wade offers the same
evidence that the court found would allow a reasonable juror to find either
or both that (a) Wade had to pay Chames differently than Murray and
Hurst because of civil service statutes and rules and/or (b) Wade paid
Murray and Hurst differently than Chames because they performed
different jobs, that required more qualifications, than Chames. Thus, to
avoid summary judgment, Chames must offer enough evidence to allow
the same reasonable juror to instead find that Wade paid Chames
differently because she was female. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 56(e).
Chames, however, offers the same fact assertions to support her
gender discrimination claim that the court rejected as supporting Chames’
race discrimination claim. See (doc. 63, pp. 20-25). So the court adopts its
analysis of Counts 1 and 4 to find that Chames’ evidence fails to create a
genuine debate about the reason for her pay disparity. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1); 56(e). Further, while the court does not apply McDonnell Douglas
for the reasons explained, the court notes that Chames fails to point to
any similarly situated male employees to help prove gender
discrimination. Chames mentions only one male employee that held the
same position that she did (corrections lieutenant): Judson Blewster. But
it is undisputed that Blewster simultaneously worked for the Mental
Health Board as a mental health officer, which resulted in extra pay from
funds that Wade did not control.
Because Chames fails to create a genuine dispute whether gender
was a but-for cause of the pay gap, Wade is entitled to summary judgment
on Counts 5 and 7. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 56(e)(3).
Counts 6, 9: Unequal Pay, Equal Pay Act and Lily Ledbetter
In Counts 6 and 9, Chames alleges that the pay gap between her,
Hurst, and Murray violated the Equal Pay Act and the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act. But the LLFPA does not create independent causes of action;
it clarifies how courts determine the start of the limitations period for
challenging pay discrimination. See Tarmas v. Sec’y of Navy, 433 Fed.
App’x 754, 760 (11th Cir. 2011). The court thus analyzes Chames’ claim
under the EPA.
1. Legal standard: “The EPA prohibits wage discrimination on the
basis of sex and forbids the specific practice of paying unequal wages for
equal work to employees of the opposite sex.” Baker v. Upson Reg’l Medical
Ctr., 94 F.4th 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2024). Courts analyze EPA claims in
two steps. The first step is the plaintiff’s prima facie case. To prove her
EPA claim, Chames must show that her “employer pays different wages
to employees of opposite sexes for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions.” Id. If Chames meets her
burden, the second step is Wade proving one of four affirmative defenses:
(1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (4) a differential based
on any factor other than sex. Id.
Wade argues that it is entitled to summary judgment under both
steps, but as explained below, the court needn’t go past step one because
Chames fails to create a genuine dispute on her required elements.
2. Wade’s evidence: Wade argues that, in step one, Chames cannot
prove that the job of corrections lieutenant (a) “requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility” and (b) is performed “under similar working
conditions” compared to the job of investigations lieutenant and patrol
lieutenant. Id. On the first point, Wade provides the Sheriff’s
Department’s Standard Operating Procedure (“SOP,” doc. 56-4) and
points to multiple differences in the responsibilities of a corrections
employee (SOP § 31), a patrol employee (SOP § 30), and an investigation
employee (SOP § 32). Merely pasting the “responsibility” section for each
division demonstrates that each division requires distinct skills, efforts,
and responsibilities:
31.000 CORRECTIONS DIVISION
31.010 Functions and Responsibility
This division has the responsibility for the operation of the Calhoun County, Jail and
involves the custedy, security and the care of all sentenced and pre-sentenced
prisoners held in these facilities. This division has the primary responsibility for
checking all in-coming prisoners for outstanding arrest warrants through the county,
state and national computer systems, documentation of charges and for removing
such persons from the system in accordance with jail procedures.
This division has jurisdiction over all persons booked into the county jail system
during the time they are inmates of the jail division. It is also responsible for the
location and status records for all county inmates. Additionally, it is responsible for
stored personal property and clothing of all inmates.
26
30.000 PATROL DIVISION
30.010 Functions and Responsibility
This division is responsible for providing law enforcement services to the citizens
of Calhoun County, including the performance of the basic tasks of protecting life
and property, preserving the peace, ferreting out crime, on criminal
activity, and the apprehension of violators of the law.
Each Deputy individually and collectively is responsible for the following;
¢ Enforcing Federal, State and County statutes and ordinances :
e Initial investigation of reported or observed crimes with follow up as needed
e Recording and preserving evidence found at crime scene
e Initial investigation of reports of missing, found or unidentified persons
e Responding to scenes of emergencies
e Arresting on-sight violators
e Recovering property .
e Investigating complaints received from the public
Patrolling to prevent and suppress crime
e Providing assistance to other public agencies pertaining to the elimination of
- health or safety hazards
e Maintaining law and order at public gatherings
e Preparing reports of incidents investigated or observed
e Observing and inspecting drivers, vehicles and roadways
e Supervising traffic movement as needed
e Checking and patrolling areas of high traffic hazard
¢ Arresting or citing traffic violators, issuing warnings on minor violations
e Preserving evidence
e Testifying in court
e Providing traffic information on request of the public
e Assisting members of the public or other public safety agencies as needed
e Security and transportation of prisoners
e Perform other duties as assigned
27
32.000 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
32.010 Functions and Responsibility
The responsibility of the criminal investigations Division of the Calhoun County
Sheriff's Office is to make a full investigation of all crimes reported in the area of
operations of the Sheriff's Office, to assist other agencies on those occasions that a
crime committed in another jurisdiction requires investigative efforts in (Calhoun
County and conduct investigations in Calhoun County as directed by supervision
This Division will follow up on all reported felony crimes in the Sherifi's Office
jurisdiction, initiate criminal investigations based on evidence or information
reported, recover property, identify and preserve evidence, maintain a database of
stolen property (hot sheet), criminal information and a list of reported crimes.
Division personnel will work with and assist as possible members of othr public
safety agencies in and around Calhoun County to solve criminal cases! Every
attempt will be made to share criminal information with surrounding agencies.
Investigating deputies will contact victims and advise them that they will be assigned
to follow up on their case and co-ordinate with patrol units to check with persons in
the area of the crime for information. Investigating deputies shall keep the victims
of cases appraised of the status of their case.
Deputies assigned to the investigative division shall organize and maintain case files
on all cases. Files will include a copy of report, statements of witnesses, lab reports,
photographs, copies of documents, statements of suspects, copies of arrest warrants,
search warrants and any other pertinent information. Deputies shall document all
case work activity with supplemental forms. On all cases where an arrest has been
made or the case is being presented to a grand jury, the deputy will provide|the D.A.
's office with a case file with copies of all information listed above. Files are to be
maintained at the Sheriff's Office.
Personnel will participate in regular training programs for professional development.
There is an on-call schedule for evenings and weekends. A copy of the list shall be
forwarded to communications and other supervisors.
The on-call Investigator may operate their unmarked agency vehicle during the
hours they are on call. The vehicle may be used for personal business as long as the
business is appropriate to standards of professional conduct. The On Call
Investigators may not use alcoholic beverages and be available for telephone contact
via their agency issued phone.
(Doc. 56-4, §§ 30.010, 31.010, 32.010).
28
Of course, differing responsibilities means differing skills, training,
and certifications. The skill and training required to investigate crimes is
different from the skill and training required to manage confidential
informants and make arrests, which is different from the skill and
training involved in managing inmates housed in the county jail. It also
means differing jurisdictions. Patrol, for example, covers all persons with
the geographical boundaries of Calhoun County (SOP § 30.020), while
corrections’ jurisdiction is limited to “all persons booked into the county
jail system during the time they are inmates of the jail division.” (SOP §
31.010).
Simply put, Wade’s evidence would allow a reasonable juror to find
that Hurst, Murray, and Chames performed fundamentally different jobs
that involved different skills, training, and jurisdiction. As a result, Wade
is entitled to summary judgment on the EPA claims unless Chames
provides evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to find instead that
her job (a) “requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility” and (b) is
performed “under similar working conditions” as the jobs performed by
Hurst and Murray. Baker, 94 F.4th at 1317.
3. Chames’ evidence: Chames does not point to any evidence that
equates her job, credentials, and jurisdiction to Murray’s and Hurst’s jobs,
credentials, and jurisdiction. She instead reiterates (a) the difference in
pay between herself and her male colleagues and (b) Wade’s ability to
spend money to close the gap:
[A] plaintiff may defeat summary judgment by pointing to a
genuine dispute of a material fact in the Rule 56 record. The
record in this case shows, that according to pay documents,
Judson Blewster, Josh Doggrell, William Moses, Joey Stone,
Falon Hurst, and Ronnie Murray, all males, received
substantially more pay than Chames.
Wade will likely reiterate in his reply, the simple reason for
pay differences is APOST certification and differences in
years on the civil service pay scale create the discrepancy in
pay. But the record contains evidence that Wade had the
ability to set pay wages for male employees while allowing
them to receive future raises while the same prospect was
not offered to Chames. Thus, summary judgment must be
denied.
(Doc. 63, p. 33). Chames’ argument misses the point. Proving that a male
co-worker is paid more is not enough. Nor is proving that Wade could have
paid female employees more. Chames also has to prove that a male
employee who was paid more than Chames performed a job that “requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility . . . under similar working
conditions.” Baker, 94 F.4th at 1317. Chames offers no such evidence. Nor,
when deposed, could Chames articulate the responsibilities of her male
comparators. See (doc. 51-1, pp. 53, 54, 72, 76, 84, 143).
Because Chames offers no evidence that would equate her
responsibilities, credentials, and jurisdiction to those of her male
comparators, Chames fails to create a genuine dispute of fact in step one
of her EPA claim. See Baker, 94 F.4th at 1317. Wade is thus entitled to
summary judgment on Counts 6 and 9. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 56(e)(3).
Count 2: Retaliation, § 1981 and 1983
Finally, Chames alleges in Count 2 that, in retaliation for Chames
complaining about the pay disparity among lieutenants to her supervisor,
Corrections Captain Eric Starr, Sheriff Wade offered her a $5,000 raise
instead of the $17,000 needed to close the pay gap.
1. Legal standard: “To establish a claim of retaliation under Title
VII or section 1981, a plaintiff must prove that he engaged in statutorily
protected activity, he suffered a materially adverse action, and there was
some causal relation between the two events.” Goldsmith v. Bagby
Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)). Wade argues that offering
to pay Chames $5,000 a year more than her pre-complaint salary is not a
materially adverse action.
2. No genuine dispute: The court needn’t do a full Rule 56 analysis
because the parties agree on the material facts:
o Chames was offered a choice between (a) accepting a
$5,000 raise and forgoing civil service status or (b)
keeping her current salary and remaining in civil
service status.
o Chames declined the raise and stayed in civil service
status.3
Because there is no genuine dispute on these material facts, the court
faces a question of law: Was offering Chames a $5,000 raise, rather than
a $17,000 raise, a materially adverse action?
As mentioned, retaliation claims under Title VII and § 1981 share
the same elements. Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1277. In a Title VII case, the
Supreme Court recently held that to prove discrimination against an
employee with respect to the terms or conditions of her employment, the
employee must show that the employer’s action “brought about some
‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or condition.” Muldrow
v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. 346, 354 (2024). Chames urges the
court to apply the Muldrow test to her claim. (Doc. 63, p. 27).
The court obliges and finds that offering Chames a choice between
a $5,000 raise or the status quo did not bring any disadvantageous change
in Chames’ employment terms and conditions. Chames was subject to the
same terms, conditions, salary, and potential pay increases on (a) the day
3 As discussed, the court finds that Chames’ assertion that Wade conditioned the $5,000 raise
on Chames’ agreement to forgo all future pay increases is not properly supported by the record
evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). So the court does not consider a ‘no future raise’ condition
as part of the raise offer here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(4). That said, the court would still find
that Chames cannot prove an adverse action even if Wade personally added a ‘no future raise’
condition to the $5,000 offer. As Wade points out, if Chames took the $5,000 and never received
another pay raise, it would take more than a decade for the annual 1.31% pay increase to catch
the one-time, up-front offer. So the $5,000 offer was not adverse to Chames’ status quo, even
considering the offer in the light least favorable to Wade.
she complained to Captain Starr and (b) the day she declined the $5,000
raise. Not only did the $5,000 offer not bring about a “disadvantageous”
change, Muldrow, supra, it brought no change at all. Put in Rule 56
terms, no reasonable juror could find that being faced with a choice of
more money or the status quo was an adverse response to Chames’
complaint.
Chames offers a novel theory of adversity—i.e., forcing Chames to
repeatedly receive an insufficient paycheck:
[E]ach time that Chames receives a paycheck that is
insufficient, she suffers from an adverse action. Based on the
premise in Muldrow regarding adverse actions, a reasonable
jury could infer that all Chames has to show is that each
paycheck leaves her in a financial disadvantage, to meet the
adverse action threshold.
(Doc. 63, p. 30). This theory is flawed. Even if Chames’ paycheck is
insufficient, Chames was receiving the same insufficient check before she
complained. That necessarily means that the check’s deficiency was not
an adverse reaction to Chames’ complaint.
Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and Chames
cannot meet an essential element of her retaliation claim, the court will
grant Wade summary judgment on Count 2. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons above, the court GRANTS Wade’s motion for
summary judgment and will DISMISS all counts WITH PREJUDICE.
The court will enter a separate order that carries out this ruling and
closes this case.
DONE and ORDERED on August 7, 2025.
COREY MAZE □
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
33