The opinion
Filed 8/7/25 P. v. Compian CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B333792
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA138169)
v.
CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH COMPIAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Andrew C. Kim, Judge. Remanded with
direction.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Noah P. Hill and Stephanie C. Brenan, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Christopher Compian of various crimes,
and a court sentenced him to a prison term that included 2 five-
year enhancements under Penal Code1 section 667, subdivision
(a)(1). Thereafter, the trial court resentenced Compian under
section 1172.1 but declined to exercise its discretion to dismiss
the five-year enhancements. After the resentencing hearing and
while this case was pending appeal, our California Supreme
Court decided People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 (Walker),
which clarified how a court should determine whether to dismiss
an enhancement. Compian appeals, contending that the trial
court was unaware of the scope of its discretion in light of Walker.
We disagree with that contention. However, we agree with his
other contention that the trial court failed to calculate his actual
credits. We therefore remand with the direction to the trial court
to calculate Compian’s actual credits but otherwise affirm the
judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. The underlying conviction and sentence
In 2015, Compian and his wife took items from a grocery
store without paying for them. A store employee asked if they
had a problem, and Compian pulled out a gun and told the
employee to back off.
In 2016, a jury convicted Compian of second degree robbery
(§ 211; count 1) and of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
subd. (a)(1); count 2).2 At the April 21, 2017 sentencing hearing,
defense counsel argued, in support of a Romero3 motion, that
Compian had diabetes and posttraumatic stress disorder, was
bipolar, suffered from mental illness, and had been addicted to
drugs since age 13. The court then found that Compian had two
prior convictions, one from 1980 and the second from 1992,
within the meaning of the Three Strikes law and granted the
Romero motion to strike the 1980 conviction. The court
sentenced Compian to the high term of five years on count 1,
doubled to 10 years; to 2 five-year terms under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1); and to 16 months on count 2. His total
sentence therefore was 21 years 4 months.
II. Resentencing proceedings
In 2022, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(the department) notified the trial court it had authority to
resentence Compian under section 1172.1 (former section
1170.03). Specifically, the trial court now had discretion to strike
the five-year enhancements that had been imposed under section
667, subdivision (a)(1).
The department submitted with its notification a
cumulative case summary and evaluation report. The report
summarized Compian’s juvenile and adult criminal history, and
parole history. It also stated that Compian had three rules
violation reports (two in 2020 and one in 2021), one counseling
2
The jury deadlocked on a section 12022.53, subdivision (b),
gun use allegation and the court dismissed the allegation in the
interest of justice.
3
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero).
3
chrono4 for disobeying an order, and that he was currently a
housing unit clerk/porter for which he had received one
exceptional and nine above satisfactory marks. Compian had not
followed through on self-help activities. His mental health status
was “listed as Correctional Clinical Case Management System
Level of Care.”
The trial court scheduled a status conference, and the
parties submitted briefing.
A. The People’s resentencing brief
The People in their brief reviewed Compian’s extensive
criminal history, which included juvenile adjudications, multiple
violations of the Vehicle and Health and Safety Codes, burglaries
in 1991 and 1992, and a petty theft with a prior for which he was
sentenced to 25 years to life. After serving 16 years of that
sentence, Compian was resentenced under Proposition 47 and
released, but he soon reoffended. In 2017, while incarcerated for
the current offenses, Compian secreted heroin and
methamphetamine in his body on behalf of the Mexican Mafia.
Compian was charged with crimes arising out of this conduct,
and pled guilty to possessing a controlled substance in prison
(§ 4573.6, subd. (a)) and sentenced to three years in prison. Thus,
Compian had not been free from incarceration for any significant
time as an adult.
While incarcerated and as of June 2023, Compian had not
earned credits, had failed to maintain membership in a substance
4
A “chrono” refers to the department’s form used to
document information about an inmate’s behavior, including
disciplinary action. (People v. Gibson (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 315,
328, fn. 5.)
4
abuse recovery group, had not completed a substance abuse
treatment program or other self-help program, and his Central
file did not contain any laudatory chronos of recognition.
Compian had minimal disciplinary history during his current
prison term, although he had a serious rules violation for an
assault on a prisoner and three other serious rules violations for
possessing a cellphone, contraband, and refusing to accept
housing or delaying a peace officer. His file also contained rules
violations from prior terms of incarceration.
Compian was a Level III inmate, with Level IV being the
highest security risk. He was considered high risk for substance
abuse, criminal personality, and education, anger, and
employment problems. He was an active member of a prison
gang.
The People urged that Compian remained a risk to public
safety but not an undue one as defined in section 1170.18. For
that reason, the People asked the court to reduce his sentence by
eight months by not doubling the sentence on count 2 and to
therefore resentence him to a total term of 20 years 8 months.
B. Compian’s resentencing brief
In his briefing, Compian argued that his continued
incarceration was no longer in the interest of justice based on his
age of 63, his degenerative disc disease, and his efforts to
rehabilitate. Further, he did not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety. He therefore asked the court to strike
the 2 five-year enhancements under section 1385 and Senate Bill
No. 1393,5 to impose the midterm of three years on count 1
5
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1393 gave trial
courts authority to strike section 667, subdivision (a)(1),
5
doubled to six years, and to impose 16 months on count 2, for a
total prison term of seven years four months.
In support of his resentencing request, Compian attached
two laudatory chronos and a certificate showing he completed
viral control training in 2020. Compian also submitted a letter
dated 2021 from a correctional officer expressing support for
Compian’s early release from prison. In the officer’s opinion, “a
prisoner should be considered for early release when he has
served enough time to be eligible and is no longer deemed a
threat to society.” In his 11 years as a correctional officer, this
was the first time the officer felt compelled to support a prisoner’s
release. On several occasions, the officer saw Compian use his
influence to persuade other inmates to avoid violence. Compian
showed compassion to others, had earned other inmates’ and staff
respect, and had been selected to be a housing unit clerk from
190 inmates.
C. The resentencing hearing
At the August 28, 2023 resentencing hearing, the trial
court found that Compian did not pose an undue risk under
section 1170.18 (that is, he was not at risk of committing a super
strike); however, he had an “abysmal criminal history.” The trial
court noted that Compian did not have “a whole lot of
improvement in institutional adjustment,” he had possessed
weapons in custody and, as recently as 2017, had also possessed
contraband and narcotics, he had not “seriously participated in
programming” despite receiving some laudatory commendations,
and he used a gun during the current offense. The trial court
enhancements. (See generally People v. Alexander (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 341, 344.)
6
said it had considered Compian’s age and physical condition but
would not exercise its discretion to dismiss the five-year priors.
The trial court resentenced Compian to the midterm of
three years, doubled to six years, to 2 five-year terms under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and to eight months doubled to 16
months on count 2, for a total prison term of 17 years 4 months.
The trial court directed the department to calculate Compian’s
actual and conduct credits.
After the trial court announced its judgment, it asked
defense counsel if he wanted to augment the record. Counsel said
no but added that Compian had been hopeful the trial court
would strike one of the five-year priors. Counsel again pointed
out that Compian was 63 years old and in poor health, so he
asked the court to reconsider striking at least one enhancement.
In response, the trial court repeated that it had considered
Compian’s medical issues, but, even so, would not strike a five-
year prior.
DISCUSSION
I. General legal principles and standard of review
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), authorizes a court to
recall and resentence a defendant convicted of a felony “at any
time” upon the department’s recommendation. The court may
resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant
had not previously been sentenced, provided the sentence is no
greater than the initial sentence. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).)
The resentencing court shall consider postconviction
factors, including, but not limited to, the defendant’s disciplinary
record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated; evidence
reflecting that age, time served, and diminished physical
7
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence; and evidence reflecting that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(5).) Also, the court shall consider if the defendant has
experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma. (Ibid.)
There is a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing, and
the presumption may be overcome only if the court finds that the
defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, as defined in section 1170.18, subdivision (c).
(§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) “ ‘[U]nreasonable risk of danger to public
safety’ ” is “an unreasonable risk the petitioner will commit a new
violent felony within the meaning of” section 667, subdivision (e),
which lists felonies known as super strikes. (§ 1170.18, subd. (c);
People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 819.) The
presumption favors recalling the defendant’s sentence, but the
sentence ultimately imposed is left to the court’s discretion
without further consideration of the presumption. (Braggs, at
pp. 819–820.)
In resentencing the defendant, the court “shall apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in
law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as
to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2).) As relevant here, Senate
Bill No. 81 (2021–2022) effected a change in law by adding
subdivision (c) to section 1385. That subdivision provides,
“[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except
if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute.” (§ 1385, subd. (c).) “In exercising its discretion under
8
this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight
to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2).)
Mitigating circumstances include where multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case, in which instance, “all
enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed”;
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over
20 years, in which instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed;
the current offense is connected to mental illness; the current
offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma;
the current offense is not a violent felony as defined in section
667.5, subdivision (c); and the enhancement is based on a prior
conviction that is over five years old. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
While this case was pending appeal, our California
Supreme Court clarified in Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th 1024 how
trial courts should apply section 1385, subdivision (c). The court
had granted review on whether “ ‘the amendment to Penal Code
section 1385, subdivision (c) that requires trial courts to “afford
great weight” to enumerated mitigating circumstances (Stats.
2021, ch. 721) create[s] a rebuttable presumption in favor of
dismissing an enhancement unless the trial court finds dismissal
would endanger public safety[.]’ ” (Walker, at p. 1031.)
9
Walker held that section 1385, subdivision (c), does not
create a rebuttable presumption. Instead, “absent a finding that
dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the
discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it
assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating
circumstances when they are present.” (Walker, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1029) The court then addressed what it means for a
mitigating circumstance to weigh greatly in favor of dismissing
an enhancement. (Id. at p. 1034.) The court found that
resentencing courts must give special emphasis (id. at p. 1036) or
“assign significant value” (id. at p. 1038) to the enumerated
mitigating factors. “Stated simply, if the court does not conclude
that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating
circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But
ultimately, the court must determine whether dismissal is in
furtherance of justice. This means that, absent a danger to
public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating
circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an
enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless
neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance,
such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1036; see also id. at p. 1038.)
We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847; accord
People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375.) The abuse of
discretion standard is highly deferential and requires us to follow
two fundamental precepts. (Carmony, at p. 376.) First, the party
attacking the sentence has the burden to clearly show the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary, and absent such a
10
showing, we presume that the trial court acted to achieve
legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review. (Id. at pp. 376–377.) Second, we will not reverse
a decision merely because reasonable people might disagree, as
we are not allowed to substitute our judgment for the trial court’s
judgment. (Id. at p. 377.) “Taken together, these precepts
establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its
decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person
could agree with it.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in
the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court.
[Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its
discretionary powers can no more exercise that “informed
discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have been based
on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s
record.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) In
such a case, we remand for resentencing unless the record clearly
indicates that the trial court would have reached the same
conclusion even if it had known it had such discretion. (Ibid.;
accord, People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 231.)
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
Compian contends that remand is required so that the trial
court can reconsider whether to dismiss his five-year
enhancements because it did not have the benefit of Walker at
the resentencing hearing. The Attorney General responds that
Compian has forfeited the issue and, in any event, no abuse of
discretion occurred.
11
A. Forfeiture
Complaints about how a trial court exercises its sentencing
discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331,
356.) “Although the court is required to impose sentence in a
lawful manner, counsel is charged with understanding,
advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the
hearing.” (Id. at p. 353.)
Here, Compian’s trial counsel did ask the trial court to
dismiss the five-year enhancements under section 1385,
subdivision (c), both in his written brief and at the resentencing
hearing. The Attorney General acknowledges this, but argues
that Compian’s cursory treatment of the issue and failure to
discuss the mitigating circumstances nonetheless constitute a
forfeiture.
Compian’s arguments in his briefs and at the resentencing
hearing why the five-year enhancements under section 1385,
subdivision (c), should be dismissed were certainly desultory. He
did not, for example, argue that Compian’s substance abuse
constituted a mental illness (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D)) or that he
suffered prior victimization or childhood trauma (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(E)). Nor did he highlight that the enhancements were
based on convictions more than five years old. (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(H)).
Nonetheless, we cannot find that Compian forfeited the
issue. As we have said, counsel raised the issue in his written
brief. And at the resentencing hearing, counsel specifically asked
the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike at least one five-
year enhancement, citing Compian’s poor health. To be sure,
counsel could have more cogently laid out any evidence
12
supporting the mitigating circumstances; for example, there were
multiple enhancements (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)), and the prior
convictions were based on enhancements from 1980 and 1992,
and therefore were more than five years old (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(H)). And he could have made a connection between
Compian’s substance abuse and any mental illness. Even so, the
relevant facts were in the record, i.e., the age of the prior
convictions and that Compian began abusing substances at age
13. The record shows that the trial court knew about this
evidence because it said it had read the department’s request for
resentencing (which cited the discretion given to courts to strike
enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c)), both parties’
briefs, the abstract of judgment, and the transcript from the
original 2017 sentencing hearing.
We therefore do not agree that Compian forfeited the issue.
B. Walker does not require remand
Turning to the merits, we cannot conclude that the trial
court was unaware of the scope if its discretion based on Walker.
Rather, when Compian’s resentencing hearing was held in
August 2023, section 1385, subdivision (c), had been in effect for
almost two years. The statute was clear that a trial court “shall”
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice and
that proof of one or more mitigating circumstances “weighs
greatly” in favor of dismissing an enhancement, unless doing so
would endanger public safety. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1), (2).)
Therefore, the trial court clearly was aware it had discretion to
dismiss an enhancement.
Similarly, as for the trial court not knowing the scope of its
discretion, this is not a case where legislation affecting how a
trial court exercises its sentencing discretion became effective
13
after a defendant was sentenced and before the judgment became
final. (See, e.g., People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416
(Salazar).) Instead, at the time of Compian’s sentencing hearing,
the new law was in effect, but courts of appeal were split about
whether it created a rebuttable presumption (People v. Walker
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, reversed by Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th
1024) or required a court to engage in a holistic approach with
special emphasis on any mitigating circumstances that weigh
strongly in favor of dismissal, in the absence of a finding
dismissing an enhancement would endanger public safety (People
v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087). Our California Supreme
Court resolved that dispute while Compian’s case was on appeal
by agreeing with Ortiz.
Thus, while Walker clarified how a trial court should
exercise its discretion, it did not clarify that a trial court had
discretion in the first place. Here, the trial court knew it had
discretion but declined to exercise it because of Compian’s
extensive criminal history. The trial court thus cited Compian’s
failure to take self-improvement programs and possession of
contraband, including weapons and narcotics, in prison. Stated
otherwise, the trial court found that dismissing an enhancement
would endanger public safety. Even if the trial court did not use
those precise words, the court “ ‘is not required to state reasons
for declining to exercise its discretion under section 1385’
[citations], and ‘is presumed to have considered all of the relevant
factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary’
[citation].” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637;
see also People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1390.)
Compian has not shown that whether the trial court
believed that section 1385, subdivision (c), created a rebuttable
14
presumption or required placing a special emphasis on mitigating
circumstances would have impacted that finding. That is,
whether dismissing an enhancement would endanger public
safety is a separate inquiry from whether a mitigating
circumstance weighs greatly in favor of dismissing an
enhancement. Section 1385, subdivision (c), states that the
presence of a mitigating factor weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing an enhancement “unless” the trial court finds that
doing so would endanger public safety. (Italics added.) A trial
court thus need engage in the weighing process described in
Walker only if it has found that dismissing the enhancement
would not endanger public safety, meaning dismissal would not
result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) The trial court here found that dismissing
an enhancement would endanger public safety. (See, e.g., People
v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 337 [§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)
does not require dismissal of enhancement when it would
endanger public safety]; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
287, 291 [same as to § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)].) The trial court
therefore had no occasion to reach the weighing process that
Walker clarified.
Compian, however, cites Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th 416, to
support his argument that remand is required. In that case, the
defense presented evidence at the sentencing hearing that
Salazar had a history of mental illness since age 10 and had been
diagnosed with a form of schizophrenia. Despite this diagnosis,
the trial court sentenced Salazar to the middle term for his crime
and denied a Romero motion, based on his “ ‘long and continuous
criminal history.’ ” (Id. at p. 422.) While Salazar’s appeal was
pending, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 567. That bill
15
amended section 1170 to provide that “ ‘unless the court finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
imposition of the lower term if,’ among other things, the
defendant ‘has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma,’ and this trauma ‘was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense.’ ” (Salazar, at p. 423.)
The Salazar court rejected the Attorney General’s
argument that the record clearly indicated the trial court would
have imposed the same sentence had it known the scope of its
discretion. (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 426–427.) The
court noted that the new law created a presumption in favor of
the lower term if a qualifying trauma contributed to the crime’s
commission. (Id. at p. 426.) There was evidence that Salazar had
a qualifying trauma, and although the trial court referenced
Salazar’s extensive criminal history, it also noted several
mitigating factors in that history, including how drug use
affected Salazar’s criminal history. (Id. at p. 427.) The court
concluded that this was “simply not the kind of record upon
which we can conclude that there is a clear indication that the
sentencing court would have exercised its discretion under
current section 1170 to impose the same middle term as before.”
(Salazar, at pp. 427–428.)
Salazar is distinguishable because the relevant law was not
in effect when the defendant was sentenced, and therefore the
trial court was unaware of the presumption favoring the low term
if Salazar had a qualifying trauma. In contrast, section 1385,
subdivision (c), was in effect at Compian’s resentencing hearing,
so the trial court here knew it had to consider any mitigating
16
circumstances. We presume the trial court knew and applied the
law and all relevant factors absent evidence to the contrary.
(People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1390; People v.
Brugman, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 637.) Given that
presumption and the trial court’s express statement that it was
declining to exercise its discretion to dismiss an enhancement, we
cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion.6
III. Custody credits
At the resentencing hearing, the trial court directed the
department to calculate Compian’s actual credits. However, the
parties agree that the trial court had to calculate the credits.
When a defendant is resentenced, “the sentencing court must
recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual
time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison,
and whether before or since he was originally committed and
delivered to prison custody.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26
Cal.4th 20, 29.) Therefore, the trial court had to recalculate
Compian’s credits, which the parties further agree totals 3,264
days, calculated as 3,141 actual days and 123 days of presentence
conduct credits.
6
Because we conclude that remand under section 1170.18 is
unnecessary, we need not address Compian’s request that we
direct the trial court to order an updated probation report.
17
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with the direction to the trial court
to modify the judgment to award custody credits in the amount of
3,141 actual days plus 123 days of presentence conduct credits,
for a total of 3,264 days and to forward an amended abstract of
judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
ADAMS, J.
GAAB, J.*
* Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
18