Claudio v. Guthrie

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

JONATHAN ANIBAL CLAUDIO PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 5:23-cv-05158-TLB-CDC

CORPORAL TANNER GUTHRIE, Benton

County Sheriff’s Office/Detention Center DEFENDANT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Jonathan A. Claudio (“Claudio”), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Claudio contends his constitutional rights were violated when he was arrested in South

Carolina and extradited to Arkansas based on a warrant obtained by Defendant Guthrie. In his

Complaint, Claudio alleges his constitutional rights were violated because of an arbitrary arrest,

false imprisonment, racial profiling, malicious prosecution, false arrest, illegal extradition, illegal

search and seizure, and defamation, libel and slander. (ECF No. 1 at 5). Claudio was acting pro

se at the time he filed his Complaint but was subsequently appointed an attorney.1 In his summary

judgment response, Claudio has abandoned all claims except for the malicious prosecution claim

and his claim that his arrest was unsupported by probable cause because there were material

falsehoods or omissions contained in the affidavit for the arrest warrant.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), United States District Judge

Timothy L. Brooks referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and

Recommendation. The case is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

1 The Court would like to express its appreciation to Mr. Alex Mickel and Ms. Colette Brashears

for undertaking representation of Claudio on a pro bono basis.

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Defendant Guthrie. (ECF Nos. 62-64). Claudio filed a response (ECF Nos. 70-72), and Defendant

replied. (ECF Nos. 75-76).

I. BACKGROUND

The facts in this case are largely undisputed. On October 30, 2022, at 20:36 (8:36 pm)

Defendant Guthrie was in pursuit of a fleeing vehicle which he knew to be stolen out of Mayes

County, Oklahoma. (ECF No. 72 at 1); (ECF No. 64-2 at 1). The pursued vehicle traveled at speeds

more than 100 miles per hour until it collided with another vehicle and was propelled into a field

due to the momentum from the accident. (ECF No. 72 at 1).

Defendant Guthrie observed a Hispanic male with a shaved head, facial hair, blue work

shirt, and dark blue pants exit the vehicle. (ECF No. 72 at 2). The suspect looked at Defendant

Guthrie and began to flee on foot. Id.

Defendant Guthrie deployed a patrol canine and engaged in foot pursuit. (ECF No. 72 at

2). During the foot pursuit, Defendant Guthrie fell, resulting in extensive cuts to both his hands.

Id. Defendant Guthrie attempted to continue the pursuit, but there was a large amount of blood

running down his hands, rendering them ineffectual. Id. Returning to the stolen vehicle,

Defendant Guthrie observed a passenger, later identified as Summer Wolfe (“Wolfe”), being

placed into custody by other officers who had arrived at the scene. (ECF No. 72 at 2). Deputy

Steven Scott read Wolfe her Miranda Warning, and she waived her right to counsel. Id. Deputy

Scott then asked Wolfe to identify the driver, to which she replied, “that’s my fiancé and I’m not

giving up shit.” Id.

One of the officers on the scene reported to Guthrie that they located Wolfe’s Facebook

page and may know the identity of her fiancé from her Facebook page, a man named Claudio.

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(ECF No. 72 at 2). The man on Wolfe’s Facebook page was identified as Jonathan Claudio. Id.

Claudio and Wolfe are in each other’s Facebook pictures, and have “loved” each other’s pictures.

Id.

Deandra Bartley is the wife a police officer and was with her husband when he received

the call; Bartley showed Claudio’s Facebook page to Defendant Guthrie. (ECF No. 72 at 3).

Defendant Guthrie positively identified Claudio as the driver of the stolen vehicle who fled. (ECF

No. 64 at 2). Claudio disputes the “positive” identification, saying he was incarcerated in South

Carolina at the time of the incident. (ECF No. 72 at 3).

Defendant Guthrie asked CENCOM to contact Mayes County to determine if they had any

information on the male. (ECF No. 72 at 3). Defendant Guthrie used the information provided by

Mayes County to run the suspect’s name through NCIC/ACIC and was provided with a photo of

Claudio, who had an active warrant for his arrest out of the Siloam Springs Police Department.

Id. Claudio disputes that the warrant could be considered “active” as it was issued on November

13, 2005, on the unrelated the charges of driving while intoxicated, driving on a suspended-

revoked license, and two charges of failure to appear. Id. at 3-4.

Defendant Guthrie identified the suspect as Jonathan Claudio and presented an affidavit

of probable cause, requesting Benton County Circuit Judge Christine Howart issue an arrest

warrant for Claudio. (ECF No. 72 at 3). Claudio was advised of the warrant and the charges against

him and consented to the extradition and signed a waiver of extradition in the presence of two

witnesses and the Municipal Court Judge. Id. at 4. Claudio attests to the fact that he voluntarily

consented to the transfer to Arkansas to face the charges against him. Id.

Claudio was extradited from Horry County, South Carolina on the warrant issued by Judge

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Howart, and booked into the Benton County Detention Center (“BCDC”) on July 7, 2023. (ECF

No. 72 at 4). Claudio remained incarcerated until August 14, 2023. (ECF No. 64-3 at 3). The

charges of fleeing by vehicle with extreme indifference, fleeing on foot, theft by receiving,

criminal mischief in the second degree, and leaving the scene of a property damage accident, were

dismissed on September 26, 2023, because Claudio had established that he was incarcerated in

South Carolina on the date of the alleged offenses. (ECF No. 70-1 at 1-3). There is currently an

arrest warrant issued for Claudio out of Siloam Springs for an unrelated matter. (ECF No. 72 at 4).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

"Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with

the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a

genuine issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d

602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). "A case founded on speculation or suspicion

is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment." Id. (citing, Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d

621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is

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blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not

adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant Guthrie seeks summary judgment on each of Claudio’s claims. Defendant

Guthrie first contends nothing in the record suggests he acted with malice as is required to establish

a claim of malicious prosecution. Second, Defendant Guthrie argues the affidavit clearly

established probable cause for Claudio’s arrest and in this regard, Guthrie asserts there were no

false statements or material omissions in the affidavit. Defendant Guthrie next contends he is

entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, Guthrie argues there is no basis for official capacity

liability.2

A. Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Claim

To establish a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, Claudio must show that

“(1) the criminal proceeding was instituted without probable cause, (2) the defendant’s motive in

instituting the proceeding was malicious, and (3) the prosecution terminated in acquittal or

discharge of the accused.” Klein v. Steinkamp, 44 F.4th 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 44 (2022)). “[T]he gravamen of the Fourth Amendment claim

for malicious prosecution . . . is the wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause.”

Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43.

2 Defendant Guthrie made numerous other arguments in his Motion for Summary Judgment.

However, these were made before it became apparent that Claudio was abandoning all claims

except for his malicious prosecution and Franks related claim. In his initial brief, Defendant

Guthrie also inadvertently relied on older caselaw with respect to the malicious prosecution claim

that had since been overruled by the Supreme Court.

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Elements one and two of the malicious prosecution claim are at issue in this case. Element

three has been established as it is undisputed that the charges were dismissed because Claudio was

incarcerated at the time of the October 30, 2022, incident.

“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept – turning on the assessment of probabilities in

particular factual contexts – not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). The Eighth Circuit has stated that probable cause exists

when “the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest ‘[is] sufficient to lead a reasonable

officer to believe that the defendant has committed or is committing an offense.’” Borgman v,

Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811,

816 (8th Cir. 2010)). “The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground

for belief of guilt.” Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 2010).

“We must give law enforcement officers ‘substantial latitude in interpreting and drawing

inferences from factual circumstances,’ ... but such latitude is not without limits.” Kuehl v. Burtis,

173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 459, 465 (8th

Cir. 1997)). First, evidence tending to “negate the possibility that a suspect committed a crime is

relevant” to whether probable cause exists. Id. “In this sense, the Fourth Amendment requires

that we analyze the weight of all the evidence – not merely the sufficiency of the incriminating

evidence.” Id. Second, “law enforcement officers have a duty to conduct a reasonably thorough

investigation prior to arresting a suspect, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances and so

long as law enforcement would not be unduly hampered if the agents wait to obtain more facts

before seeking arrest.” Id. (internal punctuation marks and citations omitted).

Recognizing that probable cause is not a high bar, Claudio asks the Court to consider the

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following:

(1) As documented by his BCDC booking information, he is “White” not “Hispanic or

Latino;”

(2) Several factors undermine Defendant Guthrie’s eyewitness account of the driver of

the vehicle including:

(a) The bodycam footage documents that the events took place in near-total

darkness at approximately 8:40 pm (at night) in an unlit field.

(b) Guthrie’s vehicle was parked approximately thirty feet behind the stopped

vehicle, suggesting this was the distance from which Defendant Guthrie

observed the driver.

(c) The brief opportunity to view the driver occurred during a period of high stress

immediately after a high-speed chase that topped speeds of 100 miles per hour

and ended in a foot chase.

(d) Defendant Guthrie was badly injured during the foot chase with injuries to his

hands as well as his groin. Soon thereafter, Defendant Guthrie observed the

photo and believed Claudio to be the escaped driver.

Claudio maintains that these factors defeat “probable cause because there was not a ‘fair

probability’ or ‘substantial chance’ that Defendant Guthrie could correctly identify the driver

relying on his own memory alone.” (ECF No. 71 at 6) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

243 n.13, 246 (1983)).

Claudio first argues he is White and not Hispanic. In support, he refers the Court to the

booking information from the BCDC. The record in question does indicate his race as White and

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ethnicity as not Hispanic or Latino. (ECF No. 64-3 at 1). Records from South Carolina reflect the

same information. (ECF No. 70-1 at 2). Defendant Guthrie’s production, however, includes a page

of Claudio’s medical records that indicates his race as Hispanic. (ECF No. 75-1 at 1). Claudio has

not filed his own affidavit to support his identification as White or Hispanic. At best, the summary

judgment record is inconclusive. The record is insufficient for the Court to find as false Defendant

Guthrie’s identification of Claudio as Hispanic.

The bodycam video does illustrate there was little illumination where the incident occurred.

(ECF No. 66 (flash drive conventionally filed)). Despite this, Defendant Guthrie was able to

describe the male driver as a Hispanic male, with a shaved head and facial hair, wearing a work

shirt like the type janitors wear, and blue pants. When one considers this information, along with

Wolfe’s identification of the male driver as her fiancé; the pictures of Wolfe and Claudio on

Facebook; the connection between Claudio and Mayes County where the vehicle was stolen; the

NCIC/ACIC report indicating Claudio had an outstanding warrant in Siloam Springs, Arkansas;

and Defendant Guthrie’s identification of Claudio as the male suspect both from the Facebook

pictures and the NCIC/ACIC’s photo, the Court believes there existed a fair probability to believe

Claudio was the individual who fled the scene. See e.g., Dunn v. Does 1-22, 116 F.4th 737, 747-

48 (8th Cir. 2024) (“Probable cause is not a high bar; It requires only the kind of fair probability

on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians act. But it is a bar.” (internal

quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). Subsequent information, of course,

definitively established that it could not have been Claudio, but hindsight cannot be employed to

inform the Court’s decision as to whether probable cause existed at the time Defendant Guthrie

identified Claudio as the suspect.

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Even if, for the sake of argument, the Court found probable cause lacking, there is no

evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Defendant Guthrie acted

maliciously. In Brown v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. and Mun. Emp’s, Council No. 5, 41 F.4th 963

(8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 491 (2022), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Circuit considered a federal claim for malicious prosecution and concluded there must be a

showing of “malice” – that is, an improper purpose for bringing the action. Id. at 968. The

summary judgment record is bare of any facts sufficient to establish an inference that Defendant

Guthrie acted with malice.

While some courts have concluded the absence of probable cause is itself sufficient to

create an inference of malice, this Court disagrees. See e.g., Dunn v. Doe 1-22, 670 F. Supp. 3d

735, 853 (S.D. Iowa 2023), aff’d in part, reversed in part, on other grounds 116 F.4th 737, 752

(8th Cir. 2024) (declining to address the appropriate standard for malice); Harris v. Hixon, 102

F.4th 1120, 1133 (11th Cir. 2024) (Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim “simplified”

to only two elements—violation of the Fourth Amendment and the favorable termination of the

criminal proceedings). Construing a malicious prosecution claim in such a way conflates two

separate elements of the offense as recognized by the Supreme Court in Thompson. The Supreme

Court noted that American courts had described malicious as being without probable cause and

for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice. Thompson, 596 U.S. at 44. Thus, while

a lack of probable cause may inform the malice inquiry, it cannot determine it – there must be

some evidence of improper motive. Here, there is no evidence from which an inference of malice

on Defendant Guthrie’s part can be made.

Alternatively, Defendant Guthrie maintains he is entitled to qualified immunity on this

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claim. “Government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity balances two important interests: the need to hold

public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials

from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. Id. “The

qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,

229 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1986)).

In evaluating whether qualified immunity applies, the Court asks two questions: (1)

whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2)

whether the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. The

questions may be answered in either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

The Court has already concluded that no constitutional violation exists on this claim.

Defendant Guthrie is therefore entitled to qualified immunity in this case. The Court further notes

that prior to the Thompson decision of April 4, 2022, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

had found no constitutional claim existed for a malicious prosecution claim.

Finally, Defendant Guthrie maintains there is no basis for official capacity liability on this

claim. The official capacity claim is one against Benton County. Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460

F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A suit against a public official in his official capacity s actually a

suit against the entity for which the official is an agent.”). To prevail on a claim against Benton

County, Claudio must show that the constitutional violation resulted from (1) an official “policy,”

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(2) an unofficial “custom,” or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. Corwin

v. City of Indep., 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016). In his Response, Claudio abandoned his

official capacity claim. (ECF Nos. 70-72).

For the reasons outlined, Defendant Guthrie is entitled to judgment in his favor on

Claudio’s malicious prosecution claim.

B. Fourth Amendment Warrant Affidavit Claim

Claudio maintains that Defendant Guthrie’s “affidavit of probable cause contained

numerous false statements and omissions that show an utter lack of probable cause to institute

these charges against [him].” (ECF No. 71 at 10). In this regard, Claudio asks the Court to

consider the following: (1) the affidavit fails to mention that Defendant Guthrie used the pictures

from Wolfe’s Facebook profile page that were posted several months before the incident to first

identify Claudio’s name and picture or mention that Wolfe’s relationship status could not be

untangled; (2) the affidavit does not contain a statement indicating Defendant Guthrie actually

reviewed the NCIC/ACIC report; (3) Defendant Guthrie failed to mention that the Siloam Springs

arrest warrant was issued years before for unrelated crimes; and (4) the NCIC/ACIC report

allegedly generated on October 20, 2022, does not appear in the discovery materials and in fact,

Claudio believes the report would have likely shown he was incarcerated in South Carolina at the

time. Id. at 10-11. According to Claudio, “[t]he false statements and omissions contained in the

affidavit are material, numerous, and clearly critical to a finding of probable cause.” Id. at 11.

In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978), “the Supreme Court defined a limited

exception to the presumptive validity of an affidavit supporting a search warrant

application.” United States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1443 (8th Cir. 1995). The Eighth Circuit stated

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that:

Under Franks v. Delaware, if the government intentionally includes material false

statements in its warrant affidavits, or includes material false statements with

reckless disregard for the truth that is the legal equivalent of intentional falsehood,

a suppression court must set aside those statements and then review the remaining

portions of the affidavits to see if what remains is sufficient to establish probable

cause. Defendants bear the burden of proving the intentional or reckless inclusion

of false statements in a warrant affidavit.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This same analysis applies to a § 1983 claim

alleging a probable cause affidavit for an arrest warrant included false information or omitted

truthful information. Howe v. Gilpin, 65 F.4th 975 (8th Cir. 2023); see also Estate of Nash v.

Folsom, 92 F.4th 746, 754 (8th Cir. 2024) (noting Franks had been extended to cover recklessly

omitted information). On this issue, the Eighth Circuit has stated that:

Including a false statement in a warrant affidavit is a Franks violation when the

defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the affiant

knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, includes a

false statement in a warrant affidavit, and (2) the false statement was necessary to

the finding of probable cause.

Omitting information violates Franks when 1) . . . facts were omitted with the intent

to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they thereby make, the affidavit

misleading, and 2) . . . the affidavit, if supplemented by the omitted information,

could not support a finding of probable cause.

Estate of Nash, 92 F.4th at 754 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Innocent

mistakes or negligence do “not suffice to demonstrate reckless or deliberate

falsehood.” United States v. Mashek, 606 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2010). “In a § 1983 case, the

issues are whether ‘the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render

official belief in its existence unreasonable,’ and, if deliberate falsehood is alleged, whether the

affidavit is truthful, which ‘means that the information put forth is believed or appropriately

accepted by the affiant as true. Omissions and falsehoods that are immaterial or not supported by

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the record do not suffice.’” Howe, 65 F.4th at 980 (quoting Morris v. Lanpher, 563 F.3d 399, 402

(8th Cir. 2009)) (cleaned up).

“In a warrant affidavit, the government need only show facts sufficient to support a finding

of probable cause.” Ozar, 50 F.3d at 1445 (quotation omitted). As discussed above, “[p]robable

cause exists if the totality of the facts based on reasonably trustworthy information would justify

a prudent person in believing an individual arrested had committed an offense.” Williams v. City

of Alexander, 772 F.3d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).

Although Claudio suggests the affidavit contains false statements and material omissions,

the alleged erroneous information is more appropriately considered to be omissions rather than

false statements, i.e., Defendant Guthrie failed to mention he used the pictures from Wolfe’s

Facebook profile page that were posted several months before the incident to first identify

Claudio’s name and picture or mention that Wolfe’s relationship status could not be untangled;3

Defendant Guthrie failed to mention whether he reviewed the NCIC/ACIC report; Defendant

Guthrie failed to indicate the Siloam Springs arrest warrant was issued years before and for

completely unrelated crimes; and finally, Claudio’s supposition that the October 30, 2022,

NCIC/ACIC report likely would have shown he was incarcerated on October 30, 2022, thereby

establishing he could not be the suspect.

After describing the high-speed chase and accident, the affidavit of probable cause

continues as follows:

Upon first approach, I did not observe anyone attempting to exit the vehicle. When

I pulled my patrol unit behind the truck to a position of cover, I observed a Hispanic

3 The profile pictures were pulled up by the wife, Deandra Bartley, of one of the officers on the

scene. Deandra Bartley indicated there were also pictures of another person, who could not be

definitely identified as a female or male, who Wolfe was apparently married to.

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male with a shaved head, facial hair, wearing a blue work shirt and dark blue pants

exit the vehicle. He looked at me and began to flee on foot. I noticed that Officer

Preston Caniglia (810) yell from behind me “STOP POLICE K-9” but the male

continued fleeing. I deployed my dual-purpose patrol canine and began to engage

in the foot pursuant. While doing so, I was injured when I fell and caused

extensive cuts to both of my hands and forced the vehicle bailout button for my

canine into my groin, causing me a great deal of pain. I regained my footing and

attempted to continue with the foot pursuit but was unable to due to the large

amount blood that was beginning to run down my hands, rendering them unusable.

I returned to the truck and observed that Officer Caniglia was holding the passenger

at gun point. Trooper Britni Binam (L 21) arrived on-scene and assisted Officer

Caniglia with placing her into custody. I then placed my canine back in the

vehicle.

* * *

Deputy Steven Scott (BC121) arrived and read the passenger, Summer Wolfe . . .

her Miranda Warning afforded to her by law and waived her right to counsel.

When Deputy Scott asked Wolfe who the driver was, she stated “that’s my fiancé

and I’m not giving up shit.” I was able to locate a possible name for the driver via

Wolfe’s Facebook profile. I then had CENCOM contact Mayes County and see if

they had any information on the male, Jonathan Claudio. They provided me with

a date of birth . .. for him and upon running him through NCIC/ACIC, I was

provided with a picture. I positively identified the male that had fled from me, and

the driver of the stolen vehicle, as Jonathan Claudio . . .. Claudio also has an active

warrant for his arrest out of the Siloam Springs Police Department.

* * *

(ECF No. 64-3 at 9-10).

Defendant Guthrie’s failure to include that he viewed the pictures on Wolfe’s Facebook

profile and identified Claudio as the driver from them did not render the affidavit misleading nor

does its addition negate the existence of probable cause. Defendant Guthrie’ affidavit included

the statement that he was able to obtain a possible name for the driver via Wolfe’s Facebook

profile. “Recklessness . . . may be inferred from the fact of omission of information from an

affidavit when the material omitted would have been clearly critical to the finding of probable

cause.” United States v. Marshek, 606 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The omitted Facebook information was not clearly critical

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to the finding of probable cause.

Next, Claudio points out that Defendant Guthrie’s affidavit does not state he in fact

reviewed the NCIC/ACIC report. While it is true Defendant Guthrie does not specifically state

he reviewed the report, he does indicate he obtained a picture of Claudio from the NCIC/ACIC

report and from it, positively identified Claudio as the driver. Claudio’s remaining argument here

is mere supposition. There in nothing in the summary judgment record to suggest that the

NCIC/ACIC report revealed that Claudio was incarcerated or that Defendant Guthrie proceeded

to submit his affidavit despite knowledge that Claudio was incarcerated on the date in question.

Next, the age of the Siloam Springs warrant does nothing to establish that it was improperly

reported as an active warrant. Nor does Defendant Guthrie make any representation with respect

to the warrant that is inaccurate. Defendant Guthrie merely states the existence of a warrant for

Claudio’s arrest. There is simply nothing misleading about the statement.

“When an issuing magistrate relies solely on a supporting affidavit in determining probable

cause, . . . ‘only that information which is found within the four corners of the affidavit may be

considered in determining probable cause.’” United States v. Saddler, 19 F.4th 1035, 1039 (8th

Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 875 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 2020)). We give great

deference to the issuing magistrate judge’s decision regarding the existence of probable cause in

an affidavit.” United States v. Reed, 25 F.4th 567, 569 (8th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). “[W]e

examine the sufficiency of a . . . warrant affidavit using a ‘common sense’ and not a

‘hypertechnical’ approach.” United States v. Grant, 490 F.3d 627, 632 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

While it has now been proven that Defendant Guthrie’s identification of the suspect was in

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error, and this error resulted in Claudio being extradited from South Carolina and temporarily

incarcerated in Benton County, this unfortunate sequence of events does not belie the existence of

probable cause in the warrant affidavit. Although the Court is sympathetic to the consequences

resulting from issuance of the arrest warrant, Defendant Guthrie’s affidavit was sufficient to

support a finding that probable cause existed for the issuance of a warrant for Claudio’s arrest.

Since the Court has found no constitutional violation exists, Defendant Guthrie is entitled

to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 2009) (unless the

facts having make out a violation of a constitutional right the Defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity). Moreover, Benton County may not be held liable. See e.g., Ivey v. Audrain Cty.,

Mo., 968 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2020) (if the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity

under the first prong of the analysis, i.e., no evidence of a constitutional violation, then the county

cannot be held liable); Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that

there was no need to consider a pretrial detainee's failure to protect claim against the city when

there was no evidence that any of the individual officers committed a constitutional violation).

Defendant Guthrie is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, it is recommended that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 62) be GRANTED, and the case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file

timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties

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are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by

the district court.

Status of Referral: The referral terminates upon the filing of this Report and

Recommendation.

RECOMMENDED this 7" day of July 2025.

CHRISTY’*COMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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