enumerating four factors trial courts should apply in reviewing motions to withdraw a guilty plea, including whether withdrawal of the plea "would result in unfair prejudice to the State . . . "
How later courts described this case
- enumerating four factors trial courts should apply in reviewing motions to withdraw a guilty plea, including whether withdrawal of the plea "would result in unfair prejudice to the State . . . "
- adopting the Strickland test in New Jersey
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0286-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DENNIS DECAMBRE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted June 3, 2025 – Decided August 6, 2025
Before Judges Firko and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment Nos. 88-05-0731
and 89-02-0245.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Mayra S. Pais, Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Dennis DeCambre appeals from the August 3, 2023 order
denying his second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an
evidentiary hearing. Having reviewed the record and defendant's arguments in
light of the applicable law, we affirm.
We discern the facts and the procedural history from the motion record.
Defendant was born in England. In 1978, he became a permanent legal resident
of the United States. Defendant briefly returned to England to attend college.
After graduating, he returned to the United States and lived with his family in
Plainfield.
In 1988, defendant was charged and indicted on drug-related offenses. On
Indictment Number 88-05-0731, a jury convicted defendant of third-degree
possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (cocaine), N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10(a)(1) (count one); third-degree possession of CDS with intent to
distribute (cocaine), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) (count two); and third-degree
possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property
(cocaine), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (count three). In September 1991, counts one and
two were merged with count three and defendant was sentenced to a four-year
prison term with three years of parole ineligibility.
A-0286-23
2
On Indictment Number 89-02-0245, defendant pleaded guilty to third-
degree possession of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). In March 1990, he was
sentenced to a four-year prison term to run concurrent to his prior sentence.
Defendant appealed from his convictions and sentence under Indictment
Number 88-05-0731. While the appeal was pending, on October 4, 1991,
defendant timely filed a self-represented PCR petition. He argued that his
sentence was illegal, the charges should have been merged, and hearsay
testimony should have been excluded. In the petition, defendant acknowledged
that a direct appeal was pending and provided both the name of his appellate
counsel and the appellate docket number. Due to the age of this petition, the
record does not reveal the disposition of defendant's PCR petition.
We reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the matter for a new
trial. State v. DeCambre, No. A-4597-89 (App. Div. June 18, 1992). On
remand, defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property. The amended judgment
of conviction dated July 21, 1992, states that defendant's sentence under
Indictment Number 89-02-0245 was vacated, and he was resentenced to time
served. The amended judgment for Indictment Number 88-05-0731, entered the
A-0286-23
3
same day, similarly states defendant was likewise resentenced to time served
and that the remaining counts were dismissed.
In 2013, defendant was detained by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and subsequently deported to England. He has remained in
England, unable to obtain a United States visa because of his felony drug
conviction.
On February 11, 2023, more than thirty years after the entry of his guilty
plea, defendant filed a second PCR petition. Following argument on defendant's
petition, Judge Stacey K. Boretz, J.S.C. issued an August 3, 2023 order and
accompanying written decision, denying defendant's second PCR petition and
request for an evidentiary hearing. In her comprehensive decision, Judge Boretz
analyzed defendant's arguments in light of the well-established law. Citing Rule
3:22-12(a)(1)(A) and the governing law, the judge found defendant's petition
was time-barred. The judge rejected defendant's argument that he was unaware
of the availability of the post-conviction relief until late 2022, concluding that
argument was insufficient to establish excusable neglect to relax the five-year
time bar.
Judge Boretz also addressed defendant's substantive argument and further
concluded that defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective
A-0286-23
4
assistance of counsel under the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-87 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58
(1987) (adopting the Strickland test in New Jersey). This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant reprises three arguments for our consideration:
I. [DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM
THAT HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
BY AFFIRMATIVELY MISADVISING HIM
ABOUT THE DEPORTATION
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA.
II. [DEFENDANT]'S GUILTY PLEA MUST BE
SET ASIDE OR THE MATTER REMANDED
FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING OR THE
MATTER REMANDED FOR A RULING BY
THE PCR COURT.
III. THE PCR COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED
THAT [DEFENDANT]'S PETITION WAS
TIME-BARRED BECAUSE ANY DELAY IN
FILING THE PETITION WAS DUE TO
DEFENDANT'S EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
AND THERE IS A REASONABLE
PROBABILITY THAT IF THE DEFENDANT'S
FACTUAL ASSERTIONS WERE FOUND TO
BE TRUE, ENFORCEMENT OF THE TIME
BAR WOULD RESULT IN A FUNDAMENTAL
INJUSTICE.
Having considered defendant's reprised arguments in view of the
applicable law, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant extended
A-0286-23
5
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the
reasons stated in the cogent decision by Judge Boretz. We add only the
following comments.
Our review of a PCR claim when a court has not held an evidentiary
hearing is de novo. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004); State v.
Lawrence, 463 N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 2020). A PCR court's decision
to proceed without an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013).
The record reveals this is defendant's second PCR petition. Under Rule
3:22-12(a)(2)(B), a second or subsequent PCR petition must be filed within one
year of the date on which a new constitutional right is recognized by the courts,
or "the date on which the factual predicate for the relief sought was discovered,"
or "the date of the denial of the first … application for [PCR]." Additionally, a
subsequent PCR petition must be dismissed unless it complies with Rule 3:22-
12(a)(2), and pleads, on its face, one of the three criteria under Rule 3:22-
12(a)(2). State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 292-94 (App. Div. 2018); R.
3:22-4(b).
Here, it is evident that defendant's second PCR petition was filed well
beyond the time limits prescribed by the Rule. Nor does defendant's PCR
A-0286-23
6
petition satisfy the requirements of Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B) because he does not
rely on a newly recognized cognizable constitutional right or a factual predicate
that could not have been discovered earlier through reasonable diligence. See
State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000). We conclude Judge Boretz
appropriately dismissed defendant's second PCR petition as untimely under
Rules 3:22-12(a)(2) and 3:22-4(b).
Even if the PCR petition under review is considered defendant's first
petition—if dismissed without prejudice while the direct appeal was pending
and filed more than five years after entry of the judgment of convictions—we
are satisfied Judge Boretz exercised her "independent, non-delegable duty to
question the timeliness of the petition[.]" State v. Brown, 455 N.J. Super. 460,
470 (App. Div. 2018); R. 3:22-12(a)(3). Defendant failed to "submit competent
evidence to satisfy the standards for relaxing the rule's time restrictions[.]" Ibid.
Although contradicted by the record, defendant cannot now rely on ignorance of
the law to establish excusable neglect under Rule 3:22-12(a). See Murray, 162
N.J. at 246; Brown, 455 N.J. Super. at 470-71. We therefore conclude Judge
Boretz did not abuse her discretion in denying defendant's PCR petition without
an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992).
A-0286-23
7
We likewise reject defendant's contention, raised for the first time on
appeal, that his guilty plea must be set aside nearly thirty-one years after the
plea hearing. The prejudice to the State resulting from the significant delay
caused by defendant's untimely request to vacate his guilty plea is apparent on
its face. See State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009) (enumerating four
factors trial courts should apply in reviewing motions to withdraw a guilty plea,
including whether withdrawal of the plea "would result in unfair prejudice to the
State . . . ").
Affirmed.
A-0286-23
8