Bailey v. Laurie, DeSantis

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2024-1643

_____________________________

CHRISTOPHER “DOC” BAILEY,

Appellant,

v.

RON DESANTIS, in his official

capacity as Governor of the

State of Florida, and WILLIAM

LAURIE, in his official capacity

as Crescent City Commissioner,

Appellees.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Angela C. Dempsey, Judge.

August 6, 2025

LEWIS, J.

Appellant, Christoper “Doc” Bailey, appeals the trial court’s

order denying his amended petition for writ of quo warranto,

arguing that the court erroneously rejected his claim that Florida

must give full faith and credit to the restoration of his civil right to

hold office under Missouri law following his federal conviction. For

the reasons that follow, we disagree with Bailey and affirm the

trial court’s order. 1

BACKGROUND

In October 1995, Bailey was convicted of a federal felony (a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001) in the United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri pursuant to a guilty plea. 2 He

was sentenced to five years of probation, which terminated in

October 2000. In 2012, Bailey moved to Florida. To date, he has

not obtained a presidential pardon or a restoration of his civil

rights from the Florida Board of Executive Clemency.

In November 2022, Bailey won a seat on the Crescent City

Commission, Group 2. He took the oath of office and began his

term on November 14th. On August 7, 2023, Appellee Governor

Ron DeSantis issued Executive Order 23-159, declaring the Group

2 seat on the Crescent City Commission vacant pursuant to article

VI, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution and section 114.01(2) of

the Florida Statutes on the asserted basis that Bailey failed to

qualify for the office within thirty days from the commencement of

the term of office because of his 1995 federal felony conviction.

Following a special election in October 2023, Appellee William

Laurie won the Group 2 seat.

Bailey filed an amended petition for writ of quo warranto

against Appellees, arguing that the Governor unlawfully removed

him from office after falsely claiming that he failed to qualify

within thirty days. Bailey asserted in part that his right to hold

office was automatically restored upon his discharge from

probation in 2000 by operation of section 561.021.2 of the Missouri

Annotated Statutes, and that Florida must give full faith and

credit to the restoration of his civil rights pursuant to article IV,

section 1 of the United States Constitution.

1 We affirm as to Bailey’s remaining arguments without

discussion.

2 See United States v. Bailey, 34 F.3d 683 (8th Cir. 1994)

(setting forth the factual background of the criminal case).

2

In denying the amended petition for writ of quo warranto, the

trial court concluded that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does

not require Florida to treat a federal conviction the same way as

Missouri does. The court reasoned that the adoption of Bailey’s

argument would elevate other states’ treatment of federal

convictions over the federal government’s handling of those

convictions; it would be unworkable considering states’ widely

varying approaches to restoring the civil rights of federal felons;

and it would be contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s

precedent that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel a

state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes.

The court further determined that even if Florida were required to

treat federal convictions as Missouri does, Bailey still could not

hold public office in Florida because he is not entitled to hold office

in Missouri pursuant to section 115.306.1, Missouri Annotated

Statutes. This appeal followed. 3

ANALYSIS

Because a writ of quo warranto is an extraordinary writ that

is not an absolute right, its granting lies within the court’s

discretion. Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1257 (Fla. 2004). While

a trial court’s decision on a petition for writ of quo warranto is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion, matters of constitutional

interpretation are reviewed de novo. Israel v. Desantis, 269 So. 3d

491, 494 (Fla. 2019) (explaining that “[q]uo warranto is used ‘to

determine whether a state officer or agency has improperly

exercised a power or right derived from the State’” (quoting League

of Women Voters of Fla. v. Scott, 232 So. 3d 264, 265 (Fla. 2017)).

Under article VI, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution, “[n]o

person convicted of a felony . . . shall be qualified to . . . hold office

until restoration of civil rights . . . .” Article IV, section 8(a) of the

Florida Constitution provides in part that the governor may, with

3 The Governor stated in a footnote of his answer brief that

while not addressed by the trial court, Bailey’s amended petition

for writ of quo warranto also failed because he had an adequate

remedy at law in the form of a declaratory judgment. We need not

reach this alternative rationale as we affirm the trial court’s order

on the grounds set forth therein.

3

the approval of two cabinet members, grant full or conditional

pardons or restore civil rights. See also § 940.01(1), Fla. Stat.

(2023) (stating the same); § 944.292(1), Fla. Stat. (2023) (providing

that upon a felony conviction, “the civil rights of the person

convicted shall be suspended in Florida until such rights are

restored by a full pardon, conditional pardon, or restoration of civil

rights granted pursuant to s. 8, Art. IV of the State Constitution”).

This constitutional provision “‘vest[ed] sole, unrestricted,

unlimited discretion exclusively in the executive’ in restoring civil

rights.” Advisory Op. to Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4,

The Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1076 n.3 (Fla.

2020) (quoting Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla. 1977));

see also Parker v. State, 263 So. 3d 192, 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)

(stating that “[t]he authority to restore civil rights belongs solely

to the executive branch and cannot be infringed upon by the

legislative or judicial branches,” and “the executive branch’s

authority to restore an individual’s civil rights is discretionary”).

In this case, it is undisputed that Bailey was convicted of a

federal felony in 1995 and that he has not obtained a presidential

pardon or a restoration of his civil rights from the Florida Board of

Executive Clemency. According to Bailey, Florida must

nevertheless consider his civil right to hold office restored

pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States

Constitution because it was automatically restored by operation of

section 561.021.2 of the Missouri Annotated Statutes upon the

completion of his probation in Missouri in 2000. We disagree.

Full Faith and Credit Clause

Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution states

that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the

public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other

State.” Pursuant to this Clause, Congress has provided that:

Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies

thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith

and credit in every court within the United States and its

Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage

in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from

which they are taken.

4

28 U.S.C. § 1738.

The United States Supreme Court has differentiated between

credit owed to laws and to judgments. Baker by Thomas v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998). “The Full Faith and Credit

Clause does not compel ‘a state to substitute the statutes of other

states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning

which it is competent to legislate.’” Id. (citation omitted).

“Regarding judgments, however, the full faith and credit obligation

is exacting. A final judgment in one State . . . qualifies for

recognition throughout the land.” Id. at 232–33. “A court may be

guided by the forum State’s ‘public policy’ in determining the law

applicable to a controversy,” but there is “no roving ‘public policy

exception’ to the full faith and credit due judgments.” Id. at 233;

see also Ledoux-Nottingham v. Downs, 163 So. 3d 560, 563 (Fla.

5th DCA 2015) (“Baker by Thomas makes clear that the public

policy of one state has no effect on whether the state must give full

faith and credit to judgments, rather than law, of another state.”),

approved, 210 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. 2017).

Bailey primarily relies upon two Florida decisions in asserting

that Florida must give full faith and credit to Missouri’s

restoration of his civil rights following his federal conviction. The

first of those cases is Schlenther v. Department of State, Division

of Licensing, 743 So. 2d 536, 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), where the

appellant committed a felony in Connecticut, as a result of which

Connecticut suspended his civil rights. After Connecticut restored

the appellant’s civil rights, he moved to Florida. Id. at 537.

Although the appellee issued a concealed weapon permit to the

appellant, it later revoked that permit because he had not sought

restoration of his civil rights in Florida pursuant to section 790.23,

Florida Statutes, which prohibited a convicted felon from carrying

a concealed weapon, unless his civil rights and firearm authority

have been restored. Id. The Second District concluded that the

appellee “erred in revoking appellant’s concealed weapon permit

because appellant’s civil rights had been fully restored in

Connecticut prior to appellant’s move to Florida, and that

restoration of appellant’s civil rights is entitled to full faith and

credit in Florida.” Id. at 536–37 (rejecting the appellee’s argument

that section 944.282(1) and article IV, section 8 required the

appellant to apply to the Governor of Florida for restoration of his

5

civil rights). “[O]nce appellant’s civil rights were restored by the

state that suspended them, the matter was completed, and this

State had no authority to suspend or restore those rights here on

the basis of that earlier out-of-state suspension.” Id. at 536. “Once

another state restores the civil rights of one of its citizens whose

rights had been lost because of a conviction in that state, they are

restored and the State of Florida has no authority to suspend or

restore them at that point. The matter is simply at an end.” Id. at

537.

The second case Bailey relies upon is Doyle v. Florida

Department of State, Division of Licensing, 748 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1999). Doyle’s application for a concealed weapon or firearm

permit was denied because he had been convicted of a

misdemeanor in New York that would have been a felony if

committed in Florida. Id. at 354. We reversed based on our

reading of section 790.23(1), Florida Statutes, as prohibiting

weapon possession “by any person who has been actually convicted

of a felony,” and not applying “to misdemeanors that are

committed in a sister state, regardless of whether such

misdemeanors would have constituted felonies if committed in

Florida.” Id. at 354–55. Citing Schlenther, we explained that

Doyle could not present proof that his civil rights had been restored

in Florida because they had never been suspended in New York,

and “[t]he governor of Florida has neither the power to restore the

civil rights of out-of-state offenders which have already been

restored by another state, nor the authority to restore the civil

rights of those whose rights were never suspended by another

jurisdiction.” Id. at 356.

As the trial court correctly recognized, Schlenther and Doyle

are distinguishable because they involved another state’s

treatment of its own conviction, not another state’s treatment of a

federal conviction, and they said nothing about whether Florida

must defer to another state’s law on collateral consequences for a

federal conviction. Had Bailey been convicted in a Missouri court

for a Missouri crime, Schlenther and Doyle would require Florida

to honor Missouri law governing restoration of rights. But that is

not the situation here. Bailey was convicted under federal law,

and he fails to cite any case holding that the Full Faith and Credit

6

Clause requires Florida to yield to another state’s laws with

respect to a federal conviction.

This state versus federal felony conviction distinction is

significant for purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See

Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1056 n.6 (11th Cir. 2020)

(Lagoa, J., concurring) (“Indigent felons with out-of-state

convictions can seek executive clemency in Florida, see Fla. R.

Exec. Clem. 5, 10B, or have their rights restored in the state of

their conviction, see Schlenther v. Dep’t of State, Div. of Licensing,

743 So. 2d 536, 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) . . . Indigent felons

with federal convictions can seek executive clemency, see Fla. R.

Exec. Clem. 5, 10B, or a presidential pardon, see U.S. Const. art.

II, § 2, cl. 1.”); Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313, 314–16 (7th Cir. 1974)

(concluding that the appellant’s prior Montana felony conviction

could be considered in ruling on his application for a license as a

dealer and manufacturer of firearms under federal law despite the

fact that he had obtained a full pardon from the Montana governor

because “[n]either the inherent nature of a pardon nor full faith

and credit require that a state pardon automatically relieve federal

disabilities”); Carlesi v. People of the State of New York, 233 U.S.

51, 56–57 (1914) (holding that a New York court could consider a

prior federal conviction despite a presidential pardon in applying

its enhanced sentencing statute); Beecham v. United States, 511

U.S. 368, 370, 374 (1994) (construing provisions of the federal

firearms statutes and concluding that the restoration of civil rights

by states could not remove the disabilities imposed as a result of

federal convictions; rather, civil rights must have been restored

under federal law).

The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Florida to

substitute the statutes of another state for its own statutes. See

Baker by Thomas, 522 U.S. at 232. Yet, by adopting Bailey’s

position, we would elevate another state’s treatment of federal

felony convictions above Florida’s treatment of the convictions, and

in doing so we would substitute Missouri’s statute (section

561.021.2) for Florida’s constitutional and statutory provisions

(article VI, section 4(a) and section 944.292(1)). Further, article

IV, section 8 of the Florida Constitution vests sole and unlimited

discretion to restore civil rights in the executive branch, whose

authority in that regard cannot be infringed upon by the legislative

7

and judicial branches, yet the Governor’s authority would be

limited by the legislative branch of another state under Bailey’s

interpretation. Florida has an interest in protecting its citizens

from convicted felons holding public office in Florida, whereas

Missouri has no discernible interest in the matter beyond its

borders.

Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the adoption of

Bailey’s argument could prove unworkable considering states’

varying approaches to restoring the civil rights of convicted felons.

For instance, had Bailey resided in another state before moving to

Florida from Missouri, would Missouri’s or that other state’s laws

govern the suspension and restoration of his civil rights following

his federal conviction, or would the answer depend on when he

moved to the other state? Lastly, giving full faith and credit to the

asserted restoration of Bailey’s right to hold public office under

section 561.021.2, Missouri Annotated Statutes, is unwarranted

for the additional reason that he is disqualified from holding

elective public office in Missouri under section 115.306.1, Missouri

Annotated Statutes, as we will discuss next. See Sun Oil Co. v.

Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727–30 (1988) (“To constitute a violation

of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause, it

is not enough that a state court misconstrue the law of another

State. Rather, our cases make plain that the misconstruction must

contradict law of the other State that is clearly established and

that has been brought to the court’s attention.”).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Full Faith and

Credit Clause does not require Florida to defer to a sister state’s

laws on restoring a person’s civil right to hold office following a

federal felony conviction.

Right to Hold Office under Missouri Law

Even if Bailey’s interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit

Clause were correct, Missouri law prohibits him from holding

elective public office. Bailey relies on section 561.021.2 of the

Missouri Annotated Statutes to argue that his right to hold office

was automatically restored upon his discharge from probation in

2000. Section 561.021.2, Missouri Annotated Statutes (2023),

provides as follows:

8

2. Except as provided in subsection 3 of this section,

a person who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is

convicted under the laws of this state of a felony or under

the laws of another jurisdiction of an offense which, if

committed within this state, would be a felony, shall be

ineligible to hold any public office, elective or appointive,

under the government of this state or any agency or

political subdivision thereof, until the completion of his

or her sentence or period of probation.

However, the later-enacted section 115.306.1, Missouri

Annotated Statutes (2023), provides that:

1. No person shall qualify as a candidate for elective

public office in the state of Missouri who has been found

guilty of or pled guilty to a felony under the federal laws

of the United States of America or to a felony under the

laws of this state or an offense committed in another state

that would be considered a felony in this state.

Thus, sections 115.306.1 and 561.021.2 appear to be in conflict

regarding qualification for elective public office following a guilty

plea to a felony. Section 561.021.2 was enacted in 1977, while

section 115.306.1 was enacted in 2015. Courts in both Missouri

and Florida adhere to the later-enacted statute rule, making

section 115.306.1 controlling. See Turner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 826,

829 (Mo. 2008) (“[W]hen two statutory provisions conflict, the

later-enacted provision, even when there is no specific repealing

clause, repeals the first statute to the extent of any conflict with

the second.”); Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.

2d 1273, 1287 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]hen two statutes are in conflict, the

more recently enacted statute controls the older statute.”).

Bailey seeks to distinguish section 115.306.1 from section

561.021.2 on the ground that the former addresses whether an

individual may qualify as a candidate on an election ballot while

the latter addresses eligibility to hold office, but it makes little

sense to disqualify a person from running as a candidate for elected

public office yet make him eligible to hold the elected office.

Indeed, the Missouri Supreme Court recently stated that “the

legislature has determined in section 115.306.1 that a plea of guilt

9

is sufficient to disqualify an individual from holding elective public

office.” Fletcher v. Young, 689 S.W.3d 161, 167 (Mo. 2024).

Therefore, under the plain text of section 115.306.1, as

confirmed by case law, Bailey is not eligible to hold elective office

in Missouri. Thus, even if the Full Faith and Credit Clause

required Florida to treat federal convictions as Missouri does,

Bailey would still be ineligible to hold elective office in Florida.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Bailey’s

amended petition for writ of quo warranto.

AFFIRMED.

BILBREY, J., concurs; ROWE, J., concurs with opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

_____________________________

ROWE, J., concurring.

I agree that we should affirm the trial court’s order denying

Bailey’s petition for a writ of quo warranto. But I would affirm

because Bailey had an adequate remedy at law, and thus quo

warranto was not a proper remedy. See e.g., State ex rel. Gibbs v.

Bloodworth, 184 So. 1, 2 (Fla. 1938) (explaining that a writ of quo

warranto “will not be issued where there is another ample and

sufficient remedy provided by law for the relief sought”); Gryzik v.

State, 380 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (“Where quo

warranto is an adequate remedy, it is the only proper remedy . . .

.” (quoting State ex rel. Booth v. Byington, 168 So. 2d 164, 175 (Fla.

1st DCA 1964))). 1

1 Appellee raised this ground for affirmance in the trial court

and on appeal in the answer brief. See Robertson v. State, 829

So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) (“[T]he tipsy coachman doctrine allows

10

Article V, section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution grants

circuit courts the power to issue the writ of quo warranto as part

of their original jurisdiction. Quo warranto, meaning “by what

authority,” was a remedy at common law historically used to “test

the right of a person to hold an office of franchise or exercise some

right or privilege the peculiar powers of which are derived from the

state.” W. Flager Assocs., Ltd. v. DeSantis, 382 So. 3d 1284, 1286

(Fla. 2024) (quoting State v. Gerow, 85 So. 144, 145 (Fla. 1920)); 3

William Blackstone, Commentaries *262 (under English common

law, the writ was “for the king, against him who claims or usurps

any office, franchise, or liberty”). In chapter 80, Florida Statutes,

the Legislature regulates in certain circumstances when a person

may file a petition. See § 80.01, Fla. Stat. (“Any person claiming

title to an office which is exercised by another has the right, on

refusal by the Attorney General to commence an action in the

name of the state upon the claimant’s relation, or on the Attorney

General’s refusal to file a petition setting forth the claimant’s name

as the person rightfully entitled to the office.”).

Quo warranto has traditionally been an extraordinary remedy

that “should only be employed with great caution and under very

limited circumstances.” Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 723 (Fla.

2011) (Polston, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). But even though

the writ’s application at common law is narrow, the Florida

Supreme Court has acknowledged that some of its prior decisions

have untethered the use of the writ somewhat from its “common

law moorings.” See, e.g., W. Flagler, 382 So. 3d at 1287 (“[O]ver

time, the use of the writ has drifted from its common law

moorings.”); Richardson v. Sec’y, Fla. Agency for Health Care

Admin., 395 So. 3d 500, 506 (Fla. 2024) (Francis, J., concurring)

(characterizing the petition denied by the Court in that case as “the

quintessential example of a petition availing itself of the runaway

nature of our quo warranto precedent”). Still, the supreme court

has made clear that “an ‘essential feature’ of quo warranto is that

it should be ‘used to challenge the authority to exercise a state

power rather than the merits of the action.’” Richardson, 395

an appellate court to affirm a trial court that reaches the right

result, but for the wrong reasons so long as there is any basis which

would support the judgment in the record.” (citation modified)).

11

So. 3d at 504 (quoting W. Flagler, 382 So. 3d at 1287). Here, Bailey

did not show that another adequate remedy was unavailable to

him to challenge the merits of the Governor’s executive action. As

explained below, there was at least one.

By Executive Order 23-159, Governor DeSantis, through his

authority under section 114.01(2), Florida Statutes, declared a

seat vacant on the Crescent City Commission, Group 2. The seat

was deemed vacant under section 114.01(1)(h), Florida Statutes,

which provides that a vacancy in office occurs upon the failure of a

person elected to office to qualify for office within thirty days from

the commencement of the term of office. The Governor determined

that Bailey failed to qualify for office because he was a convicted

felon and thus not qualified to hold office. See Art. VI, § 4(a), Fla.

Const. (“No person convicted of a felony . . . shall be qualified to

vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights.”).

Bailey argues that the Governor exceeded his executive

authority when he declared a vacancy in office 2 because even

though Bailey had been convicted of a federal felony, his right to

hold office had been restored in Missouri by operation of a Missouri

statute. Bailey asserted that Missouri’s statutory restoration of his

right to hold office should be given full faith and credit under

Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, making him

qualified to hold office in Florida.

Section 114.01(1) defines when a vacancy in office occurs, and

section 114.01(2) authorizes the Governor to issue an executive

order declaring an office vacant. None of this is in dispute. Bailey’s

petition focuses not on the Governor’s authority to declare a

vacancy in office but on the Governor’s interpretation of what it

means to qualify for office under section 114.01(1)(h). Rather,

Bailey advances a constitutional argument to challenge the

Governor’s interpretation, contending that he was qualified to hold

2 Bailey imprecisely characterizes the Governor’s action as

“removing” him from office. The Governor did not exercise his

executive power to remove a public official from office under Article

IV, section 7 of the Florida Constitution. Rather, the office was

deemed vacant under section 114.01(1)(h).

12

office despite his felony conviction because his civil rights had been

restored by operation of a Missouri statute and that Florida had to

give full faith and credit to that restoration. Indeed, Bailey pleaded

in his original petition—which is not materially different from his

amended petition—that “his petition presents wholly legal issues

of constitutional magnitude.” But no matter how his arguments

are characterized, his petition challenges the Governor’s exercise

of the authority to declare a vacancy in office, not the existence of

that authority. See W. Flagler, 382 So. 3d at 1287 (explaining that

quo warranto is available to “challenge the authority to exercise a

state power rather than the merits of the action”); State v. Tampa

Waterworks Co., 47 So. 358, 359 (Fla. 1908) (observing that quo

warranto was designed to determine “the existence of authority,

not the proper exercise of it”). Quo warranto is not the proper

vehicle for that challenge. See W. Flagler, 382 So. 3d at 1287 (“We

have never used the writ to test the substantive constitutionality

of a statute, and we decline Petitioners’ implicit invitation to

expand the scope of the writ here. To do so would serve as an

affront to an essential feature of quo warranto.”).

Moreover, Bailey had a proper vehicle available to him—he

could have sought a declaratory judgment under section 86.101,

Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Chiles v. Phelps, 714 So. 2d 453, 457

(Fla. 1998) (“We have stated that under ordinary circumstances,

the constitutionality of a statute should be challenged by way of a

declaratory judgment action in circuit court.”); Martinez v.

Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1991) (explaining that the

purpose of the declaratory judgment act is to “afford relief from

insecurity and uncertainty with respect to rights, status, and other

equitable or legal relations, and it should be liberally construed”).

Indeed, declaratory judgment actions are routinely used to

challenge the Governor’s executive orders. See, e.g., Bass v. Askew,

342 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (declaring that the

Governor’s executive order suspending a county commissioner was

insufficient and that the Governor lacked the right to amend the

order of suspension). Because an adequate remedy was available,

the trial court did not err when it declined to issue the writ. See

State v. Duval Cnty., 141 So. 173, 176 (Fla. 1932) (“It is one of the

fundamentals of procedure in quo warranto that the writ will not

be issued where there is another ample and sufficient remedy

provided by law for the relief sought.”).

13

_____________________________

Mark Herron of Messer Caparello, P.A., Tallahassee, for

Appellant.

Nicholas J.P. Meros of Shutts & Bowen LLP, Tallahassee, for

Appellee Ron DeSantis.

14