State v. Stevens

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-584

Filed 6 August 2025

Mecklenburg County, Nos. 22CRS206153-590, 22CRS206155-590

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

CLARENCE STEVENS, JR., Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 14 September 2023 by Judge

Carla Archie in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals

27 February 2025.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General John A.

Payne, for the State.

Arnold & Smith, PLLC, by Pamela L. Williams and Paul A. Tharp, for

defendant-appellant.

STROUD, Judge.

Defendant appeals from judgments convicting him of trafficking in fentanyl

and possession of a firearm by felon after entering an Alford plea. Defendant asserts

the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress as the affidavit supporting

the search warrant “failed to establish a nexus between any alleged criminal activity

and the residence in question” and was “unsupported by any facts which tend to make

the informant’s statements credible.” We affirm the trial court’s order granting in

part and denying in part Defendant’s motion to suppress.

STATE V. STEVENS

Opinion of the Court

I. Background

On or about 24 February 2022, Detective J.A. Garcia of the Charlotte-

Mecklenburg Police Department applied for a search warrant for Defendant’s house

and two vehicles owned by Defendant, a white Range Rover and a red Corvette.

Detective Garcia’s “probable cause affidavit” stated the following information:

On 15 February 2022 at about 2:14 am, Charles Mills “was spending the night at his

wife’s residence[.]” While Mr. Mills and his wife were separated, he was staying at

her house that night “due to a recent break-up she had with her ex-boyfriend,”

Defendant. Defendant arrived at Mr. Mills’s wife’s house and “began banging on the

door, demanding [Mr.] Mills and his wife open the door.” They refused to open the

door, and Defendant left. Mr. Mills left the house shortly after and he noticed

Defendant driving a white Range Rover behind him. Defendant fired a gun at Mr.

Mills’s vehicle three times and Mr. Mills heard a bullet strike his car. Mr. Mills

continued driving and Defendant went the other way after leaving the neighborhood.

Mr. Mills texted his wife what happened after the incident.

Mr. Mills’s wife showed detectives “surveillance footage of [Defendant]

violently kicking her front door on the morning of the incident just prior to the

shooting” but the shooting was not captured on video. Mr. Mills’s wife showed

detectives footage that “appeared” to show Defendant with a black shotgun and she

told detectives Defendant “is known to have a black 12-gauge Mossberg shotgun and

usually carries a black .40 caliber handgun[.]” The projectile that hit Mr. Mills’s car

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Opinion of the Court

could not be retrieved since it was “buried in the trunk liner.” Detective Garcia also

noted that Defendant was a convicted felon at the time of this incident.

On 24 February 2022, “officers observed [Defendant] leaving his residence . . .

in his White Range Rover. [Defendant] was in the passenger seat of the Range Rover.”

Defendant’s son was the driver. Defendant was dropped off and the officers arrested

him but the firearm was not in Defendant’s possession. The Range Rover, which

Defendant’s son was driving, returned to Defendant’s house and an officer “observed

[it] pull into the garage and the garage door close” and officers then “knocked on the

door and secured the [house] to wait for a search warrant.”

That same day a magistrate judge signed the search warrant authorizing

officers to search Defendant’s house, Range Rover, and Corvette. The warrant also

allowed officers to seize property. Officers recovered a handgun, shotgun, 3 rifles,

suspected narcotics, plastic baggies, a digital scale, a “baggie with white powder[,]”

and some mail with Defendant’s name on it from the house.

Defendant was indicted on or about 7 March 2022 for possession of a firearm

by a felon, trafficking in drugs, and possession with intent to sell or deliver a

controlled substance (“PWISD”). Defendant was indicted by superseding indictment

on 3 July 2023 for possession of a firearm by a felon, trafficking in drugs, and PWISD.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the search of his house on 19 June 2023 “because

the facts in th[e] case do not give rise to probable cause to search Defendant’s

residence” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

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States Constitution and Article I, Sections 19, 20, and 21 of the North Carolina

Constitution. Defendant filed an amended motion to suppress the search on 11

September 2023 to include the red Corvette listed in the search warrant.

The trial court heard Defendant’s motion on 11 September 2023. The court

rendered findings of fact at the close of the hearing and denied Defendant’s motion to

suppress as to the house and the Range Rover but granted the motion as to the

Corvette. The trial court entered a written Order on 19 September 2023 concluding

there “was probable cause to believe a crime had occurred[,]” Defendant committed

the crime, and “evidence of the crime would be inside [Defendant’s house] or in the

White Range Rover.”

On 14 September 2023, Defendant pled guilty in an Alford plea to trafficking

in fentanyl by possession and possession of a firearm by a felon. The State dismissed

the PWISD charge as a part of the agreement. Defendant specifically pled

“preserving his right to appeal the motion to suppress the search and seizure of the

residence pursuant to the search warrant[.]” The trial court entered judgments that

same day and Defendant filed written notice of appeal on 25 September 2023.

II. Preservation

We must first address whether Defendant preserved his argument regarding

the denial of his motion to suppress for appellate review. The State contends he did

not, and while Defendant presents this issue last in his brief, we will address it first

because if Defendant did not preserve the issue for full review, we must use a different

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standard of review. See State v. Williams, 291 N.C. App. 497, 501, 895 S.E.2d 912,

916 (2023) (“[O]ur standard of review changes when a motion-to-suppress issue is not

preserved.” (citation omitted)). Defendant contends the issue is preserved as he filed

a timely motion to suppress and preserved his right to appeal the Order in his plea

agreement. The State acknowledges Defendant preserved his right to appeal the

Order in his plea but contends the issue is not preserved since “the record and

transcript do[es] not demonstrate that Defendant objected to the evidence in the

search warrant at trial or to the final ruling from the trial court.”

Rule 10(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure states:

In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party

must have presented to the trial court a timely request,

objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the

ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific

grounds were not apparent from the context. It is also

necessary for the complaining party to obtain a ruling upon

the party’s request, objection, or motion.

N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). North Carolina General Statute Section 15A-979(b) states

“[a]n order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an

appeal from a judgment of conviction, including a judgment entered upon a plea of

guilty.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-929(b) (2023).

This Court has held that when a defendant intends to

appeal from the denial of a suppression motion pursuant to

this section, he must give notice of his intention to the

prosecutor and to the court before plea negotiations are

finalized; otherwise, he will waive the appeal of right

provisions of the statute.

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Opinion of the Court

State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 732, 735, 392 S.E.2d 603, 605 (1990) (citation omitted).

Here, Defendant filed his motion to suppress evidence from the search of the

house and Range Rover on 19 June 2023. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion

on 11 September 2023 and then Defendant’s jury trial began. However, on 14

September 2023, Defendant decided to accept the State’s plea offer and the jury trial

ceased. In the transcript of the plea entered on 14 September 2023, Defendant

“pleads preserving his right to appeal the motion to suppress the search and seizure

of the residence pursuant to the search warrant.” The transcript of the plea was

signed by the deputy clerk of superior court, Defendant’s attorney, the State, and the

trial judge. The State acknowledges this but contends the issue is still not preserved,

based on State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 405-06, 533 S.E.2d 168, 198-99 (2000), since

Defendant did not object “to the evidence in the search warrant at trial or to the final

ruling from the trial court.” This Court concluded in Golphin that the defendant’s

“pretrial motion to suppress is not sufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the

admissibility of his statement because he did not object at the time the statement was

offered into evidence.” Id. at 405, 533 S.E.2d at 198 (citation omitted).

But Golphin is inapposite to this case as Golphin involved a verdict and

judgment entered after a jury trial and not a guilty plea. See id. at 379, 533 S.E.2d

at 183. In Golphin, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress before

the jury trial and then the evidence the defendant had requested to be suppressed

was presented at the jury trial without objection from the defendant. See id. at 405,

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533 S.E.2d at 198-99. The jury then returned a verdict and on appeal the defendant

in Golphin argued the evidence he sought to suppress was admitted and considered

by the jury in error. See id. Here, trial did begin on 11 September 2023, but

Defendant decided to plead guilty on 14 September 2023, so on appeal we are not

considering any issues of evidence admitted at the trial. Instead, Defendant properly

filed a motion to suppress the evidence and “g[a]ve notice of his intention to the

prosecutor and to the court before plea negotiations [were] finalized[,]” demonstrated

by Defendant’s preservation of his right to appeal in the transcript of the plea. Tew,

326 N.C. at 735, 392 S.E.2d at 605 (citations omitted). In this appeal, we are not

considering any argument regarding evidence being improperly presented to the jury

or trier of fact so whether Defendant objected to evidence during the beginning of the

jury trial is not relevant.1 This argument is properly preserved for appellate review

and we will thus address the merits of the appeal.

III. Motion to Suppress

Defendant argues “the trial court erred in partially denying Defendant’s

motion to suppress where the search warrant for Defendant’s residence was

unsupported by probable cause.” (Capitalization altered.) Specifically, Defendant

1 Because Defendant’s appeal is based only on the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and

his legal argument that the warrant application did not provide sufficient information to support

probable cause for issuance of the search warrant, our record includes only the hearing on the motion

to suppress. The transcript filed with this Court covers only the hearing on the motion to suppress

and the guilty plea colloquy.

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Opinion of the Court

argues “Detective Garcia’s affidavit was conclusory because it failed to establish a

nexus between any alleged criminal activity and the residence in question” and

“Detective Garcia’s affidavit is unsupported by any facts which tend to make the

informant’s statements credible.” We disagree and affirm the trial court’s Order.

A. Standard of Review

The scope of appellate review of a ruling upon a

motion to suppress is strictly limited to determining

whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact

are supported by competent evidence, in which event

they are conclusively binding on appeal, and

whether those factual findings in turn support the

judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.

The trial court’s conclusions of law are fully reviewable on

appeal. An appellate court accords great deference to the

trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress because the trial

court is entrusted with the duty to hear testimony (thereby

observing the demeanor of the witnesses) and to weigh and

resolve any conflicts in the evidence.

State v. Brown, 248 N.C. App. 72, 74, 787 S.E.2d 81, 84 (2016) (citations, quotation

marks, and ellipses omitted).

Here, Defendant does not challenge any of the findings of fact as unsupported

by the evidence, so we must determine if the trial court’s findings of fact support its

conclusions of law that:

1. There was probable cause to believe a crime had

occurred (shooting into occupied vehicle).

2. There was probable cause to believe that . . . [D]efendant

had committed the crime.

3. There was probable cause to believe that evidence of the

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Opinion of the Court

crime would be inside the Hubbard Road residence or in

the white Range Rover.

The trial court’s order includes the following findings of fact which are not challenged

on appeal as unsupported by the evidence, so these facts are binding for purpose of

appellate review, see State v. Ashworth, 248 N.C. App. 649, 651, 790 S.E.2d 173, 176

(2016) (“Findings of fact that are not challenged on appeal are binding and deemed

to be supported by competent evidence.” (citation omitted)):

1. On February 24, 2022, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police

Department (CMPD) Detective Joseph Garcia applied for

and obtained a search warrant from Magistrate F. Wilson

to search a residence located at 4402 Hubbard Road in

Charlotte, North Carolina.

2. In addition to the residence, the search warrant also

included a 2005 white Range Rover and a 1994 red

Chevrolet Corvette, both of which were registered to . . .

[D]efendant Clarence Stevens, Jr., date of birth [redacted],

at the Hubbard Road address.

3. The search warrant was supported by an affidavit that

included evidence of a crime that occurred on February 15,

2022. The evidence was that Charles Mills was spending

the night at his wife’s house because she had recently

broken up with . . . [D]efendant. When Mills left the house,

he observed . . . [D]efendant in a White Range Rover. . . .

[D]efendant drove up behind Mills and fired a gun at Mills’

car three times. According to Mills’ wife, . . . [D]efendant

was known to carry a black 12-gauge shotgun and a .40-

caliber handgun with an extended magazine that he kept

on his person or inside his vehicle.

4. An arrest warrant was issued for . . . [D]efendant for

shooting into an occupied vehicle based on the incident that

occurred on February 15, 2022.

5. In an attempt to serve the arrest warrant on February

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Opinion of the Court

24, 2022, CMPD officers were conducting surveillance at

4402 Hubbard Road and observed . . . [D]efendant leave the

residence in a white Range Rover. CMPD officers arrested

. . . [D]efendant when he exited the Range Rover at an auto

body shop located at 2514 Sugar Creek Road in Charlotte

and did not find any weapons on . . . [D]efendant.

B. Nexus Between the House and Criminal Activity

As stated above, Defendant’s argument is that the affidavit in support of the

application of the search warrant of his house and car was not sufficient for issuance

of the search warrant. This Court has explained the proper role of the trial court

conducting a suppression hearing in the case of a search after a warrant was issued:

The question for a trial court

reviewing the issuance of a search warrant is

whether there is substantial evidence in the record

supporting the judicial officer’s decision to issue the

warrant. North Carolina employs the totality of the

circumstances approach for determining the

existence of probable cause. Thus, the task of the

issuing judicial officer is to make a common-sense

decision based on all the circumstances that there is

a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a

crime will be found in a particular place.

Because its duty in ruling on a motion to suppress based

upon an alleged lack of probable cause for a search warrant

involves an evaluation of the judicial officer’s decision to

issue the warrant, the trial court should consider only the

information before the issuing officer. Thus, although our

appellate courts have held that the scope of the court’s

review of the judicial officer’s determination of probable

cause is not confined to the affidavit alone, additional

information can only be considered where

the evidence shows that the judicial officer made his

notes on the exhibit contemporaneously from

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Opinion of the Court

information supplied by the affiant under oath, that

the paper was not attached to the warrant in order

to protect the identity of the informant, that the

notes were kept in the magistrate’s own office

drawer, and that the paper was in the same

condition as it was at the time of the issuance of the

search warrant.

State v. Hicks, 60 N.C.App. 116, 119, 120-21, 298 S.E.2d

180, 183 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted;

emphasis added), disc. review denied, 307 N.C. 579, 578,

300 S.E.2d 553 (1983). In such circumstances, an appellate

court may consider whether probable cause can be

supported by the affidavit in conjunction with the

aforementioned notes. Id. at 121, 298 S.E.2d at 183; see

also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-245(a) (2015) (“Before acting on

the application, the issuing official may examine on oath

the applicant or any other person who may possess

pertinent information, but information other than that

contained in the affidavit may not be considered by the

issuing official in determining whether probable cause

exists for the issuance of the warrant unless the

information is either recorded or contemporaneously

summarized in the record or on the face of the warrant by

the issuing official.”) (emphasis added). Outside of such

contemporaneously recorded information in the record,

however, it is error for a reviewing court to rely upon facts

elicited at the suppression hearing that go beyond the four

corners of the warrant.

Brown, 248 N.C. App. at 74-76, 787 S.E.2d at 85 (citations, quotation marks, brackets,

ellipses, and emphasis omitted).

Defendant first contends “Detective Garcia’s affidavit was conclusory because

it failed to establish a nexus between any alleged criminal activity and the residence

in question.” Defendant mostly argues the information in the affidavit was stale since

the shooting occurred eight to nine days before and “Mr. Mills’ statement that

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Opinion of the Court

Defendant shot at him while driving a white Range Rover does not establish probable

cause to search Defendant’s purported residence.” We disagree.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable cause means that there must exist a reasonable

ground to believe that the proposed search will reveal the presence upon the premises

to be searched of the objects sought and that those objects will aid in the apprehension

or conviction of the offender.” State v. Lindsey, 58 N.C. App. 564, 565, 293 S.E.2d

833, 834 (1982) (emphasis in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Before a search warrant may be issued, proof of probable

cause must be established by facts so closely related to the

time of issuance of the warrant so as to justify a finding of

probable cause at that time. The general rule is that no

more than a “reasonable” time may have elapsed. The test

for “staleness” of information on which a search warrant is

based is whether the facts indicate that probable cause

exists at the time the warrant is issued.

Id.

Defendant cites Brown, 248 N.C. App. at 76, 787 S.E.2d at 85, to assert “where

the alleged criminal activity has been observed within a day or two of the affidavit

and application, the information is generally not held to be stale.” But Brown also

states “[a]s a general rule, an interval of two or more months between the alleged

criminal activity and the affidavit has been held to be such an unreasonably long

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Opinion of the Court

delay as to vitiate the search warrant.” Id. (citation omitted). In Brown, the affidavit

stated, in part,

[i]n the past 48 hours, Det. Putnam spoke with a person

whose name cannot be revealed. This person has concern

for their [sic] safety, and Det. Putnam feels this person

would be of no further value to law enforcement if their [sic]

true identity was revealed. For the remainder of this

application Det. Putnam will refer to this person as “CRI #

1095.” CRI # 1095 has been in contact with Don Brown and

has provided Det. Putnam with a counterfeit $100 bill that

came from 1232 N. Ransom St. Det. Putnam verified that

this is the addess [sic] of Don Newton Brown. Don Brown

resides at this residence with a black female by the name

of Kisha Harris. The house is also frequented by Paquito

Brown and Don Brown. Don Brown is known to have

firearms and the CRI stated that Don Brown has been seen

with a handgun.

Id. at 76-77, 787 S.E.2d at 86 (ellipses omitted). We noted

[a]t the suppression hearing, Putnam testified that what

he meant to say in the first paragraph of the affidavit was

both (1) that the CRI told Putnam the information about

Brown within 48 hours of applying for the warrant and also

(2) that the CRI had obtained the counterfeit money within

that time period.

Id. at 77, 787 S.E.2d at 86 (emphasis in original). Citing State v. Newcomb, 84 N.C.

App. 92, 93, 351 S.E.2d 565, 566 (1987), we stated “[a]s did Putnam here, the officer

in Newcomb ‘failed to state the time the informant’s observations were made.’” Id. at

80, 787 S.E.2d at 87 (ellipses omitted). We concluded “[w]e cannot distinguish the

staleness of the CRI’s information contained in Putnam’s affidavit from that in

Newcomb” and vacated the judgments. Id. at 80, 787 S.E.2d at 88.

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Opinion of the Court

Just as in Brown, Defendant also heavily relies on Newcomb, where the

affidavit was based on information obtained from a confidential informant who

supplied “sparse” information which “g[a]ve[ ] no details from which one could

conclude that he had current knowledge of details or that he had even been inside the

defendant’s premises recently.” Id. at 95, 351 S.E.2d at 567. The officer who obtained

the search warrant testified that he “‘unintentionally and inadvertently’ failed to

state the reason the informant was reliable and the time the informant’s observations

were made.” Id. at 93-94, 351 S.E.2d at 566. He also made no “investigation of [the]

defendant or his residence” before applying for the search warrant. Id. at 94, 351

S.E.2d at 566. “The affidavit contain[ed] a mere naked assertion that the informant

at some time saw a ‘room full of marijuana’ growing in [the] defendant’s house” and

“Officer Cockman made no attempt to corroborate the informant’s story. He did

nothing more than verify that [the] defendant lived in the house.” Id. at 95, 351

S.E.2d at 567. We noted

the officer fail[ed] to provide the magistrate with sufficient

information from which to find probable cause, fail[ed] to

conduct any independent investigation, provide[d] a bare-

bones affidavit, and a warrant [was] issued by a Magistrate

who, according to the record, assert[ed] that her job is “to

find probable cause,” and has found probable cause in each

of the approximately 300 warrant applications[.]

Id. at 96, 351 S.E.2d at 567.

Neither Brown nor Newcomb are similar to this case. In Brown, the problem

was that the affidavit did not include sufficient information and the trial court

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Opinion of the Court

improperly considered testimony at the hearing which added to the affidavit:

The suppression order clearly indicate[d] that the trial

court did consider [Detective] Putnam’s hearing testimony

about what he intended the affidavit to mean—evidence

outside the four corners of the affidavit and not recorded

contemporaneously with the magistrate’s consideration of

the application—in determining whether a substantial

basis existed for the magistrate’s finding of probable cause.

Brown, 248 N.C. App. at 79, 787 S.E.2d at 87 (emphasis in original). Thus, the

magistrate would have had no way of knowing those additional facts when the

warrant was issued. Here, Defendant does not contend that there is any substantial

difference between the information in the affidavit and testimony at the hearing, nor

that the trial court improperly considered testimony or facts that were not included

in the affidavit.

In Newcomb, the warrant was issued based on information provided by a

confidential informant, and the affidavit omitted any statement regarding the

informant’s reliability or the timing of the informant’s observations. See Newcomb,

84 N.C. App. at 93, 351 S.E.2d at 565-66. The officer did not investigate the

informant’s reports before requesting the search warrant, so the only information

available in the affidavit was from the confidential informant.

This case differs dramatically from both Brown and Newcomb. “Common sense

is the ultimate criterion in determining the degree of evaporation of probable cause.”

State v. Teague, 259 N.C. App. 904, 911, 817 S.E.2d 239, 244 (2018) (citations,

quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Here, Detective Garcia thoroughly

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Opinion of the Court

investigated the shooting on 15 February 2022, leading up to Defendant’s arrest on

24 February 2022 for the shooting. Upon Defendant’s arrest, the officers did not find

a gun on him, so they believed his gun may be located in either his house or his

vehicle. These few days are much less than the “two or three more months between

the alleged criminal activity and the affidavit [that] has been held to be such an

unreasonably long delay as to vitiate the search warrant.” Brown, 248 N.C. App. at

76, 787 S.E.2d at 85 (citations omitted). The affidavit in support of the search

warrant outlined that Detective Garcia interviewed two separate witnesses who saw

Defendant kicking at the door just before shooting at Mr. Mills’s vehicle and Detective

Garcia watched video footage showing Defendant trying to kick in the door,

corroborating the version of events from Mr. Mills and his wife. Detective Garcia also

saw footage of Defendant “possessing what appeared to be a black shotgun” and

“[d]etectives observed [Defendant] in possession of what appeared to be a shotgun on

surveillance footage on the day of the incident.” Further, the affidavit stated “Mills’

wife was in a dating relationship with [Defendant] and advised detectives

[Defendant] maintains firearms on his person and/or in his vehicle/home.” And

Detective Garcia included in the affidavit that Mr. Mills observed Defendant using a

firearm to shoot at his car the day of the incident.

Defendant focuses on the statements in the search warrant that Mr. Mills’s

wife stated Defendant was known to carry firearms but

[i]t is unclear from Detective Garcia’s affidavit when and

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Opinion of the Court

to whom [Mr. Mills’s wife] said Defendant kept firearms in

his home, and her statements on their face fail to raise a

reasonable inference that firearms would be found in . . .

Defendant’s home. Detective Garcia’s affidavit is

completely devoid of any evidence as to if or when [Mr.

Mills’s wife] observed any firearm ever in Defendant’s

home.

But Mr. Mills’s wife’s statements about Defendant’s ownership of firearms was only

one relevant fact – although its relevance may be higher since Defendant was also a

convicted felon who was violating the law by merely possessing the firearms.

Defendant’s argument overlooks the fact that Mr. Mills saw Defendant with a gun

and ended up with a bullet hole in his car when Defendant shot at his vehicle on 15

February. We must consider the “‘totality of the circumstances’ test to assess whether

probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant[,]” as this Court noted in

State v. Boyd:

In the present case, the unchallenged statements in the

affidavit show that 20 different sources contacted police

over a six-month period to complain about criminal activity

occurring in the Wilson Street residence; two months’

surveillance of the residence revealed substantial coming

and going by individuals who stayed at the house only for

very short periods of time; a confidential informant

submitted to a full search by officers, made a controlled buy

of cocaine at 809 Wilson Street, and returned with cocaine

that he promptly gave to the police; and the confidential

informant identified [the] defendant as the individual who

had sold him the cocaine. Taken as a whole, this

information, set forth in the challenged affidavit, is

sufficient to support the conclusion that probable cause

existed to search [the] defendant and the Wilson Street

residence.

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Opinion of the Court

While the unusual traffic at the residence was not

sufficient, by itself, to constitute probable cause, the

additional evidence regarding the controlled buy by an

informant under surveillance of the officers was sufficient

to support issuance of the search warrant. . . . Contrary to

[the] defendant’s argument, it was unnecessary, under

these facts, for the State to make any showing addressing

the credibility and reliability of the informant.

State v. Boyd, 177 N.C. App. 165, 169-70, 628 S.E.2d 796, 801 (2006) (citations

omitted).

Here, according to the affidavit in support of the search warrant, Detective

Garcia saw footage of the incident which occurred days before the affidavit and saw

footage of Defendant, a convicted felon, as was also noted in the affidavit, with a

shotgun on video; and Mr. Mills’s first-hand account of Defendant shooting at him

from Defendant’s car was corroborated by the text message sent shortly after the

incident from Mr. Mills to his wife and by the bullet hole in his car. Thus, there was

sufficient information in the affidavit to conclude there was probable cause

incriminating items may be found in Defendant’s house or the Range Rover he was

driving when he shot at Mr. Mills. Defendant was known to “have a black 12-gauge

Mossberg shotgun” and he “usually carrie[d] a black .40 caliber handgun[.]” It was

reliably reported that he used a firearm to shoot at Mr. Mills’s car, and the house

searched belonged to Defendant. Under a “common sense” reading of the entire

affidavit, there was probable cause to believe items involved in the crime could be

found in Defendant’s house. Teague, 259 N.C. App. at 911, 817 S.E.2d at 244

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Opinion of the Court

(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Unlike Brown, Detective Garcia

did not “fail[ ] to state the time the informant’s observations were made.” Brown, 248

N.C. App. at 80, 787 S.E.2d at 87 (ellipses omitted). And unlike Newcomb, Detective

Garcia did not “fail[ ] to provide the magistrate with sufficient information from

which to find probable cause, fail[ ] to conduct any independent investigation, [or]

provide[ ] a bare-bones affidavit[.]” Newcomb, 84 N.C. App. at 96, 351 S.E.2d at 567.

This argument is overruled.

C. Facts Supporting the Affidavit

Defendant next argues “Detective Garcia’s affidavit lacked information to

establish that he relied on information from known and reliable informants” and

“Detective Garcia’s affidavit lacked information that the informants’ information was

independently verified.” We disagree.

1. Known and Reliable Informants

Defendant first contends “Detective Garcia’s affidavit lacked information to

establish that he relied on information from known and reliable informants.”

Probable cause can be established through the use of

informants. In utilizing an informant’s tip, probable cause

is determined using a ‘totality-of-the circumstances’

analysis which ‘permits a balanced assessment of the

relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and

unreliability) attending an informant’s tip. A known

informant’s information may establish probable cause

based on a reliable track record, or an anonymous

informant’s information may provide probable cause if the

caller’s information can be independently verified.

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Opinion of the Court

State v. Chadwick, 149 N.C. App. 200, 203, 560 S.E.2d 207, 209 (2002) (citations

omitted). “Even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant’s motives, his explicit

and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event

was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the

case.” State v. Smothers, 108 N.C. App. 315, 318, 423 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1992) (citation,

quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a

practical, common sense decision whether, given all the

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,

including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons

supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a

particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is

simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial

basis for concluding that probable cause existed.

Id. (citations, quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted).

Defendant relies on cases dealing with anonymous or confidential informants,

and those cases are simply not applicable to this case. He relies on State v. Benters,

367 N.C. 660, 766 S.E.2d 593 (2014), to assert Mr. Mills and his wife “could not be

considered confidential and reliable informants.” However, Benters differs from this

case since in Benters the information in the affidavit was from an anonymous tip and

“the officers’ corroborative investigation was qualitatively and quantitatively

deficient, and the affidavit’s material allegations were uniformly conclusory.” Id. at

661, 766 S.E.2d at 595.

Here, the tip was not anonymous; the tip was a complaint from Mr. Mills, who

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Opinion of the Court

reported that he was the victim of the crime of shooting into an occupied vehicle. He

provided his identity and his wife gave police video footage from the incident.

Detective Garcia investigated the report and obtained an arrest warrant for

Defendant for shooting into an occupied vehicle on 15 February 2022. Unlike Benters,

Detective Garcia was able to assess the reliability of both Mr. Mills and his wife as

they were not anonymous tipsters. See id. There was also a bullet hole in Mr. Mills’s

vehicle and a contemporaneous text message from Mr. Mills to his wife explaining

Defendant had just shot at his car, which corroborates the information given to

Detective Garcia by Mr. Mills and his wife. Detective Garcia included this

information in his affidavit. The affidavit established sufficient reliability and

corroboration of the information and this argument is overruled.

2. Verification of the Information

Finally, Defendant argues “Detective Garcia’s affidavit lacked information

that the informants’ information was independently verified.” Defendant contends

“[t]he alleged shooting was not captured on camera, no video surveillance footage

showed Defendant driving a white Range Rover or following Mr. Mills[’] vehicle, and

when Mr. Mills’ vehicle was processed by law enforcement, no projectile was found.”

We disagree.

Defendant’s characterization that a projectile was not found is misleading.

Our record includes a picture of a bullet hole in the back of Mr. Mills’s car, and the

affidavit stated investigators “processed [Mr.] Mills’ vehicle but were unable to

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Opinion of the Court

retrieve the projectile due to it being buried in the trunk liner.” The affidavit also

expressly states there was video footage from before the shooting that showed

Defendant on camera “violently kicking [Mr. Mills’s wife’s] front door.” The affidavit

states Mr. Mills “observed [Defendant] appear in his White Range Rover behind him”

and Defendant “fired at his vehicle approximately 3 times from behind[.]” Detective

Garcia also stated in the affidavit that detectives viewed the video footage themselves

and thus Detective Garcia did not solely rely on either Mr. Mills or his wife for an

account of what the video footage showed.

Defendant essentially argues that if there isn’t video footage of him following

Mr. Mills or shooting at him, there isn’t sufficient verification of the information from

the informants. But there is no such requirement for video verification of an

informant’s report of a crime, nor could there be. In fact, video footage is not

necessary in any criminal case and is not part of the evidence in most cases. The

shooting was not captured on camera and there was no video surveillance of

Defendant in a white Range Rover, but there was video surveillance of Defendant

kicking in Mr. Mills’s wife’s front door “just prior to the shooting.” This video

corroborates Mr. Mills’s wife’s report that Defendant was at her home at this

particular time and that he was inclined to violence toward anyone in the home. Mr.

Mills identified Defendant as driving the white Range Rover behind him during the

shooting. Mr. Mills sent a text message to his wife right after the shooting explaining

what occurred. Police did not recover the projectile, but they found a bullet hole in

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Opinion of the Court

Mr. Mills’s car. Defendant argues “[n]o evidence from law enforcement set forth in

Detective Garcia’s affidavit corroborated Mr. Mills’ statements[,]” but the evidence

discussed above does corroborate Mr. Mills’s statements; thus, there was sufficient

information verified by Detective Garcia to support probable cause. See State v.

Sinapi, 359 N.C. 394, 399, 610 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2005) (“Probable cause is a flexible,

common-sense standard. It does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct

or more likely true than false. A practical, nontechnical probability is all that is

required.” (emphasis in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). This

argument is overruled.

IV. Conclusion

Defendant has failed to establish the affidavit submitted by Detective Garcia

did not contain sufficient information showing probable cause to search the Range

Rover and Defendant’s house. We affirm the trial court’s Order.

AFFIRMED.

Judges GRIFFIN and FLOOD concur.

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