Goldsboro v. Doe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

HARRY LEE GOLDSBORO, II,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:25-cv-825-JSS-RMN

WARDEN JOHN DOE, SHERIFF

WAYNE IVEY, MAJOR

TORQUADO, MAJOR WILSON,

and MAJOR SAMUEL,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, sues five officers in their individual and

official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Brevard County Sheriff Wayne Ivey and

four Brevard County Jail officers described as Warden John Doe and Majors

Torquado, Wilson, and Samuel. (Dkt. 1 at 2–4; Dkt. 1-1 at 1–2.) The court screens

Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Although some of the claims in the

complaint are sufficiently pleaded, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint if he

wishes to proceed as to other claims in the complaint that are not sufficiently pleaded.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff claims that in October 2022, he was transferred from the Florida

Department of Corrections to the Brevard County Jail for a pending case. (Dkt. 1-1 at

2.) According to Plaintiff, the Brevard County Jail has a total “ban on books and

paper,” so he “was prohibited from transporting any of his legal mail despite having

four post[-]conviction motions pending” that were “due to be ruled on in May 2023.”

(Id.) Allegedly, between May 12 and 24, 2023, Plaintiff “received legal mail

notifications” through the jail’s electronic tablet system “indicating that legal mail had

been received.” (Id.) Plaintiff reports that the legal mail was then sent to the mail

processing center for Smart Communications, where the mail was scanned to create

an electronic copy, and the originals were destroyed. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, this

practice caused a six-day delay before he could access the legal mail on a tablet, and

the mail was related to cases where he had only thirty days to file an appeal. (Id.)

Plaintiff was also allegedly “prohibited by the [p]roperty office from accessing his legal

mail in his property because it was not legal mail related to” his pending Brevard

County case. (Id.)

Plaintiff states that the jail provides only fourteen tablets for forty-eight inmates

and since December 2024, his “dorm had only six tablets for [forty-eight] inmates.

(Id.) Purportedly, “requests for more tablets ha[ve] been ignored.” (Id.) Plaintiff

further states that the “tablets are only available for about [ten] hours per day and can[]

and have been confiscated.” (Id.) He claims that officers have confiscated tablets

indiscriminately and for the actions of only one person. (See id. at 2, 4–5, 9.) For

example, Plaintiff asserts that on various dates in 2024 and 2025, “the officer in

charge . . . confiscated all of the tablets due to the actions of one inmate who hid a

tablet in his cell.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff complains that these confiscations

“delayed . . . [his] ability to access his legal mail to write his motions in his appeal.”

(Id.) He alleges that confiscations have caused him to lose research time and access to

legal mail available only on the tablet and have thus “prevented [him] from timely

completing motions, conducting research, and submitting motions to the law library

to request copies before mailing [the motions] to the courts.” (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff alleges that in addition to being the only way to access legal mail, the

tablets furnish the only access to the law library, and even that access is limited. (Id.

at 2, 5.) According to Plaintiff, the law library does not offer access to local rules,

newly passed laws, or recent Supreme Court rulings and does not provide examples of

forms, motions, civil rights complaints, or habeas petitions. (Id. at 2.) Further,

Plaintiff claims, although the “jail has two [part-time] officers assigned to the law

library,” they are not “trained in the law” and “can offer no legal assistance.” (Id.)

Plaintiff also asserts that the books available on the tablets consist of only

approximately 150 to 180 classic novels and he has no access to new or recent books.

(Id. at 5.) Purportedly, he has no access to other forms of entertainment such as

movies, either, and the unnamed warden “has commented that the tablets will never

have movies as long as he[ i]s in charge.” (Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).)

Given the book and paper ban, the limited law library access, and Plaintiff’s

inability to access his legal paperwork for his previous convictions stored in his

property, Plaintiff allegedly “had to file three of his post[-]conviction motions without

the record and without any legal assistance from persons trained in the law, and all

three motions were denied.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff reports that he has “made mistakes in

filing his post[-]conviction motions” in a timely fashion and failed to “follow certain

appellate procedures, such as appealing to the proper court, . . . submitting motions

for rehearing, [and] citing proper caselaw to support his claims.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff

states that he has made additional procedural and formatting errors in civil rights cases

about the conditions of his confinement and in other cases. (Id. at 4–5.) According to

Plaintiff, although he was permitted to amend some motions, others were dismissed.

(Id. at 3–5.) In addition, Plaintiff claims, the delays caused by the ban caused him to

“los[e] as many as [six to fifteen] working days on orders that had

[thirty-]day deadlines,” and some orders imposed deadlines that expired before he

received the orders. (Id. at 3.) Allegedly, on various dates in 2024 and 2025, Plaintiff

also needed the law library to print copies of certain legal mail “so that he could

include [it] as evidence” on appeal and in section 1983 complaints. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff

states: “[D]ue to an issue with Smart Communications, the law library personnel

cannot access any legal mail that was sent to [him] since [November 1, 2024];

consequently, [he] has [seventy-five] legal mail documents that he cannot access.”

(Id.) According to Plaintiff, “this issue . . . has not been resolved” even though he

submitted two grievances and the law library “contacted Smart Communications

multiple times.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “refuse to spend allocated funds” from an

inmate welfare account supported by jail commissary sales “to improve the law library

and provide legal materials and supplies to indigent inmates.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff

claims that the jail provides only four sheets of lined paper, two envelopes, and one

pen each month to indigent inmates and he needed more than those supplies to

prosecute his legal actions. (Id.) He states that as of January 2024, the account

contained more than $1 million. (Id.) While some funds were used to build a half-

court basketball court, to provide chess boards in dorms, and to pay for additional

security for a jail-wide tournament, Plaintiff alleges that these expenditures “cost

nowhere near [$1 million], and the jail suddenly had money to replace the cell doors.”

(Id.) Allegedly, when Plaintiff filed a records request to ascertain how the funds are

being spent, the records custodian told him that responding to his request would cost

over $1,000, leading Plaintiff to believe that the funds are being misappropriated. (Id.)

Overall, Plaintiff asserts that the total book and paper ban implemented and

enforced by Defendants is an arbitrary infringement on his rights with no valid

penological objective. (See id. passim.) Plaintiff claims that “th[e] ban has not stopped

drugs or contraband from entering the jail.” (Id. at 3.) Moreover, Plaintiff identifies

alternatives to the ban, such as “permit[ting] inmates to purchase up to three books per

month from approved vendors to prevent tampering,” with the books subject to a

monthly search, and permitting “newer titles and law books [to] be added to the jail

tablets.” (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that Defendants have “fail[ed] to provide an

adequate law library with assistance from persons trained the law” and that this failure

has resulted in violations of Plaintiff’s rights. (Id. at 9.) In general, Plaintiff charges

Defendants with subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement and

with infringing on his rights of access to the courts, free speech, and equal protection.

(Id.) Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants violated article I, sections 4, 9, and 21, of

the Florida Constitution. (Dkt. 1 at 3.) He seeks declaratory relief, preliminary and

permanent injunctions, nominal and punitive damages, costs, and attorney fees. (Id.

at 5; Dkt. 1-1 at 1, 10.)

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

“A dismissal for failure to state a claim under the early screening provision is

no different from a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Danglar

v. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.4th 54, 55 n.1 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting White v. Lemma, 947 F.3d

1373, 1376–77 (11th Cir. 2020)). Thus, the court “accept[s] the allegations in

the . . . complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to” the

plaintiff. Id. “To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, [the] complaint must

include factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant[s] [are] liable for the alleged misconduct.” Waldman v. Ala. Prison Comm’r,

871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017). “A pro se pleading is held to a less stringent

standard than a pleading drafted by an attorney and is liberally construed.” Id.

“However, a pro se pleading must still suggest that there is at least some factual support

for a claim.” Id. Moreover, a plaintiff’s pro se status does not permit the court to

“serve as de facto counsel for [him] or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading . . . to

sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jam., Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014)

(quotation omitted).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s state and federal free speech claims against Sheriff Ivey may proceed

to service of process. The court otherwise dismisses the complaint without prejudice

for six reasons. First, Plaintiff does not describe any actions taken by Defendants in

their individual capacities. Second, the official-capacity claims against the unnamed

warden and Majors Torquado, Wilson, and Samuel are duplicative of the claims

against Sheriff Ivey. Third, Plaintiff does not sufficiently identify any case or claim

that was dismissed due to the alleged deficiencies in the legal mail system and access

to legal resources. Fourth, Plaintiff does not allege that his inability to read magazines,

listen to music, or watch movies on the provided tablets threatens his health or safety

or violates contemporary standards of decency. Fifth, Plaintiff does not assert that he

is part of a protected class for federal equal protection purposes. Sixth, the court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims based on the

Florida Constitution’s guarantee of access to the courts because the claims raise a

novel or complex issue of Florida law.

In explaining how the court arrived at these reasons and the outcome that they

support, the court examines the individual- and official-capacity nature of Plaintiff’s

section 1983 claims before turning to the merits of these claims. The court then

addresses Plaintiff’s state law claims and considers his request for preliminary

injunctive relief.

A. Individual and Official Capacities

Although Plaintiff sues Sheriff Ivey, the unnamed warden, and Majors

Torquado, Wilson, and Samuel in their individual and official capacities, Plaintiff does

not allege individual actions taken by any Defendant. (See Dkts. 1, 1-1.) Instead, he

describes Defendants’ involvement in the alleged constitutional violations as

supervisory rather than personal. (See Dkt. 1-1 at 1.) Because Plaintiff does not relate

Defendants’ personal participation in the violations or explain how actions they took

in their supervisory roles are causally connected to the violations, the court dismisses

the individual-capacity claims. See Braddy v. Fla. Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Sec., 133 F.3d

797, 802 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [an]

individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.”); Brown v.

Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Supervisory liability occurs either when

the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when

there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged

constitutional deprivation.”).

As to the official-capacity claims, “[f]or liability purposes, a suit against a public

official in his official capacity is considered a suit against the local government entity

he represents.” Owens v. Fulton County, 877 F.2d 947, 951 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). Here, each official-capacity claim

against each Defendant is a claim against the government entity that runs the jail.

Because Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Sheriff Ivey suffice to sue this entity,

the court dismisses the official-capacity claims against the other Defendants as

duplicative. See Parnell v. Sch. Bd. of Lake Cnty., 731 F. Supp. 3d 1298, 1315 (N.D. Fla.

2024) (“Claims against the Lake County Superintendent in her official capacity are

dismissed as duplicative of claims against the Lake County School Board.”).

B. Section 1983

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims allege unconstitutional conditions of confinement

and violations of the rights of access to the courts, free speech, and equal protection.

The court discusses these topics in turn.

1. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff claims that the situation at the jail amounts to the imposition of

unconstitutional conditions of confinement, in violation of the punishment- and due

process-related protections provided by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See

Dkt. 1-1 at 9–10.) Regarding a conditions of confinement claim, “the minimum

standard allowed by the [Fourteenth Amendment’s] due process clause [for pretrial

detainees] is the same as that allowed by the [E]ighth [A]mendment for convicted

persons.” Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985). The Eighth

Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane

conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate

food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)

(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)).

A conditions of confinement plaintiff must make two showings: (1) “an

objective showing of a deprivation or injury that is ‘sufficiently serious’ to constitute a

denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’” and (2) “a subjective

showing that the official [who caused the deprivation] had a ‘sufficiently culpable state

of mind.’” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834). For the objective showing, “[t]he challenged condition must be

‘extreme,’” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)), such that the “condition . . . ‘poses an unreasonable

risk of serious damage to [the plaintiff’s] future health’ or safety,” id. (quoting Helling

v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). Further, the complained-of risk must not be “one

that today’s society chooses to tolerate.” Id. (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 36). For the

subjective showing, the plaintiff must allege that “the official knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 1289–90 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837).

Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims fail because he does not show that

the ban on physical books, the limited number of books available on the provided

tablets, and his inability to access other forms of entertainment, such as movies, create

conditions so extreme as to threaten his health or safety or violate contemporary

standards of decency. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed. See id. at 1289.

2. Access to the Courts

Plaintiff asserts that the jail’s book and paper ban causes undue delay in the

receipt of his legal mail and impairs his ability to access his stored legal paperwork.

(See Dkt. 1-1 at 2, 4–5.) He also asserts that combined with the other issues at the

jail—namely, the limited number of tablets available for inmates to access their

scanned legal mail and law library resources, the limited number and type of legal

resources available to inmates, and officials’ refusal to spend more of the allocated

funds to improve the law library and provide additional legal supplies to inmates—the

ban infringes on the federal constitutional right to access the courts. (See id.)

“Access to the courts is clearly a constitutional right,” as implied by “the

First Amendment, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth

Amendment, and/or the Fourteenth Amendment.” Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279,

1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002), and

Bank of Jackson Cnty. v. Cherry, 980 F.2d 1362, 1370 (11th Cir. 1993)). However, “in

an access-to-courts claim, ‘a plaintiff cannot merely allege a denial of access to a law

library or adequate attorney, even if the denial is systemic.’” Wilson v. Blankenship, 163

F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Sabers v. Delano, 100 F.3d 82, 84 (8th Cir.

1996)). A plaintiff must “prove that he has a colorable underlying claim for which he

seeks relief.” Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the

plaintiff must specifically identify in his complaint “a nonfrivolous, arguable

underlying claim.” Id. (cleaned up). “The allegations about the underlying cause of

action must be specific enough to give fair notice to the defendants and must ‘be

described well enough to apply the nonfrivolous test and to show that the arguable

nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.’” Cunningham v. Dist. Att’y’s Off. for

Escambia Cnty., 592 F.3d 1237, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416).

Here, although Plaintiff shares some information about the cases purportedly

affected by the situation at the jail and attaches related filings to his complaint, he does

not describe the underlying causes of action with enough specificity for the court to

ascertain whether they contained nonfrivolous claims and does not adequately connect

his allegations with the attached filings. (See Dkts. 1, 1-1, 1-6.) Consequently, the

court dismisses the access-to-courts claims without prejudice. See Cunningham, 592

F.3d at 1271.

3. Free Speech

Plaintiff alleges that through the complete ban on physical books, the limited

availability of books on the tablets, and the unavailability of other forms of

entertainment, Defendants have violated his First Amendment rights, including

freedom of speech and freedom of expression. (See Dkt. 1-1 at 9.) “[A] prison inmate

retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a

prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell

v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). As relevant here, the Supreme Court has

explained:

The right of freedom of speech . . . has broad scope. The authors of the

First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might

disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which

they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph

over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right to distribute

literature and necessarily protects the right to receive it.

Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (footnote and citation omitted).

However, prisoners’ “free speech rights are uncontrovertedly limited by virtue of their

incarceration.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 392 (6th Cir. 1999). For “a prison

regulation” that allegedly “impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights” to be valid, the

regulation must be “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“[E]ven

when an institutional restriction infringes a specific constitutional guarantee, such as

the First Amendment, the practice must be evaluated in the light of the central

objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional security.”).

Upon reviewing the complaint, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s official-

capacity claim against Sheriff Ivey for violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right

to free speech is sufficient to proceed to service of process. The complaint plausibly

alleges that the complained-of situation at the jail infringes on Plaintiff’s right and does

not serve a legitimate penological interest. (See Dkt. 1-1 at 9.) See Paull v. Tony, No.

19-63170-CV, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27510, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2020)

(recommending that a pro se prisoner’s First Amendment claim based on a jail’s book

ban proceed when the complaint could “be liberally construed to argue that the ban

[wa]s not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest,” in violation of “[the

p]laintiff’s constitutional rights under Turner”).

4. Equal Protection

Plaintiff claims that he is being denied equal protection because similarly

situated inmates at other facilities have access to physical books and various kinds of

media. (See Dkt. 1-1 at 7.) “To establish an equal protection claim, a prisoner must

demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners who received more

favorable treatment[] and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination against him

based on race, religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected

basis.” Sweet v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing

Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also McCleskey v. Kemp,

481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (explaining that a plaintiff “must prove that the

decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose” (emphasis omitted)).

Plaintiff does not allege his membership in a protected class for his equal

protection claims, and to the extent that he points to his incarcerated status, the claims

fail. See Nyberg v. Crawford, 290 F. App’x 209, 211 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[P]risoners are

not a suspect class . . . .”). The court thus dismisses Plaintiff’s equal protection claims.

C. State Law

In addition to bringing section 1983 claims, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants

have violated article I, sections 4, 9, and 21, of the Florida Constitution, which pertain

to free speech, due process, and access to the courts. (Dkt. 1 at 3.) See Fla. Const. art.

I, § 4 (“No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech . . . .”); id.

§ 9 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty[,] or property without due process of

law . . . .”); id. § 21 (“The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury,

and justice shall be administered without sale, denial[,] or delay.”). Although section

1983 does not furnish a remedy for violations of state law, “[s]upplemental jurisdiction

permits parties to append state claims in federal cases, provided that the state[ ]law

claims ‘form part of the same case or controversy’ as the federal claims.” Crosby v.

Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). The court

does not pass on the forms of relief available to Plaintiff under the Florida Constitution

but observes that in general, Plaintiff seeks a variety of relief. (See Dkt. 1 at 5; Dkt. 1-

1 at 1, 10.) Because the complaint does not explain how Plaintiff’s rights under the

Florida Constitution have been violated, the court liberally construes the claims under

the Florida Constitution as running parallel to the section 1983 claims discussed

above. (See Dkts. 1 to 1-7.) See Waldman, 871 F.3d at 1289.

With respect to free speech and conditions of confinement, the state claims rise

and fall with the federal claims. The Florida Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he

scope of the protection accorded to freedom of expression in Florida under article I,

section 4[,] is the same as is required under the First Amendment.” Dep’t of Educ. v.

Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455, 461 (Fla. 1982); see Fla. Ass’n of Pro. Lobbyists, Inc. v. Div. of Legis.

Info. Servs. of the Fla. Off. of Legis. Servs., 525 F.3d 1073, 1076 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008).

Consequently, because the court determines that Plaintiff’s First Amendment official-

capacity claim against Sheriff Ivey is sufficient to proceed to service of process,

Plaintiff’s related claim under the Florida Constitution is also sufficient to proceed.

Similarly, “[u]nder the Florida Constitution, the . . . due process standards are the

same as the federal standards.” Modern, Inc. v. Fla., Dep’t of Transp., 381 F. Supp. 2d

1331, 1346 n.26 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Duncan v. Moore, 754 So. 2d 708, 712 (Fla.

2000), and Rice v. State, 754 So. 2d 881, 884–85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). Therefore,

because Plaintiff fails to state conditions of confinement claims under the federal

constitution, he also fails to state such claims under the Florida Constitution. The

court accordingly dismisses the conditions of confinement claims based on the Florida

Constitution.

With respect to access to the courts, however, the Florida Constitution

seemingly affords greater protection than does the United States Constitution. See

Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001) (“The right to access is specifically

mentioned in Florida’s constitution. Therefore, it deserves more protection than those

rights found only by implication.” (citation omitted)). There is “a lack of clarity about

whether a Florida constitutional claim [for access to the courts] requires a showing of

actual injury or something less such as an impermissible burden or a significantly

difficult impediment test.” Wingard v. Sprigle, No. 4:20cv341-AW-MAF, 2022 WL

18103334, at *8, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234401, at *20 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2022)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 527; Lambrix v.

Singletary, 618 So. 2d 787, 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); and McCuiston v. Wanicka,

483 So. 2d 489, 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)), report and recommendation adopted by

2023 WL 25355, at *1, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2023). This

lack of clarity presents “a novel or complex issue of [s]tate law” permitting the court

to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over Plaintiff’s claims. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(1). Accordingly, in its discretion, the court dismisses without prejudice the

claims that Plaintiff bases on the Florida Constitution’s guarantee of access to the

courts. See Rowe v. Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Among the

factors a district court should consider in exercising its discretion [regarding whether

to dismiss state law claims without prejudice on grounds related to supplemental

jurisdiction] are judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Both comity

and economy are served when issues of state law are resolved by state courts.” (citation

omitted)).

D. Preliminary Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks preliminary injunctive relief. (See, e.g., Dkt. 1-1 at 10.) As the

Eleventh Circuit has explained, preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate only if the

party seeking the relief demonstrates all of the following elements:

(1) [that the claim supporting the request for preliminary injunctive relief

has] a substantial likelihood of success on the merits[,] (2) that the

preliminary [injunctive relief] is necessary to prevent irreparable injury[,]

(3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the preliminary

[injunctive relief] would cause the other litigant[s,] and (4) that the

preliminary [injunctive relief] would not be averse to the public interest.

Chavez v. Fla. SP Warden, 742 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Parker v. State

Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1034–35 (11th Cir. 2001)). The granting of

preliminary injunctive relief is “an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy,’ and [Plaintiff]

bears the ‘burden of persuasion’ to clearly establish all four of these prerequisites.”

Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Siegel v.

LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). Plaintiff has neither attempted

to allege nor established these elements. (See Dkts. 1 to 1-7.)

Further, although Plaintiff cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, (Dkt. 1-1

at 1), he fails to fully comply with the rule, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, or with the Middle

District of Florida Local Rules governing requests for preliminary injunctive relief, see

M.D. Fla. R. 6.01, 6.02. For example, Rule 65 states that the court may grant

preliminary injunctive relief “only if the movant gives security in an amount that the

court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to

have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c), and Local Rules

6.01 and 6.02 require a motion for preliminary injunctive relief to include “a precise

and verified explanation of the amount and form of the required security,” M.D. Fla.

R. 6.01(a)(4), 6.02(a)(1). However, Plaintiff does not address the security requirement.

(See Dkts. 1 to 1-7.) For these reasons, the court denies the request for preliminary

injunctive relief.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly:

1. The official-capacity federal and state claims asserted in the complaint against

Sheriff Ivey for violation of Plaintiff’s free speech rights REMAIN PENDING

in this action, as the court finds them sufficiently pleaded to proceed to service

of process. However, all other claims in the complaint (Dkt. 1) are

DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claims based on the Florida Constitution’s guarantee of access to the courts.

However, if Plaintiff wishes to proceed with the other dismissed claims, he must

file an amended complaint on or before October 16, 2025.

a. To amend his complaint, Plaintiff shall fill out a new civil rights

complaint on the appropriate form and shall mark it “Amended

Complaint.” The amended complaint must include all claims that

Plaintiff seeks to assert in this case (not the state law claims based on the

Florida Constitution’s guarantee of access to the courts). The amended

complaint may not refer to or incorporate portions of the prior complaint.

b. The amended complaint supersedes Plaintiff’s prior complaint, and all

claims that Plaintiff seeks to assert in this case—including the claims

identified in this order as sufficient to proceed to service of process—must

be raised in the amended complaint.

c. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff must specifically describe the actions

taken by each Defendant and how those actions violated his

constitutional rights.

d. The amended complaint—including the claims identified in this order as

sufficient to proceed to service of process—is subject to screening for

frivolity under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

3. Should Plaintiff fail to timely file an amended complaint, the case will proceed

to service of process of the complaint (Dkt. 1) on Sheriff Ivey for the pending

claims identified above.

4. Plaintiff has filed this action pro se, and he is DIRECTED that he must

immediately advise the court of any change of address. He shall entitle the

paper “Notice to the Court of Change of Address.” This notice shall contain

only information pertaining to the address change and the effective date of such

and should not contain other motions or requests. Failure to inform the court

of an address change may result in the dismissal of this case without further

notice to Plaintiff.

5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail to Plaintiff, along with this order, a copy of

the standard prisoner civil rights complaint form.

ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on August 5, 2025.

2 ot S. Sarees —

NITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Unrepresented Parties

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