Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. Todd Rokita

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-2927

REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

TODD ROKITA, Attorney General of Indiana, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 23-cv-1805 — James R. Sweeney II, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 13, 2025 — DECIDED AUGUST 5, 2025

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, BRENNAN, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PRYOR, Circuit Judge. Indiana’s “buffer law” makes it a

crime for a person to knowingly or intentionally approach

within 25 feet of a law enforcement officer who is “lawfully

engaged in the execution of the law enforcement officer’s du-

ties after the law enforcement officer has ordered the person

to stop approaching.” Indiana Code (I.C.) § 35-44.1-2-14.

2 No. 24-2927

The plaintiffs, who are various media and media-related

organizations, argue that the buffer law is unconstitutionally

vague under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause because it is susceptible to arbitrary or discriminatory

enforcement by the police. The district court concluded that

the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in their Fourteenth

Amendment challenge to the buffer law, so the court issued a

preliminary injunction blocking its enforcement. For the rea-

sons below, we affirm the district court’s decision to prelimi-

narily enjoin enforcement of the buffer law.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Indiana’s Buffer Law

Indiana’s “Unlawful Encroachment on an Investigation”

law, referenced here as the buffer law, took effect on July 1,

2023. It provides:

A person who knowingly or intentionally ap-

proaches within twenty-five (25) feet of a law

enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the ex-

ecution of the law enforcement officer’s duties

after the law enforcement officer has ordered

the person to stop approaching commits unlaw-

ful encroachment on an investigation, a Class C

misdemeanor.

I.C. § 35-44.1-2-14.

As we recently explained in Nicodemus v. City of South

Bend, 137 F.4th 654 (7th Cir. 2025), the buffer law operates

quite straightforwardly. An officer may only invoke the

buffer law against someone who is “approaching,” and only

someone who nevertheless “knowingly or intentionally ap-

proaches” within 25 feet of the officer after being ordered to

No. 24-2927 3

stop approaching violates the buffer law. Id. at 661–62. Noth-

ing in the buffer law allows an officer to order someone to

move back. Id.

B. District Court Proceedings

On October 6, 2023, several plaintiffs challenged Indiana’s

buffer law as facially void for vagueness under the Fourteenth

Amendment, facially overbroad under the First Amendment,

and failing First Amendment scrutiny as applied to them. The

plaintiffs are: The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the

Press, a non-profit organization dedicated to First Amend-

ment advocacy on behalf of journalists; the Indiana Broad-

casters Association, comprised of more than 250 member ra-

dio and television broadcasters; the Indiana Professional

Chapter of the Society of Professional Journalists, whose

members include full-time Indiana-based reporters; the Indi-

anapolis Star newspaper; and Nexstar Media Inc., Scripps Me-

dia Inc., and TEGNA Inc., each of which operates local TV

news stations and employs full-time reporters. In their com-

plaint, the plaintiffs sought a declaration of the buffer law’s

unconstitutionality and an injunction restraining the defend-

ants—the Indiana Attorney General, Marion County Prosecu-

tor, and Marion County Sheriff, in their official capacities—

from enforcing the buffer law. 1

On November 3, 2023, the plaintiffs moved for a prelimi-

nary injunction, reasserting their constitutional claims and ar-

guing that failure to enjoin enforcement of the buffer law

would cause them irreparable harm. On December 1, the State

1

For convenience, we refer to the defendants collectively as “the State.”

4 No. 24-2927

moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, arguing

that the plaintiffs lacked standing. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).

In a September 27, 2024, order, the district court ruled on

both motions. The district court denied the State’s motion to

dismiss, concluding that it had jurisdiction because the plain-

tiffs had properly alleged an injury in fact to support their

pre-enforcement challenge. Next, the district court granted

the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion, reasoning that

the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their

Fourteenth Amendment void-for-vagueness claim, that they

would suffer irreparable harm to their newsgathering activi-

ties absent an injunction, and that the balance of harms and

public interest weighed in the plaintiffs’ favor. Reporters

Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Rokita, 751 F. Supp. 3d 931,

944–948 (S.D. Ind. 2024); see Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (explaining considerations underlying a

preliminary injunction). The district court did not reach the

plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims. Reporters Comm., 751

F. Supp. 3d. at 943.

The State appeals the district court’s order granting pre-

liminary injunctive relief, arguing that the buffer law is not

unconstitutionally vague and renewing its objection to the

plaintiffs’ standing to sue. Such interlocutory appeals are au-

thorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Bevis v. City of Naper-

ville, 85 F.4th 1175, 1187 (7th Cir. 2023). The district court has

stayed further proceedings pending resolution of this appeal.

C. Indiana’s Second Buffer Law

While this appeal was pending, the Indiana legislature

passed a second buffer law, which is identical to the buffer

law at issue in this case except it specifies that a law

No. 24-2927 5

enforcement officer may only order an individual to stop ap-

proaching if he “reasonably believes that a person’s presence”

within 25 feet “will interfere with the performance” of his

“duties.” This second buffer law was signed by Governor

Braun on March 5, 2025, and took effect on July 1, 2025. It is

codified adjacent to the original buffer law, at I.C. § 35-44.1-2-

15.

II. DISCUSSION

We begin by assuring ourselves of our jurisdiction. Sum-

mers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). We then as-

sess the district court’s decision to enter a preliminary injunc-

tion in the plaintiffs’ favor.

A. Jurisdiction

We have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). But the threshold questions of standing

and mootness, which both implicate our subject-matter juris-

diction under Article III of the Constitution, merit further dis-

cussion. Chicago Joe's Tea Room, LLC v. Vill. of Broadview, 894

F.3d 807, 813–14 (7th Cir. 2018). We may address standing and

mootness “in any order we choose.” Acheson Hotels, LLC v.

Laufer, 601 U.S. 1, 4 (2023). We start with mootness.

1. Mootness

“It is fundamental to the exercise of judicial power under

Article III of the United States Constitution that ‘federal

courts may not give opinions upon moot questions or abstract

propositions.’” Zessar v. Keith, 536 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Protestant Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Maram, 471 F.3d

724, 729 (7th Cir. 2006)). This rule “subsists through all stages

of federal proceedings, trial and appellate.” Id. at 794 (quoting

Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). Thus, “if

6 No. 24-2927

an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes

it impossible for the court to grant ‘any effectual relief what-

ever’ to a prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed.”

Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12

(1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). One

such event could be the repeal or replacement of a challenged

statute. A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute “be-

comes moot if a new statute is enacted in its place during the

pendency of the litigation, and the plaintiff seeks only pro-

spective relief.” Zessar, 536 F.3d at 793; Rembert v. Sheahan, 62

F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1995).

As mentioned earlier, I.C. § 35-44.1-2-15—Indiana’s sec-

ond buffer law—was passed during the pendency of this ap-

peal. It is narrower than the original buffer law because it re-

quires an officer to have a reasonable belief that someone ap-

proaching him will interfere with his duties before he may or-

der the person to stop approaching. The original buffer law

contains no reasonable belief requirement. See I.C. § 35-44.1-

2-14. Since the plaintiffs here seek only prospective relief, we

must assure ourselves that the second, narrower buffer law

has not repealed or replaced the original, broader version,

thereby rendering this appeal moot. See Zessar, 536 F.3d at

793.

First, I.C. § 35-44.1-2-15 does not purport to repeal or re-

place any other part of the Indiana Code. Instead, House Bill

1122, which introduced the second buffer law, specified that

it would be “added to the Indiana Code as a new section.”

H.B. 1122, 124th Gen. Assemb. (Ind. 2025). Second, in a sup-

plemental letter to this appeal, the State clarified that the in-

tent behind the second buffer law is to provide “additional

No. 24-2927 7

authority for officers to order someone to stop approaching.” 2

At oral argument, which took place before the second buffer

law went into effect, the State explained that officers would

have discretion to rely on either buffer law when seeking to

stop someone from approaching. Because the State intends to

continue enforcing the first buffer law, the enactment of the

second buffer law did not moot this appeal.

2. Standing

Next, we turn to standing, a “bedrock constitutional re-

quirement” rooted in Article III of the Constitution. FDA v.

All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 378 (2024) (quoting

United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 675 (2023)). Standing at its

core is about whether a plaintiff has a “personal stake” in the

dispute. Id. at 379. To establish standing, “a plaintiff must

demonstrate (i) that she has suffered or likely will suffer an

injury in fact, (ii) that the injury likely was caused or will be

caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury likely would

be redressed by the requested judicial relief.” Id. at 380. The

last two requirements—causation and redressability—often

go together: after all, if a defendant’s action causes an injury,

then enjoining that action “will typically redress that injury.”

Id. at 380–81.

Recall that the plaintiffs here brought a pre-enforcement

challenge to the buffer law, arguing in relevant part that the

buffer law is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Argu-

ing these theories together is “not unusual.” Ctr. for Individual

Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 479 (7th Cir. 2012). A statute

that is too vague may raise the “same chilling concerns that

2

App. Dkt. 39 at 1 (emphasis added).

8 No. 24-2927

attend an overbreadth challenge.” Bell v. Keating, 697 F.3d 445,

455 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S.

610, 620 (1976)). So, a plaintiff challenging a statute as over-

broad under the First Amendment “may also facially chal-

lenge [it] as void for vagueness” under the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. (citing Penny Saver Pub-

l'ns, Inc. v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 905 F.2d 150, 154 n. 2 (7th Cir.

1990)). We focus on vagueness because that is the issue at the

center of this appeal.

Relating as it does to due process, the vagueness doctrine

“incorporates notions of fair notice or warning.” Smith v.

Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974). It is unjust to punish a person

without providing clear notice as to what conduct is prohib-

ited. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983). A statute

that is “so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seri-

ously discriminatory enforcement” similarly leads to con-

cerns about fairness. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304

(2008). Thus, a vagueness claim alleges that a statute “either

fails to provide definite notice to individuals regarding what

behavior is criminalized,” invites arbitrary or discriminatory

enforcement, or both. Bell, 697 F.3d at 455 (citing Skilling v.

United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010)).

The State does not contest that the plaintiffs have estab-

lished an injury in fact for standing purposes, and we see no

reason to second-guess the district court’s thorough injury

analysis. As the district court explained, the plaintiffs submit-

ted affidavits from their journalist members or employees ex-

plaining that they conduct newsgathering activities in prox-

imity to police officers every day, and that at least some jour-

nalists intend to continue doing so, even if it means flouting

the buffer law. Other journalists claim to have engaged in self-

No. 24-2927 9

censorship by changing how they behave when conducting

newsgathering activities near Indiana police officers out of

fear that the buffer law will be invoked against them. Given

the buffer law’s chilling effect on some journalists’ speech,

and other journalists’ intentions to continuing recording po-

lice activity, we agree with the district court that the plaintiffs

have demonstrated injury in fact. Bell, 697 F.3d at 455; see also

Kilborn v. Amiridis, 131 F.4th 550, 565–66 (7th Cir. 2025).

The State argues, however, that the plaintiffs fail to satisfy

the causation and redressability requirements of standing,

which are often “flip sides of the same coin.” Sprint Comms.

Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 288 (2008). The State

maintains that any injury suffered by the plaintiffs is not re-

dressable by enjoining enforcement of the buffer law because

law enforcement officers could simply fall back on Indiana’s

emergency incident statute, which also allows them to ask

people to stay at least 25 feet away. We described the emer-

gency incident statute in Nicodemus:

[The statute] makes it a Class A misdemeanor to

knowingly or intentionally refuse to leave an

emergency incident area when requested to do

so by a law enforcement officer. Emergency in-

cidents include crimes scenes, police investiga-

tions, and locations where an individual is be-

ing arrested. I.C. § 35-44.1-4-1.5. An “emergency

incident area” means an area defined by public

safety officers either orally or with certain phys-

ical markers; or that is 25 feet “in all directions

from the perimeter of the emergency incident.”

I.C. § 35-44.1-4-2.

137 F.4th at 669.

10 No. 24-2927

The State’s argument fails twice over. First, although there

may be some overlap between the buffer law and the emer-

gency incident statute, the overlap is not complete. See id. (ex-

plaining that “the buffer law aims to fill gaps left by the exist-

ing statutory scheme”). As the plaintiffs point out, they con-

duct newsgathering activities in proximity to the police at a

variety of public events—such as public assemblies, rallies,

and press conferences—that do not qualify as “emergency in-

cidents.” Moreover, an “emergency incident” is defined by a

set perimeter; by contrast, the buffer law, by its own terms,

operates whenever and wherever a law enforcement officer is

“lawfully engaged in the execution” of his duties. I.C. § 35-

44.1-2-14. The buffer law applies in a far broader set of situa-

tions, as explained below.

Second, even if there were complete overlap, the plaintiffs’

injuries would be redressed by enjoining enforcement of the

buffer law. The buffer law and emergency incident statute are

both criminal laws—when they both apply, one could be

charged and convicted under both, thus resulting in steeper

penalties for the same conduct. In an analogous situation, our

colleagues in the Eighth Circuit concluded that removing an

additional layer of criminal liability was a form of redress suf-

ficient to confer standing, even though the underlying behav-

ior was still subject to prosecution. See Animal Legal Def. Fund

v. Reynolds, 89 F.4th 1071, 1078 (8th Cir. 2024) (reasoning that

enjoining Iowa’s “trespass-surveillance” law would provide

relief to animal-welfare groups seeking to surreptitiously rec-

ord industrial agricultural operations even if they could still

be prosecuted for general trespass); accord Uzuegbunam v.

Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 291 (2021) (“[T]he ability ‘to effectu-

ate a partial remedy’ satisfies the redressability require-

ment.”) (quoting Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 13);

No. 24-2927 11

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007) (finding stand-

ing when the risk of injury “would be reduced to some ex-

tent” by the requested relief, even if not completely). We reach

the same result. The plaintiffs satisfy the causation and re-

dressability requirements and therefore have standing to

challenge the buffer law. 3

Assured of our jurisdiction, we proceed to reviewing the

preliminary injunction underlying this appeal.

B. The Fourteenth Amendment

A district court may grant a preliminary injunction if a

plaintiff shows “(1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits,

(2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence

of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in his

favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.” Win-

ter, 555 U.S. at 20 (enumeration added). When evaluating a

grant of a preliminary injunction, we “review the district

court’s findings of fact for clear error, its legal conclusions de

novo, and its balancing of the factors for a preliminary

3

The Reporters Committee’s argument for standing rests largely on the

resources it has expended to raise awareness about the buffer law. See

Common Cause Ind. v. Lawson, 937 F.3d 944, 950–53 (7th Cir. 2019) (relying

on Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). This is arguably

in tension with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alliance for Hippo-

cratic Medicine. See 602 U.S. at 394. (The Court declared that “an organiza-

tion that that has not suffered a concrete injury caused by a defendant’s

action” cannot “manufacture” standing “simply by expending money to

gather information and advocate against the defendant’s action.”) How-

ever, because at least one other plaintiff has standing for each claim, we

need not resolve whether the Reporters Committee has standing, too. Chi-

cago Joe’s, 894 F.3d at 813; Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. House. Dev.

Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 & n.9 (1977).

12 No. 24-2927

injunction for abuse of discretion.” Doe v. Univ. of S. Ind., 43

F.4th 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting D.U. v. Rhoades, 825 F.3d

331, 335 (7th Cir. 2016)).

The district court preliminarily enjoined the buffer law af-

ter concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on

their claim that the buffer law is unconstitutionally vague un-

der the Fourteenth Amendment. The State challenges only the

district court’s likelihood-of-success determination, thereby

conceding any argument about irreparable harm, the balance

of equities, or the public interest. We limit our discussion ac-

cordingly, observing that when a plaintiff establishes a likeli-

hood of success on the merits of a constitutional challenge to

a statute implicating First Amendment freedoms, the other

preliminary injunction factors are easily met. ACLU of Illinois

v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589–90 (7th Cir. 2012); Joelner v. Vill. of

Washington Park, 378 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2004).

To satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause, a criminal statute like the buffer law must “define the

criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary

people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in

a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discrimina-

tory enforcement.” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 402–03 (quoting

Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357); Bell, 697 F.3d at 461. Failure to satisfy

either criterion results in a statute that is void for vagueness.

The State argues that the buffer law meets the “definite-

ness” requirement because it is “clear about what conduct

will lead to an arrest: refusing to obey an officer after being

told to move when one is within twenty-five feet.” 4 The State

4

App. Dkt. 18 at 24 (quoting (Dkt. 53, Dist. Ct. Op. at 17)).

No. 24-2927 13

points out that 25 feet is an objectively measurable distance,

and that ordinary people are unlikely to be confused about

whether they are approaching an on-duty police officer after

being told to stop approaching. Moreover, the State observes

that if someone “is not sure about where a 25-foot marker is,

he cannot be arrested” under the buffer law because it only

criminalizes those who “knowingly or intentionally” ap-

proach within 25 feet following a warning. 5

We will accept the State’s premise that the buffer law is

sufficiently definite without so deciding, and we will not an-

alyze definiteness further. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,

149 (2007) (explaining with respect to definiteness require-

ment that “scienter requirements alleviate vagueness con-

cerns”). We instead assess whether the buffer law encourages

arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. 6 Kolender, 461 U.S. at

357.

5

Id. at 25–26.

6

The challenger in Nicodemus advanced a flavor of this argument, relying

on a line of cases holding licensing and permitting statutes unconstitu-

tional for vesting “unbridled discretion” in decisionmakers. We declined

to extend those cases beyond their specialized context. See Nicodemus, 137

F.4th at 666–67. We also did not address vagueness in Nicodemus because

the challenger explicitly disavowed reliance on a vagueness theory. Id. at

667 n.9. Instead, the challenger advanced a facial challenge to the buffer

law premised on its impact on the First Amendment right to record the

police. Id. at 665–71; see Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 594–603 (explaining the right

to record). We found that the original buffer law was a content-neutral

statute that, on its face, was “a reasonable ‘time, place, or manner’ re-

striction within the bounds of the First Amendment.” Nicodemus, 137 F.4th

at 670 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).

14 No. 24-2927

A statute encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforce-

ment “if it impermissibly delegates to law enforcement the

authority to arrest and prosecute on ‘an ad hoc and subjective

basis,’” giving police unfettered discretion to make “arbitrary

and erratic arrests.” Bell, 697 F.3d at 462 (quoting Grayned v.

City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972), then quoting Wright

v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. 1146, 1151 (1985)). Put another way, a

statute may be void for vagueness if it “necessarily entrust[s]

lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the po-

liceman on his beat.” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360 (modification in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a concern

commonly arises in cases involving statutes with ambiguous

wording susceptible to broad interpretation by an enforcing

officer. In Bell, for example, we reasoned that a section of Chi-

cago’s dispersal ordinance empowering police to order dis-

persal based on “serious inconvenience” gave law enforce-

ment “too much discretion in determining when addressing

a nuisance permits quieting protected expression and when it

does not.” Bell, 697 F.3d at 463. The ordinance also permitted

dispersal based on “annoyance,” which again rendered indi-

viduals “vulnerable to arbitrary or discriminatory arrest” and

therefore “fail[ed] to fulfill due process’ second command.”

Id.

Similarly, in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme Court

considered an ordinance empowering officers to arrest sus-

pected gang members if they were “loitering,” which the or-

dinance defined as “remain[ing] in any one place with no ap-

parent purpose.” 527 U.S. 41, 47 (1999) (alteration in original).

The Illinois Supreme Court had concluded that the ordinance

was unconstitutional because it provided “absolute discretion

to police officers to decide what activities constitute loiter-

ing.” Id. at 61 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d

No. 24-2927 15

53, 63 (Ill. 1997)). The Supreme Court agreed, faulting the or-

dinance for “how much discretion the police enjoy in deciding

which stationary persons to disperse under the ordinance.”

Id. at 61–62. The fact that the ordinance “[did] not permit an

arrest until after a dispersal order [had] been disobeyed” did

not save it because it did not provide “any guidance to the

officer deciding whether such an order should issue” in the

first place. Id. at 62. And hinging criminal liability on whether

someone had an “apparent purpose” for remaining in place

gave officers the discretion “to treat some purposes—perhaps

a purpose to engage in idle conversation or simply to enjoy a

cool breeze on a warm evening—as too frivolous” to be legal.

Id.

The buffer law is similarly susceptible to arbitrary

enforcement and is therefore unconstitutionally vague. The

State attempts to distinguish cases like Bell and Morales by

arguing that the buffer law’s “specific, objective terms ensure

that it does not invite officers to enforce it in an arbitrary

manner”—but that argument only gets the State so far. It is

true that a law criminalizing approaching within 25 feet of an

officer is more objective than one criminalizing annoying

behavior. We also acknowledge that the buffer law requires a

do-not-approach warning before subjecting an individual to

arrest. But that does not immunize the buffer law from

arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. As the plaintiffs

point out, the problem is more upstream: the buffer law offers

no “guidance to the officer deciding whether [a do-not-

approach] order should issue” in the first place. See id.

Without such guidance, any on-duty officer can use the buffer

law to subject any pedestrian to potential criminal liability by

simply ordering them not to approach, even if the pedestrian

16 No. 24-2927

is doing nothing more than taking a morning stroll or merely

walking up to an officer to ask for directions.

The State offers no real rebuttal to this notion. Indeed, the

State doubled down on the vast discretion afforded by the

buffer law at oral argument. We asked counsel to explain

when an officer could invoke the buffer law to tell someone

to stop approaching. The answer? “If an officer is conducting

their official duties, an officer may tell someone to stop ap-

proaching.” For any reason? A good reason, a bad reason, a

reason the officer just makes up? “Yes.” Could an officer in-

voke the buffer law just because he had a bad breakfast?

Again, counsel answered in the affirmative. 7 These responses

highlight the problem. As the Supreme Court explained 60

years ago, a law that effectively says “a person may stand on

a public sidewalk in [a city] only at the whim of any police

officer of that city” is too vague to satisfy due process. Shut-

tlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965). The

buffer law does just that. The Fourteenth Amendment will not

tolerate a law subjecting pedestrians to arrest merely because

a police officer had a bad breakfast—no matter how bitter the

coffee or how soggy the scrambled eggs.

Undeterred, the State points to cases in which we and our

sister circuits rejected vagueness challenges to statutes afford-

ing officers some level of discretion. But those cases are easily

distinguished because the challenged statutes in each con-

tained some form of guidance constraining officer discretion.

In Bell, we upheld a portion of the challenged city ordinance

that allowed police to order people to disperse based on like-

lihood of “substantial harm,” but only after concluding that

7

Oral Argument at 2:31, 2:39–2:55, 30:05–30:22.

No. 24-2927 17

the term was related to property damage and violence. 697

F.3d at 463. And in United States v. Johnson, we rejected the

argument that the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act’s defini-

tion of “animal enterprise,” while technically broad enough

to encompass any grocery store, restaurant, or clothing store,

afforded law enforcement arbitrary discretion to prosecute

any property crime against such institutions as incidents of

animal enterprise terrorism. 875 F.3d 360, 370 (7th Cir. 2017).

That was because the Act also required that a person travel in

interstate commerce or use a facility of interstate commerce

for the purpose of damaging or interfering with an animal en-

terprise’s operations, and, in connection with that purpose,

conspire to, threaten to, or actually cause bodily injury or tan-

gible property damage. Id. These additional elements acted as

safeguards against arbitrary enforcement. See id.

The State’s out-of-circuit cases are similarly

distinguishable. In United States v. Bronstein, the D.C. Circuit

upheld language prohibiting making an “oration” or

“harangue” in the Supreme Court building because other acts

prohibited in the same one-sentence statute—such as

shooting a gun, setting off fireworks, or using loud or

threatening language—cabined the meaning of “oration” and

“harangue” to conduct that disrupted the Court’s operation.

849 F.3d 1101, 1108–11 (D.C. Cir. 2017). And in Horton v. City

of St. Augustine, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a law

prohibiting “perform[ing]” in a particular area of town

survived a facial vagueness challenge because it specifically

listed eight types of street performances that were outlawed,

thus clarifying what type of activity was prohibited. 272 F.3d

1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 2001).

18 No. 24-2927

The State offers no similar “narrowed construction” that

could save the buffer law. See Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 91 (dis-

cussing Alabama Court of Appeals’ narrowing interpretation

of Birmingham loitering law). And, given that the buffer law’s

terms are plain and unambiguous, we see no cause for re-

straint as the Indiana courts work out the kinks. See City of

Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987) (“If the statute is not

obviously susceptible of a limiting construction, then even if

the statute has ‘never [been] interpreted by a state tribunal ...

it is the duty of the federal court to exercise its properly in-

voked jurisdiction.’” (alteration in original)) (quoting Harman

v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965)); compare Trs. of Ind. Univ.

v. Curry, 918 F.3d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining, in reject-

ing vagueness challenge to Indiana statute criminalizing

transfer of fetal tissue, that it would be prudent to wait for the

Indiana courts to interpret ambiguous terms like “transfer”

and “any other part of an aborted fetus” instead of striking

the law altogether).

Laws that “encourage arbitrary and discriminatory en-

forcement” are void for vagueness. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.

Because that is precisely what Indiana’s buffer law does, we

agree with the district court that the plaintiffs are likely to suc-

ceed in their challenge to its constitutionality.

C. The Scope of the Preliminary Injunction

One final piece of business remains. The district court’s

September 27, 2024, preliminary injunction prohibits the de-

fendants—the Indiana Attorney General, Marion County

Prosecutor, and Marion County Sheriff—along with their

“agents, servants, employees, and attorneys” from enforcing

the buffer law “against any individual, corporation,

No. 24-2927 19

association, or other entity until this case has been finally re-

solved.” 8 On June 27, 2025, the Supreme Court held that fed-

eral courts lack the equitable power to issue universal injunc-

tions under the Judiciary Act of 1789 because “the universal

injunction lacks a historical pedigree.” Trump v. CASA, Inc.,

606 U.S. ---, 145 S.Ct. 2540, 2554 (2025). Although an equitable

remedy like an injunction is “flexible,” explained the Court,

its “protection extends only to the suing plaintiff[s].” Id. at

2551, 2557. Therefore, when considering the permissible

scope of an injunction, “the question is not whether an injunc-

tion offers complete relief to everyone potentially affected by

an allegedly unlawful act; it is whether an injunction will offer

complete relief to the plaintiffs before the court.” Id. at 2557 (cit-

ing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)). Accordingly,

although we agree with the district court’s decision to prelim-

inarily enjoin enforcement of Indiana’s buffer law, the CASA

decision suggests that the scope of the injunction requires fur-

ther consideration.

The Supreme Court acknowledged in CASA that in some

situations, an injunction requiring the defendant to cease the

offending activity entirely may be the only way to provide

complete relief to the plaintiff. For example, in a nuisance case

involving a noisy neighbor blasting loud music, “the court

has only one feasible option: order the defendant to turn her

music down—or better yet, off.” Id. Such an injunction would

no doubt incidentally benefit the entire neighborhood, yet it

would be permissible as the only way to provide relief to the

plaintiff, and only the plaintiff could enforce it. Id. “Extending

the injunction to cover all other similarly situated

8

Dkt. 54 at 2–3.

20 No. 24-2927

individuals” is not appropriate if doing so would not “render

[the plaintiff’s] relief more complete.” Id. at 2557–58.

The question, then, is whether the scope of the district

court’s preliminary injunction in this case was necessary to

provide complete relief to the plaintiffs pending resolution on

the merits. To the extent the plaintiff media organizations rely

on information and observations from ordinary citizens going

about their day as source material for stories, enjoining the

buffer law’s enforcement statewide may be necessary to

provide the plaintiffs themselves with complete relief. After all,

a “man on the street” interview could hardly take place if the

man’s presence on the street were dependent on the

“moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his

beat”—even if the journalist conducting the interview were

protected from arbitrary enforcement of the buffer law.

Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360 (citation omitted). 9

Given the lack of briefing on these topics both before us

and the district court, we “decline to take up these [questions]

in the first instance.” CASA, 606 U.S. ---, 145 S.Ct. at 2558. In-

stead, following the Supreme Court and our colleagues in the

First and Fifth Circuits, we will leave it to the district court to

“determine whether a narrower injunction is appropriate.”

9

See also David Bauder, Detailed ‘Open Source’ News Investigations Are

Catching On, AP NEWS (May 8, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/open-

source-media-investigations-d1093d4ea4e98a3ae21850196847c6e1 (ex-

plaining rise of “open-source” journalism based on data generated by oth-

ers); Jesse Holcomb, On TV, Few Amateur Journalists Get Credit for their Con-

tributions to the News, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 5, 2014),

https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2014/06/05/on-tv-few-ama-

teur-journalists-get-credit-for-their-contributions-to-the-news/ (explain-

ing that TV journalists often rely on the work of others).

No. 24-2927 21

Id.; see Doe v. Trump, 142 F.4th 109, 112 (1st Cir. 2025); United

States v. Texas, --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 1836640, at *38 (5th Cir.

July 3, 2025).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

decision to enjoin enforcement of the buffer law against the

plaintiffs, but we REMAND for the district court to consider,

through additional briefing or other means, the appropriate

scope of injunctive relief.