Larry Smith v. Wayne Cnty., Mich.

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 25a0205p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐

LARRY SMITH,

│

Plaintiff-Appellant, │

> No. 24-1688

│

v. │

│

WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN; ROBERT J. DONALDSON, │

Defendants-Appellees. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

No. 2:21-cv-12070—David M. Lawson, District Judge.

Argued: May 7, 2025

Decided and Filed: August 5, 2025

Before: THAPAR, BUSH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jarrett Adams, THE LAW OFFICE OF JARRETT ADAMS, PLLC, New York,

New York, for Appellant. Josephine A. DeLorenzo, PLUNKETT COONEY, Bloomfield Hills,

Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jarrett Adams, THE LAW OFFICE OF JARRETT

ADAMS, PLLC, New York, New York, Pamela L. Campbell, RICE LAW PLLC, Eastpointe,

Michigan, for Appellant. Josephine A. DeLorenzo, PLUNKETT COONEY, Bloomfield Hills,

Michigan, for Appellees.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

BUSH, Circuit Judge. After prosecutors agreed to have his murder conviction thrown

out, Larry Smith sued Wayne County and Robert Donaldson. Smith claims that his conviction

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 2

resulted from an elaborate scheme designed by police and prosecutors to elicit false testimony

from jailhouse informants to help secure criminal convictions. He alleges that Donaldson, one of

the prosecutors in his case, is liable because he actively participated in eliciting false testimony

from a key witness. And he maintains Wayne County is also on the hook because it had a policy

or custom of encouraging the nefarious activities. The district court granted summary judgment

in favor of Donaldson and Wayne County.

We AFFIRM. Donaldson is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity because Smith

seeks to hold him liable for his conduct as an advocate preparing for trial. And Smith released

his claim against Wayne County when he accepted a settlement under Michigan’s Wrongful

Imprisonment Compensation Act. Both Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

I.

A.

In 1994, Kenneth Hayes was murdered in Wayne County, Michigan. Detectives in the

Detroit Police Department settled on Smith and his eventual codefendant, Jay Clay, as the

suspects. Smith went to trial, and a jury convicted him of first-degree murder and a firearm

charge. The prosecution’s case centered on the testimony of Edward Allen, a fellow county-jail

inmate. Allen testified against Smith and claimed that, while incarcerated together, Smith

confessed to the murder. Allen also provided key testimony linking Smith and Clay.

Smith was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, and his

convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Between 2003 and 2018, Smith filed multiple state

and federal habeas petitions. He repeatedly argued that he was actually innocent, and that

Allen’s testimony was false. But his attempts at collateral relief were unsuccessful.

In time, Smith’s case came to the attention of the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Conviction

Integrity Unit. The Unit’s investigation uncovered evidence that Allen may have been involved

in a broader scheme where Detroit Police Department detectives, in possible coordination with

County prosecutors, routinely elicited false testimony from jailhouse informants to be used in

criminal prosecutions. Ultimately, the Unit determined that Allen’s testimony in Smith’s case

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 3

may have been fabricated. Because Allen’s testimony was central to the prosecution’s case, the

Unit asked the state trial court to vacate Smith’s convictions, which it did in 2021. The Unit also

concluded that “[d]ue to the passage of time,” it was “not possible for the case to be re-tried.”

Unit Press Release, R. 102–6, PageID 3503.

B.

Once released, Smith filed an action in the Michigan Court of Claims seeking

compensation under Michigan’s Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA). That

statute permits certain “individual[s] convicted under the law of [Michigan] and subsequently

imprisoned in a state correctional facility for 1 or more crimes that he or she did not commit” to

bring an action for compensation against the State. Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1753. Ultimately,

Smith reached a settlement agreement with the State. The State agreed to pay Smith $850,000 in

compensation. In return, Smith “release[d] the State of Michigan of all claims, actions, causes of

action, or demands which [Smith] now has or which may accrue that arise out of the

consequences resulting or to result from” his 1994 conviction. Release & Settlement Agreement,

R. 116–6, PageID 5058; see also id. (“[T]his is a release in full, and . . . Plaintiff will not be able

to otherwise recover damages or monies from the State of Michigan as a result of Plaintiff’s

Wayne County convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and felony firearm in this

matter.”); id. at PageID 5059 (“It is further . . . agreed that [Smith] will not institute any

complaint, suit, action, or cause of action, in law or in equity, against the State . . . relating to the

investigation, arrest, prosecution, conviction, or imprisonment of Plaintiff.”). The agreement

contained a merger clause, in which the parties “agreed that there exists no promise, inducement,

or agreement outside of” the agreement’s text, and that the agreement “contains the entire

agreement of the parties.” Id. at 5060.

C.

By law, Smith’s acceptance of the settlement did “not operate as a waiver of, or bar to,

any action in federal court against an individual alleged to have been involved in the

investigation, prosecution, or conviction that gave rise to” his conviction. Mich. Comp. Laws

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 4

§ 691.1755(8). So, Smith also filed this lawsuit against, as relevant here, Wayne County and

Donaldson.

Smith brought a variety of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Donaldson for alleged

constitutional violations surrounding the investigation and prosecution of Hayes’s murder.1 He

claims that Detroit Police Department detectives and Wayne County prosecutors developed an

elaborate scheme to produce and elicit false testimony from jailhouse informants to help secure

criminal convictions. According to Smith, Allen was one such informant, and Donaldson

schemed with detectives to have Allen falsely testify that Smith confessed while in pretrial

detention. In return, informants, like Allen, had charges dropped or sentences reduced, were

placed in better housing, and received a variety of other benefits.

Smith also brought a § 1983 Monell claim2 against Wayne County. He claims the County

had a policy or custom of allowing prosecutors and detectives to obtain false testimony from

informants to use against criminal defendants.

After discovery, Donaldson and Wayne County moved for summary judgment. The

district court granted both motions.

As to Donaldson, the court determined that the only evidence Smith produced of

Donaldson’s involvement in the alleged scheme were his interviews with Allen before trial.

Allen claimed Donaldson enticed him in these interviews to provide false testimony at trial. But

that conduct, the court held, fell within the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

As to Wayne County, the court held that Smith’s WICA settlement agreement operated as

a release of claims against Wayne County and foreclosed all claims against it arising out of

Smith’s conviction. The settlement was signed by the State and did not specifically mention the

County in its release provisions. But WICA states that a person who “accept[s] . . . an award

under this act, or . . . a compromise or settlement of the claim” releases “all claims against this

1

Smith also brought state-law claims against Donaldson for the same conduct. The district court concluded

that the state and federal immunity questions rise and fall together, and, accordingly, held that official immunity also

precluded Smith’s state-law claims. On appeal, Smith does not challenge this conclusion (that the state and federal

immunity questions run together). So, we focus on the federal claims.

2

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 5

state.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1755(8). The Act, in turn, defines “[t]his state” to mean “the

state of Michigan and its political subdivisions,” which includes Wayne County. Mich. Comp.

Laws § 691.1752(e). Putting the provisions together, the court held that by accepting the

settlement, Smith released all claims against Wayne County, including his Monell claim. Smith

timely appealed.

II.

On appeal, Smith challenges the grant of summary judgment to both Defendants. We

review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397,

401 (6th Cir. 2011), and will affirm if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In undertaking our

review, we view the facts in the light most favorable to Smith and draw all reasonable inferences

in his favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Smith raises two arguments on appeal. First, he claims the district court erred in holding

that his claims against Donaldson are foreclosed by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Second, he

maintains the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the County because his

Monell claim is not precluded by the WICA settlement. Neither argument persuades.

III.

We begin with whether Smith’s claims against Donaldson are foreclosed by absolute

prosecutorial immunity. They are. Absolute immunity is a narrow, but powerful, protection

given to prosecutors when they act as advocates participating in or preparing for a judicial

proceeding. That protection extends to the conduct Smith seeks to hold Donaldson liable for.

A.

The text of § 1983 does not provide any immunities from suit. Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 342 (1986). Rather, “[i]t purports to subject ‘[e]very person’ acting under color of

state law to liability for depriving any other person in the United States of ‘rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484 (1991)

(second alteration in original) (quoting § 1983). But the Supreme Court has long held that

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 6

§ 1983 must be construed in light of common law principles and thus did not displace

immunities that are “well grounded in history and reason.” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,

376 (1951); see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361–64 (2012).

Over time, the Court has recognized a number of immunities, some more connected to

historical practice than others. See Scott A. Keller, Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common

Law, 73 Stan. L. Rev. 1337, 1378–98 (2021); William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Lawful?,

106 Cal. L. Rev. 45, 79–80 (2018). As a default, state actors are entitled to qualified immunity,

which precludes liability unless the actor violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). But the Court has also recognized that actors

performing certain functions are entitled to absolute immunity. See, e.g., Tenney, 341 U.S. at

377, 379 (legislators); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (judges).

This case involves one form of absolute immunity: prosecutorial immunity. Despite its

name, the immunity does not immunize a prosecutor for all of her acts. Instead, we apply a

“functional approach” that provides a prosecutor with absolute immunity for her conduct insofar

as it is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” such as when the

prosecutor “initiat[es] a prosecution and . . . present[s] the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976). Given the many roles a prosecutor plays in the criminal justice

system, the functional approach sometimes raises difficulties in determining what acts are

intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Two roles are relevant

here: 1) an advocate and 2) an investigator.

“The analytical key to prosecutorial immunity . . . is advocacy—whether the actions in

question are those of an advocate.” Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 775 (6th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). When a prosecutor acts as an advocate participating in a judicial proceeding, she holds

absolute immunity from suit. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31. But advocacy does not start at the

courtroom door. Id. at 431 n.33. To serve as an advocate in the courtroom, prosecutors must

engage in various preparatory activities outside the courtroom. Those acts, which include “the

professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for

its presentation at trial,” are also entitled to the protections of absolute immunity. Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 (“Preparation,

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 7

both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the obtaining,

reviewing, and evaluating of evidence.”).

Prosecutors also engage in investigatory functions. But only those investigatory

functions that “relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for

judicial proceedings” are entitled to absolute immunity. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. “When a

prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police

officer,” she receives only qualified immunity. Id. at 273, 274 n.5.

Precedent does not draw a clear line between a prosecutor’s advocacy and investigatory

functions. See Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2005). As a general matter,

the Supreme Court has distinguished between an “advocate’s role in evaluating evidence and

interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial,” and the detective’s role in searching for new

evidence or witnesses. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273.

B.

This case involves one of the more difficult functions to categorize: the interactions

between prosecutors and trial witnesses post-indictment but pretrial. Interaction with witnesses

is an essential part of a prosecutor’s role. See id. at 283–84 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part &

dissenting in part). She must choose who will testify, what they will testify to, and how to

prepare them for cross-examination. The common intuition, then, is that such communications

are shielded by absolute immunity because a prosecutor acts as an advocate preparing for trial

when she prepares witnesses. See Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2003).

But not all courts employ such an absolute rule. Some hold that a prosecutor can act as

an investigator—and thereby lose her absolute immunity—by seeking out and generating

evidence through new witnesses in the period between formal accusation and trial. See, e.g.,

Roberts v. Lau, 90 F.4th 618, 620–30 (3d Cir. 2024); Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 163–64 (3d

Cir. 2020); Genzler, 410 F.3d at 637–42.

Categorizing prosecutorial interactions with witnesses can be a nuanced endeavor.

Almost any attempt to prepare a witness for trial, or determine whether the witness will be

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 8

presented, will involve communications with the witness that could be framed as eliciting new

testimony and thereby pegged as investigatory conduct. At the same time, almost “all

investigative activity could be considered in some sense to be” preparation for judicial

proceedings. Smith v. Garretto, 147 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Roberts, 90 F.4th at

626. Why else does the government gather evidence, other than to assist its case at trial? The

net result is that, depending on the context, witness interviews could plausibly “serve either an

investigative or an advocacy-related function.” Genzler, 410 F.3d at 638.3

We have yet to develop a significant dividing line in this context. And courts take

different approaches. Some have found the line so difficult to police that they have held any

interaction with a witness post-charge is advocacy conduct entitled to absolute immunity. See,

e.g., Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1115 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Once prosecution begins,

bifurcating a prosecutor’s role between investigation and prosecution is no longer feasible.”).

Others draw a line between 1) the incidental development of new testimony when the prosecutor

is otherwise organizing, evaluating, or marshaling evidence already gathered by law enforcement

in preparation for a pending trial, and 2) prosecutors actively joining investigations and engaging

in police-like activity to acquire new evidence that may then be used in the prosecution. See,

e.g., Roberts, 90 F.4th at 622–28; Genzler, 410 F.3d at 639. The first category includes a

generation of evidence that is almost unavoidable in the course of conducting immunized

preparatory activities. The second requires some additional, intentional conduct on behalf of

prosecutors to place themselves in investigatory roles.

Consider a few examples. Courts often hold that prosecutors are absolutely immunized

when they meet with witnesses to discuss and prepare what their testimony will be in an

upcoming hearing, even if those conversations result in the development of new evidence. See,

e.g., Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633–35 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Yarris v. County of

Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 139 (3d Cir. 2006); Beckett v. Ford, 384 F. App’x 435, 451 (6th Cir.

2010). On the other hand, some hold that a prosecutor acts in a police-like investigative capacity

when she actively joins an investigation to identify a new witness, plays an active role in finding

3

By “plausibly,” we do not imply that a plaintiff need only allege the existence of a witness interview to

state a claim at the motion to dismiss stage.

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 9

that witness, and then takes the witness’s initial testimony firsthand. See, e.g., Roberts, 90 F.4th

at 622–630; Fogle, 957 F.3d at 163–64; Wearry v. Foster, 33 F.4th 260, 263, 268 (5th Cir.

2022); cf. Rieves v. Town of Smyrna, 959 F.3d 678, 692–94 (6th Cir. 2020) (no absolute

immunity where prosecutor participates in, directs, advises, and drives investigation before

charges are filed). Somewhere in the middle are prosecutors who participate in witness

interviews at an early stage of criminal proceedings. In one such case, the Ninth Circuit held that

prosecutors acted in a police-like investigative capacity because of the timing and nature of the

interviews. Genzler, 410 F.3d at 641–43.

C.

Before us, the parties contest the role that the timing of the prosecutor’s conduct plays in

determining whether the conduct is categorized as advocacy or investigation. For its part, the

district court placed significant weight on the fact “that all of the interactions occurred after the

formal charges against Smith were lodged.” Order, R. 123, PageID 5678. Smith, in contrast,

argues that the timing of conduct is almost never relevant, as the focus should instead be on the

function performed, no matter when it occurs.

The truth sits somewhere in the middle, and we take this opportunity to clarify the proper

mode of analysis. The focus should always be on the function the prosecutor is performing. See

B.S. v. Somerset County, 704 F.3d 250, 270 (3d Cir. 2013). But the conduct’s timing is a

relevant factor in determining whether the function is purely investigatory or taken in preparation

for the prosecutor’s role as an advocate. See Cousin, 325 F.3d at 633; KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d

1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004); Genzler, 410 F.3d at 639. A few examples illustrate the point.

In Genzler, prosecutors interviewed a potential witness shortly after a criminal complaint

had been filed. Because the prosecutors merely sought to collect the witness’s recollection of

events in the first instance, the court held that they acted as investigators, not advocates. 410

F.3d at 641–43. This conclusion was supported, in the court’s view, by the timing of the

interview, which occurred mere days after the filing of the criminal complaint and weeks before

the court would decide whether probable cause supported trying the defendant. Id. at 633, 640–

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 10

41. That is, timing buttressed the inference that the prosecutors were still gathering evidence, not

preparing for trial.

Contrast the interviewers in Genzler with a prosecutor who meets with a witness—who

already met with law enforcement on multiple occasions—the day before a trial is set to begin.

All else being equal, the timing of the meeting, when combined with the fact that the witness

already met with investigators, makes it more likely that the prosecutor is preparing the witness

for trial, rather than embarking on a quest for new evidence.

But conduct occurring close to trial may not always be considered advocacy if other

factors suggested the conduct is investigatory. For example, in Roberts, the Third Circuit held

that a prosecutor acted as an investigator entitled to only qualified immunity when he identified a

category of evidence needed for trial, went out in the field, and joined a search for a new witness,

who then testified—even though the prosecutor’s conduct occurred only a month before trial. 90

F.4th at 623–25. Despite the conduct’s timing, the court held that the prosecutor had “engaged

in ‘police investigative work’” when he “embarked on a post-charge search for a new witness to

plug a hole in the prosecution’s case,” id. at 623, and therefore functioned as an investigator

“seeking to generate evidence in support of a prosecution,” not an advocate “interviewing

witnesses as he prepare[d] for trial,” id. at 625 (citation omitted).

The driving consideration, therefore, must always be on the activity of the prosecutor at

issue. Timing may inform what the function of the activity is. But it does not control the

activity’s categorization. See Price v. Montgomery County, 72 F.4th 711, 728–29 (6th Cir. 2023)

(Nalbandian, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).

D.

Applying these principles, we conclude Donaldson acted as an advocate preparing a

witness for trial, not an investigator identifying and developing evidence in the first instance.

He, therefore, is entitled to absolute immunity.

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 11

1.

We begin by isolating the conduct that forms the basis for Smith’s claims. Those claims

turn exclusively on Donaldson’s role in developing Allen’s allegedly false testimony. Almost all

of the relevant evidence comes from Allen’s deposition. And his testimony shows Donaldson

acted as an advocate preparing for trial.

Allen testified that he originally heard about Smith’s case from his cellmate (Smith’s

codefendant) and the cellmate’s lawyer. Then Allen himself reached out to police and

volunteered his testimony, including the key claim that Smith confessed to the murder. Allen’s

own description of his involvement in Smith’s case indicates that he came up with his story first,

reached out to the police to make himself a witness, developed his testimony with a police

detective, and then only later met with Donaldson to go over his testimony for court.

That version of events is consistent with the only other evidence in the record, a memo

written by a police detective about a week before Smith’s trial. The memo confirms that Allen

reached out to police and was “willing to make [a] statement” regarding “Smith bragging about

[the] murder.” Henahan Memo, R. 116–2, PageID 4912. The memo’s author then reached out

to Donaldson, who asked police to collect an official statement from Allen and then “get the

statement to [Donaldson] asap.” Id. (cleaned up).

2.

On this record, all of Donaldson’s conduct is properly characterized as that of an

advocate preparing for trial. There is no evidence that Donaldson played a role in identifying

Allen as a witness or even eliciting his testimony in the first instance. Instead, Allen reached out

to police, and it was police who identified Allen as a witness and brought him to Donaldson’s

attention. There is no indication that Donaldson actively or directly joined a police investigation

or engaged in police-like activity to identify new evidence that could then be used in Smith’s

prosecution.

Nor is there any indication that Donaldson served a police-like function in gathering

Allen’s testimony in the first instance. When he came to the police, Allen, by his own

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 12

admission, had already developed the basic contours of his testimony. It was a detective who

initially fielded his letter, which Allen himself generated on his own accord, and then members

of the police department who initially received Allen’s testimony. Donaldson played no role in

the effort to identify Allen or elicit his initial statement.

Instead, the only record evidence is that Donaldson served the core advocacy role of

meeting with a witness the police had already identified to prepare what the witness’s testimony

would be in an upcoming trial. That conduct is well within an advocate’s ability to engage in

“an out-of-court effort to control the presentation of a witness’s testimony,” Buckley, 509 U.S. at

272–73 (cleaned up), even if it resulted in the generation of new testimony from Allen.

Finally, though not dispositive, the timing of Donaldson’s conduct confirms that he was

acting as an advocate preparing for trial. Donaldson interviewed Allen a mere four days before

trial, in accordance with a pattern that, as Allen himself explained, prosecutors typically followed

to ready witnesses for court. Given the nature of the interview, the timing of Donaldson’s

conduct confirms he was acting as an advocate. He is immune from Smith’s claims.

E.

Smith raises several arguments to the contrary. None convinces.

He relies heavily on the Third Circuit’s decision in Roberts. But there, the determinative

factor was that the prosecutor had actively joined the investigation to find a new witness. 90

F.4th at 622–25. Both Roberts and the Third Circuit’s broader caselaw distinguish between 1) a

prosecutor who himself affirmatively searches for a new witness or actively joins an

investigation to generate new evidence not yet found, and 2) a prosecutor who meets and

interviews a “previously unknown witness who has been located and identified by investigators.”

Id. at 628, 630 n.11; compare Fogle, 957 F.3d at 163–64 (qualified immunity where prosecutor

had active involvement in investigation to find new witnesses and evidence), with Yarris, 465

F.3d at 139 (absolute immunity where the prosecutor solicited false statements from a witness

but there was no evidence the prosecutor played a role in identifying the witness or bringing him

into the investigation). Here, Allen’s testimony demonstrates that he made himself a witness by

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 13

contacting police and that Donaldson only became involved once police provided him with

Allen’s testimony.

The same is true for Smith’s reliance on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Wearry. Like in

Roberts, the prosecutor there was intimately involved in the identification and initial interviews

of a new witness. Wearry, 33 F.4th at 263, 268. Smith’s case, in contrast, is more similar to the

Fifth Circuit’s decision in Cousin, where the court held that a prosecutor was entitled to absolute

immunity for conduct that occurred during witness meetings that were rehearsals for trial. See

325 F.3d at 633–35 (“[W]hen [the prosecutor] met with [the witness], he did so to tell him how

he should testify in court and to rehearse his testimony with him.”). Here, Allen’s testimony

makes clear that Donaldson was not involved in making him part of the investigation, that Allen

had developed the crux of his testimony before Donaldson was involved, and that prosecutors,

like Donaldson, came to the police station to prepare witnesses for their appearances in court.

Nor does it matter, as Smith claims, that Donaldson played a role in “creating” what

Allen’s testimony would be. See Spurlock, 330 F.3d at 798 (holding a prosecutor’s decision to

have witnesses “testify falsely” at trial, “even if done knowingly, is protected by absolute

immunity”). For one, when Allen came to police, he had already developed the core of his

testimony: that Smith confessed to the murder while he was Allen’s cellmate. That distinguishes

Smith’s case from cases like Wearry, where prosecutors wholly concocted a witness’s testimony

all on their own. See 33 F.4th at 263–64, 267–68.4

What’s left are refinements that Donaldson is alleged to have told Allen to make when he

presented his story to the jury. But that is exactly the type of “out-of-court effort to control the

presentation of a witness’s testimony” that absolute immunity attaches to. Buckley, 509 U.S. at

272–73 (cleaned up); see, e.g., Price, 72 F.4th at 720–22 (majority) (holding pretrial

communication with a “key witness” is “plainly within the prosecutorial role,” even when the

communications alter the evidence presented at trial); Spurlock, 330 F.3d at 798; Beckett, 384 F.

App’x at 451.

4

Because Smith’s out-of-circuit authorities are distinguishable, we need not decide whether the absolute

immunity principles contained therein are consistent with our existing precedent.

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 14

Finally, Smith tries to reframe the facts to suggest Donaldson engaged in conduct that

was investigatory. He maintains that Donaldson directed police to obtain new testimony from

Allen, and therefore directed an investigation into specific evidence in a manner that would strip

him of absolute immunity. See, e.g., Fogle, 957 F.3d at 163–64. But the only evidence in the

record on this point is Allen’s deposition. And he testified to creating a story and then

communicating it to the police. It was then the police who brought Allen to Donaldson’s

attention. Nor does it matter that Donaldson directed police to have Allen translate his original

letter and oral statements into a written statement.5 That is the exact type of conduct necessary

for a prosecutor to obtain, review, and evaluate evidence in preparation for trial—conduct that

receives absolute immunity. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33. Donaldson, therefore, is entitled

to absolute immunity.

IV.

We move next to the district court’s conclusion that Smith released his Monell claim

against the County when he accepted a settlement under Michigan’s Wrongful Imprisonment

Compensation Act (WICA). WICA provides that a person who accepts “settlement” of a claim

under the statute releases “all claims against this state,” which includes federal claims brought in

federal court against counties. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1755(8); Mich. Comp. Laws

§ 691.1752(e). All agree that Smith accepted a settlement under WICA. The district court

concluded that, by accepting the settlement, Smith released his Monell claim against Wayne

County.

On appeal, Smith does not dispute the district court’s interpretation of WICA: that it

works to bar § 1983 claims against counties in federal court when a plaintiff accepts an award or

settlement under WICA. Nor does he claim that WICA’s release provision is generally

preempted by § 1983 or otherwise unenforceable as a matter of federal law.

5

Smith claims that the memo recording this encounter demonstrates Donaldson acted as an investigator.

But if anything, the memo supports Donaldson’s claim that he was acting as an advocate preparing testimony for

trial. It corroborates Allen’s own testimony that he reached out to police to make himself a witness and volunteer

testimony he already developed on his own. And its discussion of Donaldson’s involvement suggests the conduct of

a prosecutor who, on the eve of trial, asked the police to document evidence the police had already obtained—from a

witness Donaldson played no role in identifying—so that the evidence could be used at trial.

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 15

Instead, Smith argues that the release provision is not enforceable here because his

settlement agreement does not expressly refer to WICA’s release provision or mention that he

agreed to release claims against the County.6 In other words, he claims that (presumably as a

matter of federal law) statutory release provisions are enforceable only if there is a written

agreement with the plaintiff expressly incorporating or acknowledging the provision and claims

being released.

Our decision in Leaman v. Ohio Department of Mental Retardation & Development

Disabilities forecloses this argument. 825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc). That case

involved the enforceability of a provision of the Ohio Court of Claims Act that released “any

cause of action” a plaintiff had against a state official if the plaintiff “fil[ed] a civil action in the

court of claims” based on the same subject matter. Id. at 948, 952 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code

Ann. § 2743.02(A)(1)). The plaintiff, a former state employee, alleged through a § 1983 suit in

federal court that she was terminated in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at

948. She sued multiple defendants in her federal complaint, including a state agency and

individual officers. After filing her federal complaint, she filed a virtually identical complaint in

the Ohio Court of Claims against only one of the defendants. Id. In response, the federal district

court dismissed her federal claims against all defendants. In the court’s view, § 2743.02(A)(1),

by operation of law, worked as a release of the plaintiff’s federal claims against all state

defendants the moment the state court action was filed. Id.

On appeal, the plaintiff contended that § 1983 preempted the Claims Act’s release

provision. She also argued that the state court filing could not constitute a knowing release or

voluntary waiver of her federal claims against defendants who were not parties in state court.

6

At oral argument, and for the first time in this litigation, Smith’s counsel claimed that the failure to

mention the County was the result of an express agreement between Smith and the State to preserve Smith’s claim

against the County. That alleged agreement is not mentioned in the settlement itself—which has a merger clause—

and Smith points to no record evidence of the agreement. This late-breaking argument does not preclude affirmance

for at least two reasons. First, Smith forfeited the argument by failing to raise it in the district court and in his briefs

on appeal. See Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000, 1011 (6th Cir. 2022). Second, once the County

raised the WICA settlement as a defense, Smith was required to introduce evidence of the alleged agreement to

create a genuine dispute on the matter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

No. 24-1688 Smith v. Wayne County, Mich., et al. Page 16

We rejected both arguments. First, we held that nothing in § 1983 preempted the Claims

Act’s release provision or its enforceability in the ongoing federal suit. Leaman, 825 F.2d at

953–56. Second, we held that “by filing in the Ohio Court of Claims,” the plaintiff “made a

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of her right to bring claims against” the federal

defendants who were not parties to the state court suit. Id. at 956–57. Litigants, we explained,

are deemed to know the effect that their conduct may have under state law, even when that

conduct releases federal claims without any express acknowledgement of waiver. Id.

Leaman’s rationale forecloses Smith’s argument that WICA’s release provision is

enforceable only if there is a written agreement with Smith expressly incorporating or

acknowledging the provision. Leaman held that the Ohio provision was enforceable against

§ 1983 claims even where there was no written agreement, let alone a written agreement

expressly referencing the relevant provision. Id. at 953–56. It also held that a party can release

§ 1983 claims solely by triggering the consequences of a release statute through conduct in a

separate legal proceeding, even where that conduct does not expressly mention the release of

claims against the federal defendant. Id. at 956–57. Those are the exact circumstances here.

Michigan law triggered a release of Smith’s claims against the County when he accepted a

settlement under WICA in a separate legal proceeding. That the release-triggering conduct did

not require an express acknowledgement of the claims being released is of no moment.

Leaman’s waiver holding also squarely forecloses Smith’s argument that the release is

unenforceable because he “did not knowingly or intentionally waive his Monell claims against

the County by signing the Release and Settlement Agreement.” Reply Br. at 12. Like the

plaintiff in Leaman, Smith is deemed to know the effect that his conduct—accepting a settlement

under WICA—has under state law, even where that conduct releases federal claims without any

express acknowledgement of the waiver. See 825 F.2d at 956–57. Because the release provision

precludes Smith’s claim, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the County.

V.

We affirm the district court’s judgment.