Com. v. Brown, S.

J-S23032-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

SAMIYA T. BROWN :

:

Appellant : No. 2091 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 27, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000774-2020

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 5, 2025

Samiya T. Brown (“Brown”) appeals from the judgment of sentence,

imposed following her open guilty plea to third-degree murder, endangering

the welfare of a child (“EWOC”), and possession of an instrument of crime

(“PIC”).1 We affirm.

The trial court described the facts underlying Brown’s guilty plea as

follows:

On Wednesday, October 30, 2019, at approximately 4:30 p.m.,

police responded to a call for a person screaming at 1714 Folsom

Street in Philadelphia, PA. Upon arrival, officers met [Brown], who

was running cold water over Z.S. ([“the victim”]), who was four

[] years old at the time. [Brown] had been the custodial caregiver

of [the victim] since birth. [Brown] told police that [the victim]

had fallen out of the second-floor window of the house, and

[Brown] took [the victim] to the bathroom to care for her.

[Brown] reported that when she returned home and passed by the

second floor, she noticed [the victim] playing with a cat in the

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 4304(a)(1), and 907(a).

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bedroom. [Brown] told police that she continued to the kitchen

to make Sloppy Joes. While there, [Brown] heard the cat moaning

and checked the rear of the property, and she saw [the victim]

lying on the chairs in the backyard. When [Brown] picked up [the

victim], she noticed her eyes rolling to the back of her head, a

split lip, gashes to her head, and gushing blood.

At the time of police arrival, [the victim’s] face had

catastrophic injuries particularly to the lip and nose area. [The

victim] was transported to the hospital; due to the severity of her

condition, she was subsequently transported to the Children’s

Hospital of Philadelphia (“CHOP”). [Brown] admitted to CHOP

hospital staff that she put homemade green stitches in [the

victim’s] scalp where two open wounds were present.

During [the victim’s] examination at CHOP, the doctor found

that her injuries were inconsistent with [Brown’s] explanation to

police. On October 31, 2019, [the victim’s] biological mother,

Jasmine Singleton [“Ms. Singleton”], was interviewed. She stated

that, immediately after giving birth to [the victim], she gave

temporary guardianship of the child to [Brown] while Ms.

Singleton attempted to secure housing for herself. Ms. Singleton

stated that, in 2017, [Brown] moved without giving her any

information about the new residence. Ms. Singleton reported that

she did not see her daughter again until [the victim] was in CHOP

being treated for her injuries.

On November 3, 2019, [the victim] was pronounced dead.

Dr. Julia De La Garza [“Dr. De La Garza”] of the Office of the

Medical Examiner reported that [the victim] suffered from inflicted

trauma to various parts of her body, and that her injuries were in

different stages of healing. [The victim] had open wounds to her

face and scalp, broken bones, and what appeared to be cigarette

burns and large patch burns [caused by scalding water] to her left

arm and thigh. Homemade stitches and various puncture wounds

were found on [the victim’s] body, and she was malnourished. Dr.

De La Garza ruled that the immediate cause of death was

complications including sepsis, due to blunt impact and thermal

injuries. Dr. De La Garza ruled that the manner of death was

homicide.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/4/24, at 1-3.

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In return for the Commonwealth’s withdrawing the charge of first-

degree murder, Brown entered an open guilty plea to the above-listed crimes

in May 2022. Following receipt of a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”),

a mental health evaluation, and a psychosocial evaluation, the trial court

sentenced Brown to a term of twenty-to-forty years in prison for third-degree

murder, and a consecutive term of ten-to-twenty years’ imprisonment for

EWOC. The trial court did not impose any additional sentence for PIC. Thus,

Brown’s aggregate sentence was thirty-to-sixty years in prison.

Following the filing and denial of post-sentence motions, Brown filed a

timely appeal challenging her sentence. In November 2023, this Court

remanded the matter for resentencing, concluding the trial court had failed to

acknowledge consideration of the PSI, discuss the sentencing guideline

ranges, note it was sentencing Brown outside the guideline ranges, and put

reasons on the record for its guidelines departure. See Commonwealth v.

Brown, 2322 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. Nov. 30, 2023) (unpublished judgment

order at 4).

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The trial court held a resentencing hearing in June 2024 and reimposed

the same sentence. Following the receipt and denial of post-sentence

motions,2 Brown filed the instant, timely appeal. 3

Brown raises the following issue:

Was the sentence for [EWOC] manifestly excessive and

unreasonable because the trial court abused its discretion by (1)

relying upon impermissible factors at sentencing and (2) failing to

adequately weigh [Brown’s] considerable mitigation and

demonstrated capacity for rehabilitation?

Brown’s Brief at 3.

In her only issue, Brown challenges the discretionary aspects of her

sentence for EWOC.4 See Brown’s Brief at 17-31. There is no absolute right

to challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence. See Commonwealth

v. Hill, 66 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013). Before reaching the merits of a

discretionary sentencing claim, we must determine:

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved

h[er] issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a concise

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with

respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether

the concise statement raises a substantial question that the

sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.

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2The trial court accepted Brown’s filing of nunc pro tunc post-sentence

motions. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/4/24, at 5.

3 Brown and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

4Brown does not challenge her guideline-range sentence for third-degree

murder. See Brown’s Brief at 17, n.2.

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Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329–30 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citation omitted).

Brown preserved her sentencing issues in a post-sentence motion, filed

a timely appeal, and included in her brief a statement of the reasons relied

upon for allowance of appeal. Therefore, we consider whether Brown has

raised a substantial question.

Brown contends the sentence for EWOC was excessive, and the trial

court: (1) failed to properly consider mitigating factors; and (2) only

improperly considered factors already accounted for by the heightened

gradation of the offense and/or are not listed in the general guidelines.

Brown’s Brief at 17-31. These claims raise a substantial question. See

Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 692 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(concluding a claim that the sentence was harsh and excessive and trial court

failed to consider mitigating factors raises a substantial question);

Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064-65 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating

that “a claim that a sentence is excessive because the trial court relied on an

impermissible factor raises a substantial question.” (citation omitted)).

We consider the merits of Brown’s claim mindful of the following:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

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Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 731 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted). On appeal, “[w]e cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and

impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing court.” Commonwealth

v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009).

With respect to a sentence outside of the recommended guidelines:

When evaluating a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of sentence . . . it is important to remember

that the sentencing guidelines are advisory in

nature. If the sentencing court deems it

appropriate to sentence outside of the

guidelines, it may do so as long as it offers

reasons for this determination. [O]ur Supreme

Court has indicated that if the sentencing court

proffers reasons indicating that its decision to

depart from the guidelines is not unreasonable,

we must affirm a sentence that falls outside those

guidelines.

*****

A sentencing court, therefore, in carrying out its duty to impose

an individualized sentence, may depart from the guidelines when

it properly identifies a particular “factual basis and specific reasons

which compelled [it] to deviate from the guideline range.”

Commonwealth v. Shull, 148 A.3d 820, 836 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations

omitted, some emphasis in original, some emphasis added).

When the trial court has the benefit of a PSI, we “presume that the

sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory

factors.” Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988).

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Here, the trial court considered the PSI, the mental health evaluation,

the psychosocial evaluation, the testimony of the sentencing witnesses, the

sentencing exhibits, and the sentencing guidelines. 5 See N.T., 6/27/24, at 6,

19-21. However, the trial court explicitly acknowledged it was departing from

the sentencing guidelines for EWOC and explained it did so because of the

breadth of the injuries Brown inflicted on the victim, the fact Brown did not

seek medical attention for the victim, Brown’s status as the victim’s guardian,

Brown’s failure to feed the victim, the difference between Brown’s treatment

of her biological children and the victim, and Brown’s acknowledged ability to

access medical treatment for her disabled biological daughter on a bi-weekly

basis. See id. at 19-21. The trial court specifically found the upward

departure justified because Brown, “acted with a wicked heart when she

caused the death of this child[.]” Id. at 21.

We are not persuaded by Brown’s argument that the trial judge relied

on improper or impermissible factors when it juxtaposed the specific details

of the extensive abuse and neglect of the victim with Brown’s treatment of

her biological children. A sentencing court is not limited to merely considering

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5 We note the mental health and psychosocial evaluations are not included in

the certified record, but Brown appended copies of them to her brief. This

Court has continually stated that copying material and attaching it to the brief

does not make it a part of the certified record. See, e.g., Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 33 A.3d 122, 126 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2011); In re M.T., 607 A.2d

271, 275 (Pa. Super. 1992). Therefore, this Court did not consider those

documents.

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the guideline ranges and offense grading and nothing else. See

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 939 A.2d 974, 980 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating

sentencing court is not required “to ignore context and instead review [the]

charges in a vacuum, where only the name of the offense and corresponding

standard range sentence is considered.”). Contrary to Brown’s assertion, the

trial court properly considered the disparity between her treatment of her

biological child and the victim. In a published opinion, this Court rejected a

mother’s sufficiency challenge to her conviction for aggravated assault in the

starvation death of her four-year-old son by considering extensive testimony

concerning the mother’s differing treatment of the victim as opposed to his

siblings when it came to food, medical treatment, and living conditions. See

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 867 A.2d 594, 597-600 (Pa. Super. 2005). We

fail to see how evidence admissible to prove the charge at issue can be an

improper factor in sentencing where a sentencing court is statutorily charged

to have regard for “[t]he nature of and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant.” Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d).

At the original sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth presented

exhaustive, graphic, and detailed testimony by the medical examiner and

photographs from the victim’s autopsy. See N.T., 7/26/22, at 11-41;

Commonwealth Exhibits, 7/26/22, at 1-7. This evidence showed the victim

had been starved, tortured, and denied access to life-sustaining medical

treatment over a lengthy period and further that Brown tried to escape

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responsibility for her actions by lying to the police. See id.; see Trial Court

Opinion, 10/6/24, at 2. It was within the trial court’s discretion to weigh this

evidence against the mitigation evidence presented by Brown and determine

that the record supported a statutory maximum sentence for EWOC. We have

no basis to disturb this determination by re-weighing the evidence. See

Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778

As we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court, Brown’s

sentencing issue does not merit relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 8/5/2025

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