McMahon v. World Vision Inc.

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AUBRY MCMAHON, No. 24-3259

D.C. No.

Plaintiff - Appellee,

2:21-cv-00920-

JLR

v.

WORLD VISION INC.,

OPINION

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 21, 2025

Seattle, Washington

Filed August 5, 2025

Before: Ronald M. Gould, Richard C. Tallman, and

Morgan B. Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman

2 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

SUMMARY *

Employment Discrimination

The panel reversed the district court’s summary

judgment for Aubry McMahon and remanded for entry of

summary judgment in favor of World Vision, Inc., in

McMahon’s lawsuit against World Vision alleging

discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, and marital

status under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the

Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD).

World Vision extended a job offer to McMahon for a

remote position as a customer service representative

(CSR). After learning that McMahon was in a same-sex

marriage, World Vision revoked its job offer.

The district court initially granted summary judgment for

World Vision based on the church autonomy

doctrine. Reversing itself after McMahon moved for

reconsideration, the district court decided that the church

autonomy doctrine did not apply because World Vision had

acted under a “facially discriminatory hiring policy,” so the

court could resolve the case using “neutral principles of law”

without becoming entangled in religion. Rejecting World

Vision’s ministerial exception defense and other defenses,

the district court entered summary judgment for McMahon

after concluding that World Vision rescinded her job offer

pursuant to a policy that facially discriminated based on sex,

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 3

sexual orientation, and marital status in violation of Title VII

and the WLAD.

Renewing on appeal the arguments it made before the

district court, World Vision argued, inter alia, that CSRs fall

under the ministerial exception to employment

discrimination laws because CSRs serve a pivotal role in

World Vision’s religious mission as its public voice.

The panel held that the district court erred by rejecting

World Vision’s ministerial exception defense. The

ministerial exception bars McMahon’s employment

discrimination claims because the record shows that CSRs

perform key religious functions central to World Vision’s

mission. CSRs are responsible for effectively

communicating World Vision’s worldwide ministries and

projects to donors and supporters. CSRs engage with donors

in prayer and give them the opportunity to join World

Vision’s religious mission through financial

contributions. Because each of these “vital religious duties,”

Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S.

732, 756 (2020), lies at the core of World Vision’s religious

mission of “working with the poor and oppressed to promote

human transformation, seek justice and bear witness to the

good news of the Kingdom of God,” the ministerial

exception applies to CSRs and bars McMahon’s claims.

The panel accordingly reversed the district court’s grant

of summary judgment for McMahon and remanded for

entry of summary judgment in favor of World Vision.

4 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

COUNSEL

Michael C. Subit (argued), Frank Freed Subit & Thomas

LLP, Seattle, Washington; Casimir Wolnowski, Nisar Law

Group PC, New York, New York; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Daniel H. Blomberg (argued), Luke W. Goodrich, Jordan T.

Varberg, and Amanda G. Dixon, The Becket Fund for

Religious Liberty, Washington, D.C.; Scott J. Ward and J.

Matthew Szymanski, Gammon & Grange PC, Tysons,

Virginia; Abigail J. St. Hilaire and Nathaniel L. Taylor, Ellis

Li & McKinstry PLLC, Seattle, Washington; for Defendant-

Appellant.

Rebecca R. Dummermuth, First Liberty Institute,

Washington, D.C.; Randall W. Miller, Julie M. Christensen,

and Emily C. Means, Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr PC,

Dallas, Texas; Jeffrey C. Mateer, David J. Hacker, Stephanie

N. Taub, and Jeremiah G. Dys, First Liberty Institute, Plano,

Texas; for Amici Curiae Billy Graham Evangelistic

Association and Samaritan's Purse.

Ian S. Speir I, Covenant Law PLLC, Colorado Springs,

Colorado, for Amici Curiae Colson Center for Christian

Worldview, Moody Bible Institute, Summit Ministries, and

Cedarville University.

Steven T. McFarland, Christian Legal Society, Center for

Law & Religious Freedom, Springfield, Virginia, for Amici

Curiae Christian Legal Society, Accord Network, American

Association of Christian Schools, Association of Christian

Schools International, Campus Crusade for Christ, Crista

Ministries, Christian Medical and Dental Association,

General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,

InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, Islam and Religious

Freedom Action Team of the Religious Freedom Institute,

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 5

Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty, The Center for

Public Justice, The Institutional Religious Freedom

Alliance, and The Navigators.

Joshua W. Carden, Carden Livesay Ltd., Mesa, Arizona;

Michael P. Farris, National Religious Broadcasters,

Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae National Religious

Broadcasters.

John T. Melcon, Taylor Huse, and Stuart Lark, Taft

Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for

Amici Curiae Council for Christian Colleges & Universities,

Calvary Chapel Ft. Lauderdale. Cherry Hills Community

Church, International Mission Inc. dba Christar, Christian

Camp and Conference Association, Church Educational

System of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,

Community Bible Study, Cross Catholic Outreach Inc., The

Crowell Trust, Diocese of Colorado Springs, Ethics and

Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist

Convention, Evangelical Council for Financial

Accountability, Family Stations Inc. dba Family Radio,

Focus on the Family, Grace to You, Gull Lake Ministries,

International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, The Master's

University & Seminary, O.C. International Inc., Servant

Foundation Dba The Signatry, Tyndale House Ministries,

Upward Unlimited, The Christian Community Foundation

Inc. dba Waterstone, and Young Life.

Peter M. Torstensen Jr., Deputy Solicitor General; Christian

B. Corrigan, Solicitor General; Austin Knudsen, Montana

Attorney General, Office of the Montana Attorney General,

Helena, Montana; Steve Marshall, Alabama Attorney

General, Office of the Alabama, Attorney General,

Montgomery, Alabama; Tim Griffin, Arkansas Attorney

General, Office of the Arkansas Attorney General, Little

6 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

Rock, Arkansas; Ashley Moody, Florida Attorney General,

Office of the Florida Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida;

Raul R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General; Idaho Office of

the Attorney General, Boise, Idaho; Brenna Bird, Iowa

Attorney General, Office of the Iowa Attorney General, Des

Moines, Iowa; Kris W. Kobach, Kansas Attorney General,

Office of the Kansas Attorney General, Topeka, Kansas; Liz

Murrill, Louisiana Attorney General, Office of the Louisiana

Attorney General, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Lynn Fitch,

Mississippi Attorney General, Office of the Mississippi

Attorney General, Jackson, Mississippi; Andrew T. Bailey,

Missouri Attorney General, Office of the Missouri Attorney

General, Kansas City, Missouri; Michael T. Hilgers

Nebraska Attorney General, Office of the Nebraska Attorney

General, Lincoln, Nebraska; Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney

General, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus,

Ohio; Gentner F. Drummond, Oklahoma Attorney General,

Office of the Oklahoma Attorney General, Oklahoma City,

Oklahoma; Alan Wilson, South Carolina Attorney General,

Office of the South Carolina Attorney General, Columbia,

South Carolina; Jonathan Skrmetti, Tennessee Attorney

General and Reporter, Office of the Tennessee Attorney

General, Nashville, Tennessee; Ken Paxton, Texas Attorney

General, Office of the Texas Attorney General, Austin,

Texas; Sean D. Reyes, Utah Attorney General, Office of the

Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah; for Amici

Curiae State of Montana and 16 Other States.

Michael B. Buschbacher and Austin Lipari, Boyden Gray

PLLC, Washington, D.C.; Rachel N. Morrison and Eric N.

Kniffin, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, D.C.;

for Amicus Curiae Ethics and Public Policy Center.

Vince R. Eisinger, Cranfill Sumner LLP, Raleigh, North

Carolina, for Amici Curiae Professors Robert F. Cochran Jr.,

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 7

David F. Forte, Richard Garnett, Douglas Laycock, Michael

W. McConnell, Michael P. Moreland, and Robert J. Pushaw.

Jenny Samuels, Alexander J. Luchenitser, and Scott Lowder,

Americans United for Separation of Church and State,

Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Americans United for

Separation of Church and State and The Sikh Coalition.

Georgia C. Yeomans, Attorney; Anne N. Occhialino,

Assistant General Counsel; Jennifer S. Goldstein, Associate

General Counsel; Karla Gilbride, General Counsel; Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of General

Counsel, Appellate Services, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus

Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Michelle Fraling, Aditi Fruitwala, and Daniel Mach,

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Washington,

D.C.; Adrien Leavitt and La Rond Baker, American Civil

Liberties Union of Washington Foundation, Seattle,

Washington; for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties

Union and American Civil Liberties Union of Washington.

Adam M. Cambier, Assistant Attorney General; David C.

Kravitz, State Solicitor; Andrea J. Campbell,

Commonwealth of Massachusetts Attorney General; Office

of the Massachusetts Attorney General, Boston,

Massachusetts; Rob Bonta, California Attorney General,

Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento,

California; William Tong, Connecticut Attorney General,

Office of the Connecticut Attorney General, Hartford,

Connecticut; Philip J. Weiser, Colorado Attorney General,

Office of the Colorado Attorney General, Denver Colorado;

Brian L. Schwalb, District of Columbia Attorney General,

Office of the District of Columbia Attorney General,

Washington, D.C.; Kathleen Jennings, Delaware Attorney

General, Office of the Delaware Attorney General,

8 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

Wilmington, Delaware; Anne E. Lopez, Hawai‘i Attorney

General, Office of the Hawai‘i Attorney General, Honolulu,

Hawai‘i; Kwame Raoul, Illinois Attorney General, Office of

the Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, Illinois; Aaron M.

Frey, Maine Attorney General, Office of the Maine Attorney

General, Augusta, Maine; Anthony G. Brown, Maryland

Attorney General, Office of the Maryland Attorney General,

Baltimore, Maryland; Dana Nessel, Michigan Attorney

General, Office of the Michigan Attorney General, Lansing,

Michigan; Keith Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General,

Office of the Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul,

Minnesota; Matthew J. Platkin, New Jersey Attorney

General, Office of the New Jersey Attorney General,

Trenton, New Jersey; Raul Torrez, New Mexico Attorney

General, Office of the New Mexico Attorney General, Santa

Fe, New Mexico; Letitia James, New York Attorney

General, Office of the New York Attorney General, New

York, New York; Joshua H. Stein, North Carolina Attorney

General, Office of the North Carolina Attorney General,

Raleigh, North Carolina; Ellen F. Rosenblum, Oregon

Attorney General, Office of the Oregon Attorney General,

Salem, Oregon; Charity R. Clark, Vermont Attorney

General, Office of the Vermont Attorney General,

Montpelier, Vermont; Robert W. Ferguson, Washington

Attorney General, Office of the Washington Attorney

General, Olympia, Washington; Joshua L. Kaul, Wisconsin

Attorney General, Office of the Wisconsin Attorney

General, Madison, Wisconsin; for Amici Curiae

Massachusetts, California, Colorado, Connecticut,

Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawai‘i, Illinois,

Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New

Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont,

Washington, and Wisconsin.

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 9

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant World Vision, Inc., extended a job

offer to Plaintiff-Appellee Aubry McMahon for a remote

position as a customer service representative (“CSR”). After

learning that McMahon was in a same-sex marriage, World

Vision revoked its job offer. McMahon sued in federal

district court, alleging discrimination based on sex, sexual

orientation, and marital status under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 and the Washington Law Against

Discrimination (“WLAD”).

The district court initially granted summary judgment for

World Vision, finding that the church autonomy doctrine

“foreclose[d] judicial inquiry into World Vision’s

religiously motivated personnel decision” and thus barred

McMahon’s claims. However, the district court reversed

itself after McMahon moved for reconsideration, ultimately

deciding that the church autonomy doctrine did not apply

because World Vision had acted under a “facially

discriminatory hiring policy,” so the court could resolve the

case using “neutral principles of law” without becoming

entangled in religion. 1 The district court also rejected World

Vision’s remaining defenses under the ministerial exception,

exemptions to Title VII and the WLAD, freedom of

expressive association, and the Free Exercise Clause, and

entered summary judgment for McMahon after concluding

that World Vision rescinded her job offer pursuant to a

policy that facially discriminated based on sex, sexual

1

The district court used “church autonomy doctrine” and “ecclesiastical

abstention” interchangeably.

10 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

orientation, and marital status in violation of Title VII and

the WLAD.

On appeal, World Vision renews each of the arguments

it made before the district court. World Vision argues that

CSRs fall under the ministerial exception to employment

discrimination laws because CSRs serve a pivotal role in

World Vision’s religious mission as its public voice,

responsible for conveying the organization’s mission,

discussing World Vision’s projects, and praying with donors

and supporters over the phone. World Vision also contends

that even if the ministerial exception does not apply,

McMahon’s claims are barred by (a) another component of

what it calls the church autonomy doctrine that protects a

religious organization’s membership decisions, (b) the Free

Exercise Clause, (c) the freedom of expressive association

under the First Amendment, and (d) exemptions to Title VII

and the WLAD. We conclude that the district court erred by

rejecting World Vision’s ministerial exception defense, and

we reverse. 2

We now hold that the ministerial exception bars

McMahon’s employment discrimination claims because the

record shows that CSRs perform key religious functions

central to World Vision’s mission. CSRs are responsible for

effectively communicating World Vision’s worldwide

ministries and projects to donors and supporters. CSRs

engage with donors in prayer and give them the opportunity

to join World Vision’s religious mission through financial

contributions. Because each of these “vital religious duties,”

Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S.

732, 756 (2020), lies at the core of World Vision’s religious

2

Because McMahon’s claims are barred under the ministerial exception,

we do not reach the remainder of World Vision’s arguments on appeal.

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 11

mission of “working with the poor and oppressed to promote

human transformation, seek justice and bear witness to the

good news of the Kingdom of God,” the ministerial

exception applies to CSRs and bars McMahon’s claims.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of

summary judgment for McMahon and remand for entry of

summary judgment in favor of World Vision.

I

The parties do not dispute that World Vision is a

religious organization. See Spencer v. World Vision, Inc.,

633 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that

World Vision qualified as a religious organization exempt

from Title VII’s general prohibition on religious

discrimination). World Vision describes itself as a

“Christian ministry dedicated to sharing the gospel of Jesus

Christ” through “humanitarian outreach to children and

families around the world who are poor and underserved.”

World Vision primarily serves “the world’s most

vulnerable . . . those living in extreme poverty or fragile

contexts.” Its mission is to “follow our Lord and Savior

Jesus Christ in working with the poor and oppressed to

promote human transformation, seek justice, and bear

witness to the good news of the Kingdom of God.” World

Vision pursues this mission through partnership with donors,

prayer supporters, and churches. It helps people of any faith

or no faith. Each year, it trains more than 100,000 pastors

and faith leaders from partner churches, working with them

to serve millions of children worldwide.

World Vision holds itself out to the public as a Christian

organization, with “its faith in Jesus . . . at the heart of all it

does.” World Vision’s Articles of Incorporation state its

religious purposes, including “perform[ing] the functions of

12 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

the Christian church” in ways that “teach and preach the

Gospel” and “spread . . . the Christian religion.” World

Vision staff are required to (a) confess that they are

committed Christians, (b) agree wholeheartedly with World

Vision’s core religious principles, (c) communicate World

Vision’s Christian faith, and (d) participate in prayer

activities, devotionals, and weekly chapel services.

Every World Vision staff member is provided an

employee guidebook titled the “Orange Book: Living Out

Our Values,” which instructs that prayer “plays a central role

in World Vision’s ministry.” Each World Vision team is

expected to spend one hour each week in team devotions,

and all employees “are invited and expected” to attend a

weekly “organization-wide chapel” service. World Vision

believes that it and its staff’s “corporate and individual

behavior witnesses, reflects, and testifies about what we

believe as a ministry and as individual believers.”

Accordingly, World Vision “seeks to honor God by

requiring all staff to ‘[f]ollow the living Christ, individually

and corporately in faith and conduct, publicly and privately,

in accord with the teaching in His Word (the Bible).’”

World Vision provides Standards of Conduct (“SOC”) to

“clarify expectations and assist candidates/employees in

deciding whether or not [World Vision] is the right place for

them to serve the Lord.” Because World Vision believes that

the Bible confines the “express[ion of] sexuality solely

within a faithful marriage between a man and a woman[,]”

its SOC prohibits, among other things, “sexual conduct

outside the Biblical covenant of marriage between a man and

a woman.” To be eligible for employment at World Vision,

an individual must, among other things, be able and willing

to affirm and comply with the SOC.

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 13

Aubry McMahon is a Christian, openly gay person in a

same-sex marriage. McMahon and her wife are “huge

advocates” for “the LGBTQ community.” They attend Pride

events, display Pride symbols publicly, and conduct their

“day-to-day lives . . . to show that [they] are supportive of

the LGBTQ community.” McMahon became pregnant

around June 2020 via a sperm donor and gave birth in March

2021.

In the late fall of 2020, McMahon saw a job posting for

World Vision’s CSR position on the website Indeed.com.

The position was “remote” and offered compensation

ranging from $13 to $15 per hour depending on location and

cost of living, as well as a “comprehensive benefits

package.” The CSR position did not require any formal

religious education or training. Rather, the job posting

sought candidates with the following qualifications:

• High school graduate/GED or equivalent.

Basic routine work experience.

• Prefer a minimum of 1 year previous

customer service/sales work experience.

• Must have access to a reliable, high speed

internet connection.

• The ability to multi-task in a fast pace

[sic] environment.

• Must be able to train and work 40 hours a

week.

• Have strong technical skills with all

Microsoft Office Suite.

• The ability to type 20 wpm or more.

• Enjoys making a difference in the world!

14 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

• Must be available to start training on

February 1st.

The job description explains in detail World Vision’s

expectations for CSRs:

As a Customer Service Representative, you

will participate in a training program to gain

a working knowledge and understanding of

the position and to perform the essential

functions of the job at a level of performance

that consistently meets expectations. You

will learn, understand and develop the skills

necessary to acquire and maintain donor

relationships through basic inbound and

outbound calls. Serve as a liaison between

donors and the general public as well as

provide basic levels of customer service for

all special programs. Help carry out our

Christian organization’s mission, vision, and

strategies. Personify the ministry of World

Vision by witnessing to Christ and

ministering to others through life, deed,

word, and sign. You will also…

1. Keep Christ central in our individual and

corporate lives. Attend and participate in

the leadership of devotions, weekly

Chapel services, and regular prayer.

2. Maintain reliable, regular attendance.

Report to work on time and return from

breaks and lunches on time.

3. Under supervision, learn to answer

inbound customer service calls and make

outbound calls, to current and potential

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 15

donors in response to all media

presentations and World Vision products

and services. Answer incoming calls

using an Automated Call Distribution

system utilizing a standard script for

guidance. Recognize and respond to up-

sell opportunities and actively cross-sell

other WV programs when appropriate.

4. Through training and active participation,

gain the skills necessary to assess callers’

needs and input information accurately

and efficiently using data entry and ten-

key skills.

5. Achieve and maintain an acceptable level

of individual statistics to accomplish Call

Center business goals.

6. Develop skills to utilize technology for

maintaining and updating donor

information as appropriate.

7. Accepts constructive feedback and

welcomes instruction and direction.

8. Under supervision, research and

effectively respond to inquiries utilizing a

variety of resource materials and

methods.

9. Learn and effectively communicate

World Vision’s involvement in ministries

and projects around the world.

10. Work collaboratively with team

members.

11. Be sensitive to Donor’s needs and pray

with them when appropriate.

12. Perform other duties as assigned.

16 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

13. Keep informed of organizational

announcements, activities and changes

via regular reading of the WVUS Intranet

and other corporate communication tools.

CSRs fall under World Vision’s Donor Contact Services

(“DCS”) department. DCS describes its employees as “the

Voice, Face and Heart of World Vision” because they

“interact all day with the ministry’s donors, its lifeblood.”

“This challenge requires that each of us think of ourselves as

servants; demonstrating flexibility and servicing the

donor(s) with a smile.” More specifically, unlike most of

World Vision’s employees, CSRs engage with World

Vision’s donors, supporters, and partners on a daily basis to

provide information and answer questions about World

Vision’s work, ministry, and beliefs. For this reason, CSRs

play a crucial role in fundraising, which World Vision views

as “a form of ministry in itself.” When appropriate, CSRs

are expected to “pray[] for and with the persons with whom

they talk” because spiritual “[t]ransformation of donors is

just as vital to World Vision as that of the children they

sponsor.” World Vision states that prayer is an “essential

function of the role.” However, praying with donors is not a

requirement of the CSR role, and the failure to do so does

not result in discipline or termination.

CSRs are required to attend “devotions”—religious

meetings where teams come together “for reading of

Scripture and prayer for the daily work.” All World Vision

employees, including CSRs, are expected to lead devotions

at some point. CSRs may also lead World Vision’s weekly

organization-wide chapel services, but they are not required

to do so. Upon joining World Vision, representatives

receive nine to eleven weeks of formal training, which is

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 17

more “advanced training” than that required of any other

World Vision employee. This training covers religious

topics such as “who we are in Christ,” “how to pray with

donors,” “attending chapel,” and “leading and participating

in devotions.”

Shortly after McMahon applied for the CSR position, she

conducted a phone screening interview with a World Vision

talent acquisition partner. McMahon was asked questions

about her background and interest in World Vision and her

comfort level with job “requirement[s]” like “making

inbound and outbound calls” and “upselling” World Vision

programs. World Vision asked about McMahon’s computer

experience and skills, her background in working with

technology, and her comfort level and experience using

virtual meeting rooms. World Vision described its

“Christian commitment” and asked McMahon to describe

her personal faith. McMahon was asked if she was “willing

and able to comply with the Standards of Conduct” and

McMahon responded, “I’m aligned, yes!”

World Vision extended McMahon a verbal offer of

employment on January 4, 2021, followed by a formal

written offer the next day for the “full-time position of

Donor/Customer Service Representative Trainee (DSR

Trainee).” That same day, McMahon sent the following

email to World Vision:

Hey there, I just have a quick question! My

wife and I are expecting our first baby in

March and I wanted to see if I would qualify

for any time off since I’ll be a new employee?

I will be the one having the baby so I just

wanted to check to see if any time would be

18 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

allowed off. If not, no worries, thanks so

much!

After receiving McMahon’s email, World Vision engaged in

internal discussions about the “application of its Biblical

marriage policy . . . to Ms. McMahon’s situation.” World

Vision decided to rescind McMahon’s offer because of her

“inability” to comply with the SOC prohibiting sexual

conduct outside the Biblical covenant of marriage between a

man and a woman. World Vision rescinded McMahon’s job

offer on January 8, 2021.

II

McMahon sued World Vision in federal district court for

sex, sexual orientation, and marital status discrimination

under Title VII and the WLAD. After discovery, the parties

cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court

initially granted summary judgment to World Vision under

the church autonomy doctrine because World Vision had

rescinded McMahon’s job offer due to her inability to

comply with World Vision’s SOC. McMahon successfully

moved for reconsideration, arguing that because World

Vision had acted under a “facially discriminatory hiring

policy,” the court could resolve the case under “neutral

principles of law” without becoming entangled in religion,

and thus the church autonomy doctrine did not bar her

claims. The district court reconsidered and reversed its

initial decision, granting summary judgment for McMahon

and finding that World Vision engaged in “unlawful sex,

sexual orientation, and marital status discrimination” by

rescinding McMahon’s job offer pursuant to its “Biblical

marriage [SOC],” which the court deemed a “facially

discriminatory policy.”

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 19

The district court then rejected World Vision’s

remaining defenses under the ministerial exception,

exemptions under Title VII and the WLAD, freedom of

expressive association, and the Free Exercise Clause, and

granted summary judgment to McMahon. In lieu of a jury

trial on damages, the parties stipulated to damages of

$120,000, and the district court entered final judgment for

McMahon.

III

The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1331 and 1367, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review grants of

summary judgment “de novo, viewing the evidence and

drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party.” Behrend v. S.F. Zen Ctr., Inc.,

108 F.4th 765, 768 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

IV

A

The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment protect the

“principle of church autonomy,” which guarantees religious

groups’ “independence in matters of faith and doctrine and

in closely linked matters of internal government.” Our Lady,

591 U.S. at 747. But the church autonomy doctrine is not

absolute; churches and other religious organizations must

abide by neutral and generally applicable state and federal

employment laws. See id. at 746 (explaining that religious

institutions do not enjoy a general immunity from secular

laws). However, an exception to this requirement exists for

certain employees within religious organizations who

perform “important religious functions.” Hosanna-Tabor

20 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.

171, 190–92 (2012); see also Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 746

(explaining that religious organizations are afforded

“autonomy with respect to internal management decisions

that are essential to the institution’s central mission. And a

component of this autonomy is the selection of the

individuals who play certain key roles.”).

The ministerial exception “broadly ensures that religious

organizations have the freedom to choose ‘who will preach

their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.’”

Behrend, 108 F.4th at 766 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565

U.S. at 196). But we have recognized that “[a] religious

employer is not given carte blanche with respect to all

employees, ministerial and non-ministerial alike . . . First

Amendment protections serve as a sieve, not a lid.” Seattle

Pac. Univ. v. Ferguson, 104 F.4th 50, 58 (9th Cir. 2024).

“[T]he ministerial exception is just that, an exception,

applicable only to a subset of a religious entity’s

employees.” Palmer v. Liberty Univ., Inc., 72 F.4th 52, 71

(4th Cir. 2023) (Motz, J., concurring); see also Seattle Pac.

Univ., 104 F.4th at 58 (rejecting defendant’s “sweeping

interpretation [that] the ministerial exception” prohibits any

inquiry into a religious organization’s employment

practices).

Although the Supreme Court has declined “to adopt a

rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a

minister,” it has provided some guidance on circumstances

that might qualify an employee as a minister within the

meaning of the ministerial exception. Hosanna-Tabor, 565

U.S. at 190–92. Though they are not “inflexible

requirements,” Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 753, courts should

consider: (1) the employee’s formal title; (2) the “substance

reflected in that title,” such as “a significant degree of

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 21

religious training followed by a formal process of

commissioning”; (3) the employee’s use of that title; and

(4) whether the employee performed important religious

functions. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191–92.

Importantly, courts must not “treat[] the circumstances

that [the Court] found relevant in [Hosanna-Tabor] as

checklist items to be assessed and weighed against each

other in every case” because “[t]hat approach is contrary to

our admonition that [the Court was] not imposing any ‘rigid

formula.’” 3 Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 757–58 (quoting

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190). Rather, to determine

whether an employee falls within the ministerial exception,

we are to “take all relevant circumstances into account and

to determine whether each particular position implicated the

fundamental purpose of the exception.” Behrend, 108 F.4th

at 769 (quoting Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 758). The Supreme

Court has emphasized that “what matters, at bottom, is what

an employee does” and whether they perform “vital religious

duties.” Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 753, 756. To determine this,

the “religious institution’s explanation of the role

of . . . employees in the life of the religion in question is

important.” Id. at 757. The employee need not be a “co-

religionist,” a practicing member of the religion with which

the employer is associated, for the ministerial exception to

apply. Id. at 761. We have also rejected the argument that

the ministerial exception applies only to teachers and leaders

of the faith. Behrend, 108 F.4th at 769–70.

The ministerial exception is an “affirmative

defense . . . not a jurisdictional bar.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565

3

Relatedly, courts should refrain from overemphasizing the lack of a

clerical title or the amount of formal religious training required. Our

Lady, 591 U.S. at 758–59.

22 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

U.S. at 195 n.4. Therefore, an employer who asserts the

ministerial exception as a defense has the burden of proving

it. Fitzgerald v. Roncalli High School, Inc., 73 F.4th 529,

531 (7th Cir. 2023).

B

We begin by discussing the various contexts in which

courts have found the ministerial exception applies. The

Supreme Court has found the ministerial exception applies

to teachers at religious schools because “educating young

people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training

them to live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the very

core of the mission of a private religious school.” Our Lady,

591 U.S. at 753–54, 757–58 (finding that religious

schoolteachers responsible for educating students in the

Catholic faith—the core mission of their schools—were

ministers for purposes of the exception); see also Hosanna-

Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–92 (“called” religious schoolteacher

qualified under ministerial exception). Lower courts have

followed suit. 4

But the exception is not exclusive to Catholic school

teachers. We have applied the ministerial exception outside

the religious schoolteacher context on a few occasions,

including recently to a “work practice apprentice” at the San

Francisco Zen Center (“Center”). See Behrend, 108 F.4th at

4

See, e.g., Billard v. Charlotte Cath. High Sch., 101 F.4th 316, 331–33

(4th Cir. 2024) (substitute English and drama teacher was a “minister”

because he was required to teach in a way “agreeable with Catholic

thought,” and to pray and attend Mass with his students); Butler v. Saint

Stanislaus Kostka Cath. Acad., 609 F. Supp. 3d 184, 193–98 (E.D.N.Y.

2022) (same); Orr v. Christian Bros. High Sch., Inc., 21-15109, 2021

WL 5493416, *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2021) (finding the ministerial

exception applied to a religious-school principal).

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 23

766–67, 769–71. The Center is the largest Zen Buddhist

temple in North America and was formed to “encourage the

practice of Zen Buddhism by operating one or more religious

practice facilities and educating the public about Zen

Buddhism.” Id. at 766. It offers three residential programs

designed to be sequential: a two-to-six-week in-residence

guest student program, a two-to-three-year in-residence

work practice apprenticeship, and, for those who complete

an apprenticeship, full-time staff positions. Id. at 766–67.

As a work practice apprentice, Behrend was required to

follow a “strict practice schedule of formal and work

practice” including twice daily meditations and services,

temple cleanings, dharma talks, ceremonial tasks to support

the formal practice, and menial tasks like cooking,

dishwashing, and cleaning. Id. at 767.

We found that the ministerial exception applied to

Behrend because, although he performed mostly menial

work, that work was itself “an essential component of Zen

training.” Id. at 769. We reasoned:

Behrend was tasked with performing

maintenance, kitchen, and guest services.

But he was also responsible for assisting with

rituals, participating in meditations and

services, cleaning the temple, attending talks

and classes, and performing doan ryo

ceremonial tasks like ringing bells and

cleaning altars. He lived and worked full

time at the temple as a monk. While Behrend

may not have taught and was not a part of the

hierarchical leadership structure, he

“performed vital religious duties” as part of

24 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

the Center’s [work practice apprentice]

program.

Id. at 770 (quoting Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 756). Importantly,

we rejected Behrend’s argument that only those in key roles

in preaching and teaching the faith to others could be subject

to the exception because that would mean “‘interfering with

the freedom of religious groups to select’ who may or may

not serve as a live-in monk.” Id. (quoting Hosanna-Tabor,

565 U.S. at 184).

We have also found that the ministerial exception

applied to an Orthodox Jewish man employed by the Union

of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (“Union”) as

a mashgiach—“an inspector appointed by a board of

Orthodox rabbis to guard against any violation of the Jewish

dietary laws” (i.e., “keeping kosher”). Markel v. Union of

Orthodox Jewish Congregations of Am., 124 F.4th 796, 801

(9th Cir. 2024) cert. denied sub nom. Markel v. Union of

Orthodox Jewish, No. 24-1204, 2025 WL 1727421 (June 23,

2025). The Union ran the largest kosher certification

program in the United States and used those revenues to

further its core religious mission of serving the Orthodox

Jewish Community. Id. Markel served on the Union’s

kosher team and was responsible for grape products, which

are unique in Jewish dietary law because, to be kosher, only

Orthodox Jews can handle them until they are sufficiently

cooked or boiled. Id. at 802. Thus, “[t]o qualify to serve as

a mashgiach, Markel needed to submit a letter from an

Orthodox rabbi certifying that he was Sabbath observant,

knowledgeable about kosher law, and compliant with the

same.” Id. We held that because (1) only observant

Orthodox Jews can serve as a mashgiach for the Union, and

(2) a mashgiach is necessary to the Union’s mission of

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 25

“ensuring the wide availability of kosher food,” a mashgiach

is “essential to the institution’s central mission” and thus

qualifies as a minister for purposes of the ministerial

exception. 5 Id. at 807 (quoting Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 746).

The common thread between these cases is that the

Catholic schoolteacher in Our Lady, the work practice

apprentice in Behrend, and the mashgiach in Markel all

performed “vital religious duties” in light of the core

missions of their respective organizations. Our Lady, 591

U.S. at 756, 758; see Behrend, 108 F.4th at 769; Markel, 124

F.4th at 807. We apply that analysis here to determine

whether World Vision’s CSR position falls under the

ministerial exception.

C

World Vision, like any employer, is generally prohibited

under Title VII and the WLAD from taking adverse

employment actions based on protected characteristics,

including sexual orientation. 6 Bostock v. Clayton County,

590 U.S. 644, 661–62 (2020). Because we agree with the

district court’s determination that World Vision’s Biblical

marriage SOC facially discriminates based on sex, sexual

orientation, and marital status, World Vision is liable under

Title VII and the WLAD unless it can establish an exemption

or a defense, including by showing that the CSR position

5

The district court did not have the benefit of our most recent decisions

applying the ministerial exception, Behrend and Markel, because its

order granting summary judgment to McMahon was issued before either

case was published.

6

The parties agree that World Vision rescinded McMahon’s job offer

because she is in a same-sex marriage.

26 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

qualifies for the ministerial exception. 7 For the reasons

below, we hold that World Vision has met its burden of

showing that the CSR position qualifies for the ministerial

exception, barring McMahon’s claims.

Whether World Vision’s CSRs qualify as “ministers” for

purposes of the exception is the central issue in this appeal

and requires a lengthy analysis. The district court concluded

that World Vision’s CSR position was not entitled to the

ministerial exception affirmative defense. The district court

found that the CSR position was secular and lacked

ministerial or religious substance given that CSRs do not

receive significant doctrinal instruction or a religious

commissioning, are not required to perform any unique,

important religious functions, and perform primarily secular

job responsibilities such as placing donor calls, describing

World Vision’s work, data entry, and maintaining statistics.

Though it “considered donor prayer and credited this job

function in World Vision’s favor,” the district court

ultimately concluded that the CSR’s job duties—answering

calls, up-selling, data entry, sales work, typing proficiency—

“demonstrate[d] that the thrust of the customer service

representative position is administrative, not ministerial.”

We respectfully disagree with the district court’s

conclusion. When viewing CSRs’ religious functions within

the context of World Vision’s mission, we hold that World

Vision’s CSRs qualify for the ministerial exception because

they perform “vital religious duties” at the heart of World

Vision’s mission. Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 753–54, 756

7

It follows that World Vision generally remains bound by state and

federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on race,

color, sex, national origin, or other protected grounds for all non-

ministerial positions.

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 27

(“What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does” and

whether those responsibilities “lie at the very core of [World

Vision’s] mission.”).

The Supreme Court has made it clear that an employee’s

job duties cannot be viewed in isolation from the religious

organization’s mission. Id. at 751–52 (“The circumstances

that informed our decision in Hosanna-Tabor were relevant

because of their relationship to Perich’s ‘role in conveying

the Church’s message and carrying out its mission.’”

(quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192)). Thus, the

ministerial exception applies to individuals who perform

“vital religious duties” that are “essential to the institution’s

central [religious] mission.” Markel, 124 F.4th at 806

(quoting Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 746). For instance, because

the “very reason for the existence” of a religious school is

the “religious education and formation of students,” the

“selection and supervision of the teachers upon whom the

schools rely to do this work lie at the core of their mission.”8

Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 738.

On this critical step, the district court erred by viewing

the CSR’s responsibilities in the abstract, isolated from

World Vision’s central mission. See id. at 753–54

(explaining that courts should consider what an employee

does in the context of the “core of the [employer’s]

mission”). When viewed within the context of World

8

Similarly, the Court found the ministerial exception applied to a

religious school teacher because her “job duties reflected a role in

conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission”—she

taught religion four days a week, led prayer three times a day, took

students to a weekly school-wide chapel service, led the chapel service

twice per year, performed devotional exercises every morning with

fourth graders, and thereby played an “important role in transmitting the

Lutheran faith to the next generation.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192.

28 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

Vision’s central mission, as we must, it is evident to us that

CSRs serve “vital religious duties” at the core of World

Vision’s mission. Id. at 756.

World Vision describes its mission as to “follow our

Lord and Savior Jesus Christ in working with the poor and

oppressed to promote human transformation, seek justice

and bear witness to the good news of the Kingdom of God.”

World Vision pursues its mission through:

(1) “[t]ansformational [d]evelopment that is community-

based and sustainable, focused especially on the needs of

children”; (2) “[e]mergency [r]elief that assists people

afflicted by conflict or disaster”; (3) [p]romotion of [j]ustice

that seeks to change unjust structures affecting the poor

among whom we work”; (4) “[p]artnerships with churches

to contribute to spiritual and social transformation”;

(5) “[p]ublic awareness that leads to informed

understanding, giving, involvement and prayer”; and

(6) “[w]itness to Jesus Christ by life, deed, word and sign

that encourages people to respond to the Gospel.”

According to World Vision, CSRs play a unique and

vital role in each aspect of the organization’s mission.

World Vision describes its CSRs as the organization’s

“lifeblood” because they are the sole employees interfacing

with donors and soliciting donations, which World Vision

views as a form of ministry or religious practice. CSRs

minister to donors through prayer and routinely pray with

donors about their needs and the needs of the children they

sponsor. In this way, World Vision considers CSRs its

“voice.”

World Vision emphasizes that CSRs are at the frontline

of one of its primary goals: promoting the “child sponsorship

program,” which pairs donors with children. Some of World

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 29

Vision’s donors may wish to “learn about the Christian

faith,” and the CSRs are responsible for teaching curious

donors about World Vision’s Christian faith and mission.

Thus, World Vision views the CSR position as crucial not

only because CSRs solicit donations and complete

administrative tasks, but also because they support donors’

religious transformation by “inspiring those donors who

share World Vision’s faith and by sharing that faith with

those who don’t.”

True, the CSR job posting primarily lists secular and

administrative duties: “[r]eport to work on time”; “learn to

answer inbound customer service calls and make outbound

calls”; “[a]nswer incoming calls using an Automated Call

Distribution system utilizing a standard script for guidance”;

“[r]ecognize and respond to up-sell opportunities”; and

“[a]chieve and maintain an acceptable level of individual

statistics to accomplish Call Center business goals,” among

others. But the job posting also states that a CSR must

“[l]earn and effectively communicate World Vision’s

involvement in ministries and projects around the world,”

“[h]elp carry out our Christian organization’s mission,

vision, and strategies,” and “[p]ersonify the ministry of

World Vision by witnessing to Christ and ministering to

others through life, deed, word and sign.” In so doing, CSRs

are required to “[k]eep Christ central in [their] individual and

corporate lives,” “[a]ttend and participate in leadership of

devotions, weekly Chapel services, and regular prayer,” and

“[b]e sensitive to Donor’s needs and pray with them when

appropriate.”

But that is not all. In addition to the job posting, “[a]

religious institution’s explanation of the role of such

employees in the life of the religion in question is

important.” Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 757. According to World

30 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

Vision, “Being a part of DCS means you are the Voice, Face

and Heart of World Vision.” World Vision’s Senior

Director of Talent Management, Melanie Freiberg, testified

that “ministering to people is an essential function of the

[CSR] job” that requires “being a representative of Christ

and teaching about the witness of Jesus Christ.”

Recordings of real-world calls between CSRs and donors

also demonstrate that the CSR role is not merely an

employee at a call center cold-calling for donations. In one

call, a CSR and a current donor discuss how COVID-19 has

impacted a 15-year-old in Zimbabwe that the donor has

sponsored for the past nine years before praying together for

the donor’s family during the pandemic. In another call,

after a donor asks about how his sponsored child is doing,

the CSR thanks the donor for providing clean water to the

child and provides methods for the donor to find out how the

COVID-19 pandemic is impacting the child. The donor then

asks the CSR to pray for his brother, who is “close to meeting

God,” and the donor puts the call on speakerphone so his

wife can pray with the donor and the CSR.

In sum, we hold that the ministerial exception applies to

World Vision’s CSR position because CSRs perform “vital

religious duties” that “lie at the very core of [World

Vision’s] mission.” See Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 754, 756–57.

World Vision’s “core mission” is to bear witness to Jesus

Christ through acts of service, including support for children,

those afflicted by conflict, and the poor, by partnering with

churches, donors, and other members of the public through

prayer and ministry. The CSRs’ responsibilities “lie at the

very core of [World Vision’s] mission” because CSRs are

the organization’s “voice, face, and heart”—without the

CSRs, World Vision would be severely hindered in pursuing

its central religious mission. Although the execution of

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 31

those responsibilities requires administrative and customer

service tasks that are ubiquitous in a secular setting, CSRs

also perform “vital religious duties” crucial to World

Vision’s mission by explaining World Vision’s ministry,

programs, and by “giv[ing] people an opportunity to join

[World Vision] in the mission of God” through donations

and sponsorships. See Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 756–57.

McMahon argues that a holistic view of a CSR’s job

duties shows that the position is overwhelmingly secular,

and any religious aspects of the position were either equally

applicable to all World Vision employees or optional. We

reject these arguments. For one, that a position has primarily

administrative or secular job duties does not foreclose the

possibility that the position qualifies under the ministerial

exception. The Supreme Court has imposed no requirement

that the “thrust” of the position be ministerial, or that a

particular quantum of the position’s job duties be religious

in nature. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 193 (indicating

that the Sixth Circuit erred by “plac[ing] too much emphasis

on Perich’s performance of secular duties,” which occupied

most of each school day).

We also reject McMahon’s argument and the district

court’s conclusion that religious job duties that are equally

applicable to all World Vision employees carry diminished

or no relevance in the ministerial exception analysis. True,

all World Vision employees are expected to “bear witness to

Jesus Christ” through life, deed, word, and sign. Similarly,

all employees, not just CSRs, are “invited and expected” to

attend a weekly “organization-wide chapel” service. But the

district court did not cite any authority for the proposition

that a position is less likely to be central to a religious

organization’s core mission if its religious duties are shared

with general members of that organization. In fact, in

32 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court explained that the Sixth

Circuit “gave too much weight to the fact that lay teachers at

the school performed the same religious duties as Perich.”

565 U.S. at 193.

At the same time, we recognize that the touchstone of the

ministerial exception analysis is “whether each particular

position implicate[s] the fundamental purpose of the

[ministerial] exception,” because the exception protects only

“certain key roles” or “certain important positions.” Our

Lady, 591 U.S. at 746, 758. But while the ministerial

exception requires at least some characteristics that

distinguish a “minister” from other general employees, we

have no reason to believe that any religious job duties shared

between the “minister” position and other employees are

irrelevant. For example, in Markel, the mashgiach was

required to be an observant Jew, keep the Sabbath, and

follow kosher laws—religious obligations that would apply

to all Orthodox Jews. 124 F.4th at 807. Beyond those shared

job requirements, the mashgiach’s “certain important” role

was ensuring the kosher integrity at the two wineries to

which he was assigned, which carried out the Union’s

mission of ensuring the wide availability of kosher food. Id.

at 803 (quoting Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 746).

Here, while the CSR’s obligation to attend chapel and to

bear witness to Jesus Christ are shared with all World Vision

employees, the “certain important” and unique role of a CSR

is to “give people an opportunity to join [World Vision] in

the mission of God” through monetary donations

underwriting the organization’s mission. Secretaries,

accountants, and custodians at World Vision, despite having

the same religious obligations to attend chapel and bear

witness to Jesus Christ, would not qualify for the ministerial

exception because, unlike CSRs, they are not charged with

MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC. 33

conveying the organization’s message to its donors—a role

“vital” to World Vision’s central mission. See Our Lady,

591 U.S. at 756–57.

We emphasize that although universal, generic job

requirements can be considered in the ministerial analysis,

they are alone insufficient to establish that a position

qualifies for the ministerial exception. Otherwise, every

employee of a religious organization would qualify as a

“minister.” See Palmer, 72 F.4th at 71 (Motz, J., concurring)

(“[T]he ministerial exception is just that—an exception[.]”).

An employee does not necessarily qualify for the ministerial

exception because they are required to pray or participate in

religious services with their colleagues. Likewise, a

religious employer’s universal requirement that its

employees help carry out the organization’s religious

mission or live consistently with the organization’s religious

values cannot be enough to qualify for the ministerial

exception.

Here, every World Vision employee is required to

“[p]ersonify the ministry of World Vision by witnessing to

Christ and ministering to others through life, deed, word and

sign” and to “keep Christ central in [their] individual and

corporate lives.” Though we may consider those duties in

our ministerial exception analysis, they would not be

sufficient standing on their own. A religious organization

must show more: that the position it claims is ministerial

performs “vital religious duties” at the core of the

organization’s mission. Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 756–57.

World Vision has done so on the record before us.

We hold that the ministerial exception applies to a CSR

not merely because they interface with the public, pray with

their colleagues, or abide by World Vision’s requirements to

34 MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC.

embody Christian values. Rather, CSRs qualify for the

exception because (1) they are World Vision’s “voice,”

responsible for “effectively communicat[ing] World

Vision’s involvement in ministries and projects around the

world”; (2) their engagement with donors is a form of

ministry itself; and (3) they “give people an opportunity to

join [World Vision] in the mission of God.” Each of these

religious responsibilities is “vital” to World Vision’s

particular religious mission. See id. at 756.

***

Considering that CSRs perform “vital religious

functions” that “lie at the very core of [World Vision’s]

mission,” we conclude that CSRs qualify for the ministerial

exception. Because World Vision has carried its burden of

showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to

whether a CSR qualifies for the ministerial exception, World

Vision is entitled to summary judgment.

Each party shall bear its own fees and costs.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.