“Properly framed, the third 20 requirement for Younger abstention asks whether there remains an opportunity to litigate the 21 federal claim in a state-court proceeding at the time the federal court is considering whether to 22 abstain.”
How later courts described this case
- “Properly framed, the third 20 requirement for Younger abstention asks whether there remains an opportunity to litigate the 21 federal claim in a state-court proceeding at the time the federal court is considering whether to 22 abstain.”
- liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 DEVON K. WEBB, No. 2:25-cv-02156-DC-CKD (PS)
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
14 SACRAMENTO COUNTY PUBLIC
DEFENDER’S OFFICE, et al.
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Defendants.
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17 On August 1, 2025, plaintiff DeVon K. Webb, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint, a
18 motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and a motion requesting a preliminary injunction under
19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. (ECF Nos. 1-3.) Because plaintiff proceeds without counsel,
20 this matter is referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302(c)(21) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
21 Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief is appropriate for decision without oral argument under
22 Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set forth below, the motion for injunctive relief should be
23 denied.
24 I. Background
25 Plaintiff filed his complaint “as brother and care provider for Deantae L. Dangerfield.”
26 (ECF No. 1 at 1.) He names four agencies as defendants: the Sacramento County Public
27 Defender’s Office, the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office, the Sacramento County
28 Sheriff’s Department, and the Sacramento County Main Jail. (Id.)
1 Plaintiff cites the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) at 42 U.S.C. § 12132 as the
2 basis of his federal claim. He alleges that his brother (“Dangerfield”) “has been repeatedly
3 released, prosecuted, and returned to environments where his mental condition deteriorates.” (Id.
4 at 5.) In an attached unsigned declaration, plaintiff asserts that Dangerfield has a “long-
5 documented history of mental health disorders and developmental disabilities,” as well as
6 substance use disorders, and is unable to make decisions. (Id. at 7.) “Despite this, he has been
7 repeatedly prosecuted and released without treatment or supervision.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that
8 he and his family have been unable to secure appropriate care for Dangerfield, and that the Public
9 Defender’s Office has “refused to request a proper mental health evaluation” and allowed
10 Dangerfield to enter plea agreements “that do not reflect his capacity or his needs.” (Id. at 7-8.)
11 This has placed a “significant burden on our family.” (Id. at 8.)
12 In the accompanying motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 3), plaintiff seeks the
13 following relief: (1) an order halting any further criminal proceedings against Dangerfield
14 pending a mental health evaluation; (2) an order requiring Dangerfield to be placed in residential
15 treatment facility; and (3) an order recommending a federal investigation of how Dangerfield’s
16 case was handled “to determine systemic failures.” (Id. at 2.)
17 II. Screening under IFP Statute
18 Plaintiff, requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 (ECF No. 2.) See 28
19 U.S.C. § 1915 (authorizing the commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees or
20 security” by a person who is unable to pay such fees). Plaintiff’s affidavit makes the required
21 financial showing, and so plaintiff’s request is granted.
22 A. Legal Standard
23 The determination that a plaintiff may proceed without payment of fees does not complete
24 the inquiry. Under the IFP statute, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss any claims
25 that are “frivolous or malicious,” fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek
26 monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Further, the federal court
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1 Actions where a party proceeds without counsel are referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to
28 E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
1 has an independent duty to ensure it has subject matter jurisdiction in the case. See United
2 Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004).
3 Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7
4 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). Prior to dismissal, the court is
5 to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and provide an opportunity to cure––if it
6 appears at all possible the defects can be corrected. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31
7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, if amendment would be futile, no leave to amend need be
8 given. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).
9 Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading be “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
10 court’s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
11 entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
12 alternative or different types of relief.” Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. Rule
13 8(d)(1); see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (overruled on other grounds)
14 (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus
15 litigation on the merits of a claim.”).
16 A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which
17 relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if it either lacks a
18 cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to allege a cognizable legal theory. Mollett v. Netflix,
19 Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a
20 complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic
21 recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
22 555-57 (2007). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
23 supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
24 (2009). Thus, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
25 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
26 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
27 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
28 When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,
1 the court must accept the well-pled factual allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
2 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Papasan v.
3 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986). The court is not, however, required to accept as true
4 “conclusory [factual] allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,”
5 or “legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Paulsen v.
6 CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009).
7 B. Analysis
8 At the outset, the court notes that plaintiff, as a pro se litigant, can only bring and
9 prosecute claims on his own behalf. Courts routinely adhere to the general rule prohibiting pro se
10 plaintiffs from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. Simon v.
11 Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, although the court understands that
12 Dangerfield may be unable to represent himself, plaintiff has not shown, and is unlikely to be able
13 to show, that he can bring federal claims on his brother’s behalf.
14 Second, plaintiff has not established a basis for federal jurisdiction. The federal courts are
15 courts of limited jurisdiction. In the absence of a basis for federal jurisdiction, plaintiff’s claims
16 cannot proceed in this venue. The complaint asserts this court has subject matter jurisdiction on
17 the basis of a federal question under the ADA.
18 Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA),
19 provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
20 excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of
21 a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To
22 state a claim under Title II of the ADA, the plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the plaintiff is
23 an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive
24 the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either
25 excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs or
26 activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion,
27 denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. Thompson v.
28 Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff does not allege he (or his brother) was
1 excluded or discriminated against by reason of a disability, and thus fails to state a claim under
2 the ADA.
3 Finally, plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief in the form of halting criminal proceedings
4 against Dangerfield is barred by the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971).
5 Principles of comity and federalism weigh against a federal court interfering with ongoing state
6 criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief except under extraordinary
7 circumstances. Id. at 43-54. Younger abstention is required when (1) state proceedings, judicial
8 in nature, are pending; (2) state proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the state
9 proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issue. Middlesex County Ethic
10 Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n., 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
11 The first prong of Younger is met because plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief appears
12 to concern ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Beltran v. California, 871 F.2d 777, 781 (9th
13 Cir. 1988). The second prong of Younger is met because an important state interest is implicated
14 by criminal proceedings. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third prong of
15 Younger is also satisfied because state criminal proceedings generally provide an opportunity for
16 federal or constitutional questions to be presented by their nature. Federal courts assume state
17 procedures will afford an adequate opportunity for consideration of constitutional claims “in the
18 absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15
19 (1987); see also Duke v. Gastelo, 64 F.4th 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Properly framed, the third
20 requirement for Younger abstention asks whether there remains an opportunity to litigate the
21 federal claim in a state-court proceeding at the time the federal court is considering whether to
22 abstain.”)
23 As the complaint fails to invoke the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it must be
24 dismissed. Nevertheless, in light of plaintiff’s pro se status, the court finds it appropriate to grant
25 plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint.
26 C. Standards for Amendment
27 If plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, this new pleading shall:
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1 i. be captioned “First Amended Complaint”;
ii. be limited to 20 pages, with text utilizing a font size of 12 Times New Roman or
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equivalent and double spacing (pages exceeding the 20-page limit will be summarily
stricken and will not be considered part of plaintiff’s operative pleading);
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iii. use numbered paragraphs;
4 iv. set forth her various claims in separate sections and clearly identify which defendants
are allegedly at fault for each claim (e.g., Claim I against defendants X, Y, and Z,
5 Claim II against defendants R and S, etc.);
v. under each section, list the factual allegations supporting that particular claim (for
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brevity, plaintiff may refer to specific prior paragraphs [i.e. “See ¶¶ 25, 34, and 42”],
7 but in no case shall plaintiff “incorporate all preceding paragraphs” for any claims);
vi. include a general background facts section to orient the reader only as necessary;
8 vii. include her statements for jurisdiction, venue, and relief sought as is necessary;
viii. omit exhibits, documents, photos, or other such “evidence” of his claims (except for
9 any contracts on which she bases any breach of contract claim);
ix. refrain from alleging redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters; and
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x. address any other pleading deficiencies outlined above.
11 This amended complaint shall be filed within 28 days of this order.
12 Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in order
13 to make plaintiff’s first amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended
14 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an
15 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and once the first amended complaint is
16 filed, the original complaint no longer serves any function in the case.
17 Finally, nothing in this order requires plaintiff to file a first amended complaint. If
18 plaintiff determines that he is unable to amend his complaint in compliance with the court’s order
19 at this juncture, he may alternatively file a notice of voluntary dismissal of her claims without
20 prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) within 28 days of this order.
21 III. Motion for Preliminary Injunction
22 “A federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and
23 subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons
24 not before the court.” Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Here, as set forth
25 above, the complaint fails to set forth a basis for the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and must
26 be dismissed. Accordingly, this court must abstain from issuing the requested preliminary
27 injunction.
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1 IV. Conclusion
2 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
3 1. Plaintiff's motion for in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED;
4 2. Plaintiff granted 28 days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall file either (a) an
5 amended complaint in accordance with this order, or (b) a notice of voluntary
6 dismissal of the action without prejudice; and
7 3. Failure to file either an amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal by the
8 required deadline may result in the imposition of sanctions, including potential
9 dismissal of the action with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
10 41(b).
11 Additionally, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's motion for preliminary
12 || injunction (ECF No. 3) be denied.
13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
14 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14)
15 || days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
16 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
17 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections
18 || shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within seven (7) days after service of the
19 || objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the
20 || District court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951
21 | F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).
Dated: August 4, 2025 ff q aad } /9 / x lg ae
LANG fH A." 7
CAROLYN K. DELANEY
24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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2/Awebb2156.mpi
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