Catalano v. PNC Bank, N.A.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

PAMELA CATALANO,

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:23-cv-289

y j Judge Walter H. Rice

PNC BANK, N.A., et a/,

Defendants.

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS PNC BANK, N.A., AND AMY LASKODY

(DOC. #28); JUDGMENT TO ENTER IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND

AGAINST PLAINTIFF PAMELA CATALANO; TERMINATION ENTRY

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants PNC

Bank, N.A. (“PNC”), and Amy Laskody (“Laskody”). (Doc. #28). For the reasons

set forth below, the Motion is SUSTAINED.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

At the summary judgment stage, the facts are viewed and ambiguities are

resolved in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party.

Washington v. Newsom, 977 F.2d 991, 996 (6th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff began her

employment with what is now PNC in 2003 and, beginning in October 2020,

Plaintiff served as Branch Manager, Sr., also known as Branch Manager 2

(“Manager”) at PNC’s branch in Troy, Ohio (“Branch”). Part of her responsibilities

as Manager was to supervise branch employees, including one Lori “Jill” Brown,

a Branch Banker. (Memo. in Support, Doc. #28-1, PAGEID 246; Pitf. Dep., Doc.

#28-2, PAGEID 261, 264-65, 281). Despite it being well-known at the Branch that

Plaintiff is an Apostolic Pentecostal, Brown made several comments to Plaintiff

that Plaintiff perceived as derogatory and hostile. Specifically, Brown called

Plaintiff a “holy roller,” and encouraged her to “let her hair down” and “get

drunk,” despite both of those activities being contrary to Plaintiff's beliefs and

practices. (Memo. in Opp., Doc. #29, PAGEID 528, citing Doc. #28-2, PAGEID 269-

70, 271-72). Another Branch employee, Carey Simons, told Plaintiff that Brown

was “out for” Plaintiff, despite Plaintiff being Brown's supervisor. (/d., citing Doc.

#28-2, PAGEID 270). As Brown’s supervisor, Plaintiff put her on a performance

improvement plan (“PIP”), a step which, if Brown failed to better her performance,

could have led to her termination.’ (Doc. #28-2, PAGEID 290).

On October 14, 2021, Brown called PNC’s Employee Relations Information

Center (“ERIC”) hotline and stated that Plaintiff had instructed Brown to violate

several PNC policies, including directing Brown to update a customer’s personal

information without the customer being physically present at the branch and

providing identification, in contravention of PNC’s “Know Your Customer”

(“KYC”) policy. (A. Laskody Decl., Doc. #28-3, PAGEID 378 □□□ 21, 24-25; Doc. #28-

4, PAGEID 468-69), PNC assigned Laskody to investigate the alleged violation,

1 The details of the PIP are not discussed by either party. However, neither party claims that the

PIP is related to comments made by Brown to Plaintiff, or the personal interactions between Brown

and Plaintiff.

and subsequently partnered Laskody with Anti-Money Laundering Investigator

Kelly Parker. (/d. at □□ 22; Doc. #28-4, PAGEID 465-66, 468-69, 479, 489), On

January 7, 2022, Laskody and Parker interviewed Plaintiff, who initially had to

“rack her brain” to remember anything about the incident in question. (Doc. #29,

PAGEID 528-29, citing Doc. #28-2, PAGEID 281; K. Parker Dep., Doc. #28-5, PAGEID

513). Plaintiff concedes that she knew of PNC's policies—including that

instructing an employee to commit a dishonest act is a valid ground for

termination—but felt as though Laskody forced her “to answer questions during

the interview and [was] trying to ‘coerce’ her into responding to questions in a

certain way.” (Doc. #28-1, PAGEID 243, quoting Doc. #28-2, PAGEID 288; citing

Doc. #28-2, PAGEID 274, 275, 277-78, 279, 289-90). Although branch surveillance

videos were inconclusive as to whether Plaintiff or Brown engaged in the KYC

violation, Laskody concluded that Plaintiff had engaged in dishonest practice and

placed her on administrative leave. (/d. at PAGEID 239-40, citing Doc. #28-3,

PAGEID 378, 9 26-27, 29; Doc. #28-4, PAGEID 487, 491-92; Doc. #28-5, PAGEID

513).

After placing Plaintiff on paid leave, Laskody and Parker continued to

investigate. During this time, on January 11, 2022, Plaintiff told Laskody for the

first time about Brown’s derogatory comments, complaining that she was

harassed by Brown due to her religious beliefs, and that Brown, out of loyalty to

her former supervisor, had retaliated against Plaintiff by complaining about

Plaintiff through ERIC. (Doc. #28-1, PAGEID 241, citing Doc. #28-3, PAGEID 379,

38-39; Doc. #28-4, PAGEID 473-76). However, in her earlier complaint to Laskody,

Plaintiff did not inform the latter of her religious denomination, and Laskody did

not know that Plaintiff is an Apostolic Pentecostal. (/a. at PAGEID 242, citing Doc.

#28-2, PAGEID 274; Doc. #28-4, PAGEID 475, 488-89).

Despite the inconclusive video evidence, Laskody concluded that Brown's

complaints that Plaintiff had instructed Brown to be dishonest were true. After

consulting with Regional Leader Rosemary Martin, who did not know that Plaintiff

had complained to Laskody about Brown’s alleged harassment, Laskody “notified

Catalano that her employment was being terminated for directing another

employee to be dishonest.” (Doc. #28-1, PAGEID 240, citing Doc. #28-4, PAGEID

469-71, 482-83). Plaintiff filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission

(“OCRC”), alleging that she was “terminated based on religion and in retaliation

for protective activity[.]” (Doc. #28-2, PAGEID 293). Plaintiff also charged that

“Amy Laskody aided, abetted, compelled, and/or coerced PNC's discriminatory

conduct.” (/d.). The OCRC dismissed her charge, and Plaintiff timely filed her

Complaint in the Montgomery County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas on August

30, 2023. (Doc. #2, PAGEID 53, 4 14). Therein, Plaintiff raised claims: of religious

discrimination, in violation of OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.02(A) (Claim One) and Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Claim Two); claims of

retaliation, in violation of OHIO REV. CODE 8 4112.02(I) (Claim Three) and Title VII

(Claim Four); and that Laskody aided and abetted PNC’s unlawful conduct, in

violation of OHIO REV. CODE □□ 4112.02(J), 4112.99 (Claim Five). (/a. at PAGEID 59-

62, Tf] 109-141).

On June 2, 2025, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims.

(Doc. #28). Plaintiff filed a memorandum contra (Doc. #29), and Defendants filed a

reply. (Doc. #30). The Motion is now ripe for decision.

Il. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Feb.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment must be entered

“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial.” Cefotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The

moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. /a. at 323; see a/so

Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir. 1991).

Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must

present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary

to resolve the difference at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250

(1986). Once the burden has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment

cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not

sufficient to “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). Rule 56 “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings,”

and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Ce/otex,

477 U.S. at 324. “The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence in

support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably

find for the plaintiff.” Michigan Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337,

341 (6th Cir. 1994).

“Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is

‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining

whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a court must assume as true the

evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

that party. /d. at 255. If the parties present conflicting evidence, a court may not

decide which evidence to believe. Credibility determinations must be left to the

fact-finder. 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL § 2726 (3d ed. 1998).

In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a court

need only consider the materials cited by the parties. Fep.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). “A

district court is not... obligated to wade through and search the entire record for

some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim.” /nterRoyal

Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). If it so chooses, however,

6 .

the court may also consider other properly presented materials in the record.

Fep.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).

B. Employment Discrimination

A plaintiff may produce evidence of employment discrimination under the

direct or indirect evidence approach “[D]irect evidence is that evidence which, if

believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a

motivating factor in the employer's actions.” Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough

Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir.1999). “Once the plaintiff

has produced credible direct evidence, the burden shifts to the employer to show

that it would have taken the employment action of which the plaintiff complains

even in the absence of discrimination.” White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth.,

429 F.3d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff's claims are based on indirect evidence of religious discrimination

and retaliation by Defendants, meaning that the well-established McDonnel/

Douglas “burden-shifting” framework applies. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2007),

overruled on other grounds by E.E.0.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 575 U.S. 768

(2015). Employment discrimination and retaliation claims arising under Ohio Rev.

Code § 4112.02 et seq. and relying on indirect evidence of discrimination follow

the same burden-shifting analysis. Coryel/ v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 101 Ohio

St. 3d 175, 2004-Ohio-723, §] 9; Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St. 3d 578, 582

(1996).

For religious discrimination, a plaintiff employee must make a prima facie

showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse

employment action; (3) she is qualified for position; and (4) she was replaced by

someone outside the protected class or was treated differently than similarly-

situated employees. Tepper, 505 F.3d at 515. If the plaintiff makes such a

showing, then the burden shifts to the defendant employer to “articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action” it

undertook. /d., citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. “If the defendant

meets this burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff[,] who must show

that the defendant's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.” /d. at 515-

16, citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. However, “[t]he ultimate burden of

persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against

the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (emphasis added).

Pretext may be shown “either directly by persuading the [trier of fact] that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by

showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”

Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir. 1994)

(brackets in original), quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, overruled on other

grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). “TA] plaintiff

can show pretext in three interrelated ways: (1) that the proffered reasons had no

basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the

employer’s action, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate the employer's

action.” Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). “To carry her

burden in opposing summary judgment, [a plaintiff] must produce sufficient

evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject [the employer's] explanation

of why it fired her.” /d.; accord: Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d

497, 504 (6th Cir. 2014), quoting Chen, 580 F.3d at 400 (“At the summary judgment

stage, the issue is whether the plaintiff has produced evidence from which a jury

could reasonably doubt the employer's explanation.”).

For retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in protected

activity; (2) the defendant employer knew of the activity; (3) the defendant

thereafter subjected the plaintiff to an adverse employment action; and (4) there is

a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action. Montell v.

Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d at 504. “The burden of establishing a

prima facie case in a retaliation action is not onerous, but one easily met.”

Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000). At the summary

judgment stage, “all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to Montell

and all reasonable inferences must be made in her favor” with respect to the

prima facie case. Montell, 757 F.3d at 505. The second and third stages of the

burden-shifting analysis are the same as those for discrimination. Montell, 757

F.3d at 504. As with discrimination, retaliation claims arising under Ohio law and

Title are analyzed identically using the above burden-shifting framework.

Moody v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 2021-Ohio-4578, if] 35-

36, 183 N.E.3d 21 (10th Dist.).

lll. Analysis

A. Claims One and Two: Religious Discrimination

Plaintiff argues that the first three elements of a religious discrimination

claim—that she (1) was a member of a protected class (Apostolic Pentecostal); (2)

suffered adverse action (termination); and (3) was qualified for position—are not

in dispute. (Doc. #29, PAGEID 530-31, citing Tepper, 505 F.3d at 515). She further

claims that she can meet the fourth element—a similarly-situated employee being

treated differently—because Brown and Plaintiff allegedly committed the same

KYC violation, but Plaintiff was terminated while Brown was only “coached” for

making an inappropriate comment to Plaintiff. (/a. at PAGEID 531, citing Doc. #28-

4, PAGEID 477). Plaintiff asserts that “[a] jury could find this disparity in

treatment, for involvement in the same core incident, sufficient to satisfy the

fourth prong, particularly given Brown's documented performance issues and

animus towards Catalano.” (/d., citing Doc. #28-2, PAGEID 290).

Defendants responds that Plaintiff cannot meet her prima facie burden of

showing disparate treatment because she has not identified a valid comparator—

i.e., another PNC employee accused of directing another employee to be

dishonest. (Doc. #28-1, PAGEID 245, citing Tepper, 505 F.3d at 517; Doc. #28-2,

PAGEID 275). They claim that: because Brown and Plaintiff were employed as

Branch Banker and Manager, respectively, they are not similarly situated; and that

10

an employer subjecting a supervisor to greater discipline than a subordinate is a

commonly-accepted practice. (/a. at PAGEID 245-46, citing Pelcha v. MW Bancorp,

Inc., 988 F.3d 318, 328-29 (6th Cir. 2021); Doc. #28-2, PAGEID 264, 281)).

Plaintiff cites no caselaw, and the Court is unaware of any, supporting her

position that a subordinate and direct supervisor could be similarly situated, and

indeed, such rationale is belied by Sixth Circuit precedent:

In examining another employee outside the protected class, we

consider whether the employee: (1) “dealt with the same supervisor,”

(2) was “subject to the same standards,” and whether they (3)

“engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or

mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the

employer's treatment of them for it.”

Pelcha, 988 F.3d at 328, quoting Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154

F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff and Brown fail the first element, as they

necessarily have different supervisors. Moreover, there is no dispute that the

conduct that could have motivated adverse action against Plaintiff—committing

the KYC violation orinstructing a subordinate such as Brown to do so—is broader

than the conduct that could have yielded adverse action against Brown—only

committing the KYC violation. Accordingly, Brown is not a similarly-situated

employee; because Plaintiff fails to identify another comparator, Claims One and

Two fail for that reason alone.

Alternatively, even if Plaintiff had met her prima facie burden, Defendants

have articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for suspending and then

terminating Plaintiff as Manager—Laskody concluding, and Martin concurring,

11

that Plaintiff had either committed a KYC violation or instructed Brown to do so, in

violation of PNC’s Code of Ethics and Fidelity Bonding Policy. (Doc, #28-3,

PAGEID 379, 44 33-37). Termination for fraud or dishonesty has been consistently

upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason. See, e.g., Singer v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d

274, 284-85 (6th Cir. 2012); Conley v. City of Findlay, 266 F. App’x 400, 405 (6th Cir.

2008). Thus, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show pretext; to avoid summary

judgment, Plaintiff must put forth a genuine factual dispute as to the ultimate

question: whether “the employer's explanation was fabricated to conceal an

illegal motive.” Chen, 580 F.3d at 400.

Plaintiff argues that she can cast doubt on Defendants’ purported reasons

through the first two avenues. First, as to factual basis, she asserts that PNC

cannot truthfully have removed Plaintiff for instructing Brown to be dishonest

when Laskody and Parker’s investigation was inconclusive as to who committed

the KYC violation. (Doc. #29, PAGEID 533, citing Doc. #28-2, PAGEID 281; Doc.

#28-5, PAGEID 513). Second, Plaintiff claims that a reasonable trier of fact could

infer false motivation from the relatively short time between: Brown's comments

to Plaintiff; Simons warning Plaintiff that Brown was “out to get her”; Plaintiff

placing Brown on a PIP; Brown's complaints to ERIC; Plaintiff complaining about

Brown to Laskody; and Plaintiff's termination. (/a. at PAGEID 533-34).

Defendant replies that the termination decision had ample factual basis, as

Laskody relied upon: Plaintiff's statement that she could not remember whether

12

Brown or she actually inputted the information without the customer present;

Brown’s statements that Plaintiff instructed her to input the information; Laskody’s

independent investigation; and her conclusions from that investigation in

deciding, with Martin, to terminate Plaintiff. (Doc. #30, PAGEID 544, citing Doc.

#28-2, PAGEID 279, 289-90; Doc. #28-4, PAGEID 466). Indeed, the incident report

prepared by Laskody (Doc. #28-3, PAGEID 428-42) contained detailed summaries

of her interviews with Brown and Plaintiff, including Laskody’s recitation of

Plaintiff's statement that Plaintiff either inputted the customer credit card and

driver license information without the customer present or directed Brown to do

so, both PNC policy violations. (/d. at PAGEID 431-32). From those statements

and other evidence, Laskody reasonably concluded that Plaintiff had either

engaged in dishonest acts or instructed Brown to be dishonest. (/a. at PAGEID

432). As Laskody “reasonably and honestly relie[d] on particularized facts in

making an employment decision, [Defendants are] entitled to summary judgment

on pretext even if [Laskody’s] conclusion [were] later shown to be mistaken,

foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Chen, 580 F.3d at 401 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

As for the false motivation argument based on temporal proximity,

Defendant correctly notes that Simons’s statement is hearsay (Doc. #30, PAGEID

545), and Plaintiff has not offered any reason why it satisfies exclusion or

exception to the prohibition on hearsay evidence. FeD.R.EviD. 801, 803, 804. Nor

did Simons recapitulate that statement in a declaration or deposition. Thus, the

13

Court may not consider any statement by Simons in connection with this Motion.

U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1189 (6th Cir. 1997),

citing FeD.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Moreover, while Plaintiff had placed Brown on a PIP,

there is no indication she or Brown informed Laskody of that fact. Finally,

Laskody had already placed Plaintiff on administrative leave—for the infraction

that ultimately led to Plaintiffs termination—before Plaintiff told her about

Brown's derogatory comments, and, importantly, there is no evidence that Martin

was ever aware of Plaintiff's complaint to Laskody. Thus, any temporal proximity

by itself is insufficient to show that Defendants were not actually motivated by

their proffered reason to terminate Plaintiff. As Plaintiff offers no other argument

for pretext, Defendants’ Motion is sustained as to Claims One and Two for that

reason as well.

B. Claims Three and Four: Retaliation

Plaintiff argues that the temporal proximity among: her protected activity of

complaining to Laskody on January 11, 2022; Laskody concluding that Plaintiff's

allegations were unfounded on February 10, 2022; and Plaintiff's termination on

February 15, 2022, is sufficient to infer a causal connection between the protected

activity and adverse action. Thus, Plaintiff argues, she has met her prima facie

burden. (Doc. #29, PAGEID 535, citing Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d

516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008); Doc. #28-2, PAGEID 276; Doc. #28-4, PAGEID 472, 477).

However, Plaintiff has not presented evidence of the but-for causation

required to meet the fourth element of a prima facie claim. Univ. of Texas S.W.

14

Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). As discussed above, Laskody had

already suspended Plaintiff for dishonesty before Plaintiff engaged in protected

activity, and PNC’s policies—which are undisputed and were known to Plaintiff—

dictated that an employee engaged in dishonesty could not qualify for bond

coverage, and that being bonded was a condition of employment at PNC. Also,

Laskody, in an undisputed statement, averred that PNC regularly terminates

employees who have lost bond coverage. (Doc. #30, PAGEID 551-52, citing

Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 F. App'x 896, 898 (3d Cir. 2007); Doc. #28-3,

PAGEID 377, 378, 379 1 10, 26-28, 35; Doc. #28-4, PAGEID 470-71, 482; Doc. #28-5,

PAGEID 514-15)). Finally, there is no evidence that Martin had any knowledge of

Plaintiff's complaint to Laskody, meaning that there is no evidence that Martin's

adverse action was in retaliation for Plaintiff's protected activity. Montell, 757 F.3d

at 504; (Doc. #30, PAGEID 551, citing Thompson v. Potter, No. 2:04-cv-291, 2006

WL 783395, *18 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2006) (Marbley, J.)). As Plaintiff has failed to

show a but-for causal link between her protected activity and the adverse action,

she has failed to meet her prima facie burden for retaliation claims.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff had met that burden, she cannot make the

requisite showing of pretext. As discussed above, Defendants’ stated reason for

termination—instructing Brown to be dishonest—is a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason, and one that has a factual basis. As Laskody had

already initiated the disciplinary process when Plaintiff complained to her about

Brown's comments, and Martin was unaware of Plaintiff's protected activity, there

15

is no evidence that the stated reason is a false rationale. Finally, the undisputed

facts that: Plaintiff’s dishonesty would cause her to lose bonding coverage, such

coverage is a prerequisite for employment at PNC, and PNC has terminated

employees regularly who are not bonded (Doc. #28-3, PAGEID 377, 379, If] 10, 33-

35), mean that the proffered reason was sufficient for the adverse action. Chen,

580 F.3d at 400. As Plaintiff cannot demonstrate pretext, the Motion must be

sustained as to Claims Three and Four.

C. Claim Five: Aiding and Abetting

Under Ohio law, an individual may not:

[Alid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any act declared by

this section to be an unlawful discriminatory practice, to obstruct or

prevent any person from complying with this chapter or any order

issued under it, or to attempt directly or indirectly to commit any act

declared by this section to be an unlawful discriminatory practice.

OHIo REv. Cope § 4112.02(J}. Aiding and abetting is, thus, a derivative claim; if “a

defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the underlying discrimination and

retaliation claims, ‘the court must also necessarily grant summary judgment on

the claim of aiding and abetting those claims.’” Martcheva v. Dayton Bad. of Educ.,

2021-Ohio 3524, § 75, 179 N.E.3d 687 (2d Dist.), quoting Weinrauch v. Sherwin-

Williams Co., No. 1:18-cv-01696, 2019 WL 3007031, *14 (N.D. Ohio Jul. 10, 2019)).

As Claims One through Four fail as matters of law, the Court must sustain

Defendants’ Motion as to Claim Five as well.

16

D. Harassment and Hostile Work Environment Claim

Although not raised as a distinct claim, in the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged

that Brown's “comments created a hostile work environment based on religion”

(Doc. #2, PAGEID 55, ¥ 44), and that the comments were severe and pervasive,

and violated PNC’s anti-harassment policy. (/d., 32-35, 39-43). Defendants

raised the affirmative defense that “[tlo the extent Plaintiff failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies and/or failed to comply with any procedural prerequisites

before bringing her claims before the Court, such claims are barred.” (Answer,

Doc. #6, PAGEID 109). In the Motion, Defendants argue that any hostile work

environment claim is barred as a matter of law, because Plaintiff both failed to

exhaust such a claim through her OCRC charge and failed to plead the claim in

her Complaint. (Doc. #28, PAGEID 251, citing Tucker v. Union of Needletrades,

Indus. and Textile Employees, 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005)). Plaintiff responds

that “whether the harassment claim is outside the scope of an EEOC charge is a

fact-specific inquiry into whether it could be reasonably expected to grow out of

the charge of discrimination. Plaintiff's charge alleged termination based on

religion, which encompasses underlying discriminatory animus that could

manifest as harassment.” (Doc. #29, PAGEID 534).

However, in her memorandum contra, Plaintiff does not attach or even refer

to the charge or the OCRC’s right-to-sue letter. During her deposition, Plaintiff

reviewed the charge document and answered in the affirmative that “in the

narrative portion, it says you believe that you were terminated based on religion

17

and in retaliation for protect[ed] activity, and you believe that Amy Laskody aided,

abetted, compelled, and/or coerced PNC’s discriminatory conduct.” (Doc. #28-2,

PAGEID 292-93). When asked “[h]ave we discussed all the ways you believe you

were discriminated against based on your religion?” and “have we discussed all

of the claims you are bringing against PNC [and Laskody]?” Plaintiff responded in

the affirmative. (/o. at PAGEID 293). There is no evidence that harassment or

hostile work environment was mentioned in Plaintiff's charge, and it does not

appear from the deposition that Plaintiff intended to bring such a claim. Nor can

such a claim reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge, which arose from

allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory treatment by Laskody and Martin.

Meanwhile, the comments that Plaintiff claims were harassing and created a

hostile work environment (Doc. #29, PAGEID 534) were made by Brown. Laskody,

in fact, was not aware of those comments until fifteen months after they were

made. (Doc. #28-2, PAGEID 276). In sum, a reasonable trier of fact may not

reasonably infer, from the evidence of record, that a claim of harassment or

hostile work environment logically arose from Plaintiff's charge or other claims in

the Complaint. Consequently, such a claim is barred for failure to exhaust and

failure to plead, and Brown’s alleged harassment may not serve as the basis for

relief.

18

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. #28) is SUSTAINED. Judgment shall enter in favor of Defendants and

against Plaintiff on all claims.

The captioned case is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western

Division, at Dayton.

IT 1S SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/4/2025 Cates

WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

19