Rosa v. Gordan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

ENRIQUE ROSA, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 25-3096

)

GORDAN et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 5)

filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Enrique Rosa, an inmate at Western Illinois

Correctional Center (“WICC”). Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Request Counsel. (Doc. 6.)

I. Complaint

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient

claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if

it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Upon

reviewing the Complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, construing

them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be

provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States,

721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Facts Alleged

Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations at WICC against Defendants Physician

Gordan, Healthcare Administrator Ashcraft, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

(“Wexford”).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Gordan and Wexford halted three prescription

medications multiple times and for varying lengths from January through May 2023.

Plaintiff explained that his prescriptions treated the anxiety, nerve damage, and pain he

experienced because of a gunshot wound, which required the insertion of a metal rod to

replace his femur and plates and screws in both ankles. (Pl. Compl., Doc. 5 at 2-3:2-6;

4:12.) As a result, Plaintiff had difficulty walking and entering his assigned top bunk,

which did not have any stairs. Plaintiff also claims that Gordan did not renew his expired

low-bunk permit, which was issued because of the mentioned metal inserted into his leg.

(Id. at 4:11.) Plaintiff names Defendant Ashcraft because she processed Plaintiff’s

grievances. (Id. at 5:14.)

C. Analysis

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 5) is granted.

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and

unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that has both an

objective and subjective part. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Under the

objective part, a plaintiff must show that his medical condition is sufficiently severe.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective part, the prison official

must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. A “deliberate

indifference” standard is used in the medical care context. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.

“A medical professional acting in his professional capacity may be held to have

displayed deliberate indifference only if the decision by the professional is such a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a

judgment.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d

886, 895 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Construing Plaintiff’s account as accurate, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s

account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs claim against Defendant Gordan. However, Plaintiff’s account does not

state a claim against Defendants Ashcraft or Wexford.

Plaintiff named Defendant Ashcraft because she processed Plaintiff’s grievances

on the alleged violation raised in his Complaint. However, “[p]rison officials who simply

processed or reviewed inmate grievances lack personal involvement in the conduct

forming the basis of the grievance.” Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017).

Additionally, Defendant Wexford can be held liable under § 1983 if an

unconstitutional act is caused by: “(1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its

officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is

widespread and well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas

v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Woodward v. Corr. Med.

Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the standard for

municipal liability in Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), applies to

corporations as well). “The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts

of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby [clarify] that

municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is … responsible.”

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphases in original).

Plaintiff does not assert a plausible claim against Defendant Wexford, as he does

not allege any facts that establish or permit the inference that Wexford is liable under any

of the three bases mentioned. See Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 2016)

(“To hold defendants liable under § 1983 and Monell, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate that

the defendants’ ‘official policy, widespread custom, or action by an official with policy-

making authority was the “moving force” behind his constitutional injury.’”) (quoting

Dixon v. County of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016)).

II. Counsel

Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court cannot require an

attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask

for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)

(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a

district court may, in its discretion, request counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in

certain circumstances). In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask

two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel

or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case,

does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654

(7th Cir. 2007).

The Court concludes that the recruitment of counsel at this early stage of the

proceedings is not warranted. As explained below, entry of the Court’s Merit Review

Order begins the service phase. After Defendant Gordan has been served and filed his

Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, which usually takes sixty days, the Court will enter a

Scheduling Order to provide guidance and deadlines to assist Plaintiff during the

discovery process. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Docs. 6)

with leave to renew on a more developed record.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 5) is

GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to docket Plaintiff amended

pleading.

2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 6) is DENIED.

3) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to proceed with an Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Defendant

Gordan. Plaintiff’s claims against Gordan proceed in his individual capacity only.

Any additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the Court’s

discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15.

4) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate Ashcraft and Wexford as

Defendants.

5) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing Defendant a waiver of

service. Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has

not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry of

this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After

Defendant has been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines.

6) If Defendant no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for

whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk said

Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and

shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

7) Defendant shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends the

waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all

defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent

pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an

answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of

those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore, no response

to the answer is necessary or will be considered.

8) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s counsel

has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel copies of motions and other

documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply

to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not

filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses

directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk

will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to

compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an

appearance, and the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.

9) The Court grants Defendant’s counsel leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of

confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

10) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of

a change in mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of this

lawsuit with prejudice.

11) If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within thirty

days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal

service through the U.S. Marshals service on that Defendant and will require that

Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(d)(2).

12) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

13) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendant under the standard

procedures.

ENTERED August 4, 2025.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

____________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE