Daniels v. Trusewych

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

DARRIAN DANIELS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-03089-JEH

ZORIAN TRUSEWYCH, et al.,

Defendants.

Order

Plaintiff Darrian Daniels, an inmate at Western Illinois Correctional Center

(“Western”), filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his

constitutional rights. (Doc. 14). This matter is currently before the Court on

Plaintiff’s Third Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 33). For the reasons

stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

I

At merit review, the Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on (1) a claim under

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”)

against Defendant Latoya Hughes, in her official capacity as Acting Director of the

Illinois Department of Corrections, based on the alleged denial of Plaintiff’s

hearing aids at Western; and (2) a claim under the Eighth Amendment against

Defendant Dr. Trusewych based on his alleged deliberate indifference to the

treatment of Plaintiff’s hearing impairment and failure to refer him to an outside

audiologist for treatment in February 2025. (Doc. 8 at p. 9).

On July 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeking

a Court Order requiring Defendants to provide him with medical treatment for his

hearing loss. (Doc. 33).

II

Plaintiff alleges that when he was transferred to Western in January 2025,

several unknown medical staff members falsely claimed there was nothing in his

medical records to show that he ever failed a hearing test in the past, injured his

ears, or needed hearings aids. Plaintiff states that he submitted an emergency

grievance to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”), but the ARB refused to

address the grievance because it had not been exhausted at the prison level.

Plaintiff states that he filed an emergency grievance on an unspecified date.

Plaintiff states that the warden responded to his grievance and stated that “[he]

will be going out next week to get a treatment plan to get fitted for hearing aids.”

Id. at p. 2.

During an examination with Defendant Dr. Trusewych on February 3, 2025,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant falsely informed him that his medical records did

not indicate that he failed a hearing test or injured his ears. Defendant allegedly

stated that Plaintiff would not be classified as an ADA offender for hearing loss at

Western. As a result, Plaintiff asserts he was unable to have a legal phone call with

his attorney on February 4, 2025.

Plaintiff alleges that he was given the first part of a hearing test on February

13, 2025, and informed that he failed and would be referred to an audiologist for a

treatment plan. Plaintiff states that Defendant Dr. Trusewych called him back to

the healthcare unit on February 15, 2025, and again informed him that he would

not be considered an ADA offender for hearing loss at Western because he had

never failed a hearing test or injured his ears.

Plaintiff argues that his hearing loss presents “a threat to his safety” in

prison because he cannot hear gun shots or staff orders. Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff also

states that he is unable to use the phone to talk to his attorney and family and

needs hearing aids to function. Despite filing this lawsuit, sending letters to

Defendant Hughes, and submitting several medical request forms to healthcare

staff members, Defendant Dr. Trusewych, and the ADA Coordinator, Plaintiff

asserts that Defendants have still refused to provide medical treatment for his

hearing loss and refer him to an outside audiologist for a treatment plan. On an

unspecified date, an unknown nurse and mental health staff member allegedly

came to Plaintiff’s cell and held up a note instructing him to stop writing to them

for medical treatment.

Plaintiff submitted medical records in support of his Motion. An Offender

Outpatient Progress Note indicates that he was referred to a “Wexford audiologist,

per Holmes Settlement Agreement, for failing onsite hearing screening” on June

24, 2024. Id. at p. 7. Although his medical record indicates that “[a]udiology referral

paperwork [was] delivered to [the] Medical Furlough Clerk for processing and

scheduling” the same day, there is no indication that an appointment with an

audiologist was ever scheduled. Id. Plaintiff also attached a copy of an “Offender

Hearing Screening and Treatment Protocol” from Menard Correctional Center. Id.

at p. 8. A nurse noted that Plaintiff reported that he had difficulty hearing and had

been stabbed in both ears. Id.

III

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that

should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden

of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); accord Winter v. Nat.

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right”). To prevail, “the moving party

must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a lack of an

adequate remedy at law; and (3) an irreparable harm will result if the injunction is

not granted.” Foodcomm Int’l v. Barry, 328 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted). If the moving party meets the first three requirements, then the district

court balances the relative harms that could be caused to either party. Incredible

Tech., Inc. v. Virtual Tech., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2005).

The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) limits the scope of the court’s

authority to enter an injunction in the corrections context. Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d

679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary injunctive relief “must be

narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court

finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to

correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683 (PLRA

“enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging

prison conditions: prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary

authority over the institutions they manage”) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)).

The purpose of a temporary restraining order and ultimately a preliminary

injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a final hearing on the merits of the

case. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1330 (7th Cir. 1980). The relief

Plaintiff seeks here is different. The Seventh Circuit has described the type of

injunction Plaintiff seeks, where an injunction would require an affirmative act by

the defendant, as a mandatory preliminary injunction. Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio,

130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997). Mandatory injunctions are “cautiously viewed

and sparingly issued,” because they require the court to command a defendant to

take a particular action. Id. (citing Jordan v. Wolke, 593 F.2d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 1978)).

To succeed on his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Dr. Trusewych, Plaintiff must first show that he suffered from an

objectively serious medical condition. Second, Plaintiff must show that Dr.

Trusewych acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834. In other words, he must establish that Dr. Trusewych knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk to his health. Id. at 837. Plaintiff must show that Dr.

Trusewych engaged in more than negligence and that his conduct approached

intentional wrongdoing or criminal recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff,

700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

To succeed on a claim under the ADA, Plaintiff must show “he is a qualified

individual with a disability, that he was denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity or otherwise subjected to discrimination

by such an entity, and that the denial or discrimination was by reason of his

disability.” Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015).

At best, Plaintiff’s allegations permit a reasonable inference that he

disagrees with the course of treatment he has received at Western, that Defendants

chose a course of treatment different from that previously provided, or that he

desired alternative treatment, none of which are sufficient to show a constitutional

violation. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Evidence that some

medical professionals would have chosen a different course of treatment is

insufficient to make out a constitutional claim.”) (emphasis in original); Harper v.

Santos, 847 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2017) (prisoner is not entitled to dictate medical

treatment); Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) (disagreement with

course of treatment not sufficient to show constitutional violation). Plaintiff has

not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims at

this early stage of the proceedings. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction [33] is DENIED.

It is so ordered.

Entered: August 4, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge