Powell v. Grajales

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8/ C 1 L / E 2  R 0 K 2   5

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------------------------------------X U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CHARLES POWELL, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

“Light Rising Water” of the Guale LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Yamassee tribe,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM

AND ORDER

25-CV-02178 (GRB) (JMW)

-against-

ANANIAS GRAJALES, THOMAS A. ADAMS, BANK OF

NEW YORK MELLON, DERMOT MCDONOUGH,

HAROLD DAMM, LETITIA JAMES, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL

DEVELOPMENT, BROOKE ROLLINS & ROGER

GLENDENNING,

Defendants.

--------------------------------------------------------------------X

A P P E A R A N C E S:

Charles Powell

3386 Bertha Drive

Baldwin, NY 11510

Pro Se Plaintiff

Kimberly Ann Kinirons

Rudolph Max Baptiste

New York State Attorney General’s Office

300 Motor Parkway, Suite 205

Hauppauge, NY 11788

Attorneys for State Defendants

No appearance by other Defendants

WICKS, Magistrate Judge:

The question before the court is whether transfer of venue from the Central Islip Division

to the Brooklyn Division of the Eastern District of New York is proper. Pro se Plaintiff Charles

Powell (“Plaintiff”) moves for this intradistrict transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (ECF

No. 34.) Plaintiff asserts this motion is supported by evidence of Plaintiff’s hardship, including

accessibility issues under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the alleged stronger

connections in Brooklyn. Defendants Thomas A. Adams (“Adams”), Ananias Grajales

(“Grajales”), and Letitia James (“James” and collectively, the “State Defendants”) oppose this

motion (ECF No. 39). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Venue (ECF No.

34) is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings the instant action against Defendants Ananias Grajales, Thomas A.

Adams, Bank of New York Mellon, Dermot McDonough, Harold Damm, Letitia James, United

States Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Brooke Rollins, and Roger Glendenning

(collectively, the “Defendants”) to prevent further proceedings in Nassau County Supreme

Court, Index No. 007502/2008 related to mortgage foreclosure proceedings and assert violations

of his civil rights under the Federal Constitution. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Specifically,

Plaintiff’s cause of action includes (i) Violation of Federal Removal Statute 28 U.S.C. § 1446,

(ii) Violation of Tribal Sovereignty and Self-Determination, (iii) Violation of Indian Civil Rights

Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., (iv) Violation of Federal Trust Responsibility, and (v)

Constitutional Rights Violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Id. at 37-41.)

Plaintiff seeks inter alia, that the Court to (i) declare that notice of removal was properly

filed, (ii) issue an immediate temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that

prevents Defendants from exercising further jurisdiction, enforcing state court orders, and

interfering with tribal property rights, (iii) award compensatory and punitive damages as well as

attorney’s fees, (iv) grant declaratory relief, and (v) stop any foreclosure proceedings. (Id. at 42-

43.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed this Complaint on April 18, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) The State Defendants filed

pre-motion conference requests to dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to

state a claim. (ECF Nos. 11, 15.) On June 10, 2025, the Court issued an Order that all pretrial

proceedings will be referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge. (See Electronic Order dated

6/10/2025.) Thereafter, among the many motions that were filed, Plaintiff requested emergency

relief and additional time to file an amended complaint. (ECF Nos. 20-23.) The Hon. Judge Gary

R. Brown denied the emergency relief requests. (Electronic Order dated 7/8/2025.) As Plaintiff

requested to file an amended complaint, which the State Defendants did not object to, the pre-

motion conference requests were denied as moot. (Id.; ECF No. 26.) Multiple conferences have

been adjourned or rescheduled in this matter. (ECF Nos. 24, 27; Electronic Orders dated

7/10/2025, 7/13/2025.) Relevant here, is Plaintiff’s latest Motion to Change Venue (ECF No.

34), which is opposed by the State Defendants (ECF No. 39).

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court has discretion to transfer an action to another

district court ‘[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.’” Corley

v. United States, 11 F.4th 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). The moving

party has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that transfer is justified.

See Mulgrew v. United States Dep't of Transp., 717 F. Supp. 3d 281, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2024). “[I]n

deciding a motion to transfer venue, the Court may consider factual submissions, including

declarations, by defendants, who have the burden to justify a change of venue.” Everlast World’s

Boxing Headquarters Corp v. Ringside, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 735, 737 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

A motion to transfer requires a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether

the case could have been brought in the proposed transferee district. Mulgrew, 717 F. Supp. 3d at

286 (citing Herbert Ltd. P’ship v. Elec. Arts Inc, 325 F. Supp. 2d 282, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).

Second, the Court must determine whether transfer of the case is appropriate. Id.

The Court looks to several factors, including:

(1) weight accorded to the Plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) convenience of

witnesses; (3) convenience of parties; (4) locus of operative facts; (5) availability

of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) location of relevant

documents and other sources of proof; (7) relative financial means of the parties;

(8) relative familiarity of the forum with the governing law; and (9) the interests of

justice.

L. Offs. of Geoffrey T. Mott, P.C. v. Hayden, No. 22-CV-07398 (JS) (SIL), 2023 WL 7386665, at

*2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2023) (citing United States v. All Funds on Deposit in Bus. Money Mkt.

Acct., 319 F. Supp. 2d 290, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)).

These factors are not exhaustive, there is no rigid formula for balancing them, and no

single factor is determinative. See D.H. Blair & Co., 462 F.3d at 106 (“notions of convenience

and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis”). In addition, the “Rules for the Division of

Business for the Eastern District of New York (‘Division Rules’) permit the Court to transfer a

civil case assigned to the Central Islip division of the Eastern District New York to the Brooklyn

division “in the interests of justice.” L. Offs. of Geoffrey T. Mott, P.C., 2023 WL 7386665, at *2

(citing Division Rule 1(f)). However, under these Rules, however, there is a time within which

the application must be made, namely, the party must file this request “within the time allowed to

respond to the complaint.” Id. (citing Division Rule 1(f)(2)).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff requests that the Court transfer this action from the Central Islip Division to the

Brooklyn Division for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice.

(See generally, ECF No. 34.) The factors for deciding whether venue transfer is proper are

addressed accordingly.

i. Whether This Action Could Have Been Brought in the Brooklyn Division

Pursuant to Section 1391(b)(2), a civil action may be brought in “a judicial district in

which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . ..” 28

U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Both the Brooklyn and Central Islip courthouses can exercise jurisdiction

over any matter properly pending within the Eastern District. All Funds, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 292.

However, based upon the Division Rules and the internal process for management of

cases, certain cases are designated to the Central Islip Courthouse rather than the Brooklyn

Courthouse. See Division Rules. Division Rule 1(d)(3) states that any civil case, in which a

substantial part of the events occurred in Nassau or Suffolk County, or that the property is

situated there, shall be designated to the Central Islip Courthouse. See Division Rule 1(d)(3).

Under Division Rule 1(f)(2), a party in a civil case may file a motion to change courthouse

assignment within the time allowed to respond to the complaint. Id. at 1(f)(2). As Plaintiff’s

property is situated in Nassau County, the case was designated to Central Islip. (ECF No. 39 at

7.) The last day for Plaintiff to file a motion to change courthouse assignment was June 20, 2025.

(See ECF No. 10.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff waited until July 21, 2025, to file the instant motion.

(ECF No. 34.)

It is important to note that these guidelines “are adopted for the internal management of

the caseload” and “shall not be deemed to vest any rights in litigants or their attorneys.” Division

Rules at 1. There is no indication or reason why this case could not have been brought in

Brooklyn besides the internal management system designating this case to this Courthouse. Since

the Brooklyn Division can properly exercise jurisdiction over this case, the Court must next

determine whether the action should be transferred there. In doing so, as noted above, the Court

has “broad discretion in this determination, and may consider a number of factors relating to

convenience and the interests of justice.” Price v. Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C., No. 24-CV-04720

(JMW), 2024 WL 4528928, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2024) (quoting Zaltz v. JDATE, 952 F.

Supp. 2d 439, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)). This factor remains neutral.

ii. Convenience to the Parties and Witnesses

“A plaintiff’s choice of forum must be given deference and transfer should only be

ordered if the balance of conveniences weighs strongly in favor of the change of forum.” Prompt

Nursing Emp. Agency LLC v. Valdez, 222 F. Supp. 3d 194, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). Transfer of

venue “should not merely shift the burden of inconvenience from one party to another.” Neil

Bros. v. World Wide Lines, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 325, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).

In considering the convenience of the witnesses, a court “must consider the materiality,

nature, and quality of each witness, not merely the number of witnesses in each district.” Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fairbanks Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Indian Harbor

Ins. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 419 F.Supp.2d 395, 404 (S.D.N.Y.2005)). Courts often look to

the “parties’ principal places of business and the location of their offices”. Zohar CDO 2003-1,

Ltd. v. Patriarch Partners, LLC, 620 B.R. 456, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing Royal & Sun

Alliance Ins., PLC v. Nippon Express, USA, Inc., 202 F.Supp.3d 399, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The

distance between the witnesses’ residences or offices and the conflicting forums helps determine

the level of inconvenience. See Neil Bros, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 328.

Here, Plaintiff asserts that key witnesses, and named Defendants including Matthew

James, Letitia James and Bank of America, are closer to Brooklyn than Central Islip. (ECF No.

34 at 2.) Additionally, Plaintiff conclusory asserts that Tribal Witnesses of the Guale Yamassee

tribe “face significant travel hardships to Central Islip due to distance and transportation.” (Id.)

Further, considering Plaintiff’s documented disabilities, Plaintiff contends that Central Islip is

“less accessible due to limited public transportations options.” (Id.)

State Defendants’ Opposition adds that Matthew James also maintains offices in Nassau

and Suffolk counties. (ECF No. 39 at 5.) The Opposition challenges these statements by pointing

that absent the submission of objective proof that Plaintiff no longer owns a motor vehicle, the

distance between Brooklyn and Central Islip from Plaintiff’s Baldwin residence “appears almost

equidistant.” (Id. at 4.) See Longsworth v. County of Nassau, No. 17-CV-6787(KAM)(ARL),

2019 WL 8587289, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019) (denying venue transfer between Brooklyn

and Central Islip because moving party “provide[d] no basis whatsoever as to why this minor

difference in travel would prevent them from conveniently producing witnesses”). Further,

Plaintiff’s motion does not provide any support for the notion that Plaintiff’s disabilities could be

met and “accommodations provided solely at the Brooklyn, rather than Central Islip,

courthouse.” (See ECF No. 39 at 5.) Accordingly, this factor weighs against transfer.

iii. Location of Relevant Documents and Ease of Accessibility to These Sources of

Proof

Courts within the Second Circuit generally view the ease and location of relevant

documents factor as a neutral one considering the modern and advanced technological age where

access to documents has become increasingly easier. ESPN, Inc. v. Quiksilver, Inc., 581 F. Supp.

2d 542, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“In an era of electronic documents, easy copying and overnight

shipping, this factor assumes much less importance than it did formerly.”); see also Eres N.V. v.

Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“documents may be

transferred… across the country with little difficulty, using electronic means of duplication and

transmission.”).

Here, Plaintiff does not address this factor. State Defendants’ Opposition asserts that

most, if not all, of the relevant files and documents relevant to Plaintiff’s claims and defenses by

the other Defendants are likely accessible on the New York State Courts Electronic Filing

System. (ECF No. 39 at 5.) Accordingly, this factor does not support a transfer.

iv. Location of Operative Facts

“To determine where the locus of operative facts lies, courts look to the site of events

from which the claim arises.” Flood v. Carlson Restaurants Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 572, 578

(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Martignago v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 11-CV-3923, 2012 WL 112246, at

*6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2012)). Indeed, courts often look to where a party resides, has

headquarters, or maintains its personal place of business when finding the relevant location of

operative facts. See Zaltz, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 460 (holding that the locus of operative facts was

correctly determined to be where the defendant’s place of business was because this was where

the alleged wrongful conduct derived from).

Plaintiff does not address this factor. The Opposition asserts that because Plaintiff’s

property is located in Baldwin, New York then the locus of operative fact is Nassau County,

which in turn is not Brooklyn. (ECF No. 39 at 5-6.) Because the Baldwin property is situated in

Nassau County, this factor weighs against transfer. See L. Offs. of Geoffrey T. Mott, P.C., 2023

WL 7386665 at *4 (denying motion to transfer venue because “the conduct giving rise to the

claims occurred in Nassau County”).

v. Forum’s Familiarity with Governing Law

With respect to the relative familiarity of each district with governing law, where both

courts are equally equipped to handle the causes of action, this factor is a neutral one. See Arma

v. Buyseasons, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 637, 650–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (illustrating where a court

turns to other more significant factors where both potential districts were “well-equipped” to

preside over the claims); see also Freeplay Music, LLC v. Gibson Brands, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 3d

613, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (ruling that this factor weighs against transfer because both districts

are familiar with federal copyright laws).

Plaintiff asserts that the Brooklyn courthouse “has greater resources to handle complex

cases involving issues of tribal sovereignty, alleged IRS misconduct, and related bankruptcy

proceedings.” (ECF No. 34 at 3.) The Court agrees with State Defendants that “Plaintiff offers

nothing to explain why the Brooklyn courthouse would be comparatively in a better position to

address his claims than the Central Islip courthouse.” (ECF No. 39 at 6.) Furthermore, both

Courthouses have dealt with matters such as the one at hand here. Thus, this factor weighs

against transfer.

vi. Interest of Justice

“The Court's consideration of whether transfer is in the interest of justice is based on the

totality of the circumstances and relates primarily to issues of judicial economy.” Richardson v.

Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2022 WL 3701492, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2022) (quoting Indian

Harbor Ins. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 395, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). The

further along a case is in the litigation process, the less efficient a transfer would be. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Coe, 724 F. Supp. 3d 206, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). A court’s familiarity with

the case is an issue to be considered in connection with this factor. See e.g., Haber v. ASN 50th

St. LLC, 2011 WL 1226282, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011) (“Given this Court’s familiarity

with the action,” as well as the fact that “[d]iscovery is nearly complete,… judicial economy

weighs strongly in favor of a final adjudication by this Court.”).

Plaintiff argues that there is no prejudice to Defendants, relies on the “greater resources”

in Brooklyn and conclusory states that it is the public’s interest to have it in Brooklyn to promote

accessibility. State Defendants do not address this factor. Given that discovery on this case has

not yet been scheduled, this factor weighs in favor of transfer. See Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

724 F. Supp. 3d at 217 (Court holds this factor weighs in favor of transfer because the Court has

not “adjudicated any substantive motions or even any discovery disputes relating to the claims”).

As for any remaining factors, as the parties do not argue for or against, such factors

remain neutral. In sum, reviewing the totality of the circumstances, more factors weigh against

than for transfer. Accordingly, the motion is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Venue (ECF No. 34) is

DENIED.

Dated: Central Islip, New York.

August 1, 2025

S O O R D E R E D:

James M. Wicks

/S/

JAMES M. WICKS

United States Magistrate Judge