Patricio Estrada v. Director, TDCJ-CID

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUBBOCK DIVISION

PATRICIO ESTRADA,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 5:20-CV-00030-H

IRENE BUNDY, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants Irene Bundy, Julia Durden, Cynthia Williams, and Texas Department of

Criminal Justice (TDCJ) filed a motion for summary judgment with a brief and an appendix

in support. Dkt. Nos. 80, 81. Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment

because the competent summary judgment evidence shows no violation of Plaintiff’s rights

under the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), or the

Rehabilitation Act (RA). Plaintiff did not respond. After considering the applicable law,

the parties’ arguments, and the relevant summary judgment evidence, the Court grants the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

1. Background

Plaintiff Patricio Estrada, a self-represented former prisoner proceeding in forma

pauperis, filed this civil-rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several employees and

officers of the TDCJ, complaining of events that occurred during his confinement in the

Daniel Unit. Many of his claims were dismissed pursuant to judicial screening under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) & 1915A. See Dkt. No. 30.

Plaintiff’s remaining claims focus on the denial of reasonable accommodations for

his pre-existing physical and mental conditions. He claims that Defendants Williams and

Durden housed him on the second floor, and Defendant Bundy required him to climb in

violation of his medical restrictions. He also contends that TDCJ’s denial of reasonable

housing accommodations violated his rights under the ADA and RA. He seeks monetary

relief.

2. Defendants’ Motion

Defendants argue that, in light of their competent summary judgment evidence, there

are no genuine issues of material fact remaining to necessitate trial and they are entitled to

judgment in their favor. In support of their motion, Defendants submit relevant portions of

Plaintiff’s TDCJ grievance records and medical records, as well as relevant excerpts from

the TDCJ Offender Orientation Handbook. Dkt. No. 81.

First, they assert that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies

with respect to any of his remaining claims. Specifically, they assert that he filed a Step-1

grievance about the incident with Defendant Bundy, but after he received a response, he

never filed a Step-2 grievance. And Defendants contend that Plaintiff never filed any

grievances about the remaining live claims. Finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff is not

excused from the exhaustion requirement because the grievance system was available to

Plaintiff, he was aware of it, and he used it to grieve other matters during the same time

frame.

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s TDCJ medical records contradict his ADA

and RA claims with respect to his housing assignment. Likewise, they assert that the

summary judgment evidence belies Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims against

Defendants Bundy, Williams, and Durden. They point to the records to show that

Plaintiff’s documented mental and physical condition was far different than he describes in

his pleadings. And they rely on the records to show that although he had a ground floor

housing restriction in the past, it was removed by his medical provider after a full

assessment and review, and well before the involvement of the defendants in this case.

Moreover, they contend that Plaintiff improperly conflates his work restrictions with living

restrictions. They point to the records to show that they maintained compliance with all of

Plaintiff’s active work restrictions—but that he was not prohibited from or unable to

perform routine day-to-day physical activities such as walking upstairs or to and from

medical and dining facilities.

Then, Defendants Bundy, Durden, and Williams assert that they are entitled to

qualified immunity because their actions did not violate Plaintiff’s clearly established Eighth

Amendment rights and because they reasonably relied on the expertise of Plaintiff’s medical

providers.

Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff may not recover the money damages he

seeks. They argue that he is not entitled to monetary relief under the ADA and RA because

he cannot show intentional discrimination in light of the summary judgment evidence.

Moreover, they assert that he has not met the physical-injury threshold to be eligible for

compensatory damages under the PLRA.

In sum, Defendants seek summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies, his claims fail on the merits, he has not overcome their individual

assertions of qualified immunity, and he cannot recover the damages he seeks.

3. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate on a claim or defense where “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of pointing out to the Court that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323,

325 (1986). The movant can discharge this burden by pointing out the absence of evidence

supporting one or more essential elements of the nonmoving party’s claim, “since a

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.

Once the movant has carried its burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party must

identify evidence in the record that creates a genuine dispute as to each of the challenged

elements of its case. Id. at 324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (“A party asserting that a

fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of

materials in the record . . . .”). If the evidence identified could not lead a rational trier of

fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party as to each essential element of the nonmoving

party’s case, there is no genuine dispute for trial and summary judgment is appropriate.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 597 (1986). In Mississippi

Prot. & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v. Cotten, the Fifth Circuit explained that “[w]here the record,

including affidavits, interrogatories, admissions, and depositions could not, as a whole, lead

a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no issue for trial.” 929 F.2d

1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1991). Summary judgment “may not be thwarted by conclusional

allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of evidence.”

Hemphill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 805 F.3d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 2015).

The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is the same as the

standard for rendering judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving

party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597; see also Mississippi Prot.

& Advocacy Sys., 929 F.2d at 1058.

Nevertheless, a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust is treated

slightly differently. See, e.g., Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 272–73 (5th Cir. 2010).

“Exhaustion resembles personal jurisdiction and venue in that it is an affirmative defense

that allows defendants to assert that plaintiffs have not invoked the proper forum for

resolving a dispute.” Id. at 272 (citing Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Stated differently, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a “rule of judicial

administration” that is akin to doctrines like ‘abstention, finality, and ripeness . . . that

govern the timing of federal court decision making.’” Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503

U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (other citation omitted)). Since exhaustion of administrative remedies

is a “threshold issue that courts must address to determine whether litigation is being

conducted in the right forum at the right time, . . . judges may resolve factual disputes

concerning exhaustion without the participation of a jury.” Id. (citation and footnote

omitted).

B. Exhaustion

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995

(PLRA), provides that a prisoner must exhaust prison-grievance remedies before he can

pursue a civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement

applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or

particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter,

534 U.S. at 532. Even where an inmate seeks monetary damages, which may not be

available through prison-grievance proceedings, exhaustion is a prerequisite to filing suit.

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001); Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th

Cir. 2001).

TDCJ grievance procedures require that inmates complete a two-step grievance

process before their claim is considered exhausted. Rosa v. Littles, 336 F. App’x 424, 428

(5th Cir. 2009); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 515 (5th Cir. 2004). Inmates must first file

a Step-1 grievance within fifteen days of the alleged incident. Rosa, 336 F. App’x at 428.

They may then appeal an adverse Step-1 grievance decision by filing a Step-2 grievance.

Id. Both steps of the administrative grievance process must be properly completed to

fully exhaust TDCJ's administrative remedies. See Johnson, 385 F.3d at 515; Wright v.

Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit takes a “strict approach”

to the exhaustion requirement, Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863, 866 (5th Cir. 2003), and even

substantial compliance with the prison grievance process will not suffice. See Dillon v.

Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Under our strict approach, we have found that

mere ‘substantial compliance’ with administrative remedy procedures does not

satisfy exhaustion....”).

When a prisoner fails to exhaust his administrative remedies without any valid

excuse, the court may dismiss the action without prejudice as to its refiling once the prisoner

complies with the exhaustion requirement. Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 892 (5th Cir.

1998), overruled by implication on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). But when

a prisoner can no longer comply with the exhaustion requirement because the deadline for

completing the administrative remedy has passed, the court may dismiss the suit with

prejudice. See Johnson v. La. ex rel. La. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., 468 F.3d 278, 280–81 (5th

Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Courts are not “to inquire whether administrative procedures

satisfy minimum acceptable standards of fairness and effectiveness;” rather, “prisoner[s]

must exhaust such administrative remedies as are available, whatever they may be.”

Alexander v. Tippah Cty., Miss., 351 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citing Booth,

532 U.S. at 740 n.5; Wright, 260 F.3d at 358) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Courts “must interpret the exhaustion requirement in light of its purposes, which

include the goal of giving officials ‘time and opportunity to address complaints internally.’”

Johnson, 385 F.3d at 516 (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002)). Consequently,

“a grievance should be considered sufficient to the extent that the grievance gives officials a

fair opportunity to address the problem that will later form the basis of the lawsuit.” Id. at

517.

The Supreme Court has cautioned that “exhaustion is not per se inadequate simply

because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.

199, 219 (2007). Rather, “the primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a

problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued.”

Johnson, 385 F.3d at 522. A prisoner who describes unsanitary or otherwise

unconstitutional conditions may “adequately alert administrators to the problem whether or

not the grievance names anyone.” Id. at 517. But a prisoner who alleges that an officer

acted improperly “would ordinarily be expected to provide details” such as “who was

involved and when the incident occurred, or at least other available information about the

incident that would permit an investigation of the matter.” Id.

Finally, because failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA,

Defendants have the burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. Accordingly, “[a]t the summary-

judgment stage, this means that the defendant[ ] ‘must establish beyond peradventure all the

essential elements of the defense of exhaustion to warrant summary judgment in their

favor.” Wilson, 776 F.3d at 299 (quoting Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010)).

C. ADA and RA Claims

In a reasonable accommodation case like this one, the ADA and RA are virtually

indistinguishable. See Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 516, 519 (5th Cir. 2008). Title II

of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such

entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A “public entity” includes “any department, agency, . . . or

other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B).

To state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he has a qualifying

disability, (2) he is being denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities or otherwise

being discriminated against by a public entity, and (3) he is being discriminated against

because of his disability. Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2011).

i. Qualifying disability

Under the ADA, an individual has a disability if he has a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(1)(A); see also 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B). The determination of whether an impairment

substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment. 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2. But Congress has made it clear that “that the primary object of attention in cases

brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied

with their obligations[] and . . . that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a

disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.” Neely v. PSEG Texas, Ltd.

P’ship, 735 F.3d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 2013). Courts are commanded to construe disability

broadly, “to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the Act].” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(4)(A); Williams v. Tarrant Cty. Coll. Dist., 717 Fed. App’x 440, 447 (5th Cir.

2018), reh’g denied (Feb. 20, 2018). This consideration may include factors such as the

difficulty, effort, or time required to perform a major life activity; pain experienced when

performing a major life activity; or the way an impairment affects the operation of a major

bodily function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.

ii. Discrimination and Causation

A plaintiff may satisfy the second and third prongs of the ADA analysis by

establishing that a public entity failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his

disability. Garrett v. Thaler, 560 F. App’x 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2014). “A plaintiff proves a

failure to accommodate by showing that the disability and its consequential limitations were

known by the covered entity, and the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.”

Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 290 (5th Cir. 2021). The plaintiff has the burden “to

identify the disability, the limitation, and to request an accommodation in ‘direct and

specific’ terms.” Id. An accommodation is reasonable if it provides “meaningful access to

the benefit.” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985). An inmate is not entitled to an

accommodation that is ideal; he is entitled only to an accommodation that is reasonable and

effective. See Wells v. Thaler, 460 F. App’x 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2012); E.E.O.C. v. Agro

Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 471 (5th Cir. 2009). Further, courts afford deference to a

correctional facility’s determination of an appropriate accommodation. Arce v. Louisiana,

226 F. Supp. 3d 643, 651 (E.D. La. 2016) (citing Wells, 460 F. App’x at 313).

Finally, “[a] plaintiff asserting a private cause of action for violations of the ADA or

the RA may only recover compensatory damages upon a showing of intentional

discrimination.” Delano–Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002); see also

Windham v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 875 F.3d 229, 235 n.5 (5th Cir. 2017).

D. Qualified Immunity

Section 1983 “provides a claim against anyone who ‘under color of any ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State’ violates another’s constitutional rights.” Whitley

v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013). “A plaintiff makes out a [Section] 1983 claim if

he ‘shows a violation of the Constitution or of federal law, and then shows that the violation

was committed by someone acting under color of state law.’” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288,

293–94 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 23, 236 (5th Cir. 2008)).

But even if a defendant can be shown to have violated another’s constitutional rights,

the defendant may not be liable under Section 1983. Defendants who perform discretionary

duties—such as police officers and jailers—may invoke the affirmative defense of qualified

immunity in response to a plaintiff’s Section 1983 suit. Qualified immunity applies “when

an official’s conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.’” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78–79 (2017)

(quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)).

In analyzing whether an individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the

court considers whether the plaintiff has alleged any violation of a clearly established right,

and, if so, whether the individual defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable. Siegert v.

Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991); Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276–80 (5th Cir.

1992). In so doing, the court should not assume that plaintiff has stated a claim, i.e.,

asserted a violation of a constitutional right. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232. Rather, the court

must be sure that, if the facts alleged by plaintiff are true, a violation has clearly occurred.

Connelly v. Comptroller, 876 F.2d 1209, 1212 (5th Cir. 1989). Even if defendants are alleged

to have acted in unison, the court must address the actions of each individually to determine

whether qualified immunity applies. Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3 721, 730–31 (5th Cir.

2016); Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3 417, 421–22 (5th Cir. 2007); Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d

530, 537 (5th Cir. 1999).

A mistake in judgment does not cause an officer to lose his qualified immunity

defense. The Supreme Court explained long ago that “[t]he qualified immunity standard

gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quoting

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341–43 (1986)). And “an allegation of malice is not sufficient

to defeat immunity if the defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner.” Malley, 475

U.S. at 341. Further, that the officer himself may have created the situation does not

change the analysis. That he could have handled the situation better does not affect his

entitlement to qualified immunity. Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1352–53 (5th Cir.

1985).

“To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable

official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. Howards,

566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (internal quotation marks and modifications omitted). “There are

two ways to demonstrate clearly established law.” Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717, 726

(5th Cir. 2021). In the typical case, the plaintiff “identif[ies] a case or body of relevant case

law in which an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated the

[Constitution].” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). This approach “do[es] not

require a case directly on point,” but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.731, 741 (2011). In rare

cases, however, “the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is sufficiently clear even though

existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138

S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); cf. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020) (“Confronted with the

particularly egregious facts of this case, any reasonable officer should have realized that [the

plaintiff’s] conditions of confinement offended the Constitution.”).

The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower courts “not to define clearly

established law at a high level of generality.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Likewise, the Supreme Court has stated

that the purpose of the doctrine is to “give[ ] government officials breathing room to make

reasonable but mistaken judgments.” Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013). “Accordingly,

‘qualified immunity represents the norm,’ and courts should deny a defendant immunity

only in rare circumstances.” Angulo v. Brown, 978 F.3d 942, 949 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982)). When a defendant invokes qualified

immunity in his answer, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defense is

unavailable. Valderas v. City of Lubbock, 937 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2019).

Defeating an invocation of qualified immunity requires that the plaintiff “point to

summary judgment evidence (1) that [the official] violated a federal statutory or

constitutional right and (2) that the unlawfulness of the conduct was clearly established at

the time.” Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted). So, while the “plaintiff’s factual assertions are taken as true to determine whether

they are legally sufficient to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,” Baldwin

v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2020), the plaintiff bears a heavy burden in

overcoming a defendant’s good-faith invocation of qualified immunity. Mendez v. Poitevent,

823 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2016).

Although Supreme Court precedent does not require a case directly on point, existing

precedent must place the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Pauly, 580

U.S. at 79. That is, the clearly established law on which a plaintiff relies should not be

defined at a high level of generality but must be particularized to the facts of the case. Id. at

79–80. Thus, failure to identify a case in which an officer acting under similar

circumstances was held to have violated a plaintiff’s rights will most likely defeat the

plaintiff’s ability to overcome a qualified immunity defense. Id.; Surratt v. McClarin, 851

F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2017).

4. Discussion

A. Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies

Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. But he did

swear under penalty of perjury to the allegations in his complaint, Dkt. No. 1, and in his

responses to the Court’s questionnaire, Dkt. No. 20. Thus, the Court considers the

pleadings as competent summary judgment evidence. Even so, the Court finds that no

genuine issues of material fact remain as to his failure to exhaust the administrative

remedies available to him, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed because he failed to

exhaust the TDCJ administrative remedies available to him prior to filing this lawsuit. The

summary judgment evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff did not file a Step-1 or a Step-2

grievance about his housing assignment or medical restrictions, nor did he grieve any claims

of discrimination or failure to reasonably accommodate his disabilities. See Dkt. No. 81.

He did not file any grievances about any relevant interactions with Defendants Williams or

Durden. He filed a Step-1 grievance about Defendant Bundy’s requiring him to climb onto

a toilet to remove a blanket that was hung over the light and blocking the door, but it was

denied. He did not file a Step-2 grievance about the incident.

Plaintiff alleges generally that he “presented facts relating to medical complaints,”

but he does not specify the procedures he used. See Dkt. No. 1 at 10. And although he

vaguely asserts that he filed some grievances, and that he even appealed one denial, he also

claims that he could not “notify the Defendants” of his claims for fear of retaliation. But his

grievance records show that he threatened to file a lawsuit if his claims against Defendant

Bundy were denied. Nothing in Plaintiff’s pleadings or the summary judgment evidence

substantiates Plaintiff’s claimed fear of retaliation. To the contrary, the records suggest that

Plaintiff intended to skip over the administrative process and pursue his claims in federal

court, instead.

In short, the summary judgment evidence offered by Defendants shows that the

grievance procedure was available to Plaintiff and that he used it to address other matters

during the same time frame. However, the records also show that he did not complete the

grievance process against Defendant Bundy, and he did not even initiate the grievance

process to address his ADA, RA, and remaining deliberate-indifference claims. In short,

Plaintiff has failed to identify any evidence to create a genuine dispute over whether he

properly exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his remaining claims.

The Court finds that Defendants have shown beyond peradventure that Plaintiff

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. Thus, they are

entitled to summary judgment.

B. Plaintiff’s claims otherwise fail in light of the unrefuted summary

judgment evidence.

Alternatively, as thoroughly briefed by the defendants and in light of the summary

judgment evidence, Plaintiff has not shown that the defendants violated his rights under the

ADA and RA or that Defendants Bundy, Durden, and Williams were deliberately

indifferent to his health and safety.

The medical records provided by the defendants show that Plaintiff’s mental and

physical condition was assessed by medical providers when he returned to the Daniels Unit,

and his restrictions were modified appropriately. Plaintiff does not dispute that the

defendants complied with his work restrictions. Nor does he dispute that his ground-floor

housing restriction was removed by a medical provider before he was re-assigned to a

second-floor cell. Importantly, the medical records show that Plaintiff exaggerated his

mental-health diagnoses and physical condition. But the defendants reasonably relied on

the assessment of medical professionals and the documentation of his actual diagnoses and

observed physical condition when making his housing assignment and when giving him

routine orders to maintain security.

In light of the summary judgment evidence, which Plaintiff has not refuted, Plaintiff

cannot show that the defendants intentionally discriminated against him. So he is not

entitled to relief on his ADA claim. Nor has he demonstrated that the defendants

“underst[ood] the limitations [he] experienced as a result of his disability.” Valentine, 993

F.3d at 290. Similarly, in light of the undisputed summary judgment evidence, Plaintiff has

not shown that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference—that they were

subjectively aware of, but disregarded, a substantial risk of serious bodily harm. See Gobert v.

Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345–46 (5th Cir. 2006). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to overcome the

individual defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity on his deliberate-indifference claims.

Simply put, no genuinely disputed material fact remains to require a trial on Plaintiff’s

claims.

5. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above and those provided in the defendants’ brief—and

after reviewing the pleadings and the competent summary judgment evidence—the Court

grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint and all

remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice. The Court will enter judgment accordingly.

Dated July 31, 2025.