The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MICHELLE ISRAEL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 3:25-cv-00669
)
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF ) JUDGE RICHARDSON
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON )
COUNTY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Michelle Israel, a resident of Tennessee, has filed a pro se Complaint against
Defendants Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, RealtyHop, LaVergne
Police Department, Smyrna Police Department, and Metropolitan Nashville Information
Technology Services, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 249, 1961-1968. (Doc. No. 1).
Filed as an attachment to the Complaint is Plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim (Cause of
Action).” (Doc. No. 1-1). Within that document, Plaintiff requests that the Court file this case
under seal “[i]n consideration of the serious nature of these incidents which have already occurred,
and to protect national security and confidentiality of the Plaintiff who has experienced significant
impacts from the activities stated . . . .” (Id. at PageID# 10). The Court construes Plaintiff’s request
as a Motion to Seal Case.
The public has a strong interest in the accessibility of the information contained in the court
record. Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983)).
“The courts have long recognized, therefore, a ‘strong presumption in favor of openness’ as to
court records.” Shane Group, Inc., 825 F.3d at 305 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at
1179)).
“Any party requesting that documents or portions of documents be sealed must file a
motion for leave to file the document(s) under seal in accordance with LR 7.01.” M.D. Tenn. L.R.
5.03(a). Parties who seek to protect their case under seal must meet a high burden by showing
three things: “(1) a compelling interest in sealing the records; (2) that the interest in sealing
outweighs the public’s interest in accessing the records; and (3) that the request is narrowly
tailored.” Montenegro v. Vaco LLC, No. 3:23-CV-01265, 2025 WL 73247, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Jan.
10, 2025).
Plaintiff’s short declaration at the end of her Statement of Claim does not satisfy the high
burden necessary as described by Montenegro. Even if her statement suggesting a need to “protect
national security and confidentiality of the Plaintiff” could satisfy the first requirement of asserting
a compelling interest in sealing the records1, Plaintiff fails to establish the second and third
requirements. (Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID# 10). Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to seal this case is
DENIED.
Plaintiff brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 against Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County and Defendant Metropolitan Nashville Information Technology Services.2 (Doc.
No. 1 at PageID# 3-4; Doc No. 1-1 at PageID# 7-9). Title VII proscribes certain discriminatory
1 Plaintiff is cautioned that the Court is not opining on whether Plaintiff satisfied the first
requirement as described in Montenegro.
2 Plaintiff indicates in her “Statement of Claim (Cause of Action)” that her claim of employment
discrimination is against only the first Defendant, Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
employment practices. Before filing suit in federal court under Title VII, a plaintiff must first
timely file a relevant charge of discrimination before the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) or corresponding state agency. Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 498
(6th Cir. 2001). The purpose of this requirement is to allow the EEOC the opportunity to convince
the parties to resolve the matter by voluntary settlement rather than through litigation. Randolph
v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 731-32 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Parsons v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., 741 F.2d 871, 873 (6th Cir. 1984)).
A plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). If the EEOC finds that the charge has
a reasonable basis, it will issue a notice of right-to-sue to the plaintiff. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b).
Upon receipt of a notice of right-to-sue, the employee has 90 days in which to bring a federal
action alleging a violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Administrative exhaustion thus involves (1) timely filing a charge of employment
discrimination with the EEOC and (2) receiving and timely acting upon a statutory right-to-sue
notice. Granderson v. Univ. of Mich., 211 F. App’x 398, 400 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Puckett v.
Tenn. Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1486 (6th Cir. 1989)).
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was discriminated against by Defendant Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County and Defendant Metropolitan Nashville
Information Technology Services in the termination of her employment due to race, color, and
gender. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID# 4). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated from
Davidson County. (Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID# 7). However, Plaintiff alleges employment
discrimination against Defendant Metropolitan Nashville Information Technology Services as
well, and, as best the Court can discern, Defendant is a department within the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County. (Id. at PageID# 7-9). Therefore, the Court will
interpret the employment discrimination allegations of the Complaint as to both Defendants.
employment due to the violation of a nonexistent “written rule, policy, or procedure.” (Doc. No.
1-1 at PageID# 8). Plaintiff further alleges that two other employees of the same company were in
violation of the same “alleged written rule, policy, or procedure” but were not terminated from
employment. (Id.).
Plaintiff states that she was terminated from her employment in June of 2018, filed a charge
with the EEOC in August of 2018, and later received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. (Doc.
No. 1-1 at PageID# 7-8). Plaintiff further states she again filed a charge with the EEOC on May 1,
2019, and received a right-to-sue letter on November 2, 2020. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID# 5). Plaintiff
filed the instant cause of action on June 16, 2025. (Doc. No. 1). Taking the allegations of the
Complaint as true in that the later right-to-sue letter was received in November of 2020, and
construing in Plaintiff’s favor that said right-to-sue letter is the one applicable to this case, this
action is time-barred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Plaintiff concedes her Title VII claims are untimely filed and requests this Court to make
“an exception due to the impact these acts of negligence have had on the Claimant.” (Doc. No. 1-
2 at PageID# 14). However, Plaintiff does not explain why she is entitled to an exception. (Id.).
To the extent Plaintiff seeks equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applicable to her Title
VII claims, a plaintiff seeking equitable tolling must establish “1) lack of notice of the filing
requirement; 2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; 3) diligence in pursuing
one’s rights; 4) absence of prejudice to the defendant; and 5) the plaintiff’s reasonableness [in]
remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement.” Hall v. XPO Logistics Freight, Inc., No.
3:21-CV-00727, 2022 WL 989084, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2022). Equitable tolling is a
determination made on a case-by-case basis. Id. (citing Truitt v. Cnty of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 648
(6th Cir. 1998)).
Even if the Court were to construe her request as a request for equitable tolling,
“Plaintiff…bears the burden of persuading the Court that she is entitled to equitable tolling . . . ,”
and Plaintiff has failed to fulfill that burden here. Hall, 2022 WL 989084, at *4. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County and Defendant Metropolitan Nashville Information Technology Services are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Court’s analysis, however, does not stop there. Plaintiff names three additional
Defendants, RealtyHop, LaVergne Police Department, and Smyrna Police Department, alleging
they took part in “activities of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID# 7).3
Plaintiff alleges violations of federal law against RealtyHop, stating said Defendant
interfered with commerce and released Plaintiff’s personally identifiable information and property
address in violation of “Section 1951 of 18 U.S. Code SS 1961-1968.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID#
9). Based on an unrelated incident, Plaintiff alleges violations of federal law against LaVergne
Police Department, stating, “an incident occurred in Rutherford County and the Plaintiff sought to
file a police report with . . . La Vergne Police Department.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID# 10). Plaintiff
states Defendant LaVergne Police Department denied Plaintiff of her right to file the police report
and “engaged in activity outlined in Section 1511 of 18 U.S. Code SS 1961-1968,” and an officer
from LaVergne Police Department who was tasked with speaking to Plaintiff “engaged in activity
3 The Court notes that Plaintiff makes allegations against “the first Defendant’s Law Enforcement
Agency, the Metro Nashville Police Department” throughout her Statement of Claim (Cause of
Action), as well as complaints about “the US District Court of Middle Tennessee.” (Doc. No. 1-1
at PageID# 9-10; Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID# 13-14). However, Plaintiff does not name either of
these entities as a defendant. Therefore, the Court will not regard either entity as a party to this
case. The undersigned notes that nothing about Plaintiff’s references to this Court has biased him
or influenced his decision in this case in any way.
consistent with 18 U.S. Code SS 249, hate crime acts.” (Id.). Lastly, and based again on an
unrelated incident, Plaintiff alleges Smyrna Police Department approached Plaintiff at a local
business and committed violations of “18 U.S. Code SS 249, hate crime acts.” (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges violations of (and only of) federal criminal law4 on the part of Defendants
RealtyHop, LaVergne Police Department, and Smyrna Police Department5. (Doc. No. 1 at
PageID# 3; Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID# 9-10). To the extent that Plaintiff is asking the Court to
initiate some kind of criminal investigation against one or more of these Defendants, the Court
declines to do so because “[a]uthority to initiate a [federal] criminal complaint rests exclusively
with . . . federal prosecutors.” Tunne v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 5:08CV-189-R, 2010 WL 290512,
at *1 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 21, 2010) (quoting Sahagian v. Dickey, 646 F. Supp. 1502, 1506 (W.D. Wis.
1986)). So this Court lacks such authority. And private citizens (like Plaintiff) have “no authority
to initiate a federal criminal prosecution of the defendants for their alleged unlawful acts.”
Williams v. Luttrell, 99 F. App’x 705, 707 (6th Cir. 2004. Thus, this Court is without authority to
initiate any investigations of alleged criminal activity upon request of Plaintiff.
4 Plaintiff indicates that Defendant LaVergne Police Department denied her the “right” to file a
police report. (Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID# 10). However, Plaintiff fails to cite any authority that
establishes a constitutional right to file a police report, and also fails to allege any constitutional
violation that resulted due to the alleged actions of that Defendant. Therefore, there is no allegation
that triggers the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from this statement by Plaintiff.
5 A police department is not a suable entity as to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Mathes v. Metro. Gov’t, No. 3:10-CV-0496, 2010 WL 3341889, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010)
(Trauger, J.) (collecting cases); cf. Campbell v. Cheatham Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 511 F. Supp. 3d
809, 824–25 & n.12 (M.D. Tenn. 2021) (Crenshaw, C.J.) (noting that sheriff’s departments “are
not proper parties to a § 1983 suit”), aff’d, 47 F.4th 468 (6th Cir. 2022)). The same may be true as
to the kind of claims (Title VII and RICO) that Plaintiff purports to bring here. The Court need not
decide that, however, because the Court assumes arguendo in Plaintiff’s favor that the intended
Defendants are the municipalities of LaVergne and Smyrna, which are suable entities.
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks other kinds of relief based on alleged criminal violations,
the only basis for such relief is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. “RICO provides a private cause of action for ‘[a]ny person injured in
his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter.’ 18 U. S. C. §
1964(c). Section 1962, in turn, contains RICO’s criminal provisions.” Hemi Group, LLC v. City of
New York, 559 U.S. 1, 130 S. Ct. 983, 987 (2010) (citation omitted). More specifically, Section
1962 contains four different criminal provisions, each in separate subsection. In 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),RICO declares unlawful the conduct
described in each of these three respective subsections.6 And in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), RICO
declares it unlawful to conspire to commit a substantive RICO violation.7
RICO is primarily a criminal statute, enforceable by the United States Department of
Justice. But as indicated above, it also provides a civil remedy for private parties injured by a
violation of Section 1962, i.e., either a substantive RICO violation or a RICO conspiracy. In this
case, Plaintiff does not allege a RICO conspiracy and, at most, alleges only one kind of substantive
RICO violation, i.e. a violation of Section 1962(c). (See Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID# 9-10). As the
Supreme Court has explained:
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which is part of RICO, makes it unlawful “for
any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” The term “enterprise’ is
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) as including ‘any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity.”
6 Any such conduct will be referred to herein as a “substantive” RICO violation.
7 Such conduct will be referred to herein as “RICO conspiracy”.
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 576, (1981). “To state a RICO claim [based on a violation
of Section 1962(c)], a plaintiff must plead the following elements: ‘(1)} conduct (2) of an enterprise
(3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’” Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc., 694
F.3d 783, 791 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 723 (6th
Cir.2006) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985))). Forgoing as
unnecessary the need to illuminate the substance of these elements, the Court notes that Plaintiff
has completely failed to allege factual matter plausibly suggesting the existence of any of them, as
is necessary to state a substantive RICO claim.
In summary, the claims against these three Defendants therefore are DISMISSED.
Plaintiff requests relief as to all claims in the amount of $4,234,301.37 in compensatory
and punitive damages. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID# 6). Plaintiff also requests relief in the form of
“Restorative Justice and Injunctive Relief to restore and correct Plaintiff[sic] records, specifically
Personally Identifiable Information, including the restoration and protection of the Plaintiffs
identity and records” with various credit reporting agencies, software systems, telecommunication
companies, social media platforms, and ride sharing platforms. (/d.). There being no other claims
before the Court, Plaintiff is not entitled to any of the relief she seeks. Thus, this case is
DISMISSED in its entirety.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment under Rule 58 and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Chi Ruch
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE