PETERSON v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANTHONY PETERSON, Civil Action No.: 21-1165

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION & ORDER

CITY OF JERSEY CITY, et al.,

Defendants.

CECCHI, District Judge.

Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 69) (“Mot.”) filed

by defendants City of Jersey City, Jeison Martinez (“Martinez”), and Mohamed Saheed

(“Saheed”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff Anthony Peterson (“Plaintiff”) opposed the

motion (ECF No. 73) (“Opp.”) and Defendants replied in support (ECF No. 77) (“Reply”). The

Court decides the motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

78(b). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.1

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

This case arises out of two collisions between Plaintiff and a police vehicle driven by Jersey

City Police officer Saheed. On June 8, 2019, Plaintiff was walking on Bayview Avenue, Jersey

City. ECF No. 69-2 (“Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,” or “DSUMF”) ¶ 12;

ECF No. 73-12 (“Plaintiff’s Counterstatement of Undisputed Material Facts,” or “PCSUMF”) ¶ 8.

Also on Bayview Avenue were Saheed and Martinez, another officer with the Jersey City Police

Department. The officers were patrolling the area in an unmarked police vehicle. DSUMF ¶¶ 5-

1 The Court addresses the motion only insofar as it relates to the claims against Martinez and Saheed. The Court defers

consideration of the claims against City of Jersey City at this time.

11; ECF No. 73-11 (“Plaintiff’s Responsive Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,” or

“PRSUMF”) ¶¶ 5-11. Believing Plaintiff matched the description that had earlier been transmitted

over the radio of an armed individual, Saheed stopped the vehicle and Martinez exited to conduct

an investigative stop. DSUMF ¶¶ 13-14, 16-17; PRSUMF ¶¶ 13-14; 16-17. The parties’ stories

then diverge as to whether Plaintiff fled upon realizing he was being stopped by police, or whether

Plaintiff fled from Martinez until the latter identified himself as a police officer. DSUMF ¶¶ 17-

18, 20; PCSUMF ¶¶ 13-15. Both parties agree, however, that Martinez subsequently tackled

Plaintiff to the ground in the middle of the street and began to place handcuffs on him. DSUMF

¶¶ 27-28; PCSUMF ¶¶ 19-20.

At this point, Saheed placed the police vehicle in reverse, striking both Plaintiff and

Martinez. DSUMF ¶¶ 32-33; PCSUMF ¶¶ 22, 26. According to Saheed, he had lost sight of both

individuals and placed the vehicle in reverse hoping to find them. DSUMF ¶ 32. Saheed testified

that upon striking Plaintiff and Martinez, he instantly became aware he had hit something, but did

not know what. DSUMF ¶¶ 40; PCSUMF ¶ 23. Saheed then ceased moving in reverse and pulled

the car forward, striking Plaintiff a second time. DSUMF ¶¶ 40-43; PCSUMF ¶ 26. Defendants

describe both collisions as accidental, while Plaintiff describes one or both as intentional, or in the

alternative, negligent or severely reckless. DSUMF ¶ 33; PCSUMF ¶¶ 26, 34. Following these

collisions, Martinez and Plaintiff were placed in an ambulance and treated for their injuries.

DSUMF ¶¶ 61, 63; PRSUMF ¶¶ 61, 63. Plaintiff testified that he suffered a broken pelvis, back,

and ribs. PCSUMF ¶ 1; DRSUM ¶ 1. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff also experienced a two-

week coma. PCSUMF ¶ 1; DRSUMF ¶ 1.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed an initial complaint on January 26, 2021, ECF No. 1, and an amended

complaint on March 10, 2021, ECF No. 8 (“AC”). The amended complaint asserts claims for: (1)

excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J.S.A.

§ 10:6-2 et seq.; (2) municipal liability under Monell and the NJCRA; (3) intentional infliction of

emotional distress (“IIED”) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”); (4) assault

and battery; (5) negligence; and (6) respondeat superior. Id. ¶¶ 27-110. Defendants filed their

motion for summary judgment on all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on

September 27, 2024. ECF 69.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if the “depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials,” demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and, construing all

facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, “the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also

Pollock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1986).

The moving party has the initial burden of proving the absence of any genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets this burden, the non-

moving party has the burden of identifying specific facts to show that, to the contrary, a genuine

issue of material fact exists for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986). In order to meet its burden, the non-moving party must “go beyond the

pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citation omitted); see also Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.,

974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992) (“To raise a genuine issue of material fact,” the opponent must

“exceed[ ] the ‘mere scintilla’ threshold . . . .”). An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence,

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing

substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. See id. “In

considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility

determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's

evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v.

Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force

An excessive force claim under Section 1983 against law enforcement is “based on the

Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable seizures of the person.” Wachendorf v.

DeWire, No. 4-5804, 2006 WL 2385085, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2006). “To state a claim for

excessive force as an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show

that a ‘seizure’ occurred and that it was unreasonable.” Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir.

2004). “[R]easonableness is evaluated under a totality of the circumstances analysis, which asks

whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivations.” Bornstad v. Honey

Brook Tp., 211 Fed. Appx. 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). In making this

determination, courts should consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest

or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. They may also consider “the possibility that the persons

subject to the police action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether

the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be

armed, and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time.” Id.;

El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 2020). Excessive force claims under the

NJCRA are “evaluated in the same fashion.” Miller v. Waterford Tp., No. 11-3405, 2014 WL

345296, at 15 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2014); Meronvil v. Doe, No. 17-8055, 2023 WL 4864383, at *6

(D.N.J. July 31, 2023).

Defendants move for summary judgment on the excessive force claims under the Fourth

Amendment and the NJCRA against Martinez and Saheed. Because excessive force claims under

the Fourth Amendment and the NJCRA are interpreted analogously, they will be discussed

together. The claims against each defendant will be analyzed in turn.

i. Martinez

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim

against Martinez because Plaintiff “does not allege that Martinez assaulted, battered or subjected

him to excessive force.” Mot. at 10. Instead, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s excessive force

claim “arises from being accidentally struck by the vehicle, which was not operated by Martinez.”

Id. Plaintiff counters that Martinez applied excessive force when he “tackled Plaintiff to the ground

and jumped on his back.” Opp. at 13.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim against

Martinez because Plaintiff has failed to make out a prime facie claim. As Defendants correctly

note, and as further discussed below, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is premised on the allegation

that “Defendant(s) intentionally ran Plaintiff over with a police vehicle.” AC ¶ 29. The parties

agree, however, that Martinez did not “r[u]n Plaintiff over with a police vehicle” but rather was

himself struck by the vehicle driven by Saheed. See, e.g., DSUMF ¶ 34; PRSUMF ¶ 35. Because

it is undisputed that Martinez did not apply the complained-of force, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on the claim against him.

Plaintiff nonetheless argues that he has established a prima facie claim of excessive force

against Martinez by putting forth evidence that Martinez tackled him, but Plaintiff does not appear

to have asserted a claim against Martinez for his conduct in effectuating Plaintiff’s arrest. As noted,

the amended complaint asserts an excessive force claim on the basis that “Defendant(s)

intentionally ran Plaintiff over with a police vehicle.” AC ¶ 29. The complaint does not appear,

however, to set forth a claim for excessive force against either defendant for tackling plaintiff to

the ground—nor does it mention that such contact occurred. See AC ¶ 12 (stating only that

“Martinez exited the unmarked police vehicle and handcuffed Plaintiff in the middle of Bayview

Avenue”). And Plaintiff cannot now amend his complaint through his brief opposing summary

judgment to set forth an additional claim of excessive force against Martinez based on his actions

when arresting Plaintiff. See Bell v. City of Philadelphia, 275 Fed. Appx. 157, 160 (3d Cir. 2008)

(“A plaintiff may not amend his complaint through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion

for summary judgment.” (internal quotation omitted)); Gupta v. Perez, 101 F. Supp. 3d 437, 461

n. 33 (D.N.J. 2015).

ii. Saheed

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim

against Saheed because the collisions at issue were “unintended accident[s]” and therefore

“Plaintiff cannot establish that Saheed’s actions were not objectively reasonable.” Mot. at 11.

Plaintiff counters that “[t]he record offers contradictory evidence” as to whether the collisions

were accidental, thus precluding summary judgment. Opp. at 15.

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim against

Saheed because material facts regarding that claim remain in dispute. As Defendants acknowledge,

Plaintiff has provided testimony indicating that Saheed “intentionally ran over Plaintiff.” Mot. at

11, 12; see, e.g., ECF No. 69-3 at 161 (Plaintiff testifying that Saheed “gets back in the car . . . and

run back over me”), 167 (Plaintiff testifying that Saheed “looked backed back, gets back in the

car” and “throw the car in reverse”), 168 (Plaintiff testifying that witnesses were “yelling get him

from under the car” when Saheed “run back to the car and started throwing it in drive and run back

over me”). Plaintiff has also provided an expert report and surveillance images in support of this

theory. See PRSUMF ¶¶ 34-35. To be sure, Defendants have provided their own evidence to the

contrary, including an expert report and surveillance video. See, e.g., ECF No. 77-2 at 16

(Defendants’ expert opining that Saheed “would not be able to see” Plaintiff “as he was backing

up”).2 But viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—Plaintiff—a jury could

nonetheless find from this evidence that Saheed intentionally struck Plaintiff, and that such an act

constitutes excessive force. See Paige v. City of New Brunswick, No. 13-2298, 2015 WL 3452480,

at *5 (D.N.J. May 29, 2015) (denying summary judgment on excessive force claim because

“[v]iewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that

the collision was not accidental and that Officers Williams and Rodriguez intentionally struck

Paige with the patrol unit”).

Defendants appear to argue that no disputed material facts exist regarding whether either

collision was accidental because Plaintiff has only put forth “self-serving, unsupported testimony.”

Mot. at 11. This claim ignores the expert report and surveillance images provided by Plaintiff in

2 Both parties submitted letters following briefing concerning a dispute regarding the expert report relied upon by

Defendants in their reply brief and the associated counterstatement of material facts. See ECF Nos. 78-79. Having

considered that report, the Court finds that it does not change the outcome here.

further support of his theory. See PRSUMF ¶¶ 34-35. Moreover, the Court may not make

credibility determinations as to whether Plaintiff’s testimony is “self-serving” at the summary

judgment stage. See Rich v. State, 294 F. Supp. 3d 266, 273 (D.N.J. 2018) (“In considering a

motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations.”); Boyle

v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). Rather, the evidence

provided by Plaintiff “is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”

Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255). Because the Court may not discount Plaintiff’s evidence regarding whether the collisions

were intentional, a genuine dispute exists, and summary judgment is foreclosed.

Defendants appear to argue, in the alternative, that they are entitled to summary judgment

on the excessive force claim against Saheed because it is undisputed that no “seizure” occurred

since Saheed “did not attempt to physically restrain the Plaintiff.” Mot. at 11. However, a collision

constitutes a “seizure” for purposes of an excessive force claim where the officer intended to strike

the plaintiff with their vehicle. See Myrick v. Collingdale Borough, No. 11-2791, 2012 WL

4849129, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2012) (noting that if an officer “stopped the suspect by

accidentally striking them, that would not constitute [a seizure],” but if “the officer came up beside

the suspect and intentionally ‘sideswiped [their vehicle],’ the termination of the suspects

movement would have been a Fourth Amendment seizure”); U.S. v. Sinkler, 91 Fed. Appx. 226,

230-231 (3d Cir. 2004). Because a dispute exists as to whether the collisions were intentional, a

dispute therefore exists as to whether Saheed effectuated a “seizure.” Accordingly, summary

judgment on this ground is not appropriate.

B. Assault and Battery

Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment on the assault and battery claims

against Martinez and Saheed for the same reasons as presented in their arguments regarding the

excessive force claim. Under New Jersey law, “the analysis for assault and battery tracks the

analysis for excessive force.” Sanders v. Jersey City, No. 18-1057, 2021 WL 1589464, at *22 (Apr.

23, 2021); Wierzbicki v. City of Jersey City, No. 19-17721, 2021 WL 4148105, at *9 (D.N.J. Sept.

10, 2021). The Court accordingly grants summary judgment on the assault and battery claims as

to Martinez and denies summary judgment on the assault and battery claims as to Saheed for the

reasons discussed above. See Sanders, 2021 WL 1589464, at *22 (“There are genuine disputes of

fact as to whether the officers used excessive force . . . so I cannot grant summary judgment on the

assault and battery claims.”); Ewing v. Cumberland Cnty., 152 F. Supp. 3d 269, 300 (D.N.J. 2015)

(finding summary judgment on assault and battery claim “not warranted” because “there is a

dispute . . . whether [defendant’s] use of force was excessive”).

C. Negligence, NIED, and IIED

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the negligence, NIED, and

IIED claims against both Saheed and Martinez because both officers are immune from liability

under New Jersey’s Tort Claims Act (“TCA”), N.J.S.A. 59: 3-3. Mot. 15. Plaintiff argues that the

TCA’s grant of immunity does not apply. Opp. at 20.

Under the TCA, “a public employee is not liable if he acts in good faith in the execution or

enforcement of any law.” Lankford v. City of Clifton Police Dep’t, 546 F. Supp. 3d 296, 320

(D.N.J. 2021) (citing N.J.S.A. § 59: 3-3); Est. of Del Rosario v. Paterson Police Dep’t, No. 14-

5167, 2020 WL 373354, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2020). For purposes of the statute, “good faith” can

be shown by demonstrating “objective reasonableness” or “subjective good faith.” Lankford, 546

F. Supp. 3d at 320; Est. of Del Rosario, 2020 WL 373354, at *7. “This immunity applies to a police

officer’s operation of a motor vehicle within the scope of the officer’s duties and in response to

emergent circumstances.” Melendez v. Rotondo, No. 1100-22, 2024 WL 959882, at *2 (N.J. App.

Div. Mar. 6, 2024).

As an initial matter, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the negligence,

NIED, and IIED claims against Martinez for the reasons discussed above regarding Plaintiff’s

excessive force and assault and battery claims. Namely, Plaintiff’s negligence, NIED and IIED

claims are premised on the allegation that “Defendants” struck Plaintiff with a vehicle. See AC

¶¶ 93 (alleging NIED and IIED claims based on “Defendants[’] . . . outrageous conduct striking

[Plaintiff] with a vehicle twice”), 101 (alleging negligence based on “Defendants . . . negligently

hitting Plaintiff with an automobile”). It is undisputed that Martinez did not strike Plaintiff with a

vehicle but rather was struck by the vehicle himself. See, e.g., DSUMF ¶ 34; PRSUMF ¶ 35.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established a prima facie claim of negligence, NIED, or IIED against

Martinez and summary judgment is appropriate.

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as to the IIED claim against Saheed

because the TCA does not immunize officers against claims of IIED or other intentional

misconduct. Lankford, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 321 (noting TCA good faith immunity “does not apply

to claims of . . . intentional infliction of emotional distress”); Monroe v. City of Hoboken, No. 11-

2556, 2012 WL 1191177, at *14 (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2012) (noting the TCA “does not provide

immunity from claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress”).

Defendants are also not entitled to summary judgment as to the negligence or NIED claims

against Saheed because they have not established that Saheed acted with objective reasonableness

or subjective good faith. Defendants argue that Saheed acted in good faith and in an objectively

reasonable manner in attempting to apprehend Plaintiff because “the collision was an unintended

accident.” Mot. at 19. As previously discussed, however, a genuine dispute exists between the

parties as to whether the collisions were accidental. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant summary

judgment on that ground. See Paige, 2015 WL 3452480, at *6 (D.N.J. May 29, 2015) (declining

to grant summary judgment on grounds of TCA immunity where dispute of material fact existed

“regarding whether the actions of Officer Defendants [in striking plaintiff with their vehicle] were

intentional or accidental”).

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants appear to argue that summary judgment is appropriate as to all claims against

Martinez and Saheed because both officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff argues

summary judgment cannot be granted on that ground due to the existence of disputed material facts

regarding the subject collisions. The Court addresses this argument only as to Saheed, because all

substantive claims against Martinez have been dismissed for the above reasons.

Qualified immunity insulates government officials from damages suits arising from certain

actions undertaken as part of their official duties. See Bradshaw v. Twp. of Middletown, 296 F.

Supp. 2d 526, 549 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2003). To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a court

must consider whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right and whether

that right “was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.” See Lankford, 546 F.

Supp. 3d at 309; Bradshaw, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 549. This analysis ensures an officer will not be

subject to suit for making “a reasonable mistake about the legal constraints on his actions.” McKoy

v. Carter, No. 9-4170, 2012 WL 12898019, at *4 (D.N.J. June 26, 2012) (quoting Curley v. Klem,

499 F.3d 199, 206-07 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as to Saheed on the basis of qualified

immunity because genuine disputes of material fact regarding the subject collisions preclude the

application of immunity. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie violation

of a clearly established right by Saheed because Plaintiff was “accident[ally] hit by the vehicle”

and “there is no evidence showing that Saheed intended to collide into Plaintiff.” Mot. at 34. As

previously noted, however, genuine disputes of fact exist regarding Saheed’s intent, as Plaintiff

has put forth testimony and other evidence in support his theory. See, e.g., PRSUMF ¶¶ 34-35.

And Defendants do not appear to argue that the collisions, if intentional, would be subject to

qualified immunity. Accordingly, the Court cannot apply qualified immunity to insulate Saheed

from suit. See Paige, 2015 WL 3452480, at *5 (declining to apply qualified immunity to suit

alleging officer struck plaintiff with vehicle because “a reasonable jury could conclude that the

collision was not accidental” and “[i]f [plaintiff] succeeds in demonstrating the collision was

deliberate, qualified immunity would not shield the officers from liability”).

E. Punitive Damages

Finally, Defendants seek summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages

against Martinez and Saheed. Punitive damages may be sought under Section 1983 where a

defendant exhibits “a malicious intention to deprive [a plaintiff] of their rights or to do them

injury.” Lankford, 546 F. Supp. 3d 296, 327. Punitive damages may be sought under New Jersey

law against public officials where the official “engaged in willful misconduct.” Paige¸ 2015 WL

3452480, at *7. Defendants dispute that either standard is met, but do not provide detailed analysis.

Mot. at 36-37.

As to Martinez, the claims against him have been dismissed for the above reasons.

Accordingly, summary judgment on the punitive damage request against him is appropriate. See

Vineland 820 N. Main Road, LLC v. U.S. Liability Ins. Co., No. 17-2986, 2018 WL 4693965, at

*8 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2018) (“[P]unitive damages cannot stand without an underlying claim.”). As

to Saheed, however, Plaintiff has put forth evidence that his collisions were intentional which is

sufficient to meet both standards. See id. (declining to provide for summary judgment on federal

or state punitive damages where “there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the

collision between [defendant officer’s] patrol unit and [plaintiff] was accidental”). Summary

judgment is thus not appropriate as to Saheed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in

part and denied in part.

Accordingly, IT IS on this 31st day of July 2025,

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 69) is GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part; and it is further

ORDERED that summary judgment is granted for Defendants as to Plaintiff’s excessive

force, assault and battery, negligence, NIED, IIED, and punitive damages claims against Martinez;

and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied as to Plaintiff’s

excessive force, assault and battery, negligence, NIED, IIED, and punitive damage claims against

Saheed.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Claire C. Cecchi

CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.