Richard Schneiter v. Kevin Carr

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-2137

RICHARD S. SCHNEITER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN CARR, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 21-cv-135 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 23, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 31, 2025

____________________

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and LEE, Circuit

Judges.

SYKES, Chief Judge. Richard Schneiter worked for the Wis-

consin Department of Corrections for more than 40 years,

rising through the ranks to become deputy warden of the

state’s minimum-security facilities. His tenure reached an

unexpected end when the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel report-

ed that he had posted offensive internet memes on his

Facebook page. The posts denigrated Muslims, blacks,

2 No. 22-2137

liberals, and the LGBTQ community, and one referred to the

Confederate flag as “our flag.”

Department officials commenced an investigation and

eventually fired Schneiter, explaining that his offensive

Facebook posts created security concerns, diminished public

trust in the Department, and cast doubt on his ability to

perform the duties of his leadership position respectfully

and without bias. Schneiter sued the Secretary of Corrections

and other officials alleging that he was fired in retaliation for

his online speech and without due process in violation of his

rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The

district judge entered summary judgment for the defend-

ants, ruling that the Department’s interests as a public

employer outweighed Schneiter’s speech interests under the

balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of Education of

Township High School District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). On the

due-process claim, the judge held that the Department

provided adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard

before proceeding with the termination.

We affirm. Our cases recognize that law-enforcement and

corrections agencies need substantial latitude to determine

whether an employee’s speech undermines the effective

operation of governmental functions. See, e.g., Volkman v.

Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1092 (7th Cir. 2013). That principle

weighs heavily here. The Department’s interests as a public

employer—namely, its duty to maintain security and disci-

pline in state correctional facilities—outweighs Schneiter’s

interest in posting this material on Facebook. The due-

process claim is likewise meritless. Schneiter complains that

the Department did not give its employees notice that their

social-media posts might jeopardize their jobs. But public

No. 22-2137 3

employers are not constitutionally required to adopt specific

policies about social-media use before they may discipline

employees for social-media activities that may interfere with

their job duties. And Schneiter otherwise received sufficient

notice and an opportunity to be heard before he was fired.

I. Background

Schneiter’s lengthy tenure with Wisconsin’s Department

of Corrections began in 1977 when he was hired as an entry-

level correctional officer. He gradually moved up the career

ladder and in 2011 was promoted to the significant leader-

ship position of deputy warden for the Wisconsin Correc-

tional Center System. Situated within the Department’s

Division of Adult Institutions, the Correctional Center

System encompasses a network of 14 minimum-security

prisons scattered throughout Wisconsin. Schneiter’s respon-

sibilities included monitoring operations at the facilities;

hiring, training, and supervising employees; settling griev-

ances; ensuring policy compliance; and serving as a liaison

for the system. About 20% of his duties involved communi-

cating with inmates and 10% involved interacting with

community members and government bodies; the rest of his

time was spent on his managerial responsibilities as the head

of the system.

As Schneiter’s long list of management duties suggests,

the Department classifies a deputy warden as a high-level

official. Throughout this 40-year tenure with the Depart-

ment, he was never disciplined for his performance. Quite

the opposite: he was consistently recognized as a stellar

employee.

4 No. 22-2137

Over the course of several weeks in June 2019, Schneiter

posted on his Facebook page five internet memes touching

on issues of race, religion, and gay rights in particularly

inflammatory and degrading ways. We don’t need to get

bogged down in the parties’ varied interpretations of the

memes; it’s enough to say that they mocked, belittled, and

promoted dehumanizing assumptions about black people,

Muslims, and gay people.

Before turning to the details, we pause to note that

Schneiter—or possibly his son—deleted the posts from his

Facebook page sometime after they attracted public scrutiny.

Since then, no one involved in this case has successfully

accessed the posts in their original form, so the record

contains only partial screenshots. As Schneiter recalls the

posts, the screenshots omit crucial details. Some screenshots,

for example, cut off the lower portion of the posts, so we

can’t tell whether Schneiter or any of his Facebook friends

left comments and, if so, what was said. The cropped screen-

shots similarly hide whether anyone “reacted” to the posts—

i.e., responded with an icon. And one post lacks a date and

time stamp. Finally, it’s not entirely clear if Schneiter created

any of the memes himself or if all were initially posted by

others and “shared” by Schneiter. With these qualifiers in

mind, we turn to the memes.

The first one was posted on June 7. Schneiter did not cre-

ate this meme himself; he instead “shared” a meme initially

published by an account entitled “Keep America Great.”

Here is a screenshot:

No. 22-2137 5

The next meme was posted on June 21, two weeks later.

The “pause” and “volume” symbols in the lower corners

suggest that this one may have been posted as a video rather

than as a still image:

On June 22 Schneiter posted two memes. Here is the first:

6 No. 22-2137

An account called “Rowdy Conservatives” initially posted

the next meme, and Schneiter shared it to his Facebook page

minutes later:

The final meme was presumably posted sometime in

June, though it lacks a date stamp. It’s a photo of a Muslim

woman and child wearing black burqas standing next to two

full black garbage bags. The text accompanying the photo

compared the Muslim child to garbage. Unlike the others,

the screenshot of this meme includes comments showing

that two people posted emojis “reacting” to it—one with a

“thumbs up” and the other with a “sad face.”

No. 22-2137 7

One additional datapoint about Schneiter’s social-media

posts: his Facebook page had been set as “private.” In other

words, he had blocked the general public from accessing his

page, allowing only those designated as his Facebook

“friends” to view his posts. That’s not to say that his online

audience was small; he had approximately 1,200 Facebook

friends, including many employees of the Department of

Corrections.

Sometime soon after Schneiter posted the last of these

memes, an anonymous tipster leaked them to the Milwaukee

Journal Sentinel. On July 16 a Journal Sentinel reporter called

and emailed Schneiter asking about his reasons for posting

the memes and whether they represented his personal

views. Responding early the next morning, Schneiter sent

the reporter the following message from his government

email address: “I repost different things on Facebook that

are certainly not always my opinion but show the different

opinions of others to bring awareness to issues.” Schneiter

also talked with the reporter on the phone later that day.

After the interview, Schneiter immediately alerted his

8 No. 22-2137

supervisor that the Journal Sentinel planned to publish a

story about the posts that day.

And so it did. On July 17, 2019, the Journal Sentinel pub-

lished an article with the headline: “Deputy Prison Warden

Posts Facebook Meme that Compares Muslim Children to

Garbage.” The article explained Schneiter’s background,

described the five controversial memes, and included

screenshots of some of them. The reporter included several

quotes from Schneiter, who explained that his posts were

being misinterpreted and that he only wanted to engage in

discussions on controversial issues.

The article also included a response from a Department

of Corrections spokeswoman who said that agency officials

were unaware of Schneiter’s Facebook posts and would

investigate. She also said the Department was committed to

maintaining an “environment free of discrimination, har-

assment, and retaliation.” Finally, the article included a

Twitter post from the Lieutenant Governor responding to

the controversy; he criticized the posts as bigoted and stated

in part that Schneiter “ha[d] to be taken out.”

On July 17 Makda Fessahaye, the Administrator of the

Division of Adult Institutions, placed Schneiter on paid

administrative leave and initiated an investigation. In the

meantime, the Department received emails from three

community members, each expressing disgust with

Schneiter’s posts; two specifically requested that he be fired.

Fessahaye assigned investigators Tory Enger and Chris-

tine Preston to look into the matter, and they interviewed

Schneiter a week after the article was published. During the

interview, Schneiter admitted to posting the memes but

No. 22-2137 9

claimed that he did so only “to get a conversation started.”

He also acknowledged that standing alone, the memes

“could be construed as discriminatory.”

About a week later, Schneiter emailed Enger and Preston

asking them to interview several current and former De-

partment employees who were his Facebook “friends.” The

investigators interviewed two from Schneiter’s list: Chris

Buesgen and Wes Ray. Ray acknowledged that he was

Schneiter’s Facebook friend but said he was not familiar

with the posts. Buesgen explained that Schneiter was an avid

Facebook user who posted primarily about politics. Buesgen

didn’t find the posts offensive, but he agreed that they could

“open[] doors to controversies.” The investigators also

interviewed Quala Champagne, Schneiter’s supervisor, and

Stephanie Hove, the Assistant Administrator of the Division

of Adult Institutions. Champagne and Hove worried that

Schneiter’s conduct would have a negative effect on the

Department and undermine its institutional values.

Enger and Preston submitted a written summary of their

investigation on August 9. In brief, they concluded that

Schneiter had violated three work rules. First, his unauthor-

ized email exchange and phone interview with the Journal

Sentinal reporter violated the Department’s policy concern-

ing unapproved media interviews; that, in turn, violated

Rule 2, which requires employees to “comply with written

agency policies and procedures.” Second, by posting the

memes to his Facebook page, Schneiter violated Rule 14,

which in relevant part prohibits “[i]ntimidating, … harass-

ing, demeaning, treating discourteously, or bullying” others,

or using “abusive language in dealing with others.” Third,

the Facebook posts violated Rule 25, which bars employees

10 No. 22-2137

from engaging in “outside activities” that “may impair the

employee’s independence of judgment or … ability to

perform his/her duties as an employee of the state.”

An “Infraction Review Team” reviewed the report and

agreed with the investigators’ conclusions. Fessahaye was a

member of this review team in her capacity as Administrator

of the Division of Adult Institutions.

The next step was a “predisciplinary” meeting, which

Schneiter attended with his personal representative. After

presenting their findings, Enger and Preston invited

Schneiter to offer any mitigating information. Reading from

a prepared statement, Schneiter discussed his professional

accomplishments and contextualized the posts. He claimed

that he had attached a comment to the meme of the Muslim

woman and child that he contended “clearly indicated” his

disagreement with the “nature of th[e] meme,” though he

had no evidence to substantiate this claim because he had

deleted the post. Schneiter explained that he posted the flag

meme shortly after Wisconsin’s governor decided to fly the

LGBTQ flag at the state capitol. He said he feared that other

organizations may “push to have their flag[s] displayed.”

The remaining memes, he asserted, were not at all inappro-

priate; he said each one “provided a message” that he felt

“needed to be expressed.” His personal representative

echoed that position, saying that Schneiter was simply

“[s]tarting a conversation about difficult topics that we face

today in society.”

A “Disciplinary Action Review Team,” which again in-

cluded Fessahaye, then reviewed the matter and determined

an appropriate disciplinary response. The team recommend-

ed that the Department terminate Schneiter’s employment.

No. 22-2137 11

A “Management Advisory Team” of upper-level manag-

ers—including Kari Beier, the Director of the Bureau of

Personnel and Human Resources—reviewed and approved

the termination recommendation.

In early November Beier presented the recommendation

to Kevin Carr and Amy Pechacek, the Department Secretary

and Deputy Secretary at the time. They agreed that

Schneiter’s posts had damaged the Department’s credibility,

undermined its mission, and exacerbated safety concerns in

the corrections facilities. They approved the recommenda-

tion to fire him, and Pechacek signed a disciplinary routing

slip confirming that the Secretary’s Office had approved the

decision to skip the usual disciplinary track and proceed

directly to termination. That decision required review by the

Division of Personnel Management, which promptly ap-

proved it.

On November 8, 2019, Pechacek sent Schneiter a letter

informing him of the termination decision. In addition to the

specific rules violations we’ve already discussed, the letter

identified several general reasons for the decision to fire

him. We mention the main ones: (1) Schneiter’s postings

impaired his ability to perform his duties as a deputy war-

den, in part because he had “referenced the Confederate flag

as ‘our’ flag”; (2) he had denigrated “minorities, Muslims

and the LGBTQ community,” casting public doubt on his

ability to lead and to treat others “fairly and impartially”; (3)

the posts harmed the Department’s “strong working rela-

tionships within a diverse workforce” and risked interfer-

ence with recruitment; (4) Schneiter’s expressions of

“animus” created safety concerns in correctional facilities;

and (5) given his high-level position, Schneiter’s postings

12 No. 22-2137

drew a greater degree of negative attention to the Depart-

ment. The disciplinary reviewers did not accept Schneiter’s

claim that he posted the memes only “to spark conversation”

and “bring attention” to controversial topics; he provided no

evidence to support that assertion.

Schneiter sought reinstatement through the administra-

tive grievance procedures available under Wisconsin law.

When those remedies proved unsuccessful, he filed an

administrative appeal with the Wisconsin Employment

Relations Commission alleging that the Department had

fired him without just cause. A hearing examiner upheld the

Department’s decision, the Commission issued a formal

order to that effect, and Schneiter unsuccessfully sought

judicial review in state court.

While pursuing his state remedies, Schneiter also filed

this federal suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was

fired in violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of

speech and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due pro-

cess.1 Seeking damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive

relief (including reinstatement), the complaint named four

high-level Department officials as defendants: Secretary

Carr, Deputy Secretary Pechacek, Makda Fessahaye (the

Administrator of the Division of Adult Institutions), and

Kari Beier (the Director of the Bureau of Personnel and

Human Resources).

The defendants moved for summary judgment on all

claims, and the district judge granted the motion across the

1 Schneiter also brought a claim for violation of his right to freedom of

speech under the Wisconsin Constitution. He abandoned that claim on

appeal.

No. 22-2137 13

board. On the First Amendment claim, the judge applied the

Pickering balancing test and concluded that the Department’s

interests as a public employer outweighed Schneiter’s

speech interest in posting the memes to his social-media

page. Schneiter’s due-process claim rested largely on his

argument that the Department could not discipline him in

the absence of a specific policy about employee social-media

use. The judge rejected that theory and concluded that

Schneiter had received constitutionally adequate notice and

an opportunity to be heard before he was fired.

II. Discussion

We review the summary-judgment order de novo, con-

struing the evidence in the light most favorable to Schneiter

as the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable infer-

ences in his favor. Munson v. Newbold, 46 F.4th 678, 681 (7th

Cir. 2022). We begin by addressing which forms of relief are

still at issue on appeal. As we’ve noted, Schneiter initially

sought declaratory and injunctive relief in addition to dam-

ages. At oral argument his attorney withdrew the requests

for declaratory and injunctive relief, emphasizing that the

case had been narrowed to a request for damages.2

2 Before oral argument we worried about a potential clash between the

state and federal litigation and raised a concern about abstention; we

asked counsel to be prepared to address that question. With Schneiter’s

concessions at oral argument, abstention is no longer a concern. In state

court Schneiter pursued state administrative remedies and sought

reinstatement. With the narrowing of the federal litigation to the two

federal constitutional claims and a request for damages as the sole

remedy, there is no conflict or duplication.

14 No. 22-2137

With only monetary relief now in play, the doctrine of

qualified immunity rises to the surface. Qualified immunity

shields public officials from civil damages liability, protect-

ing “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)

(quotation marks omitted). The qualified-immunity inquiry

has two steps: We ask first whether the defendants “violated

a federal statutory or constitutional right” and second

whether “the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly

established at the time.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583

U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658,

664 (2012)). Both conditions must be satisfied to pierce the

immunity and subject a government official to damages

liability.

The defendants preserved the qualified-immunity de-

fense, but the district judge did not specifically address it.

That was understandable. Schneiter initially sought equita-

ble relief in addition to damages, so the judge zeroed in on

the merits of the constitutional claims and found for the

defendants across the board. That made the second step in

the qualified-immunity framework unnecessary. Because we

agree that Schneiter’s constitutional claims fail on the merits,

there’s no need to say anything more about qualified im-

munity.

A. Free-Speech Retaliation Claim

To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a

public-employee plaintiff must prove that (1) he engaged in

constitutionally protected speech; (2) he suffered a depriva-

tion likely to deter protected speech; and (3) his “protected

speech was a motivating factor in the deprivation.” Harnish-

feger v. United States, 943 F.3d 1105, 1112 (7th Cir. 2019). The

No. 22-2137 15

second and third elements are not at issue here. It’s undis-

puted that Schneiter was fired for his Facebook posts; the

loss of his job is a substantial deprivation and causation is

conceded. The free-speech claim thus turns on the threshold

inquiry, which asks whether Schneiter’s First Amendment

rights are implicated at all.

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the First

Amendment rights of public employees has long rejected the

idea that simply “answering the call to public service” strips

a citizen of his free-speech rights. Kingman v. Frederickson, 40

F.4th 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2022). After all, “a citizen who works

for the government is nonetheless a citizen.” Garcetti v.

Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). Still, the Court has recog-

nized the fundamental difference between the government’s

general role as a regulator and its role as an employer.

Accordingly, free-speech doctrine gives the government a

freer hand in regulating the speech of its employees. “Gov-

ernment employers, like private employers, need a signifi-

cant degree of control over their employees’ words and

actions; without it, there would be little chance for the

efficient provision of public services.” Id. at 418. According-

ly, the Court has held that the Constitution tolerates greater

restrictions on public-employee speech, but it does so only to

the extent “necessary for [public] employers to operate

efficiently and effectively.” Id. at 419.

Emerging from these competing aims is a two-step in-

quiry for evaluating whether a public employee’s speech is

constitutionally protected. At the first step, the employee

must establish that he “spoke as a citizen on a matter of

public concern.” Id. at 418. “If a public employee speaks

pursuant to [his or her] official duties,” then the First

16 No. 22-2137

Amendment offers no protection because “that kind of

speech is—for constitutional purposes at least—the govern-

ment’s own speech.” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S.

507, 527 (2022) (alteration in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Schneiter’s Facebook posts were not the

Department’s speech; that much is undisputed. The district

judge therefore passed over this point and assumed that the

posts qualify as citizen speech on a matter of public concern.

Everyone accepts that determination for purposes of appeal,

and we agree.

Where, as here, the public employee spoke as a citizen on

a matter of public concern, then his speech falls within a

zone of possible constitutional protection. At that point the

doctrinal inquiry requires “a delicate balancing of the com-

peting interests surrounding the speech and its consequenc-

es.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.

This balancing test originates from the Supreme Court’s

decision in Pickering. There the Court explained that the goal

of the employee-speech doctrine is to weigh “the interests of

the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of

public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,

in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs

through its employees.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. “Because

of the enormous variety of fact situations in which” employ-

ee speech risks harm to a public employer, the Court has

declined “to lay down a general standard against which”

employee speech “may be judged.” Id. at 569.

Our cases applying Pickering have articulated a nonexclu-

sive list of seven factors that may be relevant to the balance

of interests:

No. 22-2137 17

(1) whether the speech would create problems

in maintaining discipline or harmony among

co-workers; (2) whether the employment rela-

tionship is one in which personal loyalty and

confidence are necessary; (3) whether the

speech impeded the employee’s ability to per-

form her responsibilities; (4) the time, place,

and manner of the speech; (5) the context in

which the underlying dispute arose; (6) wheth-

er the matter was one on which debate was vi-

tal to informed decisionmaking; and

(7) whether the speaker should be regarded as

a member of the general public.

Harnishfeger, 943 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Kristofek v. Village of

Orland Hills, 832 F.3d 785, 796 (7th Cir. 2016)).

As we’ve noted, however, it’s not necessary to consider

each of these factors in every case, and “merely counting

how many factors line up on each side is not particularly

informative.” Darlingh v. Maddaleni, 142 F.4th 558, 566 (7th

Cir. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). Because Pickering calls

for a context-sensitive inquiry, our seven-factor list is neither

a doctrinal touchstone nor a straightjacket. Id. Rather, it is

sometimes “more meaningful to focus on the specific con-

siderations that bear weight in evaluating the competing

interests” in the case at hand. Id.

We take that approach here, starting with the interests on

Schneiter’s side of the scale. He posted the memes on his

personal Facebook page during nonwork hours, and neither

his Facebook profile nor the posts specifically identified his

public employment. Moreover, although the posts were not

“private” in the conventional sense—they were shared with

18 No. 22-2137

about 1,200 people—it remains true that only those whom

Schneiter had included in his group of Facebook “friends”

could view them. So the speech at issue in this case was

essentially personal and not on its face linked to Schneiter’s

state corrections job.

Schneiter has repeatedly denied that he posted the

memes with any “offensive or discriminatory intent.” By his

account, his aims were to criticize political parties for “tak-

ing voters for granted”; to “show how Facebook inconsist-

ently removes posts”; to “draw attention” to the risks of

flying select flags; and to confront those who arbitrarily

“level charges of racism.” Expressing no view on these

claims, we nonetheless acknowledge their connection to

contested political and cultural issues.

We turn, then, to the Department’s countervailing inter-

ests. They are significant. Our circuit’s Pickering caselaw

gives special solicitude to public employers in the law-

enforcement and correctional contexts because “safety and

order” are of “paramount concern[].” Volkman, 736 F.3d at

1092. Recognizing the limits of our own institutional compe-

tence, we generally defer to the judgments of law-

enforcement and correctional officials regarding “the disrup-

tive nature of an employee’s speech.” Lalowski v. City of Des

Plaines, 789 F.3d 784, 792 (7th Cir. 2015). Put more explicitly,

law-enforcement and correctional agencies have “more

latitude” in their personnel and disciplinary decisions than

“ordinary government employer[s].” Kokkinis v. Ivkovich, 185

F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). The

correctional context looms large in this case.

Though Schneiter disclaimed any discriminatory intent,

he conceded in his opening brief that “some of the memes

No. 22-2137 19

are offensive.” No doubt. Among other things, the memes

compared Muslim children to garbage, suggested that all

Muslims should leave the United States, referred to the

Democratic party as a “plantation,” and aligned with white

supremacists against the LGBTQ community. Public em-

ployers, like their private counterparts, have a significant

interest in ensuring respectful, nondiscriminatory workplac-

es.

More directly to the point here, the Department is a large

state corrections agency that houses a diverse population

and has a diverse workforce. As a deputy warden, Schneiter

was responsible for managing a division of 14 correctional

facilities. Targeting Muslims, black, and gay people,

Schneiter’s posts denigrated populations he was required to

supervise, manage, and lead. The Department reasonably

concluded that Schneiter’s posts risked exacerbating already

high tensions among the inmates and causing “increased

distrust, unrest, or even violence” in its correctional facili-

ties. After all, the Department’s core obligation is to maintain

order and security in its correctional facilities.

The Department was also quite reasonably concerned

that the posts called into question Schneiter’s ability to treat

staff fairly and impartially. And that, in turn, could under-

mine the Department’s efforts to maintain harmonious

workplace relationships, comply with nondiscrimination

requirements and norms, and successfully recruit new staff.

Resisting this conclusion, Schneiter emphasizes that there

is no evidence that his posts caused any disruption. But “a

showing of actual disrupti[on] is not required”; a public

employer may act based on “potential disruption” so long as

its predictions are reasonable. Lalowski, 789 F.3d at 791

20 No. 22-2137

(quotation marks omitted). And by placing Schneiter on

administrative leave soon after discovering the Facebook

posts, the Department may have prevented a disruptive

reaction in its correctional facilities. See Weicherding v. Riegel,

160 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1998) (observing that the expe-

ditious suspension of an employee likely avoided racially

motivated disruption).

The Department also has a significant interest in main-

taining public confidence in its services. A public employer’s

reputational interests are a valid part of the balancing in-

quiry. See, e.g., Lalowski, 789 F.3d at 792 (noting that a police

officer “compromised the community’s trust in its police

officers”); Anderson v. Burke Cnty., 239 F.3d 1216, 1221–22

(11th Cir. 2001) (deeming the maintenance of public confi-

dence “a compelling and legitimate government interest”).

Perhaps the weightiest consideration here is the degree of

deference owed to the Department’s own assessment of the

risks to its mission-critical correctional operations. Schneiter

was not just a rank-and-file correctional officer. He held a

high-level office as a deputy warden—a leadership role of

significant trust and confidence, with operational and mana-

gerial responsibility over inmates and staff in 14 correctional

facilities. “When close working relationships are essential to

fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference

to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.” Connick v.

Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983). And as we’ve noted, the

law-enforcement context is especially deserving of deference.

Much more than other public employers, law-enforcement

agencies depend on “order, discipline, and esprit de corps”

for their effective functioning. Kokkinis, 185 F.3d at 845. In

these sorts of “paramilitary” environments—“where safety

No. 22-2137 21

and order are paramount concerns”—we give considerable

deference to the agency’s own assessment of the risks to

security and discipline. Volkman, 736 F.3d at 1092. Under

these circumstances, the Department’s interests in maintain-

ing order, safety, and discipline in its correctional facilities

outweigh Schneiter’s interest in posting these memes on

social media.

B. Due-Process Claim

Schneiter’s due-process challenge centers on his com-

plaint that the Department lacked a specific policy about

social-media use by employees. He does not call into ques-

tion anything about the termination process itself: he has not

challenged the adequacy of the notice, hearing, and layers of

administrative review he received. Instead, he focuses on the

content of the Department’s work rules. His argument, while

not entirely clear, primarily concerns the substance of the

Department’s work rules, not the process that preceded the

termination of his employment. Though not clearly labeled

as such, his argument resembles a challenge under the void-

for-vagueness doctrine, a subset of the substantive compo-

nent of due process that reflects principles of fair notice and

reasoned enforcement. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012).

Again, Schneiter has not clearly situated his argument

within this framework. But because he asserts that the

Department’s rules failed to warn him of the possible conse-

quences of his off-duty social-media activity, we treat his

argument as one about vagueness.

Even framed this way, however, Schneiter’s argument is

meritless. True, the work rules the Department cited as the

22 No. 22-2137

basis for his termination are generic; they prohibit

“[i]ntimidating, interfering with, harassing, demeaning,

treating discourteously, or bullying,” as well as other “out-

side activities” that may impair “independence of judgment”

or the “ability to perform [one’s] duties.” But a public em-

ployer enjoys significant “latitude in crafting reasonable

work regulations for its employees.” Greer v. Amesqua, 212

F.3d 358, 369 (7th Cir. 2000). It may, for example, “prohibit

its employees from being ‘rude to customers,’ a standard

almost certainly too vague when applied to the public at

large.” Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality

opinion). And we have confirmed that the following rules

provide sufficient warning to employees: “conduct [your-

self] so as not to bring the Department into disrepute,” “treat

… superiors with respect,” and “conform to and promptly

and cheerfully obey all … rules.” Greer, 212 F.3d at 369.

Although these rules were “written in general language,” we

held that they “sufficiently define[d] a range of inappropri-

ate conduct [that] a reasonable employee would under-

stand.” Id. So too here. A reasonable employee would

understand that the Department’s broadly written rules

apply to a wide but sufficiently definite range of conduct.

At bottom, Schneiter seems to argue that a public em-

ployer must promulgate a specific policy about employee

social-media activity before it may discipline an employee

for his social-media posts. The Constitution does not require

that degree of specificity.

Schneiter also makes a brief, undeveloped argument that

the predisciplinary proceedings were influenced by bias

against him. While it’s certainly true that “[a] fair hearing

before a fair and unbiased adjudicator is a basic requirement

No. 22-2137 23

of due process,” Alston v. Smith, 840 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir.

2016), the standard for proving bias is not easily satisfied. A

challenger “must overcome a presumption of honesty and

integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” Withrow v. Larkin,

421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). This requires “lay[ing] a specific

foundation of prejudice or prejudgment, such that the

probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally

tolerable.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 675

(7th Cir. 2016). Schneiter has not met this burden. His wholly

speculative and unsupported allegation of bias does not

come close to overcoming the presumption of honesty and

integrity.

Finally, Schneiter highlights aspects of the disciplinary

process that, in his view, failed to comply with state law or

the Department’s own internal policies. Whatever the merits

of these claims, they do not amount to constitutional defi-

ciencies. “[A] failure to follow state statutes or state-

mandated procedures does not amount to a federal due

process claim of constitutional magnitude.” Dietchweiler v.

Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2016).

AFFIRMED