People v. Faial

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JERRY ANTHONY FAIAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

S273840

First Appellate District, Division Three

A159026

San Mateo County Superior Court

SC083808

July 31, 2025

Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which

Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger,

Groban, and Evans concurred.

PEOPLE v. FAIAL

S273840

Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

Enacted in 2020, Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg.

Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950) limited probation terms for

defendants convicted of most felonies to two years. (Pen. Code,1

§ 1203.1, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2.) As

a result, subject to certain exceptions not relevant here,

defendants who are placed on probation for these felonies after

the legislation became operative on January 1, 2021, will serve

no longer than a two-year term.

Defendants already serving a probation term exceeding

two years on January 1, 2021, may also be entitled to a reduced

term. As to defendants on probation as of that date whose cases

are not final, Courts of Appeal have uniformly found that

Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively under In re Estrada

(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada). (See, e.g., People v. Greeley

(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 627; People v. Lord (2021) 64

Cal.App.5th 241, 245–246; People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th

943, 964 (Sims); People v. Quinn (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 874,

1

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. In

2021, the Legislature repealed the 2020 enactment but added

substantively identical provisions in a new section 1203.1, while

redesignating former section 1203.1, subdivision (m), as section

1203.1, subdivision (l). (Stats. 2021, ch. 257, §§ 21–22; Assem.

Bill No. 177 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).) This development does not

affect our analysis, and we consider defendant’s claim based on

the operative date of the 2020 enactment: January 1, 2021.

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

881–885 (Quinn).) Courts in these cases have shortened the

length of the probation term to a total of two years in accordance

with Assembly Bill 1950.

However, as to defendants whose probation was revoked

and terminated before January 1, 2021, Courts of Appeal have

disagreed on whether Assembly Bill 1950’s ameliorative

changes apply in cases that are not yet final. (See, e.g., People

v. Faial (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 738 [Assembly Bill 1950 does not

apply]; but see People v. Jackson (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 207,

review granted Sept. 13, 2023, S281267; People v. Canedos

(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 469, review granted June 29, 2022,

S274244; People v. Butler (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 216, review

granted June 1, 2022, S273773; cf. Kuhnel v. Superior Court

(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 726, review granted June 1, 2022,

S274000.)

In this case, the trial court ordered the defendant’s four-

year probation term revoked in May 2019, and later ordered

termination of his probation and execution of his suspended

sentence. The defendant timely appealed. When Assembly Bill

1950 became operative on January 1, 2021, the defendant was

in prison serving his sentence. Under existing law, the

defendant’s appeal — which is before us here — rendered his

case not yet final. (See People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671,

680 (Esquivel).) As such, for purposes of Assembly Bill 1950’s

retroactive application under Estrada, his probation term

remained extant when the ameliorative legislation became

operative. We conclude, therefore, that Assembly Bill 1950 can

be applied retroactively to shorten the defendant’s period of

probation such that his probation term expired two years after

he was sentenced. After reviewing the text of the statute in light

of its history and purposes, we conclude that Assembly Bill 1950

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

authorizes relief from the consequences of acts occurring beyond

the two-year period. Accordingly, the judgment affirming the

orders revoking and terminating his probation and executing

his suspended sentence must be set aside.

I.

On October 6, 2016, a trial court found Jerry Anthony

Faial guilty of petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction

(§ 666, subd. (a); count 4) and two counts of making criminal

threats (§ 422, subd. (a); counts 5 and 6). These counts related

to his theft of a juicer from a Daly City department store and

threats he made to the store’s loss prevention employees. The

court also found Faial guilty of first degree burglary (§ 460,

subd. (a); count 1) based on a separate incident in which Faial

entered his father’s home in violation of a stay away order and

took tools. As to the burglary count, the trial court found Faial

had been released on bail related to the department store theft

when he committed the burglary. (§ 12022.1.) Allegations that

Faial suffered two prior strike offenses (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),

1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), two prior serious felony convictions

(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd.

(b)), were either found true or admitted.

At a May 4, 2017, sentencing proceeding, the trial court

imposed a 12-year sentence, consisting of the low term of two

years for first degree burglary, two consecutive five-year terms

for the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) priors, and concurrent

terms for the petty theft with a prior count and the criminal

threat counts. The court did not rely on the section 667.5,

subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancements in calculating

Faial’s final sentence. The court thereafter suspended execution

of sentence and placed Faial on four years’ probation with the

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

condition that he complete a residential treatment program in

lieu of a one-year jail term. In November 2017, Faial admitted

violating his probation by failing to complete the program; the

trial court revoked probation but reinstated it under the same

terms and conditions after ordering Faial to complete a different

treatment program.

On May 15, 2019, the trial court summarily revoked

Faial’s four-year probation based on six alleged violations

committed between January and May 2019. The alleged

violations involved Faial’s failure to abstain from the use and

possession of alcohol, resisting arrest, and possession of a knife

and drug paraphernalia. In November 2019, a different judge

found the alleged probation violations true, terminated Faial’s

probation, and ordered execution of his previously suspended

12-year sentence.

Faial timely appealed, asserting he was entitled to

Assembly Bill 1950’s ameliorative effects with respect to the

length of his probation term. Specifically, he asserted that

Assembly Bill 1950 applied “retroactively to shorten his

probation term from four years to two years, thereby

retroactively depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to revoke

his probation after passage of the two-year mark and rendering

the revocation and termination of his probation invalid.”

Assembly Bill 1950’s retroactive application, he argued, meant

that his probation ended on May 4, 2019, “before any

proceedings to revoke his probation had been initiated.”

Rejecting Faial’s argument, the Court of Appeal concluded

that “Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively to a specific class

of persons — i.e., defendants whose probation has not been

revoked and terminated.” Faial does not fall within this class,

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the court reasoned, because his probation had been revoked and

terminated over a year before the legislation took effect. The

Court of Appeal found “no indication” that the Legislature, in

passing Assembly Bill 1950, “intended to extinguish a

defendant’s accountability for probation violations,” “to excuse

conduct that was addressed as a violation of probation rather

than prosecuted as a new criminal charge,” or “to otherwise

invalidate revocation and termination orders predating January

1, 2021.” In the court’s view, the legislation’s “basic aims” — “to

incentivize compliance and allow for increased supervision and

services for offenders working toward rehabilitation” — “are

inconsequential for former probationers like defendant.”

In this court, Faial maintains that because his appeal from

the orders revoking and terminating probation is pending, his

case is not yet final for purposes of applying Estrada; he is,

therefore, entitled to Assembly Bill 1950’s ameliorative benefits.

He further contends that under Assembly Bill 1950, his term of

probation ended by operation of law before the court issued

orders revoking and terminating probation. For his part, the

Attorney General concedes that Faial’s case is not final under

Estrada, but he asserts the Estrada rule does not dictate “how

A.B. 1950 operates — that is, what sorts of nonfinal cases it will

affect.” (See People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 969

(Prudholme) [“deciding that a statute applies retroactively ‘does

not answer the [separate] question of how that statute should

be applied’ ”].) The Attorney General maintains that Assembly

Bill 1950’s legislative history does not “reflect any intent to

revivify a probation term that had already been properly

terminated pursuant to section 1203.2 in order to unwind a

lawfully executed sentence following a valid revocation and

termination.”

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We granted review to resolve this question.

II.

Under the prior version of section 1203.1, courts could

grant probation2 “for a period of time not exceeding the

maximum term for which the person could be imprisoned”

(Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg.

Sess.); Stats. 2020, ch. 328) or for “not over five years” (former

§ 1203.1) where the maximum sentence was five years or less.)

The Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1950 in part to shorten

the length of probation for most felonies. (§ 1203.1, subd. (a).)

Effective January 1, 2021, section 1203.1, subdivision (a),

provides in relevant part: “The court, or judge thereof, in the

order granting probation, may suspend the imposing or the

execution of the sentence and may direct that the suspension

may continue for a period of time not exceeding two years, and

upon those terms and conditions as it shall determine.”

(§ 1203.1, subd. (a), italics added; Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem.

Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2020, ch. 328.)

Thus, since January 1, 2021, section 1203.1 has prohibited

courts from imposing a probation term exceeding two years

unless the underlying offense is a violent felony listed in section

667.5, subdivision (c); is subject to a specified probation length;

or is specifically excluded from the statute’s two-year limit. (See

§ 1203.1, former subds. (a), (m), added by Stats. 2020, ch. 328,

§ 2, now subds. (a), (l).) Apart from these exceptions, Assembly

Bill 1950 “reduced the maximum allowable probation term for a

2

The term “probation” as used in the Penal Code means

“the suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence and

the order of conditional and revocable release in the community

under the supervision of a probation officer.” (§ 1203, subd. (a).)

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wide range of offenses.” (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at

p. 976.) It did not, however, “reduce the punishment for any

particular offense or enhancement.” (Ibid.)

Proponents of Assembly Bill 1950 argued that a two-year

limit on probation terms was appropriate because “probation

supervision is most beneficial in the early part of a probation

term”; “increased levels of supervision can lead to increased

involvement with the criminal justice system due to the

likelihood that minor violations will be detected”; and “reducing

the length of probation terms would enable probation officers to

more effectively manage their caseloads by focusing resources

on those most at risk of reoffending.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of

Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950

(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 10, 2020, p. 5; see

Quinn, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 879–880; see also Sims,

supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 959.) A probation term of two years

would also be long enough for defendants to “connect to

resources” for housing and job training and to complete any

required counseling or training as a condition of probation.

(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950

(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 6, 2020, p. 6 (Assembly

Committee on Public Safety Analysis).)

Assembly Bill 1950’s legislative history emphasized that

extended supervision and scrutiny of probationers who must

comply with various terms and conditions of probation — e.g.,

mandatory meetings, home visits, and regular drug testing —

increase the probability of future incarceration based on minor

infractions. (See Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 976–977;

Assem. Com. on Public Safety Analysis, supra, p. 3 [Author’s

statement: “ ‘Probation — originally meant to reduce

recidivism — has instead become a pipeline for re-entry into the

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

carceral system’ ”].) An analysis by the Assembly Committee on

Public Safety explained, “[i]f the fact that an individual is on

probation can increase the likelihood that they will be taken

back into custody for a probation violation that does not

necessarily involve new criminal conduct, then shortening the

period of supervision is a potential avenue to decrease

individuals’ involvement in the criminal justice system for

minor infractions.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety Analysis,

supra, at p. 5.) Legislative analyses also explained that

shortening probation periods would not only “ ‘decrease the

amount of time that an individual must suffer for a prior

misdeed,’ ” it would also “ ‘incentiviz[e] compliance.’ ” (Assem.

Com. on Public Safety, supra, p. 7; Assem. Com. on

Appropriations, Analysis of Assem. Bill. No. 1950 (2019–2020

Reg. Sess.) as amended May 21, 2020, p. 2.)

Relatedly, we have recognized that reduction of an

authorized probationary period speaks not “to punishment

precisely, but to the efficiency and efficacy of probation as a

rehabilitative device in a variety of circumstances. (See §

1203.1, subd. (l).)” (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 977.)

Assembly Bill 1950 “reflects a determination by the Legislature

that a shorter period of probation would more effectively achieve

the rehabilitative goals undergirding probation by

concentrating services earlier in the probation cycle when they

are predicted to be most effective. Further, according to the

bill’s author, to the extent that ‘ “half of those [probation]

violations are technical and minor in nature, such as missing a

drug rehab appointment or socializing with a friend who has a

criminal record” ’ (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of

Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended June

10, 2020, p. 4), a shorter period of probation would reduce the

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length of time during which a defendant could violate probation

on such technicality. (See Assem. Com. on Public Safety,

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950, supra, as amended May 6,

2020, pp. 5–6.)” (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 976–977.)

Against this backdrop, we next consider whether and how

Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively here given that the

trial court ordered Faial’s probation revoked and terminated

before the legislation became operative. Our recent decisions in

Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th 961 and Esquivel, supra, 11

Cal.5th 671 provide significant guidance on these questions.

III.

A new statute is presumed to operate prospectively absent

an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear indication the

Legislature or electorate intended otherwise. (Prudholme,

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 967; see § 3 [“No part of [the Penal Code]

is retroactive, unless expressly so declared”]; see also Estrada,

supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.) In Estrada, we explained that

“[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the

punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its

former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is

proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act.

It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have

intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty

now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which

it constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act imposing

the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts

committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting

the defendant of the act is not final.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d

at p. 745, italics added; see People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th

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152, 160 (Padilla) [explaining Estrada’s limited rule of

retroactivity for “new laws that mitigate punishment”].)

As we explained in Esquivel, “Estrada’s presumption of

retroactivity has been a fixture of our criminal law for more than

50 years” and “continues to stand for the proposition that (i) in

the absence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii)

legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all cases

that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.”

(Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 675.) In Prudholme, we

recently affirmed that Assembly Bill 1950 is an ameliorative

statute that may be applied retroactively under Estrada.

(Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 969.) “Although probation

is not considered a traditional form of punishment, in light of

[certain] restrictions on personal liberty contemplated by the

imposition of probation, we conclude the rationale of Estrada

applies equally” in that context. (Id. at p. 968.) By limiting

probation terms to two years, “ ‘Assembly Bill No. 1950 has a

direct and significant ameliorative benefit for at least some

probationers who otherwise would be subject to additional

months or years of potentially onerous and intrusive probation

conditions.’ ” (Id. at p. 969, quoting Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th

at p. 959.) Because a defendant’s violation of these probation

conditions could, in turn, lead to the execution of a suspended

sentence, the longer a defendant is exposed to such conditions

the greater the possibility for punishment. (See ante, at pp. 7–

8.)

Given the Legislature’s determination that “as a matter of

policy, the longer probationary terms previously allowed were

unduly costly and counterproductive, and that a reduced

maximum probationary term serves the public interest”

(Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 969), we found in Prudholme

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“adequate support for the conclusion that the Legislature ‘must

have intended’ to reduce the available probationary period in

‘every case to which [the amended statute] constitutionally

could apply.’ ” (Ibid.) On that point, we did not perceive any

contrary intent regarding the retroactivity of Assembly Bill

1950.

A.

Under Estrada, whether an ameliorative law applies

retroactively in a given case depends on finality. As we

explained in Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 678, finality

concerns “the criminal proceeding as a whole,” including direct

review of an order for execution of sentence. (See People v. Lopez

(2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392 [“A criminal case is only reduced to a

singular, final judgment following the conclusion of the entire

criminal case or prosecution”].) Direct review of the order

consists of an appeal to the Court of Appeal, a petition for review

in this court, and a petition for writ of certiorari before the

United States Supreme Court. (Esquivel, at p. 680; see People

v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305–306.) “Through all these

steps, a suspended execution sentence is not final, and the

Estrada presumption remains available.” (Esquivel, at p. 680.)

As pertinent here, we stated in Esquivel that “[a] case in

which a defendant is convicted and placed on probation with

execution of sentence suspended is not final while direct review

of the order imposing sentence remains ongoing.” (Esquivel,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 680.) As in Esquivel, the relevant

ameliorative legislation in this case, Assembly Bill 1950, became

operative after the trial court imposed probation and suspended

execution of Faial’s sentence, but before the conclusion of his

appeal from the court’s order revoking and terminating

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probation and executing the suspended sentence. Because

Faial’s case is “pending on appeal from an order causing a

previously imposed sentence to take effect” (Esquivel, at p. 680),

his case is not final for purposes of Estrada’s rule of

retroactivity. (See ibid.) We conclude, therefore, that Assembly

Bill 1950 “presumptively applies” to Faial’s case. (Esquivel, at

p. 680.)

In light of Esquivel, the Attorney General concedes that

Assembly Bill 1950 operates retroactively under Estrada and

that Faial’s case is not final for purposes of Estrada. (See

Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 676 [“well settled” rule “that a

matter is not ‘final’ for this purpose merely because the

defendant has already been sentenced”].) Thus, the trial court’s

order terminating Faial’s probation — from which Faial has

appealed — does not provide the “ ‘ “last word” ’ ” and is not

dispositive on whether Faial is entitled to relief under Assembly

Bill 1950. (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 161.)

B.

Nevertheless, as the Attorney General asserts, the fact

that this case is not final under Estrada is not dispositive of

whether Faial is entitled to relief because Estrada “does not

answer the question of how [Assembly Bill 1950] should be

applied.” (People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 700; see

Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 969.) As to defendants who

were on probation when the legislation became operative,

Assembly Bill 1950’s application is generally straightforward

and settled: courts have simply shortened the existing

probation term. (See ante, at p. 2.)

However, the Attorney General asserts Faial is not

entitled to any relief under Assembly Bill 1950 because he was,

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in fact, not on probation when the legislation became operative.

In essence, the Attorney General argues that there is no

“available probationary period” to reduce (Prudholme, supra, 14

Cal.5th at p. 968) where, as here, a trial court ordered revocation

and termination of probation before Assembly Bill 1950 became

operative. He reasons as follows: “[P]ursuant to section 1203.2,

subdivision (c), upon termination [of probation], imposition of

judgment, and pronouncement or execution of sentence, a

defendant is no longer on ‘probation’ as that term is defined in

section 1203.” He further argues that “[b]y its express terms,

section 1203.1, the statute that Assembly Bill 1950 amended,

governs the court’s authority to grant probation and covers all

active grants of probation. Nothing in its text or its provisions

addresses or governs a termination of probation or a post-

termination execution or imposition of sentence,” including

authorizing courts to “unwind orders terminating probation.”

“By amending the length of an existing term of probation

without also amending the longstanding rules governing

termination, the Legislature created a clear ameliorative benefit

for those defendants who were actually on probation, without

providing any comparable ameliorative benefit for those who

were not on probation because it had already been terminated

and sentence imposed or executed.” Finally, because the trial

court ordered Faial’s probation revoked and terminated before

Assembly Bill 1950 became operative, the Attorney General

argues that this case is instead governed by sections 1203.2 and

1203.3, authorizing the court to revoke or terminate probation.3

3

As relevant here, section 1203.2 provides: “Upon any

revocation and termination of probation the court may, if the

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Faial responds that Assembly Bill 1950 provides him relief

because “the finality of a defendant’s case is the bright line for

the application of an ameliorative statute.” He asserts that

because his case is not final for Estrada purposes, amended

section 1203.1 retroactively shortens his probation period to a

two-year period starting from when he was sentenced on May 4,

2017. His probation term, therefore, expired by operation of law

on May 4, 2019.4 Beyond the expiration of his probation term,

the trial court could neither revoke nor terminate his probation

nor order execution of the suspended 12-year prison sentence.

(See People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 514–515 [defendant’s

sentence has been suspended, pronounce judgment for any time

within the longest period for which the person might have been

sentenced. However, if the judgment has been pronounced and

the execution thereof has been suspended, the court may revoke

the suspension and order that the judgment shall be in full force

and effect. In either case, the person shall be delivered over to

the proper officer to serve their sentence, less any credits herein

provided for.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (c); see § 1203.3, subd. (a)

[§ 1203.3 authorizes courts “at any time during the term of

probation to revoke, modify, or change its order of suspension of

imposition or execution of sentence,” and outlines procedures for

the modification of probation terms and conditions]; id., subd.

(b)(1); see People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 782 (Chavez)

[“Sections 1203.2 and 1203.3 elaborate upon the fundamentally

revocable nature of probation”].)

4

Although the record contains evidence that Faial may

have violated his probation in January and March 2019, before

a two-year probation period would have expired on May 4, 2019,

the trial court did not order revocation before that date. (See

People v. White (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 677, 682–683.) The

Attorney General does not argue that probation violations

committed in early 2019 render Faial ineligible for relief under

Assembly Bill 1950, and we express no opinion on that question.

(Cf. Kuhnel v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 726, review

granted.)

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conduct occurring outside the probationary period may not be

basis for finding a probation violation].) Accordingly, Faial

contends the trial court’s orders revoking and terminating his

probation are invalid. (See Chavez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 783

[“the court cannot extend the term of probation, change its

conditions, or otherwise subject the defendant to punishment in

lieu of the successfully completed probation”]; § 1203.3.)

At the outset, unlike the Attorney General, we do not find

dispositive the fact that the trial court ordered revocation and

termination of Faial’s probation term before Assembly Bill 1950

became operative. Because Faial subsequently appealed the

trial court’s order, the question whether the trial court validly

revoked and terminated his probation — and ordered execution

of the suspended sentence — remains undecided. “[W]hen an

appeal from an order causing punishment to take effect is

ongoing . . . [,] the criminal proceeding remains pending, and

closure has yet to be obtained.” (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at

p. 680.) As such, at the time Assembly Bill 1950 became

operative, Faial’s four-year probation term remained pending

and, therefore, extant for purposes of Estrada. Given this

circumstance, we conclude that Assembly Bill 1950 can

retroactively apply to shorten Faial’s probation term to two

years from when probation was imposed. (See People v.

McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 50 (McKenzie) [defendant may

“tak[e] advantage of ameliorative amendments that took effect

while he was appealing from the subsequent revocation of his

probation and imposition of sentence”].)

Indeed, the Attorney General’s contention that there is no

probation term to shorten even when an order revoking and

terminating probation is appealed is inconsistent with sections

1203.2 and 1203.3, which outline a trial court’s authority to

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modify probation. If an appellate court reverses an order

terminating probation, the trial court on remand has full

“authority” under section 1203.3, subdivision (a) to “modify” or

“change” the terms of probation, or even to “terminate the period

of probation” and “discharge the person held.” (See Esquivel,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 680 [“when an appeal from an order

causing punishment to take effect is ongoing . . . [,] [e]ven the

terms of probation itself remain subject to modification”]; People

v. Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1421–1422 [on remand

after appellate reversal of judgment terminating probation, trial

court may “modif[y] [the] terms” of probation or “terminate

probation”].) Accordingly, because his case is not final and “the

terms of probation itself remain subject to modification”

(Esquivel, at p. 680), Assembly Bill 1950 can retroactively apply

to shorten the length of Faial’s probation. And as Faial

emphasizes, his probation period terminated by operation of law

on May 4, 2019.

IV.

In addition to arguing that the text of the relevant statutes

bar retroactive relief under these circumstances, the Attorney

General contends that affording Faial relief retroactively would

“unwind a lawfully executed sentence following a valid

revocation and termination” and would thereby relieve Faial of

the expected consequences of violating probation. The Attorney

General further insists there is no “indication that the

Legislature intended to actually or potentially alter an executed

sentence” in order to “release prisoners, who had been

probationers, from their sentences.” He adds that “simply

shortening the maximum period of probation in section 1203.1

neither expressly nor implicitly conveys any intent to so

dramatically modify the limitations the Legislature itself has

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placed on a court’s ability to revisit its decisions,” such as

altering or vacating a sentence absent error. In the Attorney

General’s view, “[n]othing in the legislative design or history

supports [a] construction of [Assembly Bill] 1950 that would

undo a prior revocation and termination of probation.”

Leveraging the policy considerations that animated

Assembly Bill 1950’s passage, the Attorney General contends

this result is inconsistent with the primary focus of Assembly

Bill 1950, which “was aimed at probationers with a chance to

succeed going forward, not those who had been given an

opportunity, failed to capitalize on it, and earned the sentence

they had been promised should they fail.” Given this focus, “the

Legislature could not have intended retroactive application

beyond shortening probation terms still in effect” which would

otherwise “extinguish a defendant’s accountability for probation

violations” or “invalidate revocation and termination orders

predating January 1, 2021.” While the Attorney General’s views

carry some force, we reject his narrow view of the focus of

Assembly Bill 1950 for reasons explained more fully below.

A.

The Attorney General is correct that Estrada itself “does

not answer the question of how [Assembly Bill 1950] should be

applied” in this case. (People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.

700.) However, his arguments critically overlook the breadth of

the “inference” on which “[t]he Estrada rule rests”: “in the

absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily

intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend

as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between

sentences that are final and sentences that are not.” (People v.

Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657; see, e.g., People v. Braden

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

(2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 801–802; People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th

618; People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1135.) Absent any

savings clause, “the statute must demonstrate contrary

indications of legislative intent ‘ “with sufficient clarity” ’ in

order to rebut the Estrada rule.” (Frahs, at p. 628; see People v.

Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299 (Rossi) [“in the absence of clear

legislative intent to the contrary” a defendant should receive

retroactive “benefit of a mitigation of punishment” if conviction

is not final].)5

We also do not agree with the Attorney General’s view that

“unwind[ing]” legal consequences of past acts is impermissible

5

Prudholme involved Assembly Bill 1950’s retroactive

effect on probation terms set by plea agreements. Determining

the proper remedy in that context was “complicated” by the

existence of a second statute that precluded a court, absent the

People’s agreement, from altering the terms of an accepted plea

bargain in a way more favorable to a defendant. (Prudholme,

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 973.) The second statute “created a

statutory ambiguity regarding how [Assembly Bill 1950] should

be applied retroactively to existing plea agreements.”

(Prudholme, at p. 974.)

In light of the Legislature’s intent to “reduce the length of

probation across the board” pursuant to Assembly Bill 1950 and

the circumstance that reducing the defendant’s probation term

from three to two years would not “so ‘fundamentally alter[] the

character of the bargain’ that the People should have an

opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement,” we held that

“Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively to nonfinal cases and

the proper remedy is to modify the probationary term to conform

with the new law while maintaining the remainder of the plea

agreement.” (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 963, 977–

978.) In this case, there is no similar “statutory ambiguity” (id.

at p. 974) arising from the “intersection of [the] statutory

scheme of [probation] and the retroactivity rule of Estrada” (id.

at p. 971).

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

for purposes of the Estrada rule because this would “obliterate”

or “extinguish” a defendant’s accountability for prohibited

conduct. We have long rejected the argument that defendants

may not benefit from ameliorative statutes that eliminate

consequences for past acts. (See McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at

pp. 50–51, citing Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 302, fn. 8 and

People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 213 (Collins).)

For instance, in Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at page 298, the

defendant was convicted of an offense — and “the trial court

rendered [a] judgment of conviction” — based on acts that were

criminal when committed. Under a statutory amendment that

became operative “after the rendition of judgment but before its

finality by the lapse of the period for appeal,” “the acts which

defendant committed [were no longer] criminal.” (Ibid.)

Applying Estrada, we held that “in light of the intervening

amendment,” the defendant’s conviction “must be reversed.”

(Ibid.) In reaching this conclusion, we rejected the dissent’s

view that the Estrada rule does not “permit[] [a] defendant to

entirely escape punishment for” acts that were criminal when

committed (id. at p. 305 (dis. opn. of Clark, J.)), as well as the

Attorney General’s related argument that the Estrada rule does

not apply where ameliorative legislation does not “merely

reduce[] the punishment for the conduct,” but “entirely

eliminate[s] any criminal sanction for [the] defendant’s acts” (id.

at p. 301). We explained that Estrada’s principles “apply a

fortiorari when criminal sanctions have been completely

repealed before a criminal conviction becomes final.” (Ibid.)

In Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at page 211, we applied Rossi

to reverse a conviction that was based on conduct that was

criminal when committed and when judgment was rendered,

but “was no longer a crime” under a statutory amendment that

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

became operative before the judgment was final. Rossi’s

holding, we explained, was based on the presumption, derived

from common law, that “the Legislature, by removing the

proscription from specified conduct, intended to condone past

acts.” (Collins, at p. 212, italics added.) Thus, “an amendment

eliminating criminal sanctions is a sufficient declaration of the

Legislature’s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct so

decriminalized.” (Id. at p. 213.) We concluded that because the

defendant’s conviction was not final and “the act that he

admitted, and upon which his guilty plea and conviction were

based, was no longer punishable” under the amended statute,

his “sentence cannot be allowed to stand.” (Ibid.)

Our decisions in Rossi and Collins make clear that for

purposes of applying the Estrada rule, we have rejected any

“distinction . . . between amendments that merely reduce

punishment and those that entirely eliminate punishment.”

(McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 50.) “[I]t would be untenable,”

we have said, “to give defendants the benefit of a reduction in

punishment while denying them the benefit of a complete

remission of punishment.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 213.)

“A contrary reading of Estrada which confined its holding to

amendments which mitigated punishment and excluded

amendments which repealed all criminal sanction would clearly

lead to absurd results.” (Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 302, fn. 8.)

In short, retroactivity principles are not limited to amendments

that mitigate or reduce punishment for an offense; they extend

to statutes that “decriminalize[] the conduct altogether.”

(People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 725.)

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B.

To the extent the Attorney General argues that

“unwind[ing]” Faial’s prison sentence could not have been

within the Legislature’s contemplation when it shortened

probation terms, we have rejected a similar contention in

another context. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857

(Buycks).) In Buycks, we described the effects of applying an

ameliorative statute retroactively — i.e., those consequences

that are not expressly identified but “fairly contemplated” (id.

at p. 887) by the legislation — as permissible “collateral

effect[s]”6 of retroactive application. (Id. at p. 876.) At issue in

Buycks was Proposition 47 (as approved by voters, Gen. Elec.

(Nov. 4, 2014) (Proposition 47)), which redesignated certain

narcotics and larceny-related offenses from felonies and

“wobblers” to misdemeanors, and permitted defendants

previously convicted of these offenses to petition to have such

convictions resentenced or redesignated as misdemeanors.

(Buycks, at p. 871; see § 1170.18.) We explained that “in

addition to affording persons the ability to retroactively have

their felony convictions be reduced to misdemeanors,

Proposition 47, through section 1170.18, subdivision (k),

mandates that the reduced conviction ‘shall be considered a

6

Buycks also used the term “collateral consequence” in

reference to “ ‘the possibility of increased punishment in the

event of a subsequent conviction,’ ” such as an enhancement.

(Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 878, italics added.) Our focus

here is on its discussion of the ameliorative legislation’s

“retroactive collateral effect on judgments that were not final

when the [legislation] took effect.” (Id. at p. 883; see id. at p. 876

[addressing “Proposition 47’s collateral effect on enhancements

and offenses attached to convictions reduced to

misdemeanors”].)

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

misdemeanor for all purposes.’ (Italics added.) Subdivision (k)

of section 1170.18, therefore, plainly extends the retroactive

ameliorative effects of Proposition 47 to mitigate any future

collateral consequence of a felony conviction that is reduced

under the measure.” (Buycks, at p. 878.)

As pertinent here, we also determined in Buycks that

“under the Estrada rule, [the ameliorative statute] can have

retroactive collateral effect on judgments that were not final

when the initiative took effect.” (Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p.

883, italics added.) We explained that “extending the

ameliorative effects of felony convictions reduced to

misdemeanor convictions under Proposition 47 to enhancements

and subsequent offenses derived from those convictions — at

least when the judgments involving these felony-based

enhancements are not yet final for purposes of Estrada — is

consistent” with the measure’s goal of generating cost savings to

invest in various crime prevention and treatment programs by

reducing the incarceration terms for those offenders. (Id. at p.

888.) We saw no impediment to relieving defendants from the

consequences of felony-based enhancements already imposed —

even though the legislation did not expressly provide for such

relief — “so long as the judgment containing the enhancement

was not final when Proposition 47 took effect.” (Id. at p. 879

[rejecting Attorney General’s claim that Prop. 47 could not

“retroactively reach back to unravel a felony-based conviction or

a felony-based enhancement”].)

In Buycks, we further emphasized that when Proposition

47’s retroactive application results in reduction of a conviction

from a felony to a misdemeanor, a collateral effect of the

reduction is to “negate[] an element required to support” a

corresponding Three Strikes allegation, i.e., a prior felony

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

conviction. (Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 889.) In other words,

a concomitant effect of retroactively applying Proposition 47 is

to “undo” or “negate” sentencing enhancements predicated on

the defendant’s underlying felony conviction (see, e.g., §§ 667.5,

12022.1). (Buycks, at pp. 880, 890.) We ultimately concluded

that when a felony conviction is retroactively redesignated a

misdemeanor under Proposition 47, “it can no longer be said

that the defendant ‘was previously convicted of a felony.’ ”

(Buycks, at p. 889.) This “collateral effect,” we determined, was

“fairly contemplated” within Proposition 47, in part, because the

“emphasis on reduced penalties for these narcotics and larceny-

related offenses extends logically to enhancements and

subsequent offenses connected to those offenses.” (Buycks, at p.

887, fn. omitted.)

We find Buycks’s reasoning applicable in this case. As

discussed, because Faial’s case is on appeal and his probation

term remained extant for purposes of applying Estrada at the

time Assembly Bill 1950 became operative, the ameliorative

legislation may retroactively apply to shorten the term to two

years. Accordingly, “it can no longer be said” (Buycks, supra, 5

Cal.5th at p. 889) that any misconduct committed during Faial’s

original probation term can support the revocation and

termination of probation; instead, the probation term effectively

ended by operation of law on May 4, 2019, two years after it was

imposed. Similar to Buycks, we conclude here that the collateral

effect of Assembly Bill 1950’s retroactive application is to “undo”

or “unravel” the orders terminating Faial’s probation and

ordering execution of the suspended sentence. (Buycks, at pp.

879, 880, 890 [Prop. 47 “can negate a previously imposed section

667.5, subdivision (b), enhancement when the underlying felony

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PEOPLE v. FAIAL

Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

attached to that enhancement has been reduced to a

misdemeanor under the measure”].)

Here, consistent with Buycks, we find the effect of

applying Assembly Bill 1950 retroactively to shorten Faial’s

period of probation is one “fairly contemplated” within the

legislation’s underlying purpose. (Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p.

887.) The Legislature “clearly indicated an intent to reduce” the

“significant impacts probation places on a defendant’s liberty

interests” and to realize the “perceived practical advantages and

increased efficacy achieved by reducing the probationary

term . . . as expeditiously and economically as possible.”

(Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 969.) Although Assembly

Bill 1950’s legislative materials “do not speak directly to the

issue of retroactivity, they suggest the Legislature viewed [the

legislation] as an ameliorative change to the criminal law that

would ensure that many probationers avoid imprisonment.”

(Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 962; Prudholme, at p. 977

[quoting Sims].) We observe that reducing the number of those

in prison for probation violations, in turn, promotes other

important legislative goals identified in Prudholme: “ ‘ “lowering

costs to taxpayers” and “allowing for the possible investment of

savings in effective measures proven to reduce recidivism and

increasing public safety for all Californians.” ’ ”7 (Prudholme, at

p. 966.)

7

Although granting relief to Faial and those in a similar

position may not further another of the Legislature’s goals in

enacting Assembly Bill 1950 — “ ‘incentivizing compliance’ ”

with probation conditions (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, supra,

p. 7) — we have never suggested that the Estrada presumption

applies only if doing so serves every legislative goal of

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

C.

To the extent the Attorney General argues it is anomalous

to apply Estrada so as to “ameliorate the sentences being served

by failed probationers,” as we have previously observed, “some

odd results are inevitable with any rule of retroactivity.”

(Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 168, citing Dorsey v. United

States (2012) 567 U.S. 260, 280 [retroactive application of new

mandatory minimum prison sentences for federal drug crimes

may create “new set of disparities . . . reflecting a line-drawing

effort”].) As we have emphasized, Estrada’s rule of retroactivity

is understood to apply broadly absent any constitutional

constraints. (See Padilla, at p. 162 [“We presume the

Legislature intends the reduced penalty to be used instead in all

cases in which there is no judgment or a nonfinal one, and in

which it is constitutionally permissible for the new law to

control”].) “And while the Attorney General raises practical

concerns” about providing defendants in Faial’s position with

the retroactive relief sought in this case, “he does not identify

any constitutional obstacles to” doing so. (People v. Lopez,

supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 399.)

Such a reprieve from punishment, as our prior decisions

demonstrate, is fully consistent with and contemplated by

Estrada and its progeny. (See Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p.

745 [“The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can

be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage

provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not

final”]; Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 969 [“Legislature

‘must have intended’ to reduce the available probationary period

ameliorative legislation, or when there is a perfect calibration

between all stated goals and retroactive effects.

25

PEOPLE v. FAIAL

Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

in ‘every case to which it constitutionally could apply’ ”].) Under

Estrada, the ameliorative purpose served by limiting probation

terms to two years through Assembly Bill 1950 “ ‘represents a

legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the different

treatment is sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the

criminal law.’ ” (Estrada, at p. 745.) And, as previously

discussed (see ante, at p. 7), the Legislature has endorsed the

shorter two-year probationary term, citing the reduction of

revocations based on technical violations, the efficacy of

frontloading services for probationers, and the decreased burden

on probation officers by reducing caseloads. It is entirely

consistent with that intent to afford retroactive relief to persons

who have been reincarcerated because of violations that

occurred beyond the time limits the Legislature has now

established for keeping a defendant on probation.

Finally, we note that although the legislative history

reflects specific concern about probationers being reincarcerated

for technical probation violations, the Legislature, in amending

section 1203.1, did not distinguish between violations that are

technical as opposed to criminal. Instead, as we stated in

Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at page 977, the Legislature

“enacted Assembly Bill 1950 to reduce the length of probation

across the board.” (Italics added.) Under Estrada’s rule of

retroactivity, we cannot read into Assembly Bill 1950 a

distinction between violations that the Legislature itself did not

draw.

The Attorney General contends that Faial’s interpretation

of Assembly Bill 1950 may result in a “significant windfall” to

some defendants who violate probation. According to the

Attorney General, as to conduct that constitutes both a

probation violation and a separate crime, a prosecutor may,

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PEOPLE v. FAIAL

Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

based on prior law, have decided to forgo a new criminal

prosecution and opted instead to pursue execution of the

suspended sentence based on the probation violation.

Retroactively invalidating termination orders based on

Assembly Bill 1950, the Attorney General suggests, may

“forever bar[] punishment” for the criminal conduct because the

statute of limitations may have expired on the separate offense.

The Attorney General’s argument is unavailing for

reasons we have explained above. First, it ignores the fact that

Estrada and its progeny contemplate that an ameliorative

statute’s retroactive application may completely eliminate a

defendant’s punishment for conduct that was criminal when

committed. Second, as the Legislature was undoubtedly aware,

probation revocation is typically not the only available means of

addressing conduct that is independently punishable as a crime.

Third, we see no indication that the Legislature viewed the

theoretical possibility that criminal prosecution may be time-

barred in some cases as a compelling reason to preclude

retroactive relief under Assembly Bill 1950 in cases where the

termination order is not final. Such a holding would be in

tension with Assembly Bill 1950’s underlying purpose: “to

reduce the length of probation across the board in order to

increase probationary effectiveness and reduce the likelihood of

incarceration for minor probation violations.” (Prudholme,

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 977, italics added.) Given this purpose,

we decline to base our determination on Assembly Bill’s

retroactive effect based on “the particular facts of this or any

other individual case.” (People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66,

76–77.)

In conclusion, we hold that in amending section 1203.1,

the Legislature has authorized courts, consistent with Estrada

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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

principles, to retroactively shorten probation terms exceeding

two years in cases where an order terminating probation and

executing a prison sentence is not yet final. (See Prudholme,

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 969.) Thus, if a probation term is

shortened to two years under amended section 1203.1, conduct

that would have constituted a probation violation, but is now

deemed to have occurred outside this term, may not be the basis

for terminating that probation. (See People v. Leiva, supra, 56

Cal.4th at pp. 514–515; see also Chavez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p.

782 [“Once probation ends . . . a court’s power is significantly

attenuated. Its power to impose a sentence over the defendant

ceases entirely”].) Nothing in the text or legislative history of

Assembly Bill 1950 requires a different result.

V.

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s

judgment and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this

opinion.

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PEOPLE v. FAIAL

Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

JENKINS, J.

We Concur:

GUERRERO, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

EVANS, J.

29

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Faial

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 75 Cal.App.5th 738

Review Granted (unpublished)

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S273840

Date Filed: July 31, 2025

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: San Mateo

Judge: Robert D. Foiles

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Alan Charles Dell’Ario, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant

Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General,

Seth K. Schalit, Alice B. Lustre and Catherine A. Rivlin, Deputy

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Alan Charles Dell’Ario

Attorney at Law

P.O. Box 359

Napa, CA 94559

(707) 666-5351

Catherine A. Rivlin

Deputy Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102

(415) 510-3850