Walls v. United States

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 24-CO-0321

RILEY S. WALLS, APPELLANT,

V.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(1994-FEL-001788)

(Hon. Heidi M. Pasichow, Trial Judge)

(Argued November 13, 2024 Decided July 31, 2025)

Peter H. Meyers for appellant.

Dylan M. Aluise, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Matthew M.

Graves, United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Chrisellen R.

Kolb, Elizabeth H. Danello, and Amanda Williams, Assistant United States

Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, DEAHL, Associate Judge, and

WASHINGTON, Senior Judge.

DEAHL, Associate Judge: When Riley S. Walls was eighteen years old, he

committed first-degree murder, assault with intent to kill, and possession of a firearm

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during a crime of violence. He received three consecutive sentences for these

offenses that left him with an indeterminate sentence of forty-five years to life.

Now in his 50s, Walls is seeking a sentence reduction under the Incarceration

Reduction Amendment Act (IRAA), effectively asking for his immediate release.

To obtain IRAA relief, movants must demonstrate that they are no longer a danger

to the community and that the interests of justice warrant a sentence reduction. If

the movant meets those two criteria, IRAA directs courts to resentence them to a

reduced term consistent with one of three general sentencing schemes, whichever

was “applicable” at their original sentencing: the indeterminate sentencing scheme

codified at D.C. Code § 24-403, the determinate sentencing scheme codified at

Section 24-403.01, or the youth sentencing scheme codified at Section 24-903. The

parties and the trial court agreed that the indeterminate sentencing scheme was

applicable here in light of when Walls was originally sentenced.

The trial court partially granted Walls’s request for IRAA relief. It determined

that while Walls was no longer dangerous and that the interests of justice favored a

sentence reduction, he was not “ready” for immediate release and “would benefit

from further time and support within the correctional system.” The trial court then

reduced Walls’s indeterminate sentence by ten years—from forty-five years to life

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to thirty-five years to life—thereby making him eligible for parole in 2027, at which

point his release would be up to the Parole Commission.

We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for further consideration.

In our view, the trial court erred in two important respects.

First, the trial court’s sole articulated basis for rejecting Walls’s request for

immediate release was that he “would benefit from” more “time and support” in

prison. This basis for further incarceration—that it is for the prisoner’s own good—

is inconsistent with IRAA’s directives to trial courts. The non-dangerous who have

otherwise checked IRAA’s boxes cannot be further imprisoned because, in a trial

judge’s view, they would benefit from further imprisonment.

Second, the trial court imposed an illegal sentence under IRAA when it

reduced Walls’s indeterminate sentence for first-degree murder to twenty years to

life, accounting for the bulk of his sentence. Indeterminate sentences, now largely

an anachronism in the District, involve a minimum and a maximum sentence with

parole eligibility lying in the delta between them, so that release is dependent upon

the Parole Commission’s independent judgment in that delta. Section 24-403 makes

clear that “[w]here the maximum sentence imposed is life imprisonment, a minimum

sentence shall be imposed which shall not exceed 15 years imprisonment.” The

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twenty-year minimum sentence that the trial court imposed went five years beyond

that maximum-minimum sentence, and was therefore unlawful.

We thus vacate and remand the case for the trial court to (1) reconsider the

extent of Walls’s sentence reduction, disabused of any consideration that

imprisonment rather than release would be most beneficial to him; and (2) modify

Walls’s sentence in accordance with the indeterminate sentencing guidelines.

I. Facts

More than thirty years ago, when Walls was eighteen years old, he and a friend

were hanging out in front of an apartment building when two other teenagers

approached them. After some heated words, Walls pulled out a gun and shot at the

two teenagers, one of whom was shot in the foot and escaped while the other was

shot in the back and died. Five years later, a jury convicted Walls of first-degree

murder, assault with intent to kill, and possession of a firearm during a crime of

violence. Walls received consecutive indeterminate sentences of thirty years to life,

ten to thirty years, and five to fifteen years, respectively, for those three convictions.

We affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. Walls v. United States, 773 A.2d 424

(D.C. 2001).

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Walls sought a sentence reduction resulting in his immediate release under

IRAA in 2021. See D.C. Code § 24-403.03. Walls met the threshold eligibility

criteria for IRAA relief because he committed his crime when he was under the age

of twenty-five and had served more than fifteen years in prison. See id.

§ 24-403.03(a)(1). IRAA requires a trial court to “reduce a term of imprisonment”

for an eligible defendant if they are no longer “a danger to the safety of any person

or the community” and “the interests of justice warrant a sentence modification.” Id.

§ 24-403.03(a)(2). In assessing those questions, the trial judge must consider ten

statutory factors, plus an eleventh catch-all factor accounting for “[a]ny other

information the court deems relevant.” Id. § 24-403.03(c)(1)-(11). 1 The extent of

1

The ten factors are:

(1) The defendant’s age at the time of the offense;

(2) The history and characteristics of the defendant;

(3) Whether the defendant has substantially complied with the rules of the

institution to which the defendant has been confined, and whether the defendant has

completed any educational, vocational, or other program, where available;

(4) Any report or recommendation received from the United States Attorney;

(5) Whether the defendant has demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and a

fitness to reenter society sufficient to justify a sentence reduction;

(6) Any statement, provided orally or in writing, provided pursuant to

§ 23-1904 or 18 U.S.C. § 3771 by a victim of the offense for which the defendant is

imprisoned, or by a family member of the victim if the victim is deceased;

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the resulting sentence reduction is guided by those same factors. See Doe v. United

States, 333 A.3d 893, 904-05 (D.C. 2025).

In support of his IRAA motion, Walls provided a thorough social history

detailing his experience growing up in poverty with an incarcerated father and with

both parents suffering from addiction during the height of the crack cocaine

epidemic. He experienced neglect, suffered physical abuse from his mother, and

lived in “constant fear” of the crime taking place in his neighborhood. Walls also

submitted a letter to the court expressing his remorse and “tak[ing] full

responsibility” for his crime, as well as multiple letters of support from friends,

family, and employers who promised to help Walls upon his release from prison.

Walls further described the personal growth he experienced during his incarceration;

(7) Any reports of physical, mental, or psychiatric examinations of the

defendant conducted by licensed health care professionals;

(8) The defendant’s family and community circumstances at the time of the

offense, including any history of abuse, trauma, or involvement in the child welfare

system;

(9) The extent of the defendant’s role in the offense and whether and to what

extent another person was involved in the offense;

(10) The diminished culpability of juveniles and persons under age 25, as

compared to that of older adults, and the hallmark features of youth, including

immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, which

counsel against sentencing them to lengthy terms in prison, despite the brutality or

cold-blooded nature of any particular crime, and the defendant's personal

circumstances that support an aging out of crime.

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while acknowledging that he committed several disciplinary infractions, he

highlighted his lack of infractions since 2018 and the fact that he has completed over

1,500 hours of educational, vocational, and mental health programming. Among

other details, Walls also noted how despite a long struggle with substance abuse

which began when he was just fifteen years old, he achieved and had maintained his

sobriety since 2019.

The government conceded that Walls met the threshold eligibility criteria for

IRAA relief but opposed his motion. The government focused its opposition on

Walls’s spotty disciplinary record in prison. It highlighted Walls’s forty-seven

disciplinary infractions, including one for assault with serious bodily injury in 2018.

This incident involved Walls stabbing another inmate with a “homemade” weapon,

which resulted in the inmate’s hospitalization.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Walls’s IRAA motion. Maureen

Baird, a former Bureau of Prisons warden, testified on Walls’s behalf regarding his

disciplinary record. The court also heard testimony from Walls’s sister and Walls

himself. Walls expressed remorse for his crimes, and described how he “started

utilizing the prison for what it offered” by pursuing drug treatment, psychological

treatment, meditation, reading, and other programming.

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The trial court issued a written order on Walls’s IRAA motion, in which the

court found six of the statutory factors weighed in favor of a sentence reduction, with

the government’s opposition to IRAA relief being the only factor that weighed

against a sentence reduction. We do not recount the trial court’s analysis on each of

the factors in detail, but note the parts of the order relevant to this appeal.

As for IRAA factor three—which relates to whether Walls “substantially

complied” with prison rules and completed programming, id. § 24-403.03(c)(3)—

the court found this factor “ultimately” weighed in Walls’s favor despite his forty-

seven infractions, which included the 2018 incident where he stabbed another

incarcerated person. The court found that Walls’s testimony about the incident

“lacked insight” and said the stabbing was “not an act of someone who has been

fully rehabilitated,” but praised Walls’s clear turnaround since then. Walls’s

“considerable change” entailed a multi-year commitment to becoming sober, 1,500

hours of educational and rehabilitative programming, and substantial compliance

with prison rules since 2019. The court characterized Walls as someone who has

“taken impressive strides” in recent years and “is focused on obeying the rules and

avoiding impulsive and immature behavior.”

As for IRAA factor ten—which relates to the “diminished culpability of

juveniles and persons under age 25,” id. § 24-403.03(c)(10)—the court found this

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factor weighed in favor of a sentence reduction because, due to “[t]he factual

circumstances of the case,” Walls was “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative

influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure[,] and was likely driven by

anger, impulsivity, and an inability to consider the consequences of his actions.”

In its discussion of the remaining IRAA factors, the trial court repeatedly

acknowledged Walls’s traumatic and difficult childhood, and praised the “strong

support system” that Walls had built and maintained while incarcerated. The court

further sympathized with the abuse that Walls had experienced while incarcerated

and reiterated its praise for Walls’s successful journey towards sobriety.

Having weighed the IRAA factors in Walls’s favor, the trial court determined

that Walls “met his burden of establishing that he is no longer a danger to society”

and that “a reduction of his sentence would be in the interests of justice,” meaning

he was entitled to a sentence reduction under the statute. Instead of granting Walls

his immediate release, however, the court reduced the sentence on his first-degree

murder conviction from thirty years to life to twenty years to life, thereby reducing

his cumulative sentence from forty-five years to life down to thirty-five years to life.

That moved up Walls’s parole eligibility date to 2027. The court reasoned that while

Walls had made “considerable progress,” it did “not believe that [Walls] is ready for

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immediate release and would benefit from further time and support within the

correctional system.” Walls now appeals.

II. Analysis

We review the trial court’s ultimate IRAA determination for an abuse of

discretion and any subsidiary legal rulings de novo. Doe, 333 A.3d at 898. In

assessing whether the trial court acted within its discretion, we consider whether the

court “failed to consider a relevant factor, whether [it] relied upon an improper

factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support [its] conclusion.” Bishop

v. United States, 310 A.3d 629, 641 (D.C. 2024). A court “by definition abuses its

discretion when it makes an error of law.” Id.

Walls argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) hinging its

decision regarding the extent of Walls’s sentencing reduction on the reasoning that

Walls “would benefit” from more “time and support” in prison; (2) imposing a

minimum sentence in excess of what the indeterminate sentencing scheme allows;

and (3) failing to properly weigh IRAA’s tenth factor. We address these arguments

in turn.

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A. The trial court’s decision to only partially reduce Walls’s sentence

is reviewable on appeal and constituted an abuse of discretion

Walls first argues that the trial court relied upon an improper basis when it

denied his request for immediate release. Before we address the merits of this

argument, we must first consider the government’s contention that a trial court’s

determination of how much to reduce a sentence by—as opposed to the

determination of whether to grant a sentence reduction at all—is a discretionary

decision “beyond appellate review.” 2 For the following reasons, we reject the

government’s view.

1. The trial court’s determination of the proper extent of a

sentence reduction under IRAA is reviewable on appeal

The government first points to IRAA’s subsection (e)(1), which describes how

trial courts must “resentence[]” movants under the indeterminate, determinate, or

youth sentencing regimes. Id. § 24-403.03(e)(1). According to the government, this

provision indicates that “resentencing” is a distinct and open-ended analysis when

compared to the prior determination of whether to grant sentencing relief in the first

2

The government concedes that a determination as to the extent of a sentence

reduction under IRAA is “subject to a few statutory and constitutional provisions”

and is reviewable at least with respect to D.C. Code § 24-403.03(e) and the Eighth

Amendment. More pointedly, it concedes that we can review Walls’s particular

argument that he received an illegal sentence when the trial court resentenced him

to twenty years to life on the first-degree murder charge.

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place based on IRAA’s eleven enumerated factors. Because of this and the fact that

sentence lengths are generally not reviewable on direct appeal, see, e.g., Matter of

L.J., 546 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C. 1988) (noting that this court declines “to review on

appeal sentences which are within statutory limits, upon the ground that such

sentences are too severe”), the government argues that a court’s IRAA resentencing

determination is generally unreviewable.

This argument is at odds with this court’s recent analysis in Doe. We said in

Doe that the issues of “whether to reduce the sentence” and “the extent of the

sentence reduction” in IRAA cases “are two sides of the same coin,” both guided by

the same eleven enumerated IRAA factors. 333 A.3d at 905. In reaching this

conclusion, we emphasized that the predominate language in IRAA establishes a

one-step process—involving the eleven enumerated factors which guide the

dangerousness and interests-of-justice criteria—for trial courts to follow when

deciding the overall question of what relief they are required to grant, if any. Id. at

904-05 (“[T]he trial court ‘shall’ reduce an eligible movant’s sentence” under that

singular rubric (quoting D.C. Code § 24-403.03(a)(2))).

Doe particularly rejected the government’s reliance on IRAA’s subsection

(e)(1) to argue otherwise. We explained that the D.C. Council’s purpose in creating

subsection (e)(1) was not to provide trial courts with unreviewable resentencing

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authority, but instead to ensure that successful movants are resentenced in

accordance with the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 905-06.

As a result, subsection (e)(1) requires trial courts to follow the general strictures of

the relevant sentencing regime when determining the nature and extent of the

sentence reduction (i.e., whether the sentence will include a range of years or will

be a fixed term). Subsection (e)(1) does not, however, turn IRAA into a “two-step

process” with a “divorced” and freewheeling resentencing step at the end of the

analysis. Id. at 904-05. We therefore reject the government’s argument that a trial

court’s determination of the extent of a sentence reduction is a distinct discretionary

choice that is unreviewable on appeal.

Two further points support our conclusion that Walls’s present claims are

reviewable on appeal. First, the government’s argument against reviewability would

severely undercut IRAA’s central purpose, which is to provide people who were

“less developmentally culpable when they committed their crimes” a “meaningful

opportunity” for release. Long v. United States, 312 A.3d 1247, 1260 (D.C. 2024)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Williams v. United States, 205 A.3d 837,

846 (D.C. 2019). If trial courts, after concluding that a movant is entitled to IRAA

relief, could comply with the statute’s mandate by simply reducing their sentence by

a single day—and thereby insulate themselves from appellate review—IRAA would

be a hollow shell. Adoption of the government’s position would leave IRAA close

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to “inoperative,” Richman Towers Tenants’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Richman Towers LLC, 17

A.3d 590, 615 (D.C. 2011) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)), and

at the very least ineffectual in achieving its stated legislative objective. Accordingly,

even if Doe did not squarely resolve the reviewability question now before us, we

would reject the government’s argument as inconsistent with IRAA’s central

purpose.

Second, as this court previously noted in Williams, IRAA’s requirement that

a trial court issue a written opinion contemplates and is a means of “ensur[ing] the

effectiveness of appellate review.” 205 A.3d at 848; D.C. Code § 24-403.03(b)(4)

(“The court shall issue an opinion in writing stating the reasons for granting or

denying the application under this section, but the court may proceed to sentencing

immediately after granting the application.”). This requirement applies to a trial

court’s decision on a movant’s whole “application,” indicating that IRAA anticipates

appellate review with respect to a movant’s request for a sentence reduction to a

particular term length (and not just their request for a sentence reduction in general). 3

3

The government suggests that the language in subsection (b)(4) permitting

trial courts to “proceed to sentencing immediately after granting the application”

places the determination of the extent of a sentence reduction beyond the scope of

the written opinion requirement. But this would be at odds with the structure and

purpose of the statute. See Doe, 333 A.3d at 904-05 (holding that the questions of

whether to reduce a sentence and by how much are considered together). Rather,

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The government’s position, conversely, would gut that clearly anticipated review

except as to a threshold question that has roughly no bearing on the extent of any

relief that is ultimately granted; under its view, a day’s reduction in a hundred-year

sentence, even for the worthiest IRAA applicant, would be essentially unreviewable

on appeal.

Therefore, in accordance with Doe and IRAA’s foundations, we hold that the

whole of IRAA resentencing determination is subject to appellate review. We now

proceed to review the trial court’s particular resentencing decision.

2. The trial court improperly relied on a rationale that is

untethered from and inconsistent with IRAA’s enumerated factors

Walls argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his

request for immediate release on the basis that he “would benefit from further time

and support within the correctional system.” He specifically asserts that IRAA does

not direct or permit trial courts to take such a factor into account. We agree.

this language reads as allowing trial courts to order a sentence reduction from the

bench prior to issuing a full written opinion. This has been a fairly common practice

in the Superior Court. See, e.g., id. at 897 (oral ruling preceded written ruling); Riley

v. United States, No. 24-CO-0100, 2025 WL 1830780, at *2 (D.C. July 3, 2025)

(same).

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IRAA does not permit a court to continue incarcerating a prisoner who

qualifies for IRAA relief—establishing that he is non-dangerous and has served the

requisite fifteen years or more imprisoned—on the grounds that further

imprisonment is in their own interests. For starters, as we recently made clear in

Doe, the determination of the extent of a sentence reduction under IRAA must be

tethered to the statute’s eleven enumerated factors. 333 A.3d at 910 (Under IRAA,

trial court’s may not “engage in an unconstrained interests-of-justice inquiry

untethered from [IRAA’s] enumerated factors.”); see also Welch v. United States,

319 A.3d 971, 975-77 (D.C. 2024) (trial court “appropriately considered” the IRAA

factors when determining that a “limited reduction” in the movant’s sentence was

proper rather than immediate release). And a trial court’s view that the inmate would

benefit from further imprisonment is not a consideration that fits within any of those

factors. So as in Doe, the trial court’s reliance upon considerations disconnected

from IRAA’s eleven enumerated factors was an abuse of discretion. See 333 A.3d

at 906 (“[A] trial court is prohibited from considering the seriousness of the

defendant’s underlying offenses in isolation and outside the framework of the

enumerated factors.”).

The government does not meaningfully counter this point. It does not suggest

that an inmate’s prospects for benefiting from further incarceration is a consideration

that fits within any of the eleven enumerated IRAA factors. It instead advances only

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the argument we rejected in Doe: that IRAA’s factors relate only to whether an

inmate gets a sentence reduction, while different considerations inform the extent of

that reduction. Again, that argument is now foreclosed. See id. at 904 (“The IRAA

does not create a two-step process whereby the trial court first decides whether to

reduce the sentence based on an application of the IRAA factors and then determines

the extent of the reduction based on a separate statutory or other resentencing

framework.”).

The only IRAA factor that seems to be a potential candidate for countenancing

the trial court’s reasoning is factor five, which requires the court to consider

“[w]hether the defendant has demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and a fitness to

reenter society.” D.C. Code § 24-403.03(c)(5) (emphasis added). But that factor

clearly contemplates a backward-looking inquiry into how far the defendant has

come; it does not ask what future benefits incarceration would yield for him. It

would also be perverse to hold a defendant’s prospects for further improvement

while incarcerated as a point against his release. It would not comport with any

sense of justice to say the non-dangerous and steadily improving inmate must remain

imprisoned because of his continued strides, while the non-dangerous inmate whose

improvements have stalled out should go free.

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Putting aside that the trial court’s ostensibly compassionate rationale for

denying immediate release was untethered from IRAA’s enumerated factors, it also

evinces a generally outdated and impoverished view that incarceration can be

justified based on its benefits to the prisoner. There is little reason to think that

Walls, who the trial court found “has a strong support system in place” outside of

prison, could not improve himself more if released, rather than being kept behind

bars, and the trial court did not offer any. A set of Supreme Court cases illustrates

the point in somewhat analogous settings.

In Tapia v. United States, the Court unanimously held that under federal

statutory law, a defendant’s sentence could not be increased to facilitate their

enrollment in a drug treatment program. 564 U.S. 319, 327, 335 (2011). In reaching

this conclusion, the Court noted that Congress had rejected the “disfavor[ed]”

rehabilitative model of sentencing back in the 1980s, and subsequently made clear

through newer laws that “imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting

correction and rehabilitation.” Id. at 324-26 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)); see also

1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.5(b) (3d ed. 2003) (describing

the same shift in the “theoretical underpinnings” for incarceration). In Pepper v.

United States, decided the same term as Tapia, the Court similarly held that evidence

of a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation could be used to decrease their prison

sentence at resentencing, but not to increase it. 562 U.S. 476, 490-93 (2011). Pepper

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reasoned that evidence of such post-sentencing rehabilitation could come into

consideration under a court’s evaluation of “the history and characteristics of the

defendant,” among other factors. Id. at 491 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). The

Pepper and Tapia duo echo several themes from Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion

in Powell v. Texas, which expressed serious concern about confining “indigent

alcoholics” under the auspices of providing them with needed medical treatment.

392 U.S. 514, 528 (1968). To do this, Justice Marshall reasoned, would commit

them to incarceration in a “slightly higherclass jail[]” until they are “cured,” which

could amount to an indefinite period of time untethered from objective constraints

and subject to the whims of supervisory authorities. Id. at 528-29.

The throughline of these cases is a simple and powerful one: While we

applaud inmates’ successful rehabilitation efforts, prisons are not well tailored to

rehabilitative goals. 4 And whatever their effectiveness at furthering those goals, an

4

There is empirical force behind this conclusion as well as legal. Studies on

the relationship between sentence length and recidivism have “yielded mixed results,

with some analyses identifying a positive general deterrent effect (preventing

community crime) but the majority indicating marginal effects at best, or no effects

when compared to shorter sentences.” Roger Pryzbylski et al., The Impact of Long

Sentences of Public Safety: A Complex Relationship, 36 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 81, 84

(2023). In fact, “[n]early half a dozen recent studies . . . report no relationship

between longer sentence length and recidivism.” Id. at 85. The D.C. Council has

also noted that in the first three and a half years of IRAA’s existence, not a single

recipient of relief was reconvicted after release, which is similar to the experience

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inmate’s prospect for further rehabilitation is a pretty lousy and potentially limitless

reason to further incarcerate them. A telling fact from the record in this case is that

Walls has attempted to partake in more prison programming but has at least once

been denied or placed on a waitlist. In 2022, Walls sent a note asking a prison staff

member to “reconsider” their initial decision to not allow him into the “Challenge

Program,” to which Walls received a response that he was being placed on a waitlist

for the program and should “be patient.” The trial court’s reasoning would seem to

permit it to keep Walls incarcerated for some additional years simply because,

through no fault of his own, the Bureau of Prisons has yet to enroll Walls in a

program that he would seemingly benefit from and has sought to avail himself of.

We thus conclude that the trial court “relied upon an improper factor,” Bishop,

310 A.3d at 641, and abused its discretion when it relied upon the notion that further

imprisonment would be a benefit to Walls.

of other states “which have all experienced little to no recidivism among individuals

resentenced after serving extreme sentences.” Committee Report, Report on Bill

No. 23-0127 before the Committee on the Judiciary and Public Safety, Council of

the District of Columbia at 17 (Nov. 23, 2020).

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B. The trial court’s new sentence was illegal

Walls’s illegal sentence argument—his second main challenge to the trial

court’s decision below—relies on subsection (e)(1) of IRAA, which we discussed in

the preceding section. To recap, that provision says that “[a]ny defendant whose

sentence is reduced . . . shall be resentenced pursuant to § 24-403, § 24-403.01, or

§ 24-903, as applicable.” D.C. Code § 24-403.03(e)(1). These three respective

provisions are the District’s indeterminate sentencing regime, determinate

sentencing regime, and youth sentencing statute, among which courts must apply

“the sentencing regime that originally governed [the IRAA movant’s] sentence.”

Williams, 205 A.3d at 848 (citing D.C. Code § 24-403.03(e)). Walls contends that

the trial court, after determining that he was entitled to relief, did not properly

resentence him pursuant to the indeterminate sentencing scheme.

As discussed above, the D.C. Council’s overarching purpose in enacting D.C.

Code § 24-403.03(e)(1) was to ensure that successful movants are resentenced in

accordance with the Ex Post Facto Clause, Doe, 333 A.3d at 905-06, which the

provision accomplishes by mandating that movants “convicted of a crime that was

committed before August 5, 2000, must have an indeterminate (parole) sentence

imposed,” Comprehensive Youth Justice Amendment Act of 2016, Bill No.

21-0683, Amendment #1, (Nov. 1, 2016). Thus, the three statutes cited in subsection

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(e)(1) are applicable in the IRAA context to the extent they impose a sentence of a

range of years or a fixed term. To the extent the statutes cited in subsection (e)(1)

provide substantive factors for courts to weigh in determining the length of a

sentence, however, they are completely irrelevant to an IRAA proceeding. See Doe,

333 A.3d at 905 (“[T]he trial court treated resentencing as a distinct step divorced

from the IRAA factors and, in so doing, applied an unrelated statute and an

inapplicable legal framework.”).

The parties agree, as the trial court concluded, that the indeterminate

sentencing scheme codified at Section 24-403 applied at Walls’s resentencing. That

statute imposes various guidelines on trial courts’ ability to impose a sentence range,

requiring in relevant part that “[w]here the maximum sentence imposed is life

imprisonment, a minimum sentence shall be imposed which shall not exceed 15

years imprisonment.” Section 24-403 contains no other qualifications or caveats to

this particular language, and does not refer readers to any other statutory provisions

for purposes of interpreting it. The trial court here ran afoul of this statutory

restriction that Section 24-403 imposes on indeterminate sentences. When

resentencing Walls on his first-degree murder conviction, the court imposed a

maximum sentence of life imprisonment while also imposing a minimum of twenty

years. That minimum was five years longer than permitted by the plain language of

the statute and was legal error.

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The government raises a few counterpoints. It first argues that the

indeterminate sentencing regime codified at Section 24-403 is “applicable” to

Walls’s resentencing, but only “to [a] point”—at the time of Walls’s crime, D.C. had

a sentencing statute specific to first-degree murder that would have applied at his

original sentencing and they say should “override[]” Section 24-403 in the IRAA

resentencing context. The government specifically points us to D.C. Code

§ 22-2404 (1992), the precursor to D.C. Code § 22-2104, which says that

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, a person convicted of first-degree

murder and upon whom a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed shall be eligible

for parole only after the expiration of 30 years from the date of the commencement

of the sentence.” 5 So the argument goes that the trial court’s resentencing

5

The government asserts that this thirty-year mandatory minimum was

incorporated into the sentencing regime governing Walls’s original sentence. For

accuracy’s sake, this does not appear to be true—D.C. increased its mandatory

minimum sentence for first-degree murder from twenty years to thirty years effective

September 26, 1992, a little more than one month after Walls’s offense, which took

place on August 9, 1992. See First Degree Murder Amendment Act of 1992, D.C.

Law 9-153, § 2, 39 D.C. Reg. 3868 (previously codified at § 22-2404(b)); Pub. L

87-423, § 801, 76 Stat. 46 (1962) (prior twenty-year mandatory minimum). This

increased mandatory minimum would have been inapplicable at Walls’s sentencing

as an ex post facto law. See Solomon v. United States, 120 A.3d 618, 621 (D.C.

2015) (An impermissible law under the Ex Post Facto Clause includes any “law that

changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to

the crime, when committed.”). It thus appears that a twenty-year mandatory

minimum applied to Walls’s sentence for first-degree murder, and the original

sentencing court decided within its discretion to impose a greater minimum of thirty

24

determination (a new sentence of twenty years to life) was permissible—with

Section 24-403 overridden and out of the picture, there was no relevant provision

saying that the minimum sentence could not exceed fifteen years. 6

But the government’s interpretation is simply incompatible with IRAA’s plain

text. Subsection (e)(1) says that movants “shall be resentenced pursuant to § 24-403,

§ 24-403.01, or § 24-903, as applicable.” That language does not instruct courts to

look at any offense-specific sentencing statutes. 7 And when a statute contains a list

of “associated” items (e.g., a group of sentencing statutes), as a matter of statutory

interpretation, we generally conclude that “the exclusion of others is implied.” J.P.

v. District of Columbia, 189 A.3d 212, 218 (D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The D.C. Council, of course, knew about the existence of Section

22-2104—the current statute governing sentencing for first-degree murder—and

other offense-specific sentencing statutes when it enacted IRAA, and apparently

years. But this does not affect the government’s legal argument for the purposes of

this IRAA appeal, the aim of which is to point us away from the “shall not exceed

15 years” language in Section 24-403 and towards a statute that does not contain

such language (i.e., either version of the first-degree murder sentencing statute).

6

If this thirty-year mandatory minimum applied as the government argues,

the trial court would have been empowered under IRAA to impose a lesser minimum

sentence of twenty years, per D.C. Code § 24-403.03(e)(2).

7

In addition to D.C. Code § 22-2104, these statutes include § 22-2106

(mandatory life without the possibility of parole for the murder of law enforcement

officers) and § 22-3153 (mandatory life without the possibility of parole for acts of

terrorism).

25

chose not to include them as provisions applicable to IRAA resentencings. See

Comprehensive Youth Justice Amendment Act of 2016, Report on Bill 21-0683

before the Committee on the Judiciary, Council of the District of Columbia, at 12

n.57 (Oct. 5, 2016) (citing D.C. Code § 22-2104 while explaining the background

for IRAA); Scholtz P’ship v. D.C. Rental Accommodations Comm’n, 427 A.2d 905,

916 (D.C. 1981) (“[T]he legislature is presumed to know [the] law.”). We cannot

simply read “and also § 22-2104” into IRAA’s mandate, as the government would

have us do.

The government further relies on Bryant v. Civiletti, a case where the D.C.

Circuit held that the mandatory minimum in D.C.’s first-degree murder sentencing

statute (now Section 22-2104) should apply to the sentencing of a first-degree

murder defendant instead of the mandatory minimum present in D.C.’s general

indeterminate sentencing statute (now Section 24-403). 663 F.2d 286, 292 (D.C.

Cir. 1981) (“Special statutes prevail over general statutes.”). We have no issue with

Bryant’s reasoning to the extent it describes what should happen at a typical

sentencing that takes place after a trial or guilty plea. But Bryant is irrelevant here

because it did not concern the new and unique context that IRAA proceedings

present. Passed in 2016 and modified since then, IRAA is a second-look statute that

creates a distinct relief mechanism for people who were incarcerated when they were

teenagers or young adults. See Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act, D.C. Law

26

21-238, §§ 301-306, 64 D.C. Reg. 3959 (eff. Apr. 4, 2017). And within this

mechanism, the statute directs trial courts towards the overarching guidelines of the

general indeterminate sentencing scheme, not the first-degree murder sentencing

statute. As such, we do not find Bryant persuasive with respect to IRAA

proceedings.

The government also advances what amounts to an absurdity argument. See,

e.g., Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. v. Off. of Tax & Revenue, 308 A.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C.

2024) (Courts will look beyond the plain language of a statute “in extraordinary

cases in which the plain language would lead to absurd results.”). Not applying the

first-degree murder sentencing statute in the IRAA context, it says, would lead to

the absurd result that first-degree murderers—generally viewed as the worst

offenders in the eyes of the law—would get what amounts to favorable treatment.

First-degree murderers with indeterminate sentences with a maximum term of life

imprisonment will invariably be parole eligible if they qualify for IRAA relief

because their minimum term could be no more than 15 years, which is the minimum

term of incarceration before one is even eligible for IRAA relief. Conversely, a

defendant who is serving a determinate thirty-year sentence for distribution of a

controlled substance could be resentenced to a twenty-year term, leaving them worse

off than the murderer, or so the argument goes.

27

This concern is exaggerated and does not approach an absurdity. To become

eligible for IRAA relief in the first place, in addition to being incarcerated for fifteen

years, IRAA movants must prove that they are no longer dangerous to the

community and that a sentence reduction would be in the interests of justice—so in

no sense do first-degree murderers with indeterminate sentences automatically

become parole eligible after fifteen years. Nor do we not think it is absurd or even

surprising that the D.C. Council would have wanted every IRAA movant who meets

the statutory requirements for relief and is subject to an indeterminate sentence to at

least be parole eligible. It is also far from obvious that a sentence of fifteen years to

life—with one’s potential release left to the uncertainties of the Parole

Commission’s discretion—is more desirable than a set term of twenty or thirty years,

so that premise of the government’s absurdity argument is rather dubious.

Still, with all that said, we can agree with the government that it is a little odd

that any defendant with a top-end life sentence under the indeterminate scheme can

receive a minimum of no more than fifteen years, whereas defendants serving

determinate sentences for less serious crimes could be resentenced to a set term of

years that is more than that. But that oddity stems principally from the contrasting

features of the now-outdated indeterminate sentencing scheme and the more modern

determinate sentencing scheme—not from any absurdity in IRAA itself. The text of

IRAA is perfectly clear that Walls’s minimum sentence could be no more than

28

fifteen years, in light of his lifetime maximum sentence, and the slight curiosity

outlined above does not constitute “extraordinary” circumstances warranting a

departure from that plain text. Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., 308 A.3d at 1212.

C. Walls’s remaining arguments are unavailing

Walls also contends that the court committed legal error in failing to

immediately release him under IRAA when it found he was no longer dangerous and

that a sentence reduction was in the interests of justice under Section

24-403.03(a)(2). He specifically posits that it was an “error of law” to “delegate[]”

to the Parole Commission, by moving up his parole eligibility date, the ultimate

decision as to the length of his incarceration.

Our case law is clear, however, that “a successful IRAA motion may (but need

not) result in a prisoner’s immediate release from incarceration.” Long, 312 A.3d at

1260; see also Doe, 333 A.3d at 904 n.9. After all, “IRAA explicitly permits trial

judges to ‘reduce’ a defendant’s sentence.” Welch, 319 A.3d at 976 n.3 (quoting

D.C. Code § 24-403.03(a)) (emphasis added). To be sure, we have highlighted how

IRAA and parole are distinct processes—“[t]he two mechanisms are motivated by

different policy considerations, operate under different procedures, and achieve

different objectives.” Long, 312 A.3d at 1259-61. But we have also held that it is

not per se improper to reduce a person’s sentence under IRAA by making them

29

parole eligible, at least when a movant has not presented any evidence that future

parole applications would be futile (thus keeping them with a “de facto life sentence”

and rendering the IRAA process a nullity). See Welch, 319 A.3d at 975-76 & n.3

(upholding decision that made movant immediately eligible for parole instead of

immediately releasing them). As in Welch, Walls has not presented such evidence,

and we cannot hold that the trial court’s decision to make him parole eligible was

improper in this regard.

Finally, Walls makes two arguments with respect to the trial court’s analysis

of IRAA factor ten. First, he notes that the trial court did not rely on the then-current

version of factor ten, because the court omitted IRAA’s then-recently added

directive to consider “the defendant’s personal circumstances that support an aging

out of crime.” D.C. Code § 24-403.03(c)(10). Walls says this caused the trial court

to “fail[] to undertake the required factual inquiry.” Second, he contends the trial

court erred by noting in its analysis of factor ten that “[t]he factual circumstances of

the case” show that his crime “was likely driven by anger, impulsivity, and an

inability to consider the consequences of his actions.” He argues that, per Bishop,

trial courts may not consider case-by-case how “the hallmarks of youth played a role

in the underlying offense.” 310 A.3d at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted).

30

Walls is correct that the trial court did not quote the newly added “aging out”

language from factor ten, which became effective one month before Walls filed his

motion in May 2021. See Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Amendment Act of

2020, D.C. Law 23-274, § 601, 68 D.C. Reg. 47921 (Apr. 27, 2021). But we are

dubious that the trial court committed the Bishop-based error that Walls attributes to

it, and in any event, neither of these alleged errors prejudiced Walls. The trial court

resolved factor ten in Walls’s favor—and the second claimed error actually inured

to his benefit—so that any errors were harmless. See Doe, 333 A.3d at 912 (finding

consideration of improper factors under IRAA harmless).

The first error was a purely semantic misstep. While the trial court

imprecisely articulated the current language of factor ten, the court did exactly what

the substance of that factor commands. The court’s order discussed various facts

that suggest Walls has “ag[ed] out” of crime, acknowledging that Walls has made

“impressive steps towards maturity,” has become “focused on obeying the rules and

avoiding impulsive and immature behavior,” and has a “strong” re-entry plan. As

to the second alleged error, the court considered particular mitigating characteristics

of Walls’s offenses that gave the impetuosity of his youth especially strong

explanatory force, making it less likely he would slip back into crime if released.

We do not mean to suggest that was any kind of error, contrary to Walls’s

argument—Bishop’s overarching holding was that “factor ten must weigh

31

categorically in favor of the movant,” 310 A.3d at 645, and the trial court acted

consistent with that holding when it determined without qualification that the

substance of factor ten weighed towards relief. But if it had been some kind of

error—given Bishop’s command that trial court “may not consider the degree to

which ‘the hallmark features of youth’ played a role in the underlying offense”—it

is not one we would hear Walls to complain about because it benefited him. Again,

the court ultimately found without qualification that factor ten weighed in Walls’s

favor and determined that he was entitled to a sentence reduction, so that both of the

errors above were undoubtedly harmless.

III. Conclusion

We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the matter for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.