Huckleby v. Stewart

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

KAMERON HUCKLEBY,

Plaintiff

No. 25 CV 6469

v.

Judge Jeremy C. Daniel

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants

ORDER

The defendants’ motion to dismiss [9] is denied as to Counts I and II. The Court

dismisses Count III for failure to state a claim. The defendants shall answer the

complaint by August 21, 2025.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Kameron Huckleby, proceeding pro se, initially filed this lawsuit in the

Circuit Court of Cook County against defendants Officer Andrew Stewart, Officer

Danielle Clifford, Officer Kristen Daniels, and the City of Chicago (“Chicago”). (R. 1-

1.)1 He amended his complaint in state court, (R. 1-2), and the defendants

subsequently removed the action to federal court, (R. 1).

Huckleby asserts that, following a car crash, he was wrongfully arrested for driving

under the influence. (R. 1-2 at 2.) According to Huckleby, the accident occurred “due

to a breakage of an axel on the vehicle.” (Id. at 3.) Huckleby alleges that the defendant

officers “were involved in [the] collision,” but also says that “[n]either of the officers

were on the scene” when the crash occurred. (Id. at 2.) Huckleby asserts that he was

“arrested due to someone’s false allegations,” though he does not say whose. (Id. at

3.) He states that while at the scene “[t]here was no blood drawn/field sobriety [test]

or anything else taken.” (Id.) According to Huckleby, the defendants “claimed [he]

was impaired, but no lawful basis existed for arrest or charges.” (Id.) After his

detention, Huckleby was released, and charges were dismissed. (Id.) He now brings

this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging (1) false arrest pursuant to the Fourth

Amendment, (2) malicious prosecution, and (3) municipal liability pursuant to Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (Id.) The defendants move to dismiss for

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 9.)

1 For ECF filings, the Court cites to the page number(s) set forth in the document’s ECF header

unless citing to a particular paragraph or other page designation is more appropriate.

Huckleby did not respond to the motion; rather, he filed a “response” stating that he

did not receive notice via mail and asks the case to be “reheard.” (R. 12.)

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Calderon-

Ramirez v. McCarment, 877 F.3d 272, 275 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (quotations omitted). The Court “draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor.” Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004

(7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). The Court will not accept legal conclusions or

conclusory allegations. McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).

Given that the movant on a motion to dismiss must show an entitlement to relief,

district courts will evaluate motions to dismiss regardless of whether the nonmovant

has filed a response. See Brockett v. Effingham Cnty., Ill., 116 F.4th 680, 685 n.1 (7th

Cir. 2024).

The defendants first argue that Huckleby’s false arrest and malicious prosecution2

claims are barred by the existence of probable cause. (R. 9 at 2.) Probable cause is a

complete defense to claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution. Gonzalez v. City

of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 2009) (false arrest) Drain v. Barbee, No. 10 C

3485, 2011 WL 3489874, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (malicious prosecution).

“[P]robable cause for an arrest exists ‘if the totality of the facts and circumstances

known to the officer at the time of the arrest would warrant a reasonable, prudent

person in believing the arrestee had committed, was committing, or was about to

commit a crime.’” United States v. Sands, 815 F.3d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013)).

Here, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Huckleby, there was no

probable cause. Huckleby alleges that he was in his vehicle at the time of the accident,

and that “collision occurred due to a breakage of an axel on the vehicle.” (R. 1-2 at 3.)

He asserts that someone made allegations about him that led to his arrest, and that

the defendants claimed he was impaired. (Id.) Huckleby also states that the officers

were not on the scene when the collision occurred. (Id. at 2–3.) A reasonable inference

that can be drawn from these allegations is that Huckleby was in a car accident,

officers arrived on the scene, and claimed he was intoxicated as a basis for arrest.

That Huckleby was “arrested due to someone’s false allegations” could reasonably

mean the officers’ false allegations of impairment. (Id. at 3.) And Huckleby’s assertion

that the “[d]efendants claimed [the p]laintiff was impaired, but no lawful basis

existed for arrest or charges,” can reasonably be inferred to mean that Huckleby was

not drinking or driving while intoxicated, and therefore no basis existed for his arrest.

2 Because there is an Illinois tort claim for malicious prosecution, there is no corresponding § 1983

claim. See Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding dismissal of § 1983

malicious prosecution claim appropriate because Illinois state law governs this cause of action). The

Court interprets Count II as being a state law claim, as opposed to a federal one.

Therefore, probable cause does not defeat Counts I and II when the allegations and

reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in a light favorable to the plaintiff.

The defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Huckleby’s

claims. (R. 9 at 4.) Qualified immunity does not extend to state law claims, Jain v.

Bd. of Educ. of Butler School Dist. 53, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1019, n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2019),

so this argument only extends to Count I, false arrest. “[D]ismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) is appropriate based on qualified immunity only when the plaintiffs’ well-

pleaded allegations, taken as true, do not ‘state a claim of violation of clearly

established law.’” Hanson v. LeVan, 967 F.3d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996)). Further, in addition to showing that

there was a violation of a statutory or constitutional right, that right must also have

been “‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged violation, such that a reasonable

public official would have known his conduct was unlawful.” Id. at 592 (citing Harlow

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

The defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they had

probable cause to arrest Huckleby. (R. 9 at 5.) However, the Court has already

determined that, reading the allegations in the light most favorable to Huckleby, the

defendants did not have probable cause to arrest; indeed, the allegations indicate that

the defendants made false allegations to substantiate the arrest. (R. 1-2 at 3.) Police

officers can be entitled to qualified immunity even when there is no probable cause if

“‘a reasonable officer could have mistakenly believed that probable cause existed.’”

Holmes v. City of Chicago, 63 F. Supp. 3d 806, 816 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting Fleming

v. Livingston Cnty., Ill., 674 F.3d 874, 879–80 (7th Cir. 2012)). But the allegations do

not support the possibility that the officers mistakenly believed there was probable

cause. And there is no duty to plead around a qualified immunity defense. Phillips v.

City of Chicago, No. 18 C 0316, 2021 WL 1614503, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2021)

(citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, the Court finds that the defendants are

not entitled to qualified immunity on Count I; it may proceed at this time.

The defendants did not move to dismiss Count III, Huckleby’s Monell claim, nor did

they raise any substantive arguments as to Count II, malicious prosecution. But the

Court can sua sponte dismiss a claim when it is “clear from the plaintiff’s pleading

that he does not state a claim.” Douglas v. Univ. of Chi., No. 14 C 7244, 2015 WL

738693, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2015) (citing Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354,

356 (7th Cir. 1997)). Establishing municipal liability under Monell requires the

plaintiff to plead that there was “(1) an express policy that causes a constitutional

deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well-

settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the

constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority.”

Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations and

quotations omitted). No such allegations are in Huckleby’s complaint. Therefore, the

complaint fails to state a Monell claim and Count III must be dismissed.

The complaint also fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution. “Under Illinois

law, a plaintiff claiming malicious prosecution must prove (1) commencement or

continuation of a judicial proceeding, (2) favorable termination, (3) absence of

probable cause, (4) malice, and (5) damages.” Johnson v. Perez, No. 12 C 9225, 2025

WL 1029254, at *8 (N.D. II. Apr. 7, 2025) (citing Hurlbert v. Charles, 938 N.E.2d 507,

512 (Il. 2010)). Here, Huckleby has not pled the existence of malice. Malice has “been

defined as the initiation of a prosecution for an improper motive.” Jd. (quoting

Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 183 N.E.2d 767, 792 (Ill. 2021)) (quotations omitted). “An

improper motive for a prosecution is any reason other than to bring the responsible

party to justice.” Jd. One can infer malice from the allegations that the officers lied

when they described the plaintiff as intoxicated.

□□□

Date: July 30, 2025

JEREMY C. DANIEL

United States District Judge