Brown v. Abbott Laboratories

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID R. BROWN,

Plaintiff

No. 25 CV 2792

v.

Judge Jeremy C. Daniel

ABBOTT LABORATORIES a Delaware

corporation,

Defendant

ORDER

The defendant’s motion to dismiss [14] is granted. Civil case terminated.

STATEMENT

This matter is before the Court on the defendant’s, Abbott Laboratories,1 motion to

dismiss. (R. 14.)2 On March 17, 2025, the plaintiff, David Brown, filed this product

liability action. (R. 1.) He alleges that he suffered injuries caused by the defendant’s

product, the Proclaim Neurostimulation System, which is an implantable device that

stimulates the spinal cord to relieve chronic back pain. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 5, 8.) He was first

introduced to the device in Nashville, Tennessee, by one of the defendant’s sales

representatives, who the plaintiff alleges made material misrepresentations

concerning the device. (Id. ¶¶ 72–76.) The plaintiff had the device implanted on

January 17, 2023; shortly thereafter, he began experiencing “complications, including

ringing of[] the ears, sounds in his brain[,] and nerve damage. He turned off the device

to avoid further complications, and it has never worked since.” (Id. ¶¶ 77, 79.) The

device “has not been turned on for approximately two years.” (Id. ¶ 78.) The plaintiff

now brings several product liability claims, alleging manufacturing defect, breach of

implied warranties, failure to warn, and negligence. (Id. ¶¶ 165–205) The defendant

moves to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

arguing that the plaintiff’s claims are preempted by federal law, based on conclusory

factual allegations, and barred by the statute of limitations. (See R. 14.)

1 According to the defendant, the entity that designed the device at issue is Advanced

Neuromodulation Systems, Inc., which is wholly owned by St. Jude Medical, LLC. (R. 14 at 1 n.1.)

The defendant is the sole member of that LLC. (Id.)

2 For ECF filings, the Court cites to the page number(s) set forth in the document’s ECF header

unless citing to a particular paragraph or other page designation is more appropriate.

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where the complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. The complaint must state a claim that is facially

plausible. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The allegations in the

complaint are accepted as true for purposes of this motion and read in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff, but the Court is not required to accept conclusory

allegations or legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Though a

complaint need not plead around an affirmative defense, a litigant may “plead itself

out of court by alleging (and thus admitting) the ingredients of a defense.” U.S.

Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas. Co., 350 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2003).

“Federal courts hearing state law claims under diversity or supplemental jurisdiction

apply the forum state’s choice of law rules to select the applicable state substantive

law. . . .”3 McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d 674, 684 (7th Cir. 2014).

Though the complaint does not clearly say what state’s tort law it invokes, the

plaintiff argues that his claims are “valid under both Tennessee and Illinois law”

because “key aspects of the injury-causing conduct occurred in Illinois, including

testing, manufacturing, marketing, and following or failing to follow federal

requirements.” (R. 22 at 7.) The defendant argues that Tennessee law controls

because the plaintiff “is a Tennessee resident implanted with his medical device in

Tennessee,” and because “there is no connection to Illinois aside from [the defendant]

being an Illinois corporation.” (R. 14 at 10.)

Illinois uses the choice-of-law analysis in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Law.

Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ill. 2007). “The cornerstone

of the Second Restatement is the most significant relationship test, the objective of

which is to apply the law of the state that, with regard to the particular issue, has

the most significant relationship with the parties and the dispute.” Burlington N. &

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. ABC-NACO, 906 N.E.2d 83, 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (citation

modified). “This means that ‘the law of the place of injury controls unless Illinois has

a more significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties,” considering

“(1) the place of the injury, (2) the place where the injury-causing conduct occurred,

(3) the domicile of the parties, and (4) the place where the relationship between the

parties is centered.” Walls v. VRE Chi. Eleven, LLC, 344 F. Supp. 3d 932, 947–48

(N.D. Ill. 2018) (quoting Fredrick v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 144 F.3d 500, 503–04 (7th

Cir. 1998)); see also Robinson v. McNeil Consumer Healthcare, 615 F.3d 861, 865 (7th

Cir. 2010) (“That test points presumptively to the law of the jurisdiction in which the

tort occurred . . . .”).

The place of the injury is Tennessee, so Tennessee law presumptively applies. The

injury-causing conduct also occurred in Tennessee. That is where the defendant’s

sales representative introduced the plaintiff to the device and allegedly made

3 The plaintiff is a citizen of Tennessee, the defendant is a Delaware corporation located in Illinois,

and there is no dispute that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The Court therefore finds

that jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

misrepresentations to the plaintiff, and it is where the device was implanted. (R. 1

¶¶ 72–77.) Though the plaintiff argues that much of the product’s development took

place in Illinois, (see R. 22 at 7), he does so without any citation to allegations in the

complaint, and the Court can locate no supporting allegations. The parties are

domiciled in Illinois and Tennessee, and the relationship between the parties is

centered in Tennessee where all interactions occurred. Even absent the presumption

that Tennessee law applies, Tennessee clearly has the most significant relationship

with the parties and the dispute. The law of Tennessee governs the plaintiff’s claims.

Moving to the plaintiff’s claims, the Court finds the statute of limitations issue

dispositive. Under Tennessee state law, a product liability action “shall be

commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued.” Tenn. Code Ann. §

28-3-104(a)(1)(A); accord § 29-28-103(a) (citing § 28-3-104 for the applicable

limitations period in product liability actions). “[T]he cause of action accrues and the

statute of limitations begins to run when the injury occurs or is discovered, or when

in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, it should have been discovered.” Potts

v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tenn. 1990). “Once a plaintiff gains information

sufficient to alert a reasonable person of the need to investigate the injury, the

limitation period begins to run.” Redwing v. Cath. Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363

S.W.3d 436, 459 (Tenn. 2012) (citation modified).

According to the complaint, the plaintiff had the device implanted on January 17,

2023. (R. 1 ¶ 77.) The device “never worked properly.” (Id. ¶ 78.) The plaintiff

experienced complications and injuries, and he turned off the device to keep them

from persisting. (Id. ¶ 79.) As of the date the plaintiff filed his complaint, the device

“has not been turned on for approximately two years.” (Id. ¶ 78.) Based on the

plaintiff’s own allegations, he knew of his injuries—and identified the defendant’s

device as the source of his injuries—approximately two years before filing this action.

This places the filing date outside Tennessee’s limitation period. The complaint states

that the “[p]laintiff did not become aware of his potential legal claim until recently,

when he contacted the [plaintiff’s] counsel to explore a potential lawsuit . . . [and]

therefore relies on the discovery rule” (id. ¶ 78), but this is not how the discovery rule

works. “The discovery rule is not intended to permit a plaintiff to delay filing suit

until the discovery of all the facts that affect the merits of his or her claim.” Redwing,

363 S.W.3d at 459; see also Orso v. Bayer Corp., No. 04 C 0114, 2009 WL 249235, at

*6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2009) (“[T]he discovery rule cannot mean that a plaintiff is not on

inquiry notice until she has established to a degree of certainty that she has a viable

[] cause of action.”).

Because the Court concludes that the plaintiffs claims are time-barred,‘* any future

amendment would be futile, and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. See

Cardenas v. City of Chicago, 646 F.3d 1001, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2011).

L§o

Date: July 30, 2025

JEREMY C. DANIEL

United States District Judge

4 For this same reason, the Court does not address the defendant’s other arguments for dismissal.