Laureano v. Massachusetts Sex Offender Registry Board

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

RENE A. LAUREANO, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. * Civil Action No. 25-11695-ADB

*

MASSACHUSETTS SEX OFFENDER *

REGISTRY BOARD, *

*

Defendant. *

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BURROUGHS, D.J.

Pro se plaintiff Rene Laureano has filed an amended complaint [ECF No. 4] in which he

challenges the decision of the Massachusetts Sex Offender Registry Board (“SORB”) that he has

been convicted of a crime which would require him to register as a sex offender. In addition to

challenging the SORB’s conclusion that he must register as a sex offender, Laureano alleges that

SORB violated his right to due process by requiring him to register before the “proper

classification” was completed. Amend. Compl. ¶ 11. Laureano represents that he has

“exhausted all administrative remedies, including appeals before SORB, and now seeks judicial

intervention.” Id. ¶ 11. Laureano asks this Court to declare that the “SORB’s classification of

him is unlawful and that he is not required to register under Massachusetts law,” and further, to

require the SORB to “remove his classification and all related registry requirements.” Id. ¶¶ 14,

15. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DISMISSES this action.1

1 Laureano represents that the SORB initially classified him as a Level 2 offender but reclassified

him as a Level 1 offender upon his appeal of the first classification decision. Amend. Compl. ¶

6.

I. Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Upon review of Laureano’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2],

the Court GRANTS the same.

II. Review of the Complaint

Because Laureano is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is subject to a

preliminary screening. Under federal law, the Court may dismiss the complaint of a plaintiff

proceeding in forma pauperis if the claims in the pleading are malicious or frivolous, fail to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary damages against a party that is

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Further, a court has an obligation to

inquire sua sponte into its own jurisdiction. See McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.

2004). In conducting this review, the Court liberally construes Laureano’s pleading because he

is proceeding pro se. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).

Laureano fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the SORB,

which is an arm of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, is not subject to suit in this Court

concerning the matters raised in the complaint. Under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment

immunity, it is recognized that States (including their departments, agencies, and officials acting

in their official capacities) have immunity from suit in a federal court unless the State has

consented to be sued in federal court or Congress has overridden the State’s immunity. See

Virginia Off. for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011).2 (“A]bsent waiver or

valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private person’s suit against a State.”);

2 The sovereign immunity of a state is often referred to as “Eleventh Amendment immunity”

because the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution “confirm[ed] the structural

understanding that States entered the Union with their sovereign immunity intact.” Va. Off. For

Prot., 563. U.S. at 253.

Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 92 (1st Cir. 2002) (upholding dismissal of claims against

Massachusetts trial court on the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity). Here, Laureano has

not stated any claim for which Congress has abrogated, or the Commonwealth has waived, its

immunity. Therefore, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.3

The Court notes that Massachusetts law provides for state court review of a final decision

of the SORB, at which a party is free to raise any constitutional challenges. See M.G.L. ch. 6,

§ 178M; M.G.L. ch. 30A, § 14; 803 C.M.R. § 1.24. This proceeding must be commenced in the

state Superior Court. M.G.L. ch. 30A, § 14. An indigent party may request that counsel be

appointed for this proceeding. M.G.L. ch. 6, § 178M.4

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby orders:

1. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] is GRANTED.

2. This action is DISMISSED without prejudice to Laureano seeking relief in the

appropriate state court.

3. To the extent not mooted by this order, all other motions are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

July 30, 2025 /s/ Allison D. Burroughs

ALLISON D. BURROUGHS

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

3 The Court notes that any claim for violations of constitutional rights against the

Commonwealth under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—in federal or in state court—fails as a matter of law

because states are not subject to suit under this statute. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

4 “[E]xcept otherwise provided by law,” judicial review of a final administrative decision must

be commenced within 30 calendar days from the date of the receipt of the agency’s final

decision. M.G.L. ch. 30A, § 14; see also 803 C.M.R. § 1.24. Whether the deadline can be

extended is a matter for consideration by the state court.