imputing income in determining child support awards
How later courts described this case
- imputing income in determining child support awards
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0063-23
A-3341-23
LARS M. BROWN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ELIZABETH K. BYHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted April 30, 2025 – Decided July 30, 2025
Before Judges Currier and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket
No. FM-15-0759-21.
Elizabeth K. Byham, appellant pro se.
Lars M. Brown, respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, we consider, back-to-back, the
appeals of defendant from trial court orders of: (1) April 14, 2023; (2) July 21,
2023;1 and (3) May 15, 2024. 2
"We accord deference to Family Part judges due to their 'special
jurisdiction and expertise in family [law] matters.'" Gormley v. Gormley, 462
N.J. Super. 433, 442 (App. Div. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Cesare v.
Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). A family court judge's "findings are binding
on appeal so long as their determinations are 'supported by adequate, substantial,
credible evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12). "Only when the
trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should an
appellate court intervene and make its own findings to ensure that there is not a
denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104
(2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605
(2007)). A judge's purely legal decisions, however, are subject to our plenary
review. Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 194 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995)). Applying this well-established law, we affirm the three orders.
1
A-0063-23.
2
A-3341-23.
A-0063-23
2
The parties were married on October 14, 2006, and they have two children,
L.B. and F.B.3 The parties executed a settlement agreement that was
incorporated into a final judgment of divorce entered on June 8, 2022.
As relevant here, the agreement provides:
1. Custody – Parties agree to joint legal custody of the
children, with [defendant] as the parent of primary
residence and [plaintiff] the parent of alternate
residence. Joint legal custody is governed by
N[.]J[.]S[.A.] 9:2-4 and 9:2-4.2 whereas both parents
have equal rights to the children regarding major
medical decisions, education of the children and
religious upbringing. Both parents shall be entitled to
equal access to the children's parent portal at school,
placed on emergency contact lists, permitted to attend
any school meetings, events or provide transportation
to and from school. Both parents are allowed to arrange
and take the children to their doctor appointments,
treatments or therapies, to access the children's medical
records and to talk to any treating professionals. The
for[e]going should always be done in consultation with
the other parent.
2. [Plaintiff] is not presently exercising parenting time
and the reinstitution of parenting time will be
accomplished with the assistance of a therapist that
provides therapy to reunify parents and children.
Parties agree to utilize Nina Kaweblum, LSW,
[(Kaweblum)] who is appointed to assist . . . with
reinstituting [plaintiff]'s parenting time. . . . Kaweblum
will determine the manner and timing of renewing
parenting time between [plaintiff] and the children and
any appropriate conditions for the parenting. She will
3
We use initials to protect the identity of the children. See R. 1:38-3(d)(13).
A-0063-23
3
determine the appropriate time for initial dinner visits,
then daytime parenting and finally overnight parenting.
It is the intention of the parties that ultimately . . .
[plaintiff] will exercise alternating weekend overnight
parenting Friday to Monday morning, although initially
weekend visitation should be limited to Friday to
Sunday evening as an interim step, and Wednesday
dinner visits. Since [defendant] is providing all
transportation for the children during the bulk of their
parenting time [plaintiff] will transport both ways for
his visitation.
3. Should . . . Kaweblum not be able to schedule an
initial session with the parties within 30 days of this
date, then the parties agree to utilize Thomas
Mackarevich, Ph.[]D. [(Mackarevich)] in lieu of . . .
Kaweblum. . . .
4. [Plaintiff] reserves the right to file a motion with the
court to expedite the process of reinstituting parenting
time without a showing of changed circumstances.
Both parties agree to fully cooperate with the therapy
sessions and getting the children to sessions. [Plaintiff]
will coordinate with [defendant] to have therapy
sessions scheduled for the children. [Defendant] will
immediately respond within 24 hours to a request by
[plaintiff] to schedule sessions for the children. Parties
agree that therapy sessions should take place at least
twice a month.
....
6. Child support – Guidelines are attached. Child
support is $160/week, effective with the signing of this
agreement. [Plaintiff] will continue to provide health
insurance for the children. [Plaintiff]'s obligation to
provide health insurance for [defendant] shall terminate
with the entry of the final judgment of divorce.
A-0063-23
4
....
11. [Plaintiff]'s pension. Parties agree to split the
marital coverture portion of the pension pursuant to the
Marx[4] formula, 50/50 subject to passive gains and
losses through date of distribution. Cost of the
QDRO[5] to be split 50/50 between the parties. Parties
to utilize Lois Fried.
....
15. Each party shall be responsible for their own
attorney['s] fees and costs. Mediation fees shall be split
60/40.
....
19. [Defendant] shall be responsible for the first $250
per child of annual out[-]of[-]pocket medical expenses.
Thereafter, out[-]of[-]pocket medical, as well as
extraordinary extracurricular expenses shall be split
between the parties pursuant to line 7 of the child
support guidelines, currently 60/40. Extraordinary
extracurricular expenses need to be agreed upon by the
parties before seeking contribution, which consent shall
not be unreasonably withheld.
April 14, 2023 Order
In December 2022, defendant "filed a [m]otion for [a] change in child
support and health insurance." She followed that motion with a motion under
4
Marx v. Marx, 265 N.J. Super. 418, 425-26 (Ch. Div. 1993).
5
Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
A-0063-23
5
the family non-dissolution docket seeking to change F.B.'s name. 6 Plaintiff
cross-moved in support of litigant's rights and moved to dismiss the name
change application. The name change action was dismissed without prejudice.
Defendant appeals from the following paragraphs of the April order:
1. DEFENDANT'S REQUEST to appoint [d]efendant
as the provider of the children's health insurance is
GRANTED in part. The parties shall attend economic
mediation to select the best health insurance for the
children. A separate [o]rder for economic mediation
shall be issued.
2. DEFENDANT'S REQUEST to require [p]laintiff to
remove children from his health insurance, effective
immediately is DENIED without prejudice. See above.
3. DEFENDANT'S REQUEST to require [p]laintiff to
pay 100% of all medical expenses incurred due to
[p]laintiff preventing the children's new medical
coverage from beginning on January 1, 2023, all bills
to be paid within 15 days of receipt is DENIED without
prejudice. See above.
4. DEFENDANT'S REQUEST to award [d]efendant all
medical fees incurred by [d]efendant and . . . [Z.B.],
after August 1, 2022, which are due to [p]laintiff's delay
in terminating their coverage with his health insurance
is GRANTED in part. This matter shall be addressed
in mediation. In the event this issue is not resolved via
6
The "FD" or "non-dissolution docket" "consists of child custody, visitation,
child support, paternity, medical support, and spousal support in non-divorce
matters." B.C. v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency, 450 N.J. Super. 197,
205 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 214
N.J. 8, 22 n.3. (2013)).
A-0063-23
6
mediation, the parties shall contact the [c]ourt and the
[c]ourt will schedule a pre-plenary hearing conference.
5. DEFENDANT'S REQUEST to modify the child
support guidelines, specifically:
1. Gross Taxable Income,
2a. Income Tax Withholding,
6. Net Income,
7. Each Parent's Share of Income,
8. Basic Child Support Amount,
10. Child's Share of Health Insurance
Premium,
17. Health Insurance Premium for the
Child Paid,
20. Adjustment for Parenting Time
Expenses,
20a. Number of Annual Overnights with
Each Parent,
20b. Parents Share of Overnights, and
21. Net Child Support Obligation
is DENIED without prejudice.
6. DEFENDANT'S REQUEST to order [p]laintiff to
pay his share of "extraordinary extracurricular
activities" bi-weekly, or to establish an alternate system
for [p]laintiff's prompt payment is GRANTED. Parties
shall communicate using Our Family Wizard. Either
party may upload receipts and proof of payment using
Our Family Wizard's expense tool. Each party shall be
responsible to reimburse the other for their share of the
prior month's expenses no later than the first of each
month.
7. DEFENDANT'S REQUEST to order a completed
. . . (QDRO) if one has not been agreed to by the return
date of this motion is GRANTED. In the event the
A-0063-23
7
parties have not resolved this, they shall use Troyan,
Inc.
....
9. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to enforce litigant's[]
rights with respect to [p]aragraph [o]ne of the parties'
MSA and [o]rdering that [d]efendant communicate
with [p]laintiff with respect to all aspects affecting the
children's health, education, and welfare is GRANTED.
The parties shall utilize Our Family Wizard to
communicate regarding the children. Further, the
parties shall mutually agree upon a parenting
coordinator to assist with communication and decision-
making and to make recommendations when the parties
cannot agree. The parties shall share in the cost
according to their respective percentages.
10. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to order that [d]efendant
cooperate with ensuring that both children attend any
and all rescheduled therapy sessions with . . .
Kaweblum, and otherwise ordering [d]efendant to
foster and encourage the children's reunification with
[plaintiff] is GRANTED.
....
15. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to order that [d]efendant
refrain from reinstating her pending application to
change the name of the child, F[.]B[.], under docket
FD-15-463-23 until agreement of the parties or further
order of the [c]ourt is GRANTED.
16. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to order that [d]efendant
specifically refrain from further discussing with the
children any ongoing litigation in this matter; from
showing the children court filings or orders; from
showing the children communications between the
A-0063-23
8
parties, counsel and . . . Kaweblum; and otherwise,
disparaging [p]laintiff to the children is GRANTED.
17. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to order that the parties
specifically comply with the children's bill of rights is
GRANTED.
July 21, 2023 Order
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the April order. Plaintiff
filed a cross-motion to enforce his litigant's rights. Defendant appeals the July
order in its entirety. In this order, the trial court denied defendant's motion for
reconsideration because defendant "failed to meet the requisite burden." The
court relied on Rule 4:49-2. In addition, the July order provided:
2. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to [d]ismiss [d]efendant's
motion in entirety is GRANTED, as per above.
3. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to find [d]efendant in
violation of litigant's rights for her refusal to follow the
[c]ourt's [o]rder and repeated direction regarding
reunification therapy is GRANTED.
REASONS: The [c]ourt's April 1[4], 2023
[o]rder directed . . . [d]efendant to
"cooperate with ensuring that both children
attend any and all rescheduled therapy
sessions with . . . Kaweblum, and otherwise
ordering [d]efendant to foster and
encourage the children's reunification with
[plaintiff]," at [p]aragraph 10.
The [c]ourt's June 15, 2023 [o]rder
directed [d]efendant to sign and return . . .
A-0063-23
9
Kaweblum's retainer letter within three
. . . days, and return to . . . Kaweblum for
reunification therapy. . . . Kaweblum has
since withdrawn her services.
Defendant has refused to comply
with the directives of the [c]ourt with
respect to fostering and encouraging the
children's relationship with [plaintiff] and
participation with the therapeutic
reunification process in violation of
[p]laintiff's litigant's rights.
4. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to [e]nforce the parties'
[f]inal [j]udgment of [d]ivorce and this [c]ourt's April
14, 2023 [o]rder with respect to cooperation with
reunification therapy is GRANTED, as per above.
5. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to [o]rder [d]efendant to
make timely payment of her share of . . . Kaweblum's
retainer and ongoing fees is GRANTED. Defendant
shall timely remit her share of any reunification
therapist's retainer, regardless of whether the therapist
is . . . Kaweblum.
Further, it was learned at oral
argument that . . . Kaweblum will no longer
work with this family. The parties'
agreement names three, mutually agreed
upon, therapists so the [c]ourt will [o]rder
the parties to retain and use the second
therapist named, . . . Mackarevich.
6. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to [o]rder that if
[d]efendant refuses to pay her share of . . . Kaweblum's
retainer and ongoing fees that he be permitted to pay
her share and deduct same from the support he is paying
to [d]efendant is DENIED. [Plaintiff] shall provide
A-0063-23
10
proof of payments and [plaintiff] may deduct his share
from his portion of extracurricular activity costs.
7. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to [o]rder that [d]efendant
will be sanctioned for further non-compliance of this
[c]ourt's [o]rders and ordering that such sanctions may
include monetary penalties and a change in custody is
GRANTED pursuant to R[ule] 1:10-3 and R[ule] 5:3-
7(a).
8. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST to [o]rder [d]efendant to
pay [p]laintiff's attorney's fees and costs incurred with
respect to this matter and ordering that such counsel fee
award be offset against [p]laintiff's ongoing support
obligations is GRANTED, in part. Defendant shall pay
[p]laintiff $1,000 to be used towards the $1,800 in
counsel fees [d]efendant incurred. Plaintiff shall pay
[d]efendant $100/month for ten . . . months, payable on
the 15th day of each month.
REASONS: [Defendant] is sanctioned $1,000
pursuant to R[ule] 1:10-3. [Defendant] shall not
be permitted to openly defy court orders without
penalty. Based on her bad faith and failure to
abide [by c]ourt [o]rders, and the number of
opportunities [d]efendant has been given to
comply, the court finds that an award of some of
[p]laintiff's counsel fees are appropriate. The
[c]ourt also finds that [p]laintiff's counsel is
charging a more than reasonable hourly fee of
$250, especially given his level of knowledge and
expertise.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred because: (1) its
reasoning under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 and the parties' agreement was flawed as the
court exceeded the scope of the agreement, appointed Mackarevich even though
A-0063-23
11
Kaweblum had initiated therapy, 7 failed to adequately address "changed
circumstances," and did not allow her to share court orders with the children and
required her to foster and encourage reunification; (2) it allowed plaintiff to
include inadmissible "hearsay and fraudulently quote . . . Kaweblum without
referencing competent sources"; (3) it failed to "render a decision on the matters
presented on April 14, 2023, and instead refer[red] them to mediation,
constitut[ing] a dereliction of its duty to adjudicate promptly and fairly"; (4) it
improperly awarded plaintiff attorney's fees without any "indication . . . [it] took
any of the" factors listed in Rule 5:3-5(c) "into account"; and (5) it denied
reconsideration despite making a "fundamentally unjust" decision that
"depart[ed] from reasonable judgment."
1.
We conclude there is no merit in defendant's arguments concerning the
trial court's interpretation of the parties' agreement and N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. The
court's requirement that "[d]efendant communicate with [p]laintiff with respect
to all aspects affecting the children's health, education, and welfare" captured
the spirit and intent of the parties' agreement and the statute.
7
In other parts of her brief defendant claims she "met with . . . Mackarevich
before [the trial court] even assigned him as the new therapist."
A-0063-23
12
Further, defendant's hyper-technical reading of the agreement to disallow
the court's appointment of Mackarevich, who the parties agreed would be the
alternative to Kaweblum, merely because Kaweblum had initiated therapy is
similarly without merit.
In addition, defendant's position that plaintiff was required to establish
"changed circumstances," rather than the court turning to Mackarevich, is
meritless. First, a hearing on something the parties had already agreed upon
would waste judicial resources and further delay reunification. Second,
defendant fails to explain how Kaweblum's resignation did not constitute the
sought after changed circumstances.
Lastly, the trial court's requirements that defendant shield the children
from the court's proceedings and "foster and encourage" the reunification
process with the children is an exercise of the court's authority. There is no
merit to the argument that the court could not order such relief merely because
it was not explicitly stated in the parties' agreement.
2.
Defendant asserts the court erred in considering hearsay statements of
Kaweblum presented in plaintiff's certification. "'Hearsay' means a statement
that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or
A-0063-23
13
hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement." N.J.R.E. 801(c).
We note "[a] judge sitting as the factfinder is certainly capable of sorting
through admissible and inadmissible evidence without resultant detriment to the
decision-making process . . . ." State v. Kern, 325 N.J. Super. 435, 444 (App.
Div. 1999). "When objectionable hearsay is admitted in a bench trial . . . we
presume that the fact-finder appreciates the potential weakness of such proofs,
and takes that into account in weighing the evidence." N.J. Div. of Child Prot.
& Permanency v. J.D., 447 N.J. Super. 337, 349 (App. Div. 2016). Under these
circumstances, given the Family Part's special expertise, the court's familiarity
with the matter, and no indication the court relied on any hearsay, we are
satisfied the trial court gave any hearsay statement its due weight.
3.
We also see no merit to defendant's contention that the court erred in
referring certain issues to mediation. "Settlement of disputes, including
matrimonial disputes, is encouraged and highly valued in our system." Quinn
v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016). Therefore, it is commonplace for trial courts
to provide matrimonial litigants with every opportunity to resolve their issues
A-0063-23
14
among themselves. Thus, there was no error in the court's referral of the parties
to mediation.
4.
The trial court sanctioned defendant pursuant to Rules 1:10-3 and 5:3-
7(a). Rule 1:10-3 provides: "The court in its discretion may make an allowance
for counsel fees to be paid by any party to the action to a party accorded relief
under this rule. In family actions, the court may also grant additional remedies
as provided by R[ule] 5:3-7."
Under Rule 5:3-7(a), "[o]n finding that a party has violated an order
respecting custody or parenting time, the court may order, in addition to the
remedies provided by R[ule] 1:10-3, any of the following remedies, either singly
or in combination: . . . (2) economic sanctions . . .; (10) any other appropriate
equitable remedy."
Defendant baldly asserts there is "no indication" the court conducted the
correct analysis. However, counsel submitted the required certification of
services. We conclude the trial court did not misuse its discretion in imposing
the sanction to compel defendant's cooperation.
A-0063-23
15
5.
"Reconsideration is a matter within the sound discretion of the [c]ourt to
be exercised in the interest of justice." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392,
401 (Ch. Div. 1990) (citing Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J. Super.
250, 257 (App. Div. 1987)). "A litigant should not seek reconsideration merely
because of dissatisfaction with a decision of the [c]ourt." Ibid. Instead,
[r]econsideration should be utilized only for those cases
which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1)
the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a
palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious
that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to
appreciate the significance of probative, competent
evidence.
[Ibid.]
"Alternatively, if a litigant wishes to bring new or additional information to the
[c]ourt's attention which it could not have provided on the first application, the
[c]ourt should, in the interest of justice (and in the exercise of sound discretion),
consider the evidence." Ibid.
Because we determine that none of these circumstances are present, we
conclude the trial court did not misuse its discretion in denying reconsideration.
A-0063-23
16
May 15, 2024 Order
In September 2023, plaintiff filed a motion seeking a trial court finding of
changed circumstances and a downward modification of his child support
obligation. Defendant filed a cross-motion in opposition. Thereafter, the court
entered a series of orders: (1) January 2024, "finding a change in circumstances"
therefore requiring new calculations under the child support guidelines and
ordering the parties to "exchange their updated [c]ase [i]nformation [s]tatements
[(CIS)], 2022 tax returns, and last three most recent paystubs"; (2) March 2024,
requiring defendant to submit her updated CIS within seven days; and (3) April
2024, requiring the parties to "exchange and submit to the [c]ourt [their] 2023
tax returns, 2023 W2s and financials within 20 days."
In the May 15, 2024 order, the trial court granted plaintiff's "request to
order an adjustment in [c]hild [s]upport payments." The court applied the Lepis
standard.8 The court found plaintiff satisfied his burden to establish changed
circumstances because of a change in a "tax exemption" and "a change in
circumstance as [p]laintiff's income has increased significantly and also
[d]efendant is voluntarily underemployed."
8
Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980).
A-0063-23
17
As to defendant's employment, the court noted defendant "states that she
has three master's degrees and . . . is a school teacher at Ocean County Vo-
Tech." The court also noted defendant "submitted documentation by way of tax
return that she made $35,481[] per her 2023 tax return."
The trial court found: (1) "[t]he U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [state]
that the annual mean wage for teachers at a secondary school is $74,410[]"; (2)
"the Department of Labor wage statistics reveal the mean annual wage for a
secondary school math educator as $73,000[] in vocational or technical
schools"; and (3) defendant failed to "provide a reason why she has such a low
wage compared to the information on mean wages" and "[i]t is not clear why
she does not work full-time." Therefore, "[t]he [c]ourt f[ou]nd that [d]efendant
[wa]s voluntarily underemployed." Further, "[b]ased on the circumstances the
[c]ourt . . . impute[d defendant's] income [at] $73,000."
As to plaintiff, the court found "he made $176,741[] per his 2023 tax
return." The "[c]ourt f[ou]nd that $176,741[ wa]s an accurate representation of
[p]laintiff's income."
Further, the court found "[p]laintiff [would] be credited with [zero]
overnights." "The [c]ourt acknowledge[d] that [d]efendant [wa]s partially the
A-0063-23
18
cause of this situation,"—plaintiff's lack of overnights—but specifically rejected
plaintiff's argument for credits, noting child support was "the right of the child."
In addition, the court found plaintiff provided "health insurance as
required by the parties ['] . . . [a]greement and it w[as] . . . included as such on
the" child support guidelines. "The [c]ourt reject[ed d]efendant's argument that
the children ha[d] free government provided benefits." The court found "[f]irst,
the [parties' agreement] require[d p]laintiff to provide the health benefits and
second, . . . government benefits [we]re not provided to the children because
there [we]re private health benefits available."
Further, the trial court found "there [wa]s no increase due to the age of the
children as this [wa]s not the first [c]hild [s]upport [g]uideline to be run for these
children."
The trial court determined "the new weekly child support amount [would
be] $164[]." The court imposed "[t]he new child support amount . . . retroactive
to . . . the date of [d]efendant's cross[-]motion."
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by: (1) imputing her
income; (2) "calculating taxable income and dependent split"; (3) "requiring
[her] to pay plaintiff's health insurance premium"; (4) "refus[ing] to adjust for
A-0063-23
19
the age of the children"; and (5) "fail[ing] to protect [her] children's right to
child support."
1.
Defendant argues the trial court erred when it imputed income to her
because it failed to consider "her detailed explanation of" specific factors listed
under the court rules.
Imputation of income is appropriate for support purposes when a party is,
without just cause, intentionally and voluntarily underemployed or unemployed.
See Caplan v. Caplan, 182 N.J. 250, 268 (2005) (imputing income in
determining child support awards). We have explained:
Imputation of income is a discretionary matter not
capable of precise or exact determination but rather
requiring a trial judge to realistically appraise capacity
to earn and job availability. Rarely is there evidence
that an obligor turned down an offer of employment at
a fixed amount, and proof of that or similar certainty is
not a prerequisite to imputation. A trial judge's
decision to impute income of a specified amount will
not be overturned unless the underlying findings are
inconsistent with or unsupported by competent
evidence. Competent evidence includes data on
prevailing wages from sources subject to judicial
notice.
[Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J. Super. 464, 474-75 (App.
Div. 2004) (internal citations omitted).]
A-0063-23
20
The trial court considered defendant's education and her current
employment status. Further, the court utilized government resources to
determine the mean income for defendant's profession. In addition, the court
considered that defendant did not explain her part-time work status. Under these
circumstances, we conclude the court did not misuse its discretion and do not
disturb defendant's imputed income.
2.
Defendant argues the trial court "made significant errors in calculating
both taxable income and the dependent split." She contends the court
"improperly included non-taxable income as taxable." However, aside from her
generalized statements, defendant fails to provide any specific detail regarding
the trial court's error. Plaintiff asserts the trial "court properly calculated the
taxable income split." He notes the guidelines "clearly show [his] taxable
income and correctly applied the federal, state and local taxes." In the absence
of a detailed argument, we do not disturb the trial court's decision.
Further, defendant asserts the trial "court incorrectly attributed both
dependents to [her], contrary to the clear evidence that the dependents should
have been split between the parties." Plaintiff "agree[s] with . . . [d]efendant's
. . . statement that [their] dependents are split between the parties." However,
A-0063-23
21
he asserts "[i]t[ i]s unclear if this . . . changes the federal, state, and local taxes
withheld in the [guidelines] calculation." Again, in the absence of a detailed
argument, we do not disturb the trial court's decision.
3.
Defendant relies on the language from the appendix to the child support
guidelines that provides: "If the custodial parent and the child receive Medicaid,
the non-custodial parent shall be ordered to enroll the child in a health insurance
plan if it is available at a reasonable cost." 9 She states "the children have free
government benefits, it is an indisputable fact." Further, she notes the parties'
agreement "does not state that [she] ha[s] to pay for [plaintiff's] health
insurance." Ultimately, she argues if she "cannot convince the [c]ourt to cease
from making [her] pay for [p]laintiff's health insurance premium, the [c]ourt
should at least charge [her] the correct amount." She asserts she is wrongly
being charged for the premium attributable to plaintiff, rather than just the
premium attributable to the children.
9
Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules,
Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A, ¶ 26(f) (2025).
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Plaintiff contends defendant "does not contribute to [his] health insurance
premiums." Instead, he asserts his health insurance premiums "are included in
calculating [his] available income for child support purposes."
We start from the premise that the court rules require that where there is
health insurance available, at a reasonable cost, the children should be enrolled.
In addition, the parties' agreement requires plaintiff "to provide health insurance
for the children." Therefore, plaintiff correctly has continued to provide health
insurance for the children.
Defendant's argument that she is paying plaintiff's insurance premiums is
not supported in the record. Rather, as plaintiff notes, the guidelines represent
his available income for child support calculations.
4.
Defendant contends the trial "court's failure to render an adjustment due
to the age of the children [wa]s a gross error or a blatant bias against" her. She
notes the guidelines "were first run two years prior" when "[t]he children were
13 and 15." Further, she asserts "they should have qualified for the age
adjustment at the time" but the guidelines were "improperly r[u]n" and her
children were "cheated . . . out of the support that they were owed."
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Child support is necessary to ensure that parents provide for the "basic
needs" of their children. Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 590 (1995). "A party
seeking modification of . . . [a] child support obligation has the burden of
demonstrating a change in circumstances warranting an adjustment." Jacoby v.
Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157).
Our "courts have recognized 'changed circumstances' that warrant modification
in a variety of settings . . . includ[ing]: . . . [the] increase or decrease in the
supporting spouse's income" and "[w]hen children are involved, an increase in
their needs -- whether occasioned by maturation, the rising cost of living or more
unusual events . . . ." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 151.
However, defendant cannot sustain her burden by merely stating the
children have aged. Instead, she needs to produce evidence establishing that the
children's maturation requires an increase in plaintiff's child support obligation.
Absent any evidence, defendant has not met her burden.
5.
In a catchall argument, defendant asserts that "[d]espite [her] repeated
request for the [trial] court to hold [p]laintiff accountable for adequately
supporting the children, the court consistently sided with [p]laintiff, ignoring
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evidence that he is underpaying." As discussed in this opinion, we find no merit
in defendant's arguments.
Any arguments not addressed lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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